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ABSTRACT 
 
Pershing’s Right Hand:  
 
General James G. Harbord and the American Expeditionary Forces  
 
in the First World War.  (August 2006) 
 
Brian Fisher Neumann, B.A., University of Southern California; 
 
M.A., Texas A&M University 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Arnold P. Krammer 
 
 
 
 This project is both a wartime biography and an examination of the American 
effort in France during the First World War.  At its core, the narrative follows the military 
career of Major General James G. Harbord.  His time in France saw Harbord serve in the 
three main areas of the American Expeditionary Forces: administration, combat, and 
logistics.  As chief of staff to AEF commander General John J. Pershing, Harbord was at 
the center of the formation of the AEF and the development of its administrative policies.  
He organized and managed the AEF General Staff and served as Pershing’s most trusted 
subordinate.  In May of 1918, Harbord transferred to the fighting line, taking over 
command of the 4th “Marine” Brigade.  During his time with the 4th Brigade, and later as 
commander of the 2nd Division, Harbord played a significant part in the battles of Belleau 
Wood and Soissons.  A dedicated supporter of Pershing’s tactics of “open” warfare, 
Harbord’s failings as a combat commander showed the limits of American tactical 
experience.  For the final four months of the war, Harbord took over control of the AEF’s 
logistical system, the Services of Supply.  Though he proved an able administrator, the 
American supply system approached total collapse in the fall of 1918, and was prevented 
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only by the signing of the Armistice.  In all three of these roles, Harbord embodied the 
emergence of the military manager in the American army.  The First World War 
illustrates that war had grown so large and complex that it required officers whose 
primary talents lay not in leading men in combat, but in the areas of administration and 
management of large bureaucratic organizations.  James Harbord was one of the first, and 
best, examples of this new type of officer. 
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 CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Statement of Purpose 
 
When asked to name an American officer from the First World War, few 
respondents will be able to think beyond General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing.  As 
commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), Pershing monopolizes all 
discussion of the American effort in France.  He embodies the image of the glorious 
general at the head of his army, the Great Chief who commands from the front and is 
victorious due to his own brilliance, character, and natural ability.  History is replete with 
these paragons of the military arts: Alexander the Great, Caesar, and Napoleon to name a 
few.  This cult of personality dominates American military history as well, stretching 
from George Washington to Norman Schwarzkopf.  As Winfield Scott and Zachary 
Taylor dominate discussions of the American war with Mexico, so do Douglas 
MacArthur and Matthew Ridgway hold sway in the Korean War and William 
Westmoreland in the Vietnam War.  The list expands considerably for the American Civil 
War and the Second World War, where names like Lee, Grant, Sherman, Jackson, 
McClellan, Eisenhower, Marshall, Patton, and the aforementioned MacArthur have 
become established figures in the public mind.  That these two wars should produce so 
many commanders of renown is understandable, for they are the pivotal struggles in the 
development of the United States and its rise to a global super power.  Every other war 
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pales in comparison to those titanic struggles, and it is only natural that they receive the 
lion’s share of attention amongst students of American military history. 
 The First World War is an anomaly in this equation.  In terms of size and scope, it 
is the third largest war in American history.  Two million Americans served in France 
during the United States’ eighteen-month involvement, more than the forces of the 
Spanish-American, Korean, and Vietnam Wars combined.  Yet, the American war of 
1917-1918 remains a minor occurrence in the public mind.  The reasons for this 
presumed irrelevance are varied and complex.  Though the war lasted four years, the 
United States entered it only at the very end, with combat troops engaging in the fighting 
in the last six months of the war.  The war also suffers in the shadow of the Second 
World War in the American imagination.  There were no great campaigns in France in 
1918, nor was there an enemy that embodied evil as Adolf Hitler and the Nazis did.  
What glories there were in the First World War were confined to the trenches, where 
death and desolation went hand in hand.  It was an impersonal war, fought with artillery 
and machine-guns, tanks and aeroplanes, with the common soldier reduced to grist for the 
mill of industrialized warfare.  Even the relative importance of the American contribution 
to the war remains a topic of debate amongst historians, with many arguing that the 
presence of American soldiers on the battlefields of France relieved the pressure on the 
European Allies but did not secure the victory against Imperial Germany.  Consequently, 
for many observers there is limited interest in war as a source of national pride, and little 
need to look beyond Pershing when discussing the AEF and the American military effort. 
 But understanding the First World War is essential to a larger comprehension of 
the development of the American military.  It was a transitional war for the United States, 
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completing the transformation from the Napoleonic warfare of the nineteenth century to 
the era of modern war in the twentieth century.  It brought the American Army into the 
arena of mechanization and saw the United States engage in coalition warfare on a large 
scale for the first time.  More importantly for the present discussion, it was the first war 
in which the United States benefited from what historian Edward Coffman termed the 
“Managerial Revolution” in the United States Army.1  Begun during the reforms of 
Secretary of War Elihu Root (1899-1904), the transformation of the U.S. Army from a 
constabulary force to a modern army is one of the major sea changes in the Army’s 
history.  One of the most important reforms with regard to the development of officers 
with management skills was the creation of an educational system within the army, 
centered around the Army War College and the Leavenworth schools.  This system 
brought a managerial ethos to the American military, conceptualizing war as not only a 
contest of arms, but also, given the increasing size and modernization of military forces, 
as a business enterprise requiring officers to possess skills beyond the direction of troops 
in combat.  Consequently, the army needed a “new breed” of officer: the military 
manager.2
 This study focuses on one such military manager in the First World War: Major 
General James G. Harbord.  During the war, Harbord quickly established himself as 
General Pershing’s most trusted subordinate, the able lieutenant who the AEF 
commander called upon to oversee the most difficult operations in the AEF.  To illustrate 
Harbord’s role in the AEF, this work uses a narrative format to examine his wartime 
career.  In addition, it focuses on his contributions to the American war effort in the three 
primary facets of the AEF: administration, combat operations, and logistics.  From May 
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of 1917 through May of 1918, Harbord served as Pershing’s chief of staff, aiding the 
general in creating the AEF General Staff as well as the development and implementation 
of policies covering, but not limited to, the organization of American forces, training, 
coordination, administration, and supply.  In May 1918, Harbord transferred to the line, 
where he remained until the following July.  During this period, he commanded the 4th 
“Marine” Brigade at Belleau Wood and the 2nd Division during the Battle of Soissons.  
Harbord’s tenure in combat illuminates the questionable effectiveness of Pershing’s 
doctrine of “open” warfare, and shows the difficulties weighing on the American combat 
forces given the pressing need to contribute on the fighting line, the limited time they had 
to work in, and the resulting inadequacies in the American training programs, all of 
which impacted American combat effectiveness.  Finally, from August 1918 through 
May 1919, Harbord took command of the AEF’s logistical organization, the Services of 
Supply.  As Commanding General, Services of Supply, he worked to correct the 
problems and delays that plagued the AEF supply system, which was ultimately saved 
from collapse by the Armistice in November 1918.  In these three areas, Harbord 
represents the managerial officer needed to wage a modern industrialized war.  His 
talents, education, and professional experience prepared him for the responsibility of 
managing and administering organizations as complex and massive as the AEF General 
Headquarters and the SOS.  Less effective as a combat commander, Harbord is an 
example of the “new breed” of officer in the U.S. Army: the military manager whose 
primary responsibility was not the command of soldiers in combat, but the management 
and administration of a massive military organization in the field.  He is the forerunner to 
the modern officer whose duties reach beyond combat operations into areas such as civil 
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administration, the creation and maintenance of public works projects, and the direction 
of forces of occupation.  Finally, he represents the professionalization of the American 
officers corps, and the modern officer whose training and expertise is an amalgam of 
managerial techniques and military arts. 
 
Historiography and Methodology 
 
 In the present scholarship on the American Expeditionary Forces, James Harbord 
is largely forgotten, overshadowed by the monolithic presence of General Pershing.  The 
only book-length descriptions of Harbord’s wartime career are his own works.  Leaves 
From a War Diary (1925), is a compilation of Harbord’s letters to his wife, written 
sporadically throughout the war.  They offer a unique insight into the daily occurrences 
Harbord found noteworthy and display his raw feelings on Pershing, the Allies in general, 
the French people, the relationship between the AEF and the War Department, and the 
overall role of the military in a democracy.  But as with many memoirs and diaries, 
Harbord’s coverage is erratic, skipping over vast stretches of time between entries, and 
offering more anecdotal observations than any real insight into the war.  His later work, 
The American Army in France, 1917-1919 (1936), is a much fuller examination of the 
war and description of Harbord’s experiences in Europe.  In it he seeks to give a 
complete history of the American war effort, while also covering his own role in intricate 
detail.  Its general breadth and depth, along with Harbord’s natural skill as a writer, make 
the work one of the best treatments of the war from any of the American generals 
involved.  Even so, it suffers from a sense of self-aggrandizement regarding the 
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American contribution to the war and is overly forgiving in its treatment of Pershing and 
the AEF.  All successes were due to Pershing’s skill and the abilities of the AEF, while 
any setbacks or difficulties encountered were the fault of the Allies, the War Department, 
or circumstance.3
Given his prominence in the AEF, Harbord is not a complete unknown to 
historians of the First World War.  Timothy Nenninger provides a brief biography of 
Harbord’s career in The American National Biography (1999), as does Reggie Shrader in 
the Dictionary of American Military Biography (1984).4  While suitable for their 
purposes, neither offers more than the most cursory, encyclopedic treatment of Harbord’s 
life.  The most detailed discussion of Harbord during the war comes in Donald Smythe’s 
biography, Pershing (1986).  In it Smythe characterizes Harbord as, “A man of wit, 
imagination, and independent thought” who proved “enormously competent” during the 
war.5 Yet the focus of the work is on Pershing and it subsequently loses touch with 
Harbord when he is not connected in some way to the AEF commander.  The same can 
be said of Frank Vandiver’s biography Black Jack (1977).  While it traces the 
relationship between Harbord and Pershing over a longer timeline, the book fails to 
discuss Harbord as an individual, instead confining him as a supporting character in the 
life of John Pershing.6  Edward M. Coffman also covers Harbord tangentially in The War 
to End All Wars (1968), which remains the best single volume treatment of the American 
military contribution in the First World War, but does not examine him in any detail or 
capture his overall importance to the AEF’s development.7
Very little has been written on officership in the Great War, or the experiences of 
the staff officers in the American Expeditionary Forces.  Allan R. Millett’s, The General 
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(1975), covers the career of Lieutenant General Robert L. Bullard, and analyzes the 
transformation of the American officer corps into a professional organization in the 
decades leading up to the First World War.  It provides an excellent look at the 
experiences of those in the line during the war, but is limited in its discussion of the work 
of the General Staff.8  James Cooke’s Pershing and His Generals (1997) is the best 
description of the formation and development of the AEF General Staff and the 
relationship between Pershing and his senior officers in France.  It contains detailed 
information on Harbord as AEF chief of staff, but does not follow him after he leaves 
AEF General Headquarters.  I.B. Holley’s General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and 
the Army of a Democracy (1982) also provides an insight into the inner-workings of the 
AEF General Staff.  It blends biographical narrative with historical interpretation in its 
analysis of John McCauley Palmer, who directed the AEF’s Operations Section for the 
first months of American involvement in 1917.  The book discusses the challenges in 
setting up the American organization in France, and provides a good picture of the 
personal relationships between Pershing’s staff officers at AEF General Headquarters.9
 Regarding Harbord’s time as a combat commander, Oliver Spaulding and John 
Wright’s The Second Division (1937) is the most complete general history of the entire 
2nd Division, in which Harbord served as a brigade commander and then later as the 
division commander.  Allan R. Millett’s Semper Fidelis (1980) contains excellent 
information on the Marine Corps in the World War, and specifically covers Harbord’s 
time as the commander of the 4th “Marine” Brigade from May through July of 1918.  As 
to the specific battles Harbord fought in, Robert Asprey’s At Belleau Wood (1996) is the 
best treatment of that battle and specifically analyzes, rather critically, Harbord’s role as 
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the brigade commander.  The only book on the divisional experience of the Aisne-Marne 
offensive is Douglas Johnson and Rolfe Hillman’s Soissons 1918 (1999), which is also 
critical of Harbord’s abilities as a combat commander.10  In addition, several memoirs 
and historical monographs discuss the combat experiences of the Marines and the 2nd 
Division during Harbord’s tenure in the line.11
 The historiography of logistics in the AEF is rather sparse. Coming mostly in 
general works on the war, such as the aforementioned The War To End All Wars by 
Edward Coffman, the most detailed analysis of the supply system in the AEF remains 
Johnson Hagood’s The Services of Supply (1927).  Hagood served in the AEF supply 
system for most of the war, first as chief of staff in the Line of Communications, AEF, 
and then later in the same capacity in the reorganized Services of Supply.  Though a 
memoir, his work gives a good account of the challenges facing the AEF supply system 
and its overall development.  But like Harbord’s own works, Johnson’s slides into self-
affirmation and treats the supply services as an organization perpetually ignored or 
disregarded by GHQ AEF.  James A. Huston’s The Sinews of War (1966) provides the 
most comprehensive look at Army logistics from the Revolutionary War through the 
Korean War, and its five chapters on the United States in the First World War are the 
standard for historical analysis of American logistics.12
 All of the above works touch on Harbord’s experiences in the AEF in one manner 
or another, but none deal with him specifically, save his own books.  The goal of this 
dissertation is to fill this gap in the historiography of the United States in the First World 
War.  In so doing, it details how Harbord used his skills as a manager to help organize 
and administer the AEF, his effectiveness in implementing Pershing’s doctrine of “open” 
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warfare during his time as a combat commander, and his difficulties in bringing order to 
the AEF’s supply system.  The investigation takes the form of a basic narrative, 
beginning with Harbord’s assignment to the AEF as Pershing’ s chief of staff in May of 
1917 and ending with the Armistice of 11 November 1918.  Although Harbord was 
intimately involved in the demobilization of the AEF after the war, first as the 
Commanding General, Services of Supply from November 1918 to May 1919, then as 
AEF chief of staff from May 1919 until his detail to American Mission to Armenia the 
following September, this study is specifically targeted at Harbord’s experiences under 
the pressure of wartime and will not offer a detailed analysis of his post-war career. 
Given these parameters, the narrative can be broken down into three main 
sections.  Section I (Chapters II-VII) deals with the organizational development and policy 
formation in the AEF.  As Chief of Staff, Harbord oversaw the AEF General Staff’s 
eventual emergence as a effective administrative organization, whose basic makeup was 
later reproduced in the War Department General Staff after the war.  Section II (Chapters 
VIII-X) covers Harbord’s time in the line, first with the 4th “Marine” Brigade and then as 
commander of the 2nd Division.  While he was only in the line for three months, Harbord 
took part in two of the AEF’s first major combat engagements: the battles of Belleau 
Wood and Soissons.  Harbord’s firm belief in Pershing’s views on combat doctrine and 
effort to implement them illustrate their limited effectiveness given the inadequate 
training provided the AEF combat soldiers and the constraints of time affecting the 
Americans in the summer of 1918.  Section III (Chapter XI & XII) is the culmination of 
the analysis of the AEF’s logistical system.  While Section I covers the initial 
development of the AEF’s Line of Communications and its reorganization into the 
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Services of Supply (SOS) in February of 1918, the supply problems that plagued the AEF 
over the course of its entire existence came to a head in the later summer and fall of 1918, 
prompting Pershing to tap Harbord to command the SOS and bring order to the chaotic 
organization.  Harbord’s efforts to improve the overall performance of the SOS could not 
offset the struggles the SOS endured as it tried to supply the AEF as it began conducting 
independent combat operations against the German Army.  Chapter XI will discuss the 
circumstances surrounding Harbord’s taking over the SOS and his initial efforts to 
improve its efficiency.  Chapter XII will analyze the mounting problems that afflicted the 
American supply system and the factors that contributed to the SOS’s anticipated 
collapse had the war extended into 1919. 
 
Pre-war Biography 
 
 Before examining Harbord’s wartime career, it is important to possess a general 
understanding of his life prior to 1917, for it was during this period that he gained the 
skills that made him an effective officer in the AEF.  Harbord’s origin is as 
undistinguished as it is classically American.  His family came from Scotch-Irish stock, 
moving west from Virginia around the time of the American Revolution to settle in the 
Kentucky territory.  In the winter of 1823, Harbord’s grandfather, James C. Harbord, and 
great-grandfather, William Harbord, moved the family again to Twin Grove, Illinois, one 
of the first white settlements in the area that would become McClean County, IL.  Seven 
years later, James C. Harbord brought his Irish-born bride from Indiana, and the two 
settled down to build a life as simple farmers.  Harbord’s father, George Washington 
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Harbord, was born in 1841, and remained close to home until the Civil War, in which he 
served in the Union cavalry.  During the war, George Harbord married Effie C. Gault, a 
native of Ohio, and the two had a son in 1864.  Although the boy died after only nine 
months, their second child would grow to the penultimate position in the U.S. Army.  
Born on 21 March 1866 in the small farming community of Bloomington, Illinois, James 
Guthrie Harbord was the first of three children to grow to adulthood.  By the time 
Harbord was born, his father owned several pieces of farmland in the Bloomington area, 
and had part ownership in a local mill.  His mother divided her time between managing 
the household and teaching at the local school.  Despite these apparent signs of success, 
the family struggled to get by.  Seeking better fortunes elsewhere, they eventually moved 
to Pettis County, Missouri in 1870, and again to Lyon County, Kansas in 1878, traveling 
by covered wagon to settle on newly opened Indian land.  Young James did not 
accompany the family to Kansas, but returned to Bloomington to finish his schooling.  He 
joined them the next year, and spent the next three years dividing his time between school 
and working the land, learning the values of physical labor and the need for continuing 
his education.13
 By 1882, the now 16-year old Harbord was a tall, lanky, raw-boned young man 
with a thatch of red hair and a ravenous thirst for knowledge.  He walked two-and-a-half 
miles to the local school, where he devoured any book he could get his hands on.  Effie 
Harbord described her son as “a better student than most, [who] didn’t have to spent a lot 
of time with his books, but he always mastered everything thoroughly, and he also took 
an active part in school affairs.”14  His parents recognized the limited educational 
opportunities available to Harbord and his two younger sisters in Lyon County, and 
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decided to move to Manhattan, Kansas, where the children could take advantage of the 
Kansas State Agricultural College.  They rented out their homestead and sold most of 
their belongings to pay for the trip, which Harbord’s mother and sisters took by rail.  
After working the summer as a hired hand to earn enough for clothes and books, Harbord 
and his father walked the seventy-six miles to Manhattan, which took a week, conducting 
the family’s remaining cow along the way.  Once there, Harbord enrolled in the 
Agricultural College, where he did well in science and mathematics.  He also served as a 
captain in one of the school’s three cadet companies, and spent his summers working in 
the local telegraph office, where he learned to type.  It was at this point that Harbord 
developed an admiration for military life, and after earning a Bachelor of Science degree 
in June of 1886, he took the entrance exam for the United States Military Academy at 
West Point.  Though he tied for top score out of twenty-four applicants, Harbord did not 
gain acceptance to the academy.  The other finalist was one year younger than Harbord, 
and the acceptance committee decided that he was the more preferable choice.  It was 
also rumored that the boy had certain political connection that helped him secure the 
position.  Either way, Harbord learned the value of making oneself the best possible 
choice in any contest, and the need to develop personal and professional relationships that 
could help in future situations where qualifications alone could not secure 
advancement.15
Disappointed, Harbord spent the next two years as the assistant principal at a 
school in Lyon County, where he served as librarian and instructor of telegraphy before 
enlisting in the U.S. Army in 1889 as a private in Company A, 4th U.S. Infantry.  His 
colleagues at the Agricultural College were reluctant to lose the jovial young man, but 
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believed that his “intellectual attainments and pleasing manner make it reasonably certain 
that he will not for long remain with the rank and file of the army.”16  Assigned to Fort 
Spokane in the Washington Territory, Harbord proved his supporters correct, using his 
typing skills to rise quickly through the ranks, eventually becoming the post’s Sergeant 
Major.  After a transfer to Fort Sherman in Idaho, Harbord served as Quartermaster 
Sergeant for the 4th Infantry, where he caught the eye of the regiment’s commanding 
officer, who recommended him for a regular commission to the grade of 2nd Lieutenant.  
Harbord went to Fortress Monroe in Virginia to complete the examination process, and 
eventually received promotion to the officer’s list in August of 1891.  Assigned to the 5th 
U.S. Cavalry, Harbord spent the next two years at Fort Reno, Oklahoma, and Fort 
McIntosh, Texas, before attending the Army’s Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1893.  He graduated on the distinguished list in 1895, and his 
thesis, “Requisites of Rapid Field Sketching,” earned him a Master of Science degree 
from Kansas State.  He returned to service in Texas for the next three years before the 
outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898.17
 Hoping to secure some form of foreign service during the war, Harbord joined the 
Second U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, the Torrey Rough Riders, early in 1898 with a rank of 
major.  The unit was transferred to Florida in preparation for shipment to Cuba, but the 
conflict ended before Harbord could depart.  Frustrated at missing out on the opportunity 
to take part in combat operations, Harbord took solace in further career advancement, as 
he received a promotion to 1st Lieutenant and a transfer to the 10th U.S. Cavalry.  The 
young lieutenant journeyed to Huntsville, Alabama, where the unit was training, and 
quickly made a name for himself in the eyes of one John J. Pershing, future commander 
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of the American Expeditionary Forces.  Serving in the 10th as a Major of Volunteers, 
Pershing was having difficulty with an Army auditor over missing supplies.  With the 
bureaucrat threatening to cut off his pay until he found the lost property, Pershing was in 
a tight spot until informed that a new quartermaster officer had located nearly all of his 
missing material.  That officer was Harbord, and he and Pershing became fast friends 
during the chance encounter.18
 Eighteen ninety-nine finally brought Harbord the opportunity for service in Cuba 
and a significant development in his personal life.  In January, the thirty-two year old 
lieutenant married Emma Yeatman Ovenshine, daughter of Brigadier General Samuel 
Ovenshine, in a small ceremony in the Ovenshine home in Washington, D.C.  A small, 
lovely girl, Emma was a year younger than Harbord, and possessed a delicate constitution 
that prevented her from having children.  She remained the one constant in Harbord’s life 
until her death in 1937.  Soon after the wedding, Harbord was transferred to Cuba to aid 
in the post-war administration of the country.  His good-natured personality and 
determined work ethic brought him to the attention of the Military Governor, General 
Leonard Wood, who made Harbord the adjutant general of the departments of Santiago, 
Puerto Principle, and Eastern Cuba.  Along the way, Harbord gained a promotion to 
Captain, 11th Cavalry in February of 1901.19
 After returning to the United States in 1901, Harbord briefly served in 
Washington as the assistant Chief of Insular Affairs under General Clarence R. Edwards, 
before shipping out to the Philippines, where he would spend the next twelve years.  
Initially his Philippine service came in the cavalry, but Harbord’s reputation as a man 
who could get things done administratively brought him to the Insular Government.  
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Governor William H. Taft appointed Harbord to be one of the assistant Chiefs of the 
Philippine Constabulary upon the recommendation of General Wood, now the governor 
of the Moro Province.  Promoted to Colonel on the Constabulary list, Harbord spent most 
of the next ten years in southern and central Luzon, working to improve relations 
between the Americans and the Moros.  Harbord tried to learn the ways of the Filipinos 
to make him a better administrator, and his ability to deal with frustration effectively and 
without anger endeared him to subordinates and earmarked him to his commanders.  
Sympathetic to the Filipinos, Harbord hoped to use his time to help them rise above what 
he perceived to be their primitive nature so that they could join the ranks of the civilized 
world.  It was a tremendous opportunity for Harbord.  Slightly balding and approaching 
forty, he used his time in the Philippines to learn the skills of management and 
administration.  Exercising what amounted to independent control over an area the size of 
New England, he was responsible for maintaining law and order and had to solve a 
myriad number of problems in the field.  As one newspaper writer pointed out regarding 
Harbord’s experiences, “Successfully solving problems in one field helps men to solve 
them in others.  It trains them in the exercise of tact, coolness and the habit of prompt 
decision.”20  His service also allowed Harbord to develop associations with the seasoned 
leaders in the army, who he could watch and learn from.  On the whole, the Philippines 
provided a measure of excitement to an officer used to the dreariness of life on the 
American frontier.  “The romance and adventure of the Constabulary service, particularly 
in the Moro country,” Harbord later wrote, “would furnish the theme for a score of 
Kiplings, Remingtons, or Wisters.”21  Up to that point, Harbord’s tenure in the 
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Philippines was the crowning achievement in his life, but more opportunities were soon 
on the way.22
 By 1913, Harbord had risen to acting chief of the Philippine Constabulary, but 
politics in Washington and the War Department soon brought his time in the islands to an 
end.  In response to a fight between General Wood, now the Army chief of staff, and 
Adjutant General Frederic C. Ainsworth, Congress passed the “Manchu Law” in 1912, 
stipulating that all officers on detached service who had not spent at least two years out of 
the previous six with their commissioned units must end their details immediately.23  
Harbord had been in the Philippines for twelve years, and was required to return to the 
United States.  It was a bitter pill to swallow.  He complained to Pershing that, “After ten 
years service among these people, the Government throws away that experience and 
sends me back to do what I was doing well ten years ago, interrupts some officer 
commanding a [Cavalry] troop, and again breaks it up a few months later to make me a 
major.”24  He tried to secure an exemption from the new law’s stipulations due to his 
intricate knowledge of the Philippine Constabulary, but was unsuccessful.  It was the first 
instance where he felt somewhat betrayed and unsupported by the politicians and 
administrators in Washington and the War Department.  Those feelings would grow 
stronger during his time in France when the War Department became a source of 
opposition and annoyance to Harbord and Pershing.  For now, though, Harbord followed 
orders and returned to the United States, where he was again assigned to the 5th U.S. 
Cavalry at the Presidio in San Francisco.  The next two years brought brief service along 
the Mexican border and a promotion to major on the Regular list.  In the fall of 1916, he 
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received an assignment to continue his education at the Army War College, where he 
remained until America’s entry into the World War in April of 1917.25
 Harbord’s pre-war experiences provided the chance to develop several distinct 
attributes that prepared him for service in the American Expeditionary Forces.  His 
education and desire for knowledge gave him an inquisitive nature that allowed him to 
think creatively.  It also forced him to organize his time in order to solve problems 
quickly and decisively, a feature Pershing demanded of his officers.  Harbord’s long 
tenure in the Army gave him the opportunity to develop personal relationships with many 
of the officers he would serve with in France, which proved a necessity in Pershing’s 
staff that was built around those same relationships.  Finally, his education at Fort 
Leavenworth and his time in the Philippines gave Harbord the knowledge and skills 
needed to serve not only as a staff officer in a combat unit, but to build and manage a 
complex and multi-faceted organization such as the AEF General Staff and the Services 
of Supply.  He was not intimidated by a challenge, nor was he overwhelmed by the size 
and scale of the American effort in France.  Though he had never commanded a combat 
unit larger than a cavalry troop, Harbord’s pre-war experiences gave him the 
management skills necessary to serve ably in a war where the need for officers who could 
administer and manage organizations and men was as great as the need for those who 
could command in the field. 
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CHAPTER II 
OFF TO WAR (APRIL – MAY 1917) 
 
 On 2 April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson stood before a joint session of 
Congress to call for war against the German Empire.  The Congress responded four days 
later with a declaration of war.  But declaring war and actually fighting are two different 
things.  The United States was in no position to join the struggle that had consumed 
Europe for the past three years.  It had neither the army, shipping, nor administrative 
institutions to raise, transport, or supply an expeditionary force to Europe, let alone 
engage in combat operations.  Everything would have to be created from scratch, 
beginning with a basic military organization.  For a country protected by its geographic 
isolation, shifting to a war footing proved incredibly difficult.  The War Department 
suffered through a type of daze as it contemplated its new task, and the entire 
organization was gripped with the malaise of years of bureaucracy and inactivity.  It was 
into this sea of indecision that the first elements of what would become the American 
Expeditionary Forces assembled over April and May of 1917.  Uncertain of their 
responsibilities, these men gathered around their new commander, General John J. 
Pershing, and prepared for what each considered would be the defining moment of their 
respective military careers.  Lacking any specifics, each prepared as best they could for 
the long days ahead, confident in the surety of their eventual success, but possessing no 
clear vision of how to attain it. 
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Call to Washington 
 
While the Wilson Administration, and the nation as a whole, began to 
contemplate the realities of the decision for war, Major James Guthrie Harbord quietly 
passed his time as a student at the Army War College.  Knowing they would shoulder the 
burden should the United States go to war, Harbord and his fellow officers followed the 
debate closely.  Like many of his compatriots, Harbord longed for the opportunity to 
practice his craft in the field.  It had been three years since his return to the United States 
from the Philippines, and domestic service proved incessantly dull for the 51-year-old 
officer.  Though he never held a large combat command while oversees, he was at least 
close to the action in a land rife with conflict.  Since his return to the United States in 
1914 with the passage of the “Manchu Law,”1 Harbord served as a captain and then a 
major in command of various squadrons of the 5th Cavalry at the Presidio in San 
Francisco.  Despite a short stint along the Arizona-Mexico border during the Punitive 
Expedition of 1916, his service in the states was a rather dull one.  Serving at six different 
stations within his first year with the 5th Cavalry, Harbord often found his most difficult 
task being getting the post’s polo outfit into shape.  Neither he nor his wife enjoyed the 
post or the city, and both welcomed his detail to the Army War College in September of 
1916.2
A career officer who had never experienced a war, Harbord sensed the 
opportunities for adventure and advancement that the present crisis offered.  Growing up 
in the shadow of the Civil War and missing out on combat service in Cuba during the 
Spanish-American War, Harbord ached to see a large-scale military conflict and the 
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chance to test himself in the face of a determined enemy.   When the United States 
declared war on Imperial Germany on 6 April 1917, Harbord finally had that opportunity.  
The main question now was what form his service would take. 
With no direction coming from the War Department regarding Army 
mobilization, Harbord looked to alternate avenues for his place in the conflict.  The most 
promising possibility grew out of the preparedness movement and President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s plan to form a volunteer division, much like the famous “Rough Riders” 
cavalry regiment of the Spanish-American war.3  Harbord knew the former president 
through his long-time association with Major General Leonard Wood, with whom 
Harbord had served in the military administrations in Cuba and the Philippines.  He had 
modeled himself as one of Wood’s many protégés, and now hoped that his connections 
with the nation’s most renowned general at the time would begin to pay dividends.  But 
associating oneself with Leonard Wood was a double-edged sword in the spring of 1917.  
As chief of staff of the U.S. Army (1910-1914), Wood battled with then Adjutant General 
Frederick C. Ainsworth, for supremacy within the War Department.  Over the course of 
their fight, Wood succeeded in permanently establishing the General Staff and the office 
of the chief of staff, but in the process he generated a considerable amount of animosity 
from Congress towards the General Staff and himself.  Ainsworth possessed many 
influential friends in Washington who were disinclined to support anything or anyone 
associated with the former chief of staff.4  
Though Harbord knew it was potentially dangerous career-wise to attach himself 
to Wood and Roosevelt’s star, the chance to go to France proved too tempting, and 
Harbord offered his services to the former Rough Rider.  Writing to Roosevelt on 6 May, 
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Harbord plainly stated his interest in any opportunity for service in France should 
Congress and the President accept Roosevelt’s offer.  This was no small matter, for it 
required Harbord to turn down a position he had been offered in the Adjutant General’s 
Department and run the risk of being irrevocably linked with Roosevelt and Wood, 
whose standing with the current administration was less than stellar.  On a personal level, 
the position within the Adjutant General’s Department came with a promotion to colonel, 
and would secure a transfer back to Washington, which both Harbord and his wife 
desired. The move would also bring Harbord into the Army’s staff system and its 
opportunities for further career advancement.  Yet despite these factors, Harbord’s desire 
to go to France trumped all other concerns and he decided to pursue service with 
Roosevelt.5
The chances of securing a position in Roosevelt’s proposed division looked 
promising.  Aiding Harbord’s cause was his long-standing friendship with Captain Frank 
McCoy, whom Harbord served with in the Philippines.  Roosevelt had already designated 
McCoy as his chief of staff should the division be approved.6  Though serving in Mexico 
at the time, McCoy was also close to General Wood, and had his own source on the 
coming’s and going’s in the War Department in the form of the current Army chief of 
staff, Major General Hugh Scott.  Like Wood, General Scott supported the idea of 
Roosevelt’s division, considering it the best way to get the military machine rolling.  
Approaching the end of his career, General Scott now found himself facing the challenge 
of overseeing the transformation of the American Army from a small peacetime 
constabulary organization to a massive combat force.  With the war in France in its third 
year, whatever force the United States sent overseas needed to hit the ground running in 
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order to provide an immediate lift to the wilting Allies.  But as Scott knew all to well, the 
Army with which the United States went to war was not built for major combat 
operations on a grand scale.   
In April of 1917, the United States Army did not posses sufficient manpower 
levels, equipment, or an organizational structure suitable for service on the European 
battlefields.  Though the Defense Act of 1916 raised the Army’s authorized strength to 
235,000, poor recruitment efforts resulted in the U.S. Army containing roughly130,000 
officers and men at the time of the war declaration.7  Deficiencies in motorized 
transportation, airplanes, artillery, and tanks placed the United States well behind their 
European counterparts in development of military technology.  Most American soldiers 
knew nothing of grenades, rifle-grenades, automatic rifles, trench mortars, or light 
infantry cannon; all standard fare on the Western Front.  Most alarmingly, though the war 
in Europe clearly showed the value and necessity of the machine-gun on the modern 
battlefield, the American Army called for only four such weapons per infantry regiment 
(compared to thirty-six in each infantry battalion in the German Army) and was still in 
the process of adopting a standard model.8  
Organizationally the U.S. Army found itself wanting as well in comparison to the 
Europeans.  With the exception of the 1916 Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa, the 
Army had conducted no major field operations since the Spanish-American War.  It had 
no standing armies, corps or brigades, and very few regiments.  Structurally, the 
American army was still designed along the same lines of the late nineteenth century, 
when it served as a frontier constabulary, coastal defense force, and civil engineering and 
exploration service.  Only one officer, Brigadier General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing, 
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had experience commanding a force larger than 10,000 men, and roughly one-third of the 
Army’s officers were in their first year of service.9
General Scott was well aware of how fearfully unprepared the United States was 
in 1917.  He confided as much to Frank McCoy in late April, admitting, “This is the 
twenty-fourth day of the war, and nobody knows how to raise a force.”  He considered 
Roosevelt’s preparedness movement a good place to start, but knew there was little 
chance that President Woodrow Wilson would authorize the division.10  Like Scott, 
Roosevelt hoped Wilson would put aside partisan squabbles and accept his proposal.  
While he awaited official word from the administration, the former president made what 
preparations he could, including selecting Harbord to take command of one of the 
division’s brigades.11  Thankful for the opportunity, Harbord could not accept outright 
until the administration made up its mind regarding the division’s status.  Like Roosevelt, 
Harbord would have to wait until Wilson and the War Department settled on a policy for 
American mobilization. 
Unknown to both men, events were proceeding in Washington that promised to 
change things considerably for both Roosevelt’s volunteer division and Harbord’s 
military career.  Over a month removed from the declaration of war, the administration 
finally decided that the United States would send an expeditionary force to France.12  
With the decision made, they now needed to select an officer to command what would 
become the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).  Taking charge of the process was 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, a small, shy-looking man, who came across as a 
rather unimpressive specimen to be in control of the nation’s military arsenal.  A 
Cleveland lawyer in his mid-forties, Baker had well-established pacifistic leanings, 
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making him an easy target for critics.  One of Harbord’s friends thought Baker more 
suited to be a “first class teacher of rhetoric at a ladies seminary” than to be Secretary of 
War.13  But despite his appearance and lack of experience, Baker emerged as an excellent 
choice to head up the War Department.  Well-read and quick-witted, Baker possessed a 
quiet determination that allowed him to attack any issue put before him skillfully.  A 
model of competency, Raymond Fosdick referred to Baker’s mind as “one of those rare 
combinations in which swift perception is balanced by judgement, and clarity and sanity 
run hand in hand.”14
Taking the first step in forming a military force for service in France, Baker 
appointed now Major General Pershing to command the American Expeditionary Forces 
(AEF) on 10 May.  Like all of Baker’s decisions, this one was based on careful study and 
contemplation.  The major generals and brigadier generals in the American army in 1917 
had had little opportunity to gain experience in combat operations over the previous 
fifteen years.  Moreover, Baker wanted a man not only experienced, but physically able 
to handle the strain of command in Europe.15  The Secretary knew that whoever he chose 
would have to tackle unfathomable challenges in order to put the Americans on the battle 
line with any speed, and would have to bear an immense burden in the process.  In 
Baker’s mind, there were only two realistic choices for command in Europe: Generals 
Pershing and Wood.  From the beginning, General Wood was at a disadvantage in terms 
of his physical presence.  On top of being several pounds overweight, Wood suffered 
from an old head injury for which he wore a steel guard in his cap.  Though the wound 
did not impair his ability, it did cause the general to walk with an easily discernable limp.  
Baker noticed Wood’s apparent physical ailments on an inspection tour of Plattsburg, and 
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could not put the memory of the man struggling up a hill out of his mind when the time 
came to select a commander for the AEF.16
Pershing, on the other hand, looked every bit the commander that Baker wanted.  
Tall, robust, with a jaw line chiseled from pure granite, Pershing exuded physical 
confidence and ability.  His command of the Punitive Expedition made him the most 
senior officer in the Army to hold a large field command, and his lack of stated political 
aspirations made him all the more acceptable to the Democratic administration.  Though 
Baker had never personally seen Pershing before their meeting on 10 May, he knew of 
the general’s qualifications.  During his service in Mexico, Pershing had to deal with 
serious frustrations regarding supply and restrictions regarding the parameters of his 
authority.  But the general never criticized the administration, showing himself to be 
“obedient and loyal” in times of struggle.17  The same could not be said of General 
Wood, whose open criticism of President Wilson’s policies during the preparedness 
campaign were a matter of public record.  Baker took all of these considerations into 
account and decided that Pershing was the only real choice for command in France.18
For Harbord, Pershing’s selection as AEF commander came as an act of 
providence.  Though he had a close relationship with Wood, Harbord also knew Pershing 
well.  From their brief encounter in 1898, the two men maintained a friendly relationship 
while both served in the Philippines.  Though Harbord criticized Pershing’s management 
of the Moro Province as Military Governor, it did not affect their burgeoning 
friendship.19  When Pershing received the command of the AEF and began selecting his 
staff he specifically thought of that same lieutenant who had saved him a great deal of 
worry almost twenty years earlier. 
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Still at the Army War College, neither Harbord nor any of his fellow students 
knew of the plan to send an expeditionary force to France, or of Pershing’s selection to 
command it.  While they knew Pershing had been recalled from Texas, many believed it 
was for the position of Army chief of staff, which would open soon with the retirement of 
General Scott and the assistant chief of staff, Major General Tasker Bliss.  Harbord had 
been expecting the move for several months, and supported the idea.20  It therefore came 
as a great shock when, on 14 May, Harbord was summoned from his classes by telephone 
to report to Pershing at the War Department that afternoon.  Departing at once, Harbord 
made his way to the State, War and Navy Building, still unclear as to the reason for his 
visit.  He later recalled, “There was no intimation of the purpose for which I was called 
until I faced General Pershing in the office of the Chief of Staff – a Military Holy of 
Holies [sic], to which I had not been a frequent visitor up to that time.”21
Pershing wasted little time at this initial meeting, explaining his assignment to 
lead an expedition to France.  The new AEF commander then dropped a bombshell: he 
was considering Harbord for his chief of staff.  Dumbstruck, Harbord muddled through 
the rest of their brief conversation.  At the end Harbord found himself admitting that he 
was not fluent in French, which presented a particular challenge considering Pershing’s 
own deficiencies with the language. Pershing said he would hold off on a decision for the 
time being, but wanted Harbord to accompany him to France in some capacity and 
needed him to come to the War Department at once to begin preparing for their departure.  
Excited and bewildered, Harbord immediately set up shop in Room 223 of the War 
Department and began addressing the numerous tasks required to build an expeditionary 
force.  Several days later, Pershing unexpectedly intimated that he was considering two 
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other candidates for chief of staff.  Spurred on by Pershing’s emphasis on frankness, 
Harbord responded that he was a better choice, even with his problems with French.  
Pershing eventually agreed and named Harbord chief of staff for the AEF several days 
later.  So began the working relationship of James Harbord and John Pershing.22
 
Leadership in the AEF 
 
Of all the partnerships in the history of the American Army, perhaps none were as 
effective and long lasting as the one between John J. Pershing and James Harbord.  The 
two men proved ideally suited to each other in terms of temperament and administrative 
style.  Pershing, the hard-charger and martinet, provided the drive and sense of purpose 
for the AEF.  Though he possessed a quiet warmth about him, few had the pleasure to 
experience it.  Most saw only his icy demeanor of military discipline and single-
mindedness that inspired more respect than affection.  While not a brilliant strategist or 
tactician, Pershing knew how to make decisions, and could not be rattled or intimidated 
easily.  He held himself and his men to the highest of standards, and made the AEF his 
own through sheer force of will and an unquestioning belief in the American soldier.   
Harbord, on the other hand, was a more cajoling spirit.  No less driven than 
Pershing, Harbord was more sensitive to those under him.  A true man’s man, he 
garnered genuine affection from his contemporaries through his good-natured humor and 
receptiveness to the concerns of others.  When Pershing ran roughshod over the AEF 
staff, which happened often during the early months, Harbord would follow close behind 
soothing egos and rounding off the sharp edges of the commander-in-chief’s dictums.23  
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As Pershing dealt with the myriad aspects of his command, which included considerable 
political and diplomatic duties on top of his military responsibilities, it fell to Harbord to 
manage the day-to-day operations of the AEF General Staff and to make sure that those 
things that needed to be done got done. 
Pershing had a clear idea of what he expected from a chief of staff.  “Apart from 
sheer ability,” he explained, “a chief of staff, to be highly efficient, should have tact, and 
he must have the confidence of his commander.  He would be of small value without the 
courage to give his own views on any question that might arise, and he must have the 
loyalty to abide by the decisions of his chief.”24  This is exactly what Pershing got from 
Harbord.  While unquestionably loyal, Harbord never shied away from speaking his mind 
when he thought it necessary.  He was open with his views, and stated it clearly when he 
disagreed with the AEF commander’s course of action.  Once Pershing made a decision, 
however, Harbord made every effort to see it carried out to the best of his ability.  
Pershing recognized these features early on and soon came to rely upon them, and 
showered Harbord with praise after the war: 
 
Throughout the war Harbord never hesitated for a moment to 
express his opinion with utmost frankness, no matter how radically it 
might differ from my own, nor did he ever fail to carry out instructions 
faithfully even when they were not in accord with his views.  Entirely 
unselfish, he labored incessantly for what he believed to be the best 
interests of our armies.  His ability, his resourcefulness, his faculty for 
organization, and, above all, his loyalty, were outstanding qualities, and 
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these together with a compelling personality made him invaluable to the 
nation in this important position [of chief of staff].25
 
With Harbord established as Pershing’s primary subordinate, the two men began 
working out the details for their imminent departure for Europe.  Between his meeting 
with Pershing on 14 May and their departure on the 28th, Harbord worked diligently to 
fashion together the beginnings of a General Staff.  Adding to his difficulties were 
swarms of officers and civilians who descended upon the War Department seeking an 
assignment to Pershing’s expedition.  The applicants displayed various levels of military 
experience, age, and physical fitness, forcing Pershing to quickly establish the types of 
officers he wanted for the AEF.26
From the beginning, Pershing looked to officers he knew either personally or by 
reputation.  His long service gave him a considerable reservoir of knowledge of the 
Army’s officer corps, which served him well in the selection process.  His initial criteria 
when considering officers were efficiency and availability.  Neither political connections, 
seniority, nor personal friendship with the General secured a position (although the latter 
could certainly help).  Nor did Pershing require the officers to have graduated from West 
Point, though its graduates were certainly well represented on the staff.  Harbord himself 
signified this fact, having been denied entry into the Academy and risen through the 
ranks as an enlisted man.  But there were certain standards that Pershing insisted upon.  
To serve in France an officer needed to be fairly young and in good physical shape.  They 
needed to show the same commitment to personal and professional discipline that 
Pershing embodied.  Though he did not require attendance, Pershing intended the AEF to 
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represent the standards of West Point in terms of discipline, drill, and general 
comportment.  But these concerns were secondary to a man’s ability.  In simplest terms, 
if the man could do the job, Pershing wanted him.27
The question of officer availability proved more problematic than Pershing and 
Harbord anticipated.  Naturally every officer in the Army wanted to go to France, but 
Pershing and Harbord immediately ran into difficulties with the War Department over 
officer selection.  The problem boiled down to numbers.  When the war began, there were 
less than 9,000 officers in the Federal service (5,791 Regulars and 3,199 National 
Guard).28  While plans were already in motion to expand the officer corps through 
selective service, as of May 1917 both the War Department and the AEF had to work 
with the resources at hand.  This led to a competition between the AEF and the War 
Department for trained officers.  As the commander of military operations in France, 
Pershing wanted the best and brightest with him.  But whatever forces Pershing hoped to 
command, he needed the War Department to furnish it, and Washington needed capable 
officers as well.  Of particular need were those officers with general staff experience.  
Whereas England began the war with a General Staff of some 230 officers, the United 
States had only forty-one, over half of which was prohibited by law from being in 
Washington at any one time.  Consequently, the General Staff in Washington, the heart of 
the American war effort, numbered only nineteen officers.  Though it would number over 
a thousand by the end of the war, in those early days it needed men just as desperately as 
Pershing did.29
For the most part, Pershing and the War Department cooperated in the selection of 
officers for service on the AEF General Staff, but there was some initial difficulty in 
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securing present General Staff officers for duty in France.  With its ranks already 
understaffed, the War Department allowed Pershing to select only two officers from the 
General Staff on duty in Washington to accompany him to France, a restriction Harbord 
found to be particularly irritating.  “One might easily have inferred,” he noted, “ that 
some of them considered the opportunity for an officer to serve in their Washington 
offices outweighed the importance of accompanying General Pershing to France.  It was 
a question if some of those asked for were not too busy to be ‘spared’ for the War.”30  
While understandable, Harbord’s feelings betrayed a lack of sympathy for the War 
Department’s concerns, which only grew stronger as the war continued.31  But without 
any form of recourse, Pershing and Harbord pushed forward in the selection process, all 
the while grumbling at the War Department’s restrictions. 
 
Building a Staff 
 
Despite these irritations, Pershing and Harbord made great strides in putting 
together an effective staff in the two weeks before departing for Europe.  Of critical 
importance, they needed to fill the main staff positions for the AEF General Staff.  For 
these, Pershing took full advantage of his limited access to the General Staff and selected 
two men from within its ranks: Majors John McCauley Palmer and Dennis E. Nolan.  The 
AEF commander gave Harbord the task of informing the men, which he did several days 
after arriving at the War Department.  Seeking to keep the decision private, Harbord 
extended invitations for both men to join him at his home that evening.  When the two 
men arrived, Harbord informed them that Pershing desired their presence in the AEF 
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General Staff.  Both men were equally thunderstruck, especially when Harbord 
enlightened them as to the scope of their duties.  Nolan was to command the Intelligence 
section and Palmer would head up Operations.  Each duty carried with it overwhelming 
challenges and would require a tremendous effort to be carried off successfully.32
Given the War Department’s restrictions concerning their selections, Pershing and 
Harbord chose exceptionally well.  Though filled with self-doubt, Major Dennis Nolan 
proved himself particularly well suited for the task ahead.  Considered the “father of U.S. 
Army intelligence” by historian James Cooke, Nolan graduated from West Point in 1896 
before serving with both Harbord and Pershing in the Philippines.33  Twice cited for 
gallantry in the Spanish-American War, he took up a position as a college professor of 
history from 1902 to 1903 before being selected to serve in the intelligence section of the 
first General Staff (a duty he attributed to Harbord’s recommendations).  While 
questioning his own knowledge of wartime intelligence matters, Nolan had a patient, 
studious nature about him and was a rigid adherent to detail.  These characteristics served 
him well in sifting through the mounds of information churned up by his own intelligence 
apparatus.  Not one prone to informality, he remained a valuable but distant member of 
Pershing’s staff throughout the war.  While conducting personal meetings daily with the 
AEF commander, Nolan never became a member of Pershing’s inner circle.34
Like Nolan, Major John M. Palmer performed well in his short tenure with the 
AEF General Staff.  Graduating from West Point in 1892, he served in both Cuba and the 
Philippines before returning to the Academy as an instructor from 1901-06.  In addition 
to details to China, the General Staff College at Leavenworth, Kansas, and with the 
Maneuver Division of 1911, Palmer served twice with the General Staff.  He sat on a 
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committee charged with ironing out the details for shipping Pershing’s initial force 
abroad and worked with the various foreign missions sent to Washington to help 
coordinate American activities with their new Allies.35  A good-natured man who made 
and held friendships easily, Palmer was blessed with a remarkable understanding of 
military policy and theory, which he put to good use in the initial month’s of American 
operations in France.  Though he eventually suffered a breakdown from the strain of 
building the AEF from scratch, Palmer remained a valuable asset to Pershing and the 
AEF, and became a leading figure in the post-war fight over Army reorganization. 
Palmer clearly expressed his fellow officers’ frustrations with the restrictions the 
War Department put on the AEF General Staff, stating that “The failure of those in 
authority to appreciate the importance of a fully trained staff to an army in the field was 
to impede us seriously in the months to come."36  Too many things needed to be done in 
the short amount of time before the senior AEF officers sailed to France, and any 
obstacles, no matter how justified, only increased their already considerable workload.  
Not only did Nolan and Palmer need to put together their own staffs, but they also had to 
keep Pershing supplied with the information he needed for the overall job of forming the 
AEF.  It soon became apparent that the AEF desperately needed additional staff officers.  
Palmer went so far as to suggest initiating an apprentice program to train young staff 
officers as quickly as possible.  He wanted all recent graduates of the Staff College to be 
shipped to France with all due haste, where they could learn on the job and then a 
sufficient number would be returned to the United States.37
Though understandable given the AEF’s enormous need for staff officers, such a 
plan would have decimated the War Department.  The General Staff rightly concluded 
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that the proposal was not feasible and rejected the plan.  It did, however, sympathize with 
the AEF’s needs and authorized Harbord to call upon qualified staff officers on duty with 
the troops for service with the AEF General Staff.  Harbord wasted little time in securing 
the details of Majors Arthur L. Conger, Hugh A. Drum, and Captain William O. Reed to 
Pershing’s group.  When combined with the men attained from the Staff Bureaus, 
Pershing’s party grew to just over fifty officers.38  Harbord later observed, “Neither arm 
of service nor seniority played much part in [Pershing’s] selections.  One or more were to 
give way under the terrific strain of work to which they were subjected after arrival in 
France – but the record of the group as a whole justified his judgement.”39
As personnel decisions were finalized, orders went out with due haste, catching 
many men unprepared for the rapid progression of events.  One such case, that of Major 
Hugh Drum, illustrates the experience of many officers that May.  On 17 May, Drum was 
stationed at the headquarters of the Army’s Southern Department at Fort Sam Houston, 
Texas, where he was serving as assistant chief of staff.40  With no advance warning, 
Drum received orders to report to the War Department, where he learned of his detail to 
Pershing’s General Staff.  Though delighted at the opportunity, he was initially stunned 
to discover they were scheduled for departure within a week.  This left little time to wrap 
up his affairs, secure his orders, say goodbye to his family, and journey to New York 
City, from which they were scheduled to depart on 28 May.41
That the process of putting the AEF General Staff together suffered from 
difficulties and confusion is not surprising.  The same can be said of the entire American 
war effort in May of 1917.  But it was hardly the Americans’ fault.  As representatives 
from France and Britain arrived in Washington to begin coordinating with their new ally, 
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they amplified the pressure bearing down on the United States.  The British military 
attaché in Washington, Major General G. T. M. Bridges told General Scott that the 
quickest and best way for the Americans to contribute to the war would be by “sending 
500,000 untrained men at once to our depots in England to be trained there, and drafted 
into our armies in France.”42  Likewise the head of the French Mission, René Viviani 
urged that the United States’ vast, untapped, manpower reserves be immediately funneled 
into the French Army.  But the most persuasive argument came from Marshal Joseph 
Joffre, the hero of the Marne, when he stated that Allies had but one need from the 
Americans: “We want men, men, men.”43  Though each man recognized the desire for 
the Americans to fight under their own flag, they also saw the pitiable state of the 
American military.  It would take perhaps months, but probably years before the 
Americans would be ready to conduct major operations on the Western Front, and none 
of the Europeans expressed any belief that their nations could hold on that long.  If the 
Americans chose to find under their own flag they needed to do so in a hurry, and that 
meant making mistakes. 
With the pressure already building from the Europeans, the War Department 
girded for action.  Considering the abbreviated time frame, inefficiency became the 
watchword of the day.  This included even the all-important task of writing Pershing’s 
orders for his command.  At this crucial point, President Wilson decided to send Chief of 
Staff Scott to Russia as a part of a military mission.  Though scheduled to retire soon due 
to age, Scott’s departure left the Army without its nominal head just as it was organizing 
an expedition overseas.  The assistant chief of staff, Major General Tasker H. Bliss, filled 
in as acting chief of staff and Brigadier General Francis Kernan became his acting 
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assistant.  While neither could issue orders except by direction of the secretary of war, 
Kernan began to draw up a set of orders for the AEF commander. 
Despite being in constant contact with Bliss, neither Pershing nor Harbord heard 
anything pertaining to their orders.  Consequently, they decided to prepare a letter of 
instruction for Pershing in case the War Department neglected to produce one.  Each man 
wrote his own draft and the two were then combined into a final letter for Bliss to sign, 
which he did.  At the same time, Kernan drafted his set of orders for Pershing, which 
Secretary Baker signed.  Whether Bliss knew of Kernan’s draft or not, he never spoke of 
it to either Pershing or Harbord.  Either way, when Pershing and Harbord visited the 
secretary of war on 27 May just before their departure, Baker presented Pershing with the 
orders prepared by General Kernan.  Pershing now had before him two legitimate sets of 
orders, one signed by the secretary of war and one by the chief of staff.  A bit confused 
and more than a bit irritated, Pershing gave precedence to Kernan’s draft, as it had 
Baker’s signature on it.44
Luckily for all concerned, the actual provisions put forth in both documents were 
fairly similar, differing only in the level of detail they conveyed.  The Bliss letter, written 
by Pershing and Harbord, was the simpler of the two.  It instructed Pershing to establish 
his forces, cooperate with allies, and conduct operations against Germany.  Given the two 
officers’ ignorance regarding Wilson and Baker’s concepts as to the scope of American 
operation, the letter established conservative geographic limits for Pershing’s command 
authority, stating that Pershing would be the “superior military representative of the 
United States in France.”45  It made no mention of any ancillary operations that the AEF 
could possibly conduct, and gave him no authority over forces beyond the French border.  
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The Bliss letter, in the end, amounted to basic instructions, and as such comes across as a 
poor piece of staff work. 
The Baker letter, however, was the more useful of the two.  It specified Pershing 
as the commander of the American land forces (including the Marines) operating in 
continental Europe and the United Kingdom.  More importantly, the letter stated clearly 
that “the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a 
separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be 
observed.”  Thus the letter ordered Pershing to build his own army and not simply turn 
over his troops to the Allies.  Though the letter did allow “minor exceptions in particular 
circumstances,” it left the final decision to Pershing.  This made Pershing the final arbiter 
over how American soldiers were to be used; an arrangement that both Secretary Baker 
and President Wilson supported fully throughout the war.  Whenever calls for the 
amalgamation of American soldiers into Allied armies grew in intensity, as they did in 
the spring of 1918 during the German Spring Offensive, Pershing held the ultimate trump 
card in the form of the Baker letter.46
With both letters in hand, Pershing and Harbord left Washington for New York on 
27 May, beginning one of the more laughable attempts at military secrecy of the entire 
war.  Considering the very real threat German submarines presented for anyone crossing 
the Atlantic, let alone the command apparatus of the forthcoming American army, every 
effort was made to keep knowledge of Pershing’s sailing to a minimum.  Harbord and the 
rest of the group spent the two weeks prior to departure trying to keep as low a profile as 
possible, while at the same time running around Washington making the necessary 
arrangements for the journey.  Harbord noted in his diary that “with War Department 
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bureau chiefs regaling dinner guests with secrets supposed to be sacred; with the Pershing 
party hiding its heads around the capitol for two weeks, avoiding its friends and looking 
mysterious when Europe was mentioned . . . one wonders while we are making the world 
safe for Democracy, who is going to make Democracy safe for the world.”  Each officer 
was allowed to tell his spouse of their impending departure, but had to refrain from 
giving further details (i.e. the date of departure or the ship they would travel on).  
Harbord himself gained clearance to write Theodore Roosevelt and decline service in his 
proposed division, but could give no reason save that circumstances made it now 
impossible.47
On the morning of 28 May, Pershing’s entire sailing party gathered at Governors 
Island in New York City.  Grey skies and pouring rain greeted them, prompting ceaseless 
observations of bad omens at the beginning of their grand undertaking.  With an eye 
towards secrecy, the party had to take a ferry to their vessel, the S.S. Baltic of the British 
White Star Line.  When Harbord arrived at Pier 60, he was presented with a scene as 
comedic as it was disconcerting.  The party, numbering some 193 officers, soldiers, field 
clerks and civilians, were told to travel in plain clothes so as not to arouse suspicion.  
However, some thirty officers failed to heed these provisions and arrived in uniform, 
while numerous others wore military shoes or carried their swords.  The supply 
departments, appearing to have been left out of the loop regarding security, had been 
assembling supplies on the pier for several days, all of which with “S.S. Baltic, General 
Pershing’s Headquarters” stenciled on them in large letters.  An assortment of civilians 
were also milling about, many of whom wanted to accompany General Pershing aboard 
the ferry.  Harbord looked on with pride as the General, jaw clamped in noticeable 
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irritation, held his temper throughout the entire affair.  Major Hugh Drum observed wryly 
that “the long peace America had enjoyed has kept her in ignorance as to secrecy.”  
Finally, in case anyone within earshot was not aware of what was occurring, the signal 
battery at Governors Island fired the Major General’s salute to mark Pershing’s 
departure.48
If the strain were not enough after the situation on the dock, events continued to 
conspire against the party once aboard the ferry.  The plan called for the group to steam 
out to Gravesend Bay, a rather inauspicious name, to meet the Baltic so as not to make 
the ship’s name public.  Departing Governors Island around noon, the party found no ship 
waiting for them when they reached the bay.  Apparently delayed by the Navy, the Baltic 
did not appear for several hours and the ferryboats, lacking an anchor, were forced to 
bounce around in the bay while the party waited.  One soldier, not knowing that they 
were waiting to board another ship, lambasted their ragged conveyance, saying, “Hell, we 
can’t go to France in this damned thing!”49  When the Baltic finally arrived, the party 
began transferring over, which ended up being quite a challenge in the rough seas.  
Harbord had to stop several impatient uniformed officers lest they beat Pershing up the 
gangplank and present themselves to the ship’s captain as the commanders of the 
American Expeditionary Forces. 
Once aboard, the Baltic finally set out for England at around 5:15 p.m.  Harbord, 
gazing at the dark, foggy weather and the aging ship, took the time to mark the moment 
in his mind.  “There was no inspiring view of the New York skyline,” he wrote in his 
diary, “no Napoleon-on-the-Bellerophon-gazing-at-the-fast-fading-shores-of-France for 
us, for it was cold and raw, and a fog like pall settled over the green shores of Long 
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Island.”50  Several members of the party, coming face to face with their situation, 
expressed a slightly fatalistic apprehension as they confronted the black ocean in front of 
them and the unknown future beyond.  The reality finally sank in; they were heading off 
to war.51
 
A Working Voyage Across the Sea 
 
As the Baltic steamed out past Halifax, the small contingent that formed the 
American Expeditionary Forces got down to business.  They quickly fell into a routine of 
life-boat drills, French lessons, briefings from French and British officers aboard, work, 
and various other entertainment that helped pass the time.  The general topic of 
conversation centered on the submarine threat.  Most of the passengers found themselves 
glancing out over the vast ocean and wondering what dangers lie beneath.  News that two 
torpedoes narrowly missed the Baltic on her voyage from Europe added to the tension, 
and efforts to find distractions often failed as conversations invariably turned back to the 
lurking predators.  Harbord knew that submarines were not equipped to take on 
passengers, and that should a German sub captain know of Pershing’s crossing he would 
make every effort to send the ship and all aboard to a watery grave.  In an effort to 
conceal their position, the ship’s captain ordered all windows covered and strictly 
prohibited smoking on deck after dark. Once away from Halifax, however, the weather 
cleared and the bright moon over the Atlantic illuminated the ship as well as any 
spotlight.  Several passengers took to sleeping in their life preservers, which one can 
imagine led to less than restful sleep.  Card games, shuffleboard and other such 
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diversions could ameliorate the fear of attack only so far, leaving many to bear the stress 
as best they could.52
Harbord, meanwhile, struggled with his own jumbled emotions.  Though excited 
at the opportunity before him, he was more than a little apprehensive regarding his new 
responsibilities.  Added to this was a quiet sadness at leaving his wife, Emma, for an 
indeterminate amount of time.  He could not shake the image of her tearful farewell, and 
she remained always in the back of his mind.  To keep himself busy, Harbord began 
thinking about the task ahead.  The more he thought about circumstances in the War 
Department the more concerned he became.  Harbord knew of the competitive nature of 
American officers, and feared that the failure to use men like Leonard Wood, J. Franklin 
Bell and Hunter Liggett threatened to create a situation where “somebody will be starting 
little backfires behind us.”53
Harbord’s initial fears illustrate a degree of suspicion and paranoia that would 
become increasingly pointed as the war continued.  He knew the poor reputation 
American officers had in the eyes of Europeans, and believed that Pershing needed 
immediate promotion to full general lest he meet the various Field Marshals of Europe at 
a disadvantage.  Having recently received a promotion to lieutenant colonel (Cavalry) on 
the Regular list himself, Harbord knew that this small group was conspicuously short of 
general officers.  He consoled himself with the knowledge that neither French Generals 
Robert Nivelle, Henri Philippe Pétain, nor British Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig were 
first-tier generals when the war began.  Only time would tell who in the American 
contingent would see their star rise in the AEF. 
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The relative youth aboard the Baltic symbolized the need to transform the U.S. 
Army into a modern military force.  For many of these officers, their introduction to the 
military came on the American frontiers, where boredom was a more common foe than 
the American Indians.  They served in Cuba and the Philippines, and witnessed the 
organizational upheaval that came with the reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root in the 
first years of the century.  These men, raised on tales of the American Civil War, 
educated at West Point and the Leavenworth schools, and seasoned in foreign service, 
represented a new breed of American officer.  As argued by historian Allan Millett, 
“Between the Civil War and the World War, the army officer corps became an 
institutionalized profession.”54  The new breed of officers, beneficiaries of career-long 
education in the military arts and sciences, looked to supplant once and for all the past 
image of the amateur warrior. 
Henceforth, the war promised to change the makeup of the American army and 
officer corps.  Over the past thirty years, the army never rose above 200,000 officers and 
men, even during the Spanish-American War.  Consequently, there developed a small, 
insular officer corps well suited to the Army’s pre-war role of frontier constabulary, 
coastal defense, and foreign occupation force.  This aided Pershing in selecting officers to 
accompany him to France, but could not last given the numbers the AEF would 
eventually need.  Considering the size of the armies now fighting in Europe, Major 
Palmer noted that “success in contemporary warfare is less a matter of dash than of mass 
– millions of men and tons of supplies.”55  The fraternal officer corps could not hold up 
under this weight of numbers.  Harbord knew the truth of this fact.  He also understood 
that this war marked an end of an era for the army as he knew it.  “Many of that old Army 
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of ours,” he observed, “of which we have grumbled and complained so much, and with 
which we have found so much fault, but which we have all the time loved so well, will 
lay their bones in the soil of France.”56
In between the officers’ French classes, Pershing and Harbord put the staff to 
work on other tasks.  Pershing had various officers, especially those British and Canadian 
officers accompanying them, give a series of lectures ranging from discussions on the 
British Army to the dangers of social diseases in wartime.  The latter became a personal 
campaign for Pershing, who had a puritanical obsession with combating venereal disease.  
In addition to these lectures, Pershing created several Boards of Officers to make studies 
of the various issues before them.  One board examined the issue of artillery equipment, 
making recommendations as to caliber, manufacturer, etc, while another studied the port 
situation in France.  Pershing also worked closely with his staff on the issue of where 
they would fight.  Knowing the political necessities of keeping the French in control of 
the front guarding Paris, and the British protecting the English Channel, the Americans 
looked further to the interior, settling on the Lorraine as the most agreeable choice.57
As the staff went about recommending solutions for the various challenges before 
them, Pershing and his immediate subordinates worked on creating the policies and 
organizational framework under which the AEF would operate.  With the exception of 
the AEF commander, Major Palmer suffered more under his workload than anyone 
aboard.  As head of the Operations sections, Palmer oversaw the creation of the actual 
staff system for the AEF.  At present, Pershing’s staff consisted of Harbord as chief of 
staff, followed by an amorphous mass of men with no operational structure guiding them.  
All other sections relied upon Palmer getting the structure up and running, which was a 
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daunting task given the lack of precedence for building an American General Staff in the 
field.  Palmer recognized this with an ominous feeling.  “The more I reflected on the 
comments of our British friends,” he recalled, “the more I came to appreciate how 
rudimentary and inadequate our existing staff organizations really was.”58
The main problem, as Harbord saw it, was that “certain staff problems appeared 
to demand almost simultaneous and immediate solution.”59  Foremost of these were: 
 
The Organization for the divisions that were about to be formed in the 
home country; the constitution of our General staff and the allocation of its 
functions; the order of priority of shipments of troops and supplies 
including munitions; the organization of what we then styled the Line of 
Communications; the training of the troops that were to come; the system 
of supply for the Lines of Communications to the troops; [and lastly] the 
strategy of our future combat employment.60
 
When combined with the thousand other decisions that needed to be made, the Americans 
faced a daunting task for even the most skilled and seasoned staff organization, let alone 
one being created along the way.  In an effort to get a head start on the process, Palmer 
and Harbord drew up a rudimentary outline for Pershing’s staff before leaving 
Washington.  Their initial plan mirrored the Army’s organization in the United States, 
separating the General Staff from the operational bureaus.  At the top was the 
commander-in-chief, followed by the chief of staff.  Next came the Adjutant General and 
the senior members of the General Staff on an equal footing.  They divided the General 
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Staff into two sections: Intelligence and Operations, while the Adjutant General oversaw 
the various service bureaus: Supply, Inspector General, Law, Medical, etc.  The British 
officers on board quickly expressed their doubts regarding the staff system’s feasibility in 
regard to the complexities of modern war.  They advised a total reorganization, and 
suggested that the Americans needed to re-envision their conception of a working field 
staff.  The focus on planning and policy-making that earmarked the General Staff in 
Washington, in lieu of actual operational command authority, could prove fatal to the 
effectiveness of the AEF General Staff.  Pershing saw this too and wanted Harbord and 
Palmer to “create an executive section in the General Staff ‘to give it responsibility.’”61  
Pershing did not want the AEF to see its General Staff and service bureaus engage in the 
same squabbles over conflicting authority that plagued the War Department.  
After making his directions clear, Pershing moved on to work with the heads of 
the staff departments, leaving Harbord and Palmer to create a workable staff 
organization.  With the outline they prepared prior to leaving the War Department in 
hand, the two men began a long and exhaustive attempt to flesh out the details of this 
system.  After several long nights in Harbord’s office stateroom, however, they 
concluded that they were fighting a losing battle.  They lacked the practical knowledge of 
how a staff operates in wartime and had no precedents to work from.  They decided that 
their time was better spent addressing other problems until they could observe their Allies 
in action and gain a better understanding of a functional General Staff.62
On the night of 5 June, the Baltic reached the submarine Danger Zone west of 
Great Britain.  The captain required the passengers to sleep fully clothed should a 
submarine attack, knowing that if he could get them in the lifeboats quickly there was a 
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good chance of being rescued.  Trusting his own ability to dress rapidly, Harbord laid out 
his clothing for easy access, adding a box of matches to his pocket contents should the 
lights be knocked out in an attack.  The Baltic itself took up a zig-zag course designed to 
throw off any submarine seeking to home in on their position.  Two destroyers took up 
escort positions on 6 July, with a third arriving the next day, providing the passengers a 
measure of relief from the constant fears of the German U-boats.  Several SOS calls from 
vessels making the crossing along with the Americans dimmed their spirits a bit, as did 
the news that some fifteen ships were sunk in British waters while the Baltic steamed 
between Halifax and Liverpool.63
Finally, the Baltic arrived in Liverpool in the early morning of 8 June after nearly 
two weeks at sea.  Ever the student of history, Harbord observed that they were the first 
foreign soldiers to step foot on English soil since William the Orange in 1688.  Unlike the 
famed English monarch, the Americans were not at their final destination, still needing to 
cross the English Channel.  For now, however, Harbord and the rest of the group relaxed 
and enjoyed the revelry that accompanied their arrival, clear in the knowledge that their 
real work would come soon enough. 
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CHAPTER III 
“LAFAYETTE, WE ARE HERE” (JUNE – JULY 1917) 
 
 After a rapid organization of an initial expeditionary force, General John J. 
Pershing and two hundred officers, clerks, and enlisted men departed for Europe in late 
May 1917.  During the voyage, the Americans worked to outline a basic organizational 
framework for the American Expeditionary Forces and to develop its operational policies.  
When they arrived in France after making a brief stop in England, the group endured an 
agonizingly long period of jubilation and relief from the British and French citizenry.  
Suffering through three long years of war, the Europeans were desperate for any sign of 
hope that could signal the eventual end to the war.  To these people the Americans were a 
godsend, and they poured all of their emotions into the arrival of their friends from across 
the sea.  But unknown to many, the Americans were in no way prepared to make an 
impact on the Western Front, nor would they be for many months.  The failure of the 
United States to prepare for war had left its military wholly deficient in the techniques of 
modern warfare now being utilized on the battlefields of Europe.  The Americans in the 
AEF were well aware of their own limitations, and could only hope that the celebratory 
spirit that accompanied their arrival would not turn to anger and disappointment during 
the extended period it would take for the United States to train, transport, and supply an 
army for operations against Imperial Germany. 
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London 
 
 The Baltic steamed safely into the Mersey River on the morning of 8 July.  Upon 
disembarking at Liverpool, a grand reception of the local officials, military 
representatives, and reporters met with the members of the fledgling AEF.  The most 
senior members of the party, who would come to be known as the staff,1 accompanied 
Pershing ashore to a serenade of the Star Spangled Banner from a local band.  While 
Pershing reviewed a contingent of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the rest of the party stood 
back, taking in the significance of the moment. The presence of a young soldier wearing 
a vertical shoulder stripe, signifying being wounded in combat, brought home that this 
celebration concerned a darker purpose.2
 Freshly promoted Lieutenant Colonel James G. Harbord received his first 
appreciation for the subtle differences between his own armed services and those of his 
new allies when a British lieutenant colonel mistook his oak leaf for a star and thought 
Harbord a brigadier general.  Much to his embarrassment, Harbord admitted his own 
confusion regarding American ranks, let alone those of his British counterparts.  None in 
the party, either American or British, could surmise why the gold leaf of a major was 
subordinate to the silver of a lieutenant colonel, but all enjoyed the mutual puzzlement.3  
After the ceremonies ended, the Americans returned to the Baltic to gather their luggage 
and prepare for the journey to London.  Pershing made a short address to a group of 
reporters, playing up the British public a bit in a show of diplomacy.  Harbord 
humorously observed the ceremony with which the British dock workers unloaded their 
luggage, taking an hour to do a job the Americans could have performed themselves in 
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fifteen minutes, and without jumbling up the baggage as the British did.  Conceding to 
ceremony, Harbord boarded the special train provided for their journey to London with a 
dispatch case under his arm containing the complete records of the American 
Expeditionary Forces.4
 The group arrived in London’s Euston Station around 3:15 p.m., where they were 
met by the Secretary of State for War, Lord Derby, Field Marshal Sir John French, the 
American Ambassador Walter H. Page, Admiral William S. Sims, and various others.  
While their arrival brought a new feeling of hope to the British, the Americans’ 
appearance did little to inspire confidence.  Over the course of the previous three weeks, 
the entire party were subjected to several rounds of inoculations for typhoid, smallpox 
and the like, with the last shots being delivered the day before.  One of Pershing’s 
officers noted that “every American staff officer I saw looked yellow and old as if they 
were all suffering from bad livers; everyone looked [at] least ten years older than he 
actually was.”5  Thankfully, General Pershing must have declined the last round of shots, 
for his appearance remained as straight and vigorous as ever, personifying everything the 
British could hope for in the American commander. 
For a nation expecting the vaunted resources of the United States, the size of 
Pershing’s party came as a cold shock to the British.  The Americans brought less than 
two hundred officers and men to a war in which millions were engaged.  Only two 
conclusions came to mind: either the Americans did not understand the situation, or they 
were not ready for the fight.  Both statements had elements of truth to them.  While 
obviously not ready for the war, the Americans were only now coming to realize the size 
and scope of the conflict.  The next few weeks would show entire nations engaged in a 
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desperate struggle for existence, things that could not be discerned from official reports 
and newspaper accounts.  The AEF faced a steep learning curve if they hoped to help 
prevent the Allies from crumbling.6
The necessary introductions and ceremonies progressed accordingly.  Already 
sensing Pershing’s deficiencies regarding public relations, Harbord suggested the AEF 
commander stand for a photograph with the train’s engineer and fireman.  Pershing did 
so, making a point to shake each man’s hand, ruining a new pair of gloves in the process 
as the cameras shuttered away.  The party then made its way to the Savoy Hotel, which 
housed the American officers during their stay in London.7  That night, Pershing and the 
Staff enjoyed a dinner in their honor given by Brigadier General Lord Brooke, who had 
been assigned as aide-de-camp to Pershing during his visit.  The informal affair offered 
an excellent opportunity for the Americans to become acquainted with their new allies.  
Over the course of many such dinners and excursions in London, the Americans began to 
notice the impact and agony of war.  Major John M. Palmer noted, “To dine on fish 
instead of beef is not war, but like the darkened ship our first night at sea, little evidences 
of austerity like this helped to push one closer toward understanding what it meant.”8
 The next morning, 10 June, Harbord received a great thrill, accompanying 
General Pershing and the Staff to Buckingham Palace for an audience with His Majesty 
the King of England.  Though he enjoyed the historical significance, Harbord was fast 
growing weary of ceremonial waiting.  He confided in his diary that “a king’s anteroom 
is no better place for me to cool my heels in than that of many a man of less degree for 
whom I have waited.  I am rapidly getting to be a professional waiter since I joined this 
staff.”9  Harbord struggled with the fact that he was no longer simply a military officer, 
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but a representative of the United States, which required a certain level of pomp and 
circumstance as part of his normal duties. 
 The meeting with King George V went well, with Pershing finding him a most 
pleasant conversationalist.  Harbord thought the King a rather unimpressive figure, with 
his small stature and habit of nervously shaking his left knee while speaking, but found 
his words satisfactory for the occasion.  When presented with Pershing’s Staff, the King 
took the opportunity to mark the occasion, saying, “It has always been my dream that the 
two English-speaking nations should some day be united in a great cause, and to-day my 
dream is realized.  Together we are fighting for the greatest cause for which peoples 
could fight.  The Anglo-Saxon race must save civilization.”10
 The rest of their time in London progressed in much the same way.  Dinners 
followed luncheons, which followed various other ceremonies, all marking the American 
entrance into the war with a dual sense of excitement and relief.  After three long years of 
hardship, the British could look to their American cousins for aid in this struggle that had 
taken such a toll on the British nation.  Ambassador Page, who had long suffered English 
stares as the United States remained ensconced behind the Atlantic and its rhetorical 
“Too proud to fight” neutrality, could now hold his head high “and look people squarely 
in the eyes.”11
 When not joining Pershing at one ceremony or another, his staff split its time 
between the War Office and sightseeing.  Majors John M. Palmer and Dennis E. Nolan, 
the newly appointed heads of Operations and Intelligence for the AEF, grew increasingly 
dismayed the more they learned from the British.  They toured the British War Office to 
see how their respective sections were organized.  What they found made clear just how 
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ill-prepared the United States was for this new war.  Palmer observed that where the 
British Operations Section contained hundreds of officers with thousands of clerks, “the 
whole Operations office for the AEF, officers, clerks, and all, could ride comfortably in a 
single one of those funny little London taxis.”12  Nolan found the same thing at the 
British Intelligence Section, with one exception: it was even larger.  The service heads 
met similar circumstances as they spent time with their British counterparts, all realizing 
that they had a long way to go before they could build a comparable organization.13
 While the staff busied themselves at the British War Office, Harbord stayed close 
to Pershing.  He accompanied the AEF commander to most meetings and engagements.   
At services at Westminster Abby on Sunday, 10 June, Harbord noted that, “in front, piled 
high on one of the figure groups, are the banners of regular regiments gone to the war” 
that provided “a constant reminder” of the struggle taking place just across the Channel.14  
After the services Harbord parted ways with Pershing, who spent the day with Lord and 
Lady Astor.  Though the AEF commander was originally scheduled to join Sir Arthur 
Paget, commander of the Home Defense Forces, and his wife for lunch, Ambassador 
Page made the last minute alteration, sending Pershing to the Astors for lunch instead and 
promising him to the Pagets for tea.  Not wanting to alienate any of their influential hosts, 
Harbord decided to keep the original appointment with the Pagets.  It proved a refreshing 
decision, as Harbord “spent as lovely a day as I ever expect to spend outside my own 
little house.”15  Holding a certain affinity for European nobility, Harbord enjoyed himself 
immensely.  He found Lady Paget, an American by birth who had lived in England for 
the past thirty years, especially pleasing.  After lunch, he enjoyed a walk with Lady Paget 
 
 60
and another guest, taking in the grounds and reveling in the brief moment of respite from 
the business at hand.16
The peace and calm did not last as tea time came and went without any sign of 
Pershing.  When he finally arrived, some time after eight that evening, Ambassador Page 
insisted that they could not stay long.  Concerned that his commander was being impolite, 
Harbord pulled Pershing aside and insisted that he stay for dinner.  When Pershing 
agreed, the irritated Ambassador stayed as well intending to whisk the General away as 
soon as possible.  Harbord managed to occupy Page long enough after dinner to allow 
Pershing a few minutes’ talk with Sir Paget.  The move bore fruit as Paget promised to 
call out a full division for a mock attack on Tuesday morning for Pershing to observe.  
When the General finally departed with Ambassador Page, Harbord made his way back 
to the hotel, finally getting to bed after midnight, but not before recording his impressions 
in his diary.  “It was rather a trying day as far as the tact required to explain our 
Ambassador and our General was concerned, but otherwise a very delightful one."17
The next day Harbord had a chance for a bit of shopping, needing some warm 
clothing, boots, and the like.  The occasion finally brought him face-to-face with the 
effects of the war.  “In all the crowds along the streets there is a fair sprinkling of officers 
and men in uniform,” he recalled, “many people wearing mourning; recruiting signs still 
abound; here and there you see signs of organized relief of one sort or another; even in 
Trafalgar Square at the foot of Nelson’s monument there was exhibited during our stay a 
shell-torn ambulance.”18  Everywhere he looked Harbord saw the various uniforms of 
British colonial soldiers.  Anzacs, Canadians and the like mingled with British regulars, 
presenting a wondrous tableau of military regalia.  Only two weeks removed from the 
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United States, as yet untouched by the war, Harbord marveled at the stoic determination 
of a nation consumed in a titanic struggle for what many believed was its very existence. 
At roughly 5 a.m. Tuesday, Harbord and Pershing made their way to Brentwood 
in Essex to observe the division maneuver arranged by General Paget.  The camp held a 
quick nine-week course offering basic instruction in trench warfare.  The group witnessed 
“bomb throwing, trench fighting, bayonet fighting, and training of all kind,” which 
Pershing found “more realistic than anything we had so far seen in our own service.”19  
Harbord was not as impressed, seeing in the men signs that England’s manpower reserves 
were quickly reaching their limits.  He could not help but think the camp was a place 
“where the physically indifferent, the convalescents and other unfit are made fit.”  The 
small stature of the 17th Yorkshires, who paraded past them, made Harbord conclude that 
the British were down to the “physically poor, runts, crooked, [and] undeveloped” in their 
search for fresh bodies to throw into the trenches. 20  A better indication of the need for 
American troops could not be asked for. 
Upon their return to London, the party attended a full state dinner at the Lancaster 
Hotel for Pershing and the remainder of his staff.21  The Americans were split amongst 
six tables, with Pershing sitting at the one headed by British Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George.  When the Prime Minister arrived fifteen minutes late, Harbord surmised that a 
politician “can do that sort of thing,” but secretly hoped that Pershing would not adopt the 
practice.22  If the Americans did not feel conspicuous enough, a British officer innocently 
asked Pershing, “General, is this your personal staff?”  Pershing replied gruffly, “No, this 
is my General Staff.”23  Seated at a table headed some distance from Pershing’s, Harbord 
could only watch as the AEF commander struggled through the evening.  But despite his 
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concern for the general, Harbord found the entire evening extremely interesting.  It turned 
out that Lord Curzon, who headed up Harbord’s table, had served as Viceroy of India and 
the two men enjoyed a lively discussion over their common interest in the Far East.24
Several speeches followed, accompanied by toasts to the King and to President 
Wilson.  The entire evening was a gallant affair that one could mistake for a reunion of 
old friends.  Major Palmer could not help but notice the underlying politics of the event.  
“As I looked about the room,” he noted, “it occurred to me that this was no empty 
ceremonial but a dinner with a purpose.  Whoever arranged the seating had carefully 
contrived to mix us all into congenial groups representing a wide cross-section of 
interests.  Here were the people who would be working to make a success of coalition 
warfare for months to come; the better we knew one another as individuals, the easier it 
would be to collaborate harmoniously.”25  The Prime Minister made it a point to meet 
each member of Pershing’s group individually, which Harbord found a bit taxing.  While 
he understood the need for diplomacy and tact, his patience for politicians went only so 
far. 
On their last morning in London, 12 June, Harbord arose at 4 a.m. for the journey 
to France.  He felt a touch of regret at leaving General Brooke, whom he had enjoyed 
immensely, but their time in London could not be stretched any further.  The group 
headed for Folkstone to board a steamer for the channel crossing.  It would be nine 
months before Harbord returned to England, and there was a considerable amount of 
work to do before then. 
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The Americans Come to France 
 
The AEF’s arrival in Boulogne mirrored that at Liverpool, with crowds cheering 
and bands playing with near hysterical frenzy.  Docking alongside the Americans were 
steamers carrying Annanite troops from Indochina26 and Senegalese from North Africa, 
testifying to the strain on French manpower.  Harbord could not help noticing the AEF’s 
arrival at the sight where Napoleon had assembled the Grand Army for its planned 
invasion of England in 1805, but dismissed it as “other days; other alliances.”27  Waiting 
for Pershing amongst the cheering crowds was General Peltier, first Chief of French 
Mission to AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), who had lost a hand while throwing a 
grenade away from his wounded troops.  Alongside Peltier was Lieutenant Colonel Count 
Adalbert (Bertie) de Chambrun, a descendant of the famed Marquis de Lafayette, who 
had aided General Washington during the American Revolution.  Born in the United 
States and married to the sister of congressional representative Nicholas Longworth, 
Chambrun eventually became a close friend to both Pershing and Harbord, and proved 
himself a valuable ally in dealing with the French.  Harbord liked him immediately, but 
could not help noting that Chambrun “speaks good English, and a great deal of it.”28  
After the initial introductions the men stood through several playings of the “Star 
Spangled Banner” and the “Marseillaise.”  To Harbord it seemed that the band played 
nothing but the American anthem, and he could not help but notice that “even the 
General, who stands like a statue, growled over the number of times they played it.”29  
After two hours of speechmaking, hand shaking, and band playing the group boarded a 
train for Paris.  Harbord, for one, was glad to have a bit of peace.  He feared his hands 
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were going to break off at the wrists with all the clapping, hand shaking and back-
slapping, and could only cringe at what awaited them in Paris. 
The party finally left Boulogne around noon in order to arrive in Paris at the end 
of the work day when the greatest number of people could greet them.  Crowds gathered 
at every rail stop along the way, with their sense of joy and relief at the Americans’ 
coming growing more palatable the closer the party came to Paris.  Meeting them at the 
Gare du Nord was Paul Painlevé, current Minister of War and soon to be Premier; Joffre, 
General René Viviani, General Ferdinand Foch, the French chief of staff; American 
Ambassador William G. Sharp; and a throng of others.  The greetings were pleasantly 
informal, with no speechmaking, much to Harbord’s relief.  There ensued a bit of 
diplomatic jumbling as assignments were passed out for the automobiles designated to 
carry them through the streets of Paris.  Marshal Joffre, so instrumental in securing 
Pershing’s early dispatch to France, was shifted between several different cars, each one 
further from the front of the procession.  It was a stark reminder that the venerable French 
commander, though still close to the hearts of the French people, had been firmly shelved 
by the French government.30
On the ride from the station, roses and Parisians shouting “Vive l’Amerique” 
swarmed the motorcade.  Pershing was a bit taken aback by the overflow of emotion, 
finding it hard “to imagine that any people could be so wildly demonstrative,” to the 
point of being “most touching and in a sense most pathetic.  It brought home to us as 
nothing else could have done a full appreciation of the war-weary state of the nation and 
stirred within us a deep sense of the responsibility resting upon America.”31  Riding 
through the hordes of enthusiasts Harbord felt a bit overwhelmed himself, having to be 
 
 65
reminded by Chambrun to smile to the shouting crowds.  Frenchmen wept openly in the 
streets as the party passed and women kissed any hand hanging out the windows.  
Harbord’s enjoyment briefly turned to fear when he lost sight of Pershing’s carriage, 
leading him to think they had passed the AEF commander.  Harbord envisioned being 
mistaken for the American commander-in-chief, causing him a moment of panic that only 
subsided when they reached the Hôtel de Crillon where he saw Pershing fighting his way 
up the steps through the cheering crowds.  Never was Harbord so glad to see the general 
in a difficult position as at that moment.32
The rooms at the Crillon offered little peace and quiet to Pershing and his staff as 
expatriate Americans seemed to materialize out of thin air.  They offered endless 
opinions of the relations between the Allies, most of them less than encouraging, and 
made requests to join the AEF in various capacities.  Added to this were the constant 
calls from the streets below for a view of the American commander.   Pershing had to 
make repeated appearances on the balcony, each of which was greeted with a thunderous 
ovation. 
When the visitors finally stopped coming, Pershing and Harbord had a chance to 
sit down and compare their impressions of the day.  Both were touched by the outpouring 
of emotion on the part of the French people, but they could not shake the feeling that the 
French were making too much of their arrival.  Yes the Americans had come, but there 
were less than two hundred of them.  The men who would make up the proposed 
American Army were still many months away from being ready.  Harbord knew that with 
their arrival, “it would not be many hours before all France would be looking for the 
troops which we both knew were still undrafted in their homes all over the broad United 
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States. . . . A rebound of sentiment seemed inevitable and it was almost sure to be 
accompanied by a certain lowering of Allied morale.”  Though a remarkable day, 
Harbord could not hide the feeling that they were received “under false pretenses.”33  The 
Americans needed time to build an organization, transport their men, train their forces, 
and put them into line.  Exactly how much time they needed remained in question, but all 
evidence pointed to it being considerable.  How long the Europeans could wait was 
another matter entirely. 
Of course these were the same questions facing the Americans prior to their 
journey across the Atlantic.  But now that they were in France, Harbord surmised that the 
short boost their arrival gave to the tenuous French morale would quickly evaporate when 
American troops did not begin arriving en masse.  It made sense given the current state of 
the French war effort.  Recently the French had launched the disastrous Nivelle offensive, 
which sacrificed some 120,000 men in a futile attempt to break the German line.  What 
broke instead was the French Army, with some sixteen army corps almost simultaneously 
rising up in mutinies.  One division even threatened to march on Paris, and the Minister 
of War, Paul Painlevé, reported that only two divisions could be counted on fully should 
the Germans decide to launch an offensive.  Though the public remained unaware of this, 
Pershing was told before leaving Washington.  While the main threat of the mutinies had 
passed by the time the AEF reached France, they continued to cast a pall over the French 
military.  Now that the Americans were face to face with the desperate joy of the French 
citizenry, Ambassador Sharp’s statement, “I hope you have not arrived too late,” to 
Pershing rung in everyone’s ears.34  Pershing himself could only wonder if the French 
morale could be restored.35
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The next several days were filled with the much the same type of ceremonies as in 
London.  Though anxious to get to work, Pershing recognized the need for these delays.  
Harbord, for one, enjoyed the time immensely, having a particular soft spot for the 
unique extravagances of French hospitality.  He was doubly pleased at the skill with 
which Pershing handled himself.  Everywhere they went it seemed Pershing knew exactly 
what the moment called for, the best example coming on their visit to Napoleon’s Tomb 
at Les Invalides on 14 July.  When presented with the Emperor’s sword Pershing 
declined to take it, choosing instead to bow stiffly from the waist, hands at his side, and 
kiss the blade in a show of respect.  Harbord later recounted with pride that “the story 
was told in every bivouac and barrack in France, and ran through the drawing-rooms of 
the capital like a bulletin from the Grande Armée.”36  For days the politicians continued 
to fawn over Pershing and his officers.  During a visit to the Chamber of Deputies, the 
“Chamber nearly went amuck over General Pershing, rising to their feet and cheering for 
ten or fifteen minutes.”  When a request came in for Pershing to visit the Senate, Harbord 
mused that the General “could be elected King of France” had he so desired.37
For all the praise, Pershing knew that the time was fast approaching to begin 
tackling the business at hand.  The first step came on 16 June when Pershing and Harbord 
paid a visit to General Henri Philippe Pétain at his headquarters at Compiègne.  The first 
meeting between the men, it would set the tone for their relationship and needed to go 
well.  Though Joffre remained the hero of the people, Pétain represented the heart of the 
French Army.  After the disastrous Nivelle offensive, it fell upon Pétain to hold the army 
together, which he did through a combination of tact and understanding.  In addition to 
improving food rations and redressing justifiable grievances, he promised that there 
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would be no more major attacks for the foreseeable future.  For the time being, they 
would hold the line and wait for the Americans.38
With Pershing now in Paris, both he and Pétain anxiously sought a meeting.  
Harbord noted that for all the ministers and officials they had met in France, none seemed 
to show the iron will that had kept the French in the war up to this point.  Where were the 
men who inspired the people to carry on year after year?  Up to this point Harbord had 
only seen smiling diplomats and glad-handing politicians, a fact that made their endless 
diplomatic visits all the more wearisome.  Sensing his concern, Chambrun stated simply, 
“These are all great men, but they are great men of the past.  Wait until you see Pétain.”39
When Pershing and Harbord finally gained their audience with the French 
general, they found Pétain hard at work with the business of war (something they had not 
seen much of up to that point).  Kindred spirits, the two commanders liked each other 
immediately and formed a strong friendship that survived the strain of the next eighteen 
months.  As it turned out, the men shared a great deal in common.  They were strong, 
virile, ambitious, and serious minded, yet possessed a good sense of humor that only a 
close few enjoyed.  Roughly the same age, each man focussed on the task at hand, and 
drove those around them to a degree that bordered on ruthlessness.  Historian Donald 
Smythe summed them up by saying, “Both were men of sound common sense, of great 
steadiness, of dogged determination, tempered by humanity and a knowledge of human 
weakness.  Both were men of the possible, who knew that the grandest of schemes must 
be conditioned by finite human and material resources.”40
Dutifully impressed with Pétain, Harbord noted with pleasure that “he looks you 
in the face when he speaks to you.”  The French general’s reputation for common sense 
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preceded him, as did his disdain for politicians (a feeling Harbord found himself quickly 
developing).  Harbord eventually credited Pétain with saving France at its darkest hour, 
pulling it back from the brink of implosion. 41  Pershing echoed these sentiments, 
thinking Pétain’s appointment to command the French Army matched that of Marshal 
Ferdinand Foch’s eventual rise to generalissimo in importance to the final victory.42
The luncheon went well enough, though the need for an interpreter slightly 
hindered their ability to communicate.  Neither Pershing nor Harbord had yet reached a 
point of fluency to be able to carry on a real conversation, but the group carried on as best 
they could.  Pétain was pleased that the Americans had come at last, but he shocked his 
guests when, with solemn seriousness, he said that he hoped they were not too late.  It 
was one thing to hear such sentiments from the American Ambassador, but quite another 
for them to come from the French commander-in-chief.  It drove home the point of just 
how close the French were to losing the war and had a profound impact on the 
Americans.43
When the time came for Pershing and Harbord to depart, Pétain suggested that 
they take a trip up to see the front.  The Americans agreed and Major General Franchet 
d’Espérey, commanding a group of armies under Pétain, secured two motors and took 
them to a point in the line opposite Saint Quentin.  They took up a position in an artillery 
observation outpost and gained their first view of the front through a high-powered 
telescope.  Though there was some fear of artillery fire, the most dangerous part of the 
affair was the return trip, as their chauffeur took it upon himself to drive at breakneck 
speeds so as not to expose them to possible enemy fire for too long a time.  After 
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cautioning the man several times, General d’Espérey’s anger grew to the point that he 
threatened the chauffeur with violence, after which their speed was greatly reduced.44
With their journey to the front completed, Pershing and Harbord returned to Paris 
with the hope of getting to work.  What greeted them, instead, was an avalanche of 
representatives from various American missions seeking to do their part in the war.  
Though well-meaning, these groups soon developed into a nuisance.  Included in their 
ranks were engineers, railroad men, and scientists of various specialties, all claiming a 
need to see General Pershing.  Harbord confessed his increasing weariness at these do-
gooders to his diary, complaining of “Charitable organizations insisting on tending to the 
wounded, while hundreds of widows and orphans are in need of aid; misguided 
enthusiasts cabling for motor cars two thousand at a time when the French have not 
gasoline enough to operate those they have.  People bringing things to France that take up 
shipping room, when the most important thing in the world now, and that on which the 
victory will turn, is shipping.”45
Harbord’s emphasis on American shipping was no exaggeration.  When the war 
broke out in 1914, ninety percent of American foreign trade was carried in foreign-owned 
berths.  As France and Britain shifted their merchant fleets to wartime needs, the United 
States scrambled just to meet its own commercial needs.  After the war declaration, the 
government seized a number of German passenger and cargo vessels sitting in American 
docks since 1914, adding nearly 300,000 tons to the shipping fleet.  But to transport the 
numbers Pershing envisioned, the United States needed several million tons more for 
troop and supply transport.46  To secure these bottoms, the nation embarked upon a 
massive building program that promised great returns for 1919, should the war last that 
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long.  Until then, however, the United States would have to rely on the tonnage it already 
had, and whatever additional ships the Allies could supply.47
 
31 rue Constantine 
 
In addition to the charitable missions vying for Pershing’s attention and causing 
Harbord much irritation, there were several missions in Paris focussing on military 
problems.  The most important of these, the Military Mission in France, preceded 
Pershing to Paris, where it began studying the line and staff organizations of both the 
French and British and observing the military methods America’s new Associates utilized 
in the field. 48  Composed of six officers from various branches of the Army, the Mission 
provided valuable information concerning organizational makeup of the Allied staff 
systems to the newly arrived members of the AEF.49  The Mission also contributed 
several of its members to the AEF General Staff.  The most notable of these were 
Lieutenant Colonel James A. Logan and Major William “Billy” Mitchell, both of whom 
transferred to Pershing’s command soon after the general’s arrival in Paris.  Logan had 
been in France since the war began, having been directed to aid in the evacuation of 
American tourists during in the fall of 1914.  An extremely able staff officer, he 
eventually became Pershing’s assistant chief of staff for Administration.  No less 
efficient, Mitchell became the driving force behind American military aviation, 
eventually replacing Pershing’s original aviation officer.  After the war, he continued to 
advocate the potential for air power, but was forced to resign from the Army for 
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insubordination that stemmed from his efforts to establish a separate Air Force for the 
United States. 
In addition to providing information on the French and British staff organizations, 
the Mission aided in securing temporary office spaces for Pershing and the AEF staff.  
Though Pershing wanted to establish a General Headquarters as soon as possible, several 
questions needed answering before the process could begin.  The first of these was the 
section of the line the AEF would occupy once it built up its forces.  Several factors 
influenced the decision, the most pressing being operational and logistical practicality.  
With the British firmly ensconced along the Belgian front protecting the Channel ports, 
and the French covering the approaches to Paris, the most logical section for the 
Americans was further east, perhaps in Lorraine or the Vosges.  Supply concerns also 
factored into the discussion.  The ports and rail lines surrounding the Channel were 
already pushed to their limit with the demands of the British Expeditionary Forces.  The 
same could be said of the transportation network surrounding Paris.  Neither region could 
handle the logistical needs of another army, especially not one of the size Pershing 
envisioned.  This left central and southern France as the most practical region for 
establishing an American supply system.  But like any issue of this magnitude, a final 
decision required further study, and the Americans needed temporary facilities for the 
time being.  The need to coordinate with the French and British made Paris the obvious 
choice for a temporary headquarters, much to Pershing’s chagrin.  As any Parisian could 
attest, the city offered a bevy of potential distractions for officers and enlisted men alike.  
Pershing needed his men focussed, and wanted to create a controlled environment for 
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them to work in.  But at this early stage of AEF development, the commander-in-chief 
had to accept Paris as an initial base of operations; there being no workable alternative .50
For office space, the Mission secured houses at 27 and 31 rue Constantine on the 
left bank of the River Seine.  While not the worst choice possible, the selection suffered 
from some serious deficiencies.  First and foremost was a desperate lack of space.  The 
entire Operations Section, clerks, officers, and equipment, was confined to a single room.  
Boxes, maps, and other supplies remained scattered about, making walking a difficult 
proposition.  Nolan also piled the entire Intelligence Section into a single office, making 
it “such an uncomfortable and crowded place that it kept at least a few of the Americans 
in Paris away from us, and made us anxious to move out of the capitol to some place 
where we would have space to move around.”51  Contributing to their discomfort was the 
office’s location.  Facing the Esplanade des Invalides, the office was off the main 
cruising route of the Paris taxis, and the only convenient access was to the Invalides.  To 
go anywhere else required a long walk, not an enviable proposition in the hot Paris 
summer.  Most of the members of Pershing’s staff, Harbord included, believed the offices 
were selected with the idea of speeding up the AEF’s eventual departure from Paris, 
which one could certainly imagine.52
On the other side of the equation, the quarters secured for Pershing and his 
immediate staff proved more than adequate.  Provided by a wealthy American, Ogden 
Mills, the mansion located at Number 73 rue de Varennes met all of Pershing’s needs and 
more.  Dating back to the days of Louis XIV, the mansion had some forty rooms and 
magnificent gardens.  The AEF commander moved in on 26 June, accompanied by 
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Harbord, the Inspector General, the Adjutant General, and his personal aides.  The rest of 
the staff were left to find their own residences, often at considerable expense.53
Getting to work in their new GHQ on 17 June, Pershing and Harbord turned their 
attention to the question of the press and the persistent group of news men that reported 
their every movement.  Responding to desperate calls for information from home, 
American reporters sought out any news suitable for printing, whether the General Staff 
wanted it made public or not.  Reports began filtering in through the newspapers of the 
stupendous preparations being made at home.  Claims of hundreds of thousands of 
airplanes departing for France conflicted with official reports coming out of rue 
Constantine, causing further problems with Allied morale and consternation amongst 
Pershing’s staff.  Nolan knew that the “average professional soldier . . . distinctly 
distrusts the professional writer,” but did not want to create an adversarial relationship 
with the press.54  Instead, he sought to bring the reporters into the General Staff’s 
confidence and exert more subtle controls on their reporting.. 
Knowing the importance of controlling information in wartime, the General Staff 
quickly moved to set up a system of censorship in the AEF.  Harbord oversaw the 
issuance of regulations pertaining to censorship, taking special care to outline the 
reasoning behind the restrictions.  Seeking to avoid making “the task of the enemy agents 
easier,” the General Staff set up a rigid censorship system covering all forms of 
communication, whether they be within the AEF, with foreign entities, or 
communications with the United States.55  All war correspondents fell under the purview 
of the Intelligence Section, with censors tightly controlling all news regarding the AEF.  
These restrictions eventually led to an embarrassing situation for Harbord a year later 
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when he commanded a brigade of Marines at the battle of Belleau Wood, but for the time 
being they worked to limit confusion and misstatements concerning the AEF. 
 
Settling in 
 
While the General Staff worked away at rue Constantine, Pershing received an 
invitation from the French War Office to send several officers to the front to observe 
preparations for an upcoming assault.  Taking full advantage of the opportunity, Pershing 
designated Harbord, Palmer, and Captain James L. Collins for the task.  Though the idea 
of visiting the front appealed to Harbord, he did not want to leave Paris with so much 
going on.  With the first shipment of troops from the United States scheduled to arrive 
soon, his office still needed organizing, and a new mission from the Secretary of War had 
just arrived to aid in the development of AEF operational policies.  Harbord amused 
himself with the though of asking the French to wait, but thought “it would be 
unreasonable to ask Pétain to postpone even a small offensive because [the Americans 
were] not yet ready,” so he resigned himself to go.”56
Leaving by train around noon on 24 June, Harbord and Captain Collins traveled to 
the headquarters of the French Second Army at Souilly, with plans for Palmer to join 
them later.  During the five and a half-hour journey Harbord took in the wondrous French 
countryside, reflecting upon the land’s Napoleonic heritage, particularly the Emperor’s 
dramatic campaign of 1814.  While lost in these thoughts, he noticed mostly women and 
children working in the fields, the only civilian men he saw being too old for military 
service.  Even in this lush and fertile country, one could not escape the war.57
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Arriving at Bar-le-Due, roughly thirty miles south of Verdun, they made their way 
to Souilly and the headquarters of General Guillaumat, commander of the Second Army 
and a seventy-five mile arc of the line.  Once there, Harbord was surprised to find no 
preparations being made for an assault.  General Guillaumat explained that while he 
planned to go on the offensive, it was still several months away.  All he could offer the 
two Americans was an overview of the last offensive in the region and a tour of the 
ground.  A bit irritated at the apparent breakdown in communication between the front 
lines, the War Office, and the AEF, Harbord decided to stay and make the best of the 
situation.58
Over the next several days Harbord traveled throughout the region, observing all 
manner of operations.  He inspected the water supply system for the entire Second Army, 
witnessed the details involved in maintaining observational balloons, and experienced 
billeting for the first time.  Of particular interest was observing the interrogation of 
German prisoners.  Harbord found them the equally rugged and wretched figures one 
assumes an enemy to be.  He watched as the French searched the prisoners for any papers 
or documents and then conducted general interrogations.  At one point the interrogator 
pointed Harbord and Collins out to a German prisoner, informing him they were 
Americans come to join in the war.  The young man could only smile, saying, “For me 
the war is over and it makes no difference.”59  Harbord was a long way from the 
overwhelming sentimentality of Paris and the hope surrounding the American 
Expeditionary Forces. 
The visit also gave Harbord the invaluable opportunity of observing a functioning 
general staff in the field.  He was struck by how efficiently it operated, with men 
 
 77
frittering about here and there with a look of assuredness, each expressing confidence in 
whatever task he was doing.  When compared to the mass chaos of GHQ AEF, Harbord 
could not help but realize that the Americans had a long way to go before they could even 
hope to field a comparable organization.  Even more shocking and impressive was the 
French Intelligence Section, with detailed maps of the entire Western Front including 
information on every German unit on the line scattered about.  Harbord knew that Nolan 
would have undoubtedly marveled at the operation, but decided not to tell him, thinking 
he had enough on his mind. 
Duly impressed with the French operation, Harbord decided to take advantage of 
his location and journeyed to Verdun, intending to see life in the trenches close up.  
Amazed at the city’s magnificent fortifications, he could not help but question the logic 
behind the German offensive in 1916 that sacrificed hundreds of thousands of men and 
gained virtually nothing.  As far as the eye could see, crosses marked the graves of the 
French defenders who fell by the thousands against the German onslaught.  For a man 
new to this type of warfare, Harbord gave each side their due for enduring such slaughter.  
He felt a particular pride at the way the French stood firm on this uninspiring piece of 
land, looked the German straight in the eye and claimed: “You shall not pass.”  It was the 
very essence of martial spirit, and Harbord hoped his own countrymen could live up to 
the example of their ally.60
Once in the trenches, Harbord got his first experience of artillery fire, having 
several German shells crash around him on various occasions.  One of his guides pointed 
out how the battle showed the essential need for good coordination between the infantry 
and the artillery.  To advance without adequate artillery support was suicide, the 
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Frenchman observed, and advised Harbord, “You must get [this fact] into the heads of 
your infantry, driving it in as a nail, as it were.”61  Harbord listened dutifully, but felt a 
greater need to appear comfortable in front of his guides.  He had to fight the urge to 
duck as a shell whistled overhead.  Had he paid more attention to his guide’s words, 
perhaps he would have made more of an effort to coordinate his own infantry and 
artillery when he commanded a brigade at the front, but that was still a year away.  
When Harbord returned to Paris on 28 June, he learned of several important 
developments that had taken place in his absence.  The first was the selection of the 
American front.  In a short meeting between Pershing and Pétain, the American 
commander asked for and was given the Lorraine sector east of the Argonne Forest.  
Truly the only viable choice for an American sector, the Lorraine region did not have the 
prestige of either the British of French sections, but it did have several marked 
advantages.  Chief amongst these was its location.  A fair distance from the Channel ports 
and Paris, the likelihood that the Germans would launch a major offensive there was slim.  
Therefore, it could give the Americans the opportunity to gain valuable experience in the 
trenches before being called upon to conduct any large-scale operations. 
The Lorraine region also proved a good choice in terms of logistical access.  
Though it needed a major road and rail system, the sector was less congested than the 
more western segments of the front, with both the French and British packed in along the 
line.  The vast stretches of land offered plentiful locales for billeting troops as well as a 
greater supply of locally obtainable supplies.  Additionally, the region had distinct 
possibilities for offensive operations.  The St. Mihiel Salient, an extension of the line just 
east of Verdun, had been a continual irritant to the French since 1914.  Its reduction was 
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just the sort of task a newly formed army would desire.  Moreover, less than fifty miles 
behind German territory lay the railheads of Metz and Thionville.  Any offensive that cut 
these lines had the potential to cause a general withdrawal of the German Army from the 
entire southern front.  Finally, the area north of Lorraine was of vital economic 
importance to Germany’s war effort.  The valuable iron mines near Briery and the coal 
rich Saar valley provided raw material for German munitions production.  To deprive 
Germany of either of these, or best of all both, would potentially cripple Germany’s 
ability to continue the war.62
Harbord also learned that the first American combat troops had arrived during his 
absence.  The advance elements of the 1st Division, some 14,000 men under the 
command of Major General William L. Sibert, began arriving on 26 June at St. Nazaire.63  
Though technically a Regular division, the vast majority of the officers and men needed 
considerable training before they would be ready to go into the line.  Over half of the 
company commanders had less than six months experience, pressing the need for the 
AEF to create a systematic school system in France to provide officers additional training 
on top of what they received in the United States.  As a whole, the division contained 
only a spattering of professionals within its ranks.  The War Department hoped these men 
would form a learned core around which the division could be built.  With the small 
number of regulars available, the War Department needed to stretch them out as far as 
possible.  Though sensible, the policy meant that no American division would arrive in 
France anywhere near combat readiness for several months.64
Though delighted at the arrival of the American troops, Harbord found their 
appearance and training level most depressing.  Nor could he muster much enthusiasm 
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for the division’s commander.  An engineer by training, General Sibert had little 
experience with the infantry during his career.  He owed his stars to his work on the 
Panama Canal, and found more enjoyment in solving engineering problems than in 
building up his division.  Given his lack of experience, Sibert’s selection to command the 
1st Division came as a surprise to more than one army insider.  But even more troubling 
to Harbord was the fact that Sibert had a history of softness.  He did not show the same 
personal and professional drive that Harbord and Pershing agreed would be necessary for 
the rough American divisions.  Pershing eventually came to share Harbord’s low opinion 
of Sibert as a division commander, and removed him in January of 1918.  For now, 
however, the division took up billets around Gondrecourt and looked to begin a training 
regimen as soon as Pershing and the General Staff finalized one.65
In an effort to give the waning French morale another boost, Pershing ordered one 
of Sibert’s battalions to take part in the last great honor bestowed upon the Americans by 
the French: a celebration of the 4th of July.  Thousands of Parisians lined the streets for a 
parade from Napoleon’s Tomb at Les Invalides to Lafayette’s final resting place a few 
miles away.  Not a participant in the parade, Harbord took in the scene with Colonel de 
Chambrun and other officers from GHQ.  The affair had a dual purpose.  On the one 
hand, it honored the United States and its recently arrived men.  At the same time, the 
event provided the chance to revel in France’s grand military tradition a century after the 
battle of Waterloo.  A French battalion led the procession into the domed addition to Les 
Invalides where the Emperor’s crypt lay, followed closely by the indomitable Marshal 
Joffre, still close to the heart of the French people.  When Pershing finally arrived, 
flanked by an aide and looking the very embodiment of martial spirit, the crowd erupted 
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in a thunderous cheer.  Watching the reaction, Harbord battled with a mixture of pride 
and apprehension.  “There is always a possible tragedy in the career of every general who 
starts to serve our hysterical inefficient people,” he confessed, “whose thousand activities 
at this moment seem to be moving along parallel lines instead of being converged on the 
one object, and whose idea of conducting the war seems to be to send crowds of 
individuals and commissions of every description to visit France, and to talk, talk, 
talk.”66  It would not be long before such ceremonies would ring hollow if the Americans 
could not make more of a contribution to the war than a parade battalion, but for now it 
would have to do. 
After the ceremonies at Les Invalides, the procession moved out to the tomb of 
Lafayette some three miles away.  One can hardly imagine the scene, as flowers flowed 
from all sides, and the cheers never died away once they began.  Awash in sentimentality, 
the event allowed the Parisians to celebrate their connection to the American nation.  The 
Marquis de Lafayette, buried in American soil as per his request, tied the two nations 
together, linking the American and French people in a debt of honor.  To all those 
present, it was clear that Pershing had come to repay that debt.  Colonel Charles E. 
Stanton, chosen to speak because of his command of French, knew just what the moment 
required.  After a standard Fourth of July speech of histrionics condemning the Germans 
for their part in bringing the war, he turned to the tomb and uttered the most famous 
American quote of the war, “Lafayette, we are here!”67  It did not matter that Pershing 
was not the author, for everyone in the crowd and the nation assumed the sentiments were 
his.  It was the perfect capstone for the coming of the AEF, and Harbord doubted he 
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would see another day like this one until the long sought victory celebration.  Little did 
he know that such a celebration was still two years away.  
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CHAPTER IV 
GETTING ORGANIZED (JULY - AUGUST 1917) 
 
With the celebrations for the AEF’s arrival beginning to wane, Pershing and 
Harbord finally began addressing the problem of building an organizational structure for 
American military operations in France.  Everything needed attention, and the first order 
of business was to create a hierarchical framework for the AEF General Staff to work 
under.  Harbord knew that the most pressing questions before them were also the most 
basic, and drew up a short list in a meeting with Pershing: “What shall be the ultimate 
total of our forces in France?  What shall be the organization of the troops with which we 
fight?  How shall they be supplied?  What proportion of supply can be obtained in 
Europe?  How shall shipments of supplies and troops be worked out with reference to 
each other?  For what period must we prepare as the probable duration of the War?”1  
Pershing and the General Staff needed to establish set policies for these issues before they 
could even think about joining the fight in any meaningful way. 
 There were also smaller, more practical questions that needed addressing: What 
ports would they use?  Should the AEF rely upon animal or motor transportation?  Where 
would the training centers be located?  What was the shipment schedule for troops and 
supplies?  What types of arms should they use, and would they produce their munitions 
and armaments themselves or rely upon the Allies for aid?  The General Staff needed to 
settle these questions early on to avoid serious problems later.  Selecting the wrong port, 
such as one with poor rail access or insufficient draft capabilities, would slow the 
movement of troops and supplies for months to come.  Troops could not be brought to 
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Europe in large numbers before the General Staff knew how to supply them.  The longer 
it took to establish a training program for the AEF meant the longer it would be before 
the Americans could take up positions in the front lines.  Over the next two months, 
Pershing, Harbord, and the General Staff worked to settle these issues and create an 
organizational structure for the AEF that would be ready when the War Department 
started sending large numbers of American soldiers to France. 
 
Creating a General Staff 
 
 Before anything else, Pershing had to decide what size force he believed 
necessary to achieve victory.  On 6 July he cabled the war department, requesting the 
creation of plans for “sending over at least one million men by next May.”  Pershing 
envisioned such a force providing “practically half [a] million men for [the] trenches.”2  
A harbinger of things to come in terms of the relationship between the AEF and the War 
Department, Pershing did not explain how he arrived at the figure, nor did he state how 
the War Department should accomplish this goal.  As seen in the previous chapter, the 
United States had an alarmingly small merchant fleet available to transport personnel and 
supplies to France.  If Pershing considered this factor in his reasoning, he did not say so, 
but apparently assumed the Allies would provide the necessary shipping to make up for 
the lack of American tonnage.  After studying the resources at hand, the War Department 
replied that tonnage existed for only 650,000 men on Pershing’s timetable, and even that 
would be difficult.  Unconvinced, Pershing continued to push for his original figure, 
leaving the War Department to find a way to fulfill it.  Both sides had a point, with 
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Pershing stating what he believed necessary to accomplish his mission and the War 
Department saying what was possible in the time allowed.  They would need to find a 
common ground if they hoped to work together effectively.  But at this early stage, 
Pershing had too many other concerns to worry about ruffling feathers at the home front, 
and the War Department lacked the backbone to stand up to the commander in the field.3
 As Pershing decided on the size of force he wanted in Europe, the staff finalized 
the organizational makeup for the General Staff.  Over the past month, staff officers had 
spent time observing the Allies, gathering information, and comparing procedures to 
determine what to emulate and what to ignore.  For Pershing to effectively commence 
building an army in Europe he needed an effective General Staff to “conform to 
conditions [at hand] and enable the Commander-in-Chief to proceed with his planning.”4  
When the AEF officers finally began constructing a staff organization, they soon found 
themselves in uncharted waters with few precedents to work from.  The Field Service 
Regulations [FSR] of the U.S. Army, 1914, (the most current edition available in 1917), 
provided only a basic structure for forming a general staff.  It outlined that the General 
Staff should be divided into three sections: combat (operations), administrative, and 
intelligence.  These branches covered the specific needs of a combat operation in 
wartime: i.e. censorship, care for sick and wounded, disposition of forces, etc.  The task 
of administering the day-to-day concerns of the army fell to the technical and 
administrative services (Adjutant General, Quartermaster, Chief of Ordnance, etc.), 
grouped together in the Line of Communications.  Overseeing this organization was a 
Commander of the Line of Communications, whose duty it was to “relieve the combatant 
field force, as far as possible, from every consideration except that of defeating the 
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enemy.”5  Pershing’s staff studied this basic organization to see if it fit with the present 
circumstances in France, or if they needed a completely new system. 
 During the voyage on the Baltic, Pershing and Harbord had discussed a basic staff 
organization based upon what they presumed would be necessary once they reached 
France.  They worked up a “skeleton outline of principles” that would become the “basis 
of the larger organization later adopted after a study of French and British general staff 
systems.”6  When looking at the organization outlined in the Field Service Regulations, 
the staff realized that the situation in France required specific modifications.  In order to 
build an effective combat organization from scratch, Pershing needed a larger general 
staff with more centralized control.  By the beginning of July, the staff finally began 
drawing up a system that utilized information gleaned from the allies, but remained a 
distinctly American creation.  Issued as General Orders No. 8 [G.O. No. 8], 5 July 1917, 
the new organization followed the FSR by dividing Pershing’s headquarters into two 
branches: a general staff and an administrative and technical staff.  Taking a page from 
the more dynamic General Staff utilized by the French, the AEF version totaled five 
sections, each headed by a chief of section.7  Transferring to the AEF from the Military 
Mission, James A. Logan assumed control of the Administrative section.  Dennis E. 
Nolan remained as head of the Intelligence section, as did John McAuley Palmer with 
Operations.  The two new sections added to the General Staff dealt with issues unique to 
the AEF.  Given the current size and state of the Army, the United States needed to train 
a large body of men for operations in Europe.  With a clear understanding that this 
training could not be isolated on the home front, the planners added a Training section, 
headed up by Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. Malone.  Finally, the General Staff gained a 
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Coordination section, under the direction of W.D. Conner.  This last, and possibly most 
vital section had the express purpose of coordinating all organizations within Pershing’s 
command.  Wherever administrative policies overlapped, or involved multiple sections or 
technical/administrative staffs, it fell to the Coordination section to maintain a unity of 
purpose for all involved and to settle any disputes that arose.  Harbord remained as chief 
of staff, assisted by Frank R. McCoy who assumed the position of secretary to the 
General Staff.8
Pershing made good choices in filling out his staff personnel, as each man 
represented the best the U.S. Army had to offer.  Ambitious, eager, and vigorous, they 
were just the sort of men Pershing wanted, and proved themselves every bit as capable as 
their European counterparts had been in 1914.  The problem, however, was that it was 
now 1917, and the Americans were well behind the curve in military thought and 
experience and would suffer agonizing delays due to inexperience and inefficiency.  
Their relative lack of experience did not escape Major Hugh Drum, who admitted, “There 
is no doubt we lack men in power who have the faculty for organizing. . . . The use of a 
general staff is so new [and] strange to most of our people that they will have to play 
around with it for a while.”  Despite these concerns, he was confident “it will come out 
OK in time.  There are good men working on it.”9  Harbord was more kind in regard to 
the officers of the staff, which he considered the “very soul and sinew of General 
Pershing’s organization.”  For all the faith Harbord had in Pershing, he knew that they 
would need an effective staff if they hoped to achieve any level of success.  When 
looking at their accomplishments after the war, Harbord beamed with pride at how the 
original staff of three grew to an organization of over two hundred, eventually directing 
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an army of over two million men.  “No army can be worth the name without an efficient 
staff, and in my opinion no General, considering all the circumstances, was ever better 
served in that respect than Pershing.”10
The other component of the organization created by G.O. No. 8 was an 
Administrative and Technical staff.  It included the chiefs of some fifteen different 
Departments, Services, and Corps (e.g. Inspector General, Chief Surgeon, Chief 
Ordnance Officer, and Chief of Air Service, etc.).  By far the most important of these, in 
terms of the functioning staff, was the Adjutant General’s Department, ably headed up by 
Colonel Benjamin Alvord, with the assistance of Robert C. “Corky” Davis.  The staff, as 
a whole, knew and liked each other well enough, often dispensing with military formality 
and addressing each other by nicknames.  Even Pershing was reduced to “J.J.P.” in inter-
staff communications, though never to his face.11
Aside from their ability, Pershing’s staff also displayed the darker side of 
professional ambition.  Most of them were colonels, lieutenant colonels, or majors when 
they joined Pershing in France, and brought with them the self-confidence and arrogance 
of youth.  They showed open contempt for older, more established officers who had not 
gone through the Army’s educational program (most notably the General Staff College at 
Leavenworth).  With Pershing’s attention divided amongst organizational, political, and 
diplomatic concerns, he needed the staff to take hold of the AEF and mold it into the 
force he wanted.  The staff reveled in their newfound authority, speaking in Pershing’s 
name with such regularity that an order from the General Staff became synonymous with 
the AEF commander’s wishes.  Hence there developed an air of superiority amongst 
those closest to Pershing, most routinely directed towards anyone not serving at GHQ.  
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This brought considerable ire from officers in the line, who often took great offense to the 
officious tone and manners emanating from Pershing’s headquarters.  Historian Allan 
Millet writes that many AEF officers “often felt that Pershing was a military 
Torquemada, his staff the Inquisition, and they the heretics.  Unless a general got along 
with Pershing’s staff, he did not hold ‘the Chief’s’ confidence and he might very well 
very well soon bid his command farewell.”12
As chief of staff, Harbord took charge in keeping the staff happy and working, 
driving them to give Pershing their all so that he could concentrate on other matters.  
Harbord met with the section chiefs independently from Pershing, listening to concerns, 
complaints and grievances and worked out solutions.  He accompanied Pershing to most 
of the important conferences to keep abreast of relations with the Allies, and recounted 
any developments, as well as his own impressions, to the relevant staff members.  His 
main goal was to relieve Pershing of all unnecessary burdens concerning the staff and 
allow him to focus on the larger issues of command.  In this role as coordinating agent, 
Harbord acted as an intermediary between the staff and Pershing, explaining Pershing’s 
point of view to the subordinates, then turning around and pressing home the staff’s 
concerns before the AEF commander.  When the two sides differed, Harbord often fought 
vigorously for the staff’s views.  It was not uncommon for these deliberations to become 
heated, with both men pounding on the desk for emphasis.  If Pershing was not swayed, it 
fell upon Harbord to explain the general’s reasoning, massage any wounded egos, and 
make certain there was a continuity of policy.  In his capacity to drive the staff, and keep 
everyone content and working towards the same goal, Harbord made the chief of staff the 
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second most important man in the AEF during those first months; Pershing being the 
first.13
For their part, Harbord and Pershing quickly fell into an effective work routine.  
They would meet everyday when able, discussing the latest needs and situations, Harbord 
relaying information from the staff and Pershing issuing his orders.  For more mundane 
and routine work, they operated through a system of memorandums.  Pershing would 
write up a memo containing several items that he wanted addressed and give it to 
Harbord, who then checked the items off upon completion, or wrote in some explanation 
for why it was not satisfied.  Harbord would likewise write out memos, listing things that 
needed a decision which Pershing would return with his answers (often a yes or no).  
Thus the men could efficiently communicate with each other and address problems in a 
rapid manner. 
 Working in such close proximity gave Harbord an opportunity to know Pershing 
better than any other career officer in the AEF.  He accepted that during the early days in 
Paris Pershing took on the role of his own principal staff officer, with Harbord acting 
more as his Deputy or Assistant.  With so much to do, the staff worked long and hard, 
with little time for rest and relaxation, and there was little time for bruised feelings.  The 
lack of troops and the overwhelming amount of staff work made it necessary for Pershing 
to spend many of these early days directly supervising the staff.14
After a month of working with Pershing, Harbord committed his feelings to his 
diary: 
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General Pershing is a very strong character.  He has a good many 
peculiarities, such I suppose as every strong man accustomed to command 
is apt to develop.  He is very patient and philosophical under delays from 
the War Department.  He is playing for high stakes and does not intend to 
jeopardize his winning by wasting his standing with the War Department 
over small things,-relatively unimportant, though very annoying as they 
occur.  He is extremely cautious, very cautious, does nothing hastily or 
carelessly.  He spends much time rewriting the cables and other papers I 
prepare for him, putting his own individuality into them.  He is the first 
officer for whom I have prepared papers who did not generally accept 
what I wrote for him.  It is very seldom I get anything past him without 
some alteration, though I am obliged to say I do not always consider that 
he improves them, though often he does.  He edits everything he signs, 
even the most trivial things.  It is a good precaution, but one which can 
easily be carried to a point where it will waste time that might better be 
employed on bigger things, but is probably justified in the preliminary 
stages in which we are. 
 He thinks very clearly and directly; goes to his conclusions directly 
when matters call for decision.  He can talk straighter to people when 
calling them down than any one I have seen.  I have not yet experienced it, 
though.  He has naturally a good disposition and a keen sense of humor.  
He loses his temper occasionally, and stupidity and vagueness irritate him 
more than anything else.  He can stand plain talk, but the staff officer who 
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goes in with only vagueness where he ought to have certainty, who does 
not know what he wants, and fumbles around, has lost some time and 
generally gained some straight talk.  He develops great fondness for 
people whom he likes and is indulgent toward their faults, but at the same 
time is relentless when convinced of inefficiency.  Personal loyalty is 
strong with him, I should say, but does not blind him to the truth. 
 He does not fear responsibility, with all his caution.  He decides 
big things much more quickly than he does trivial ones.  Two weeks ago, 
without any authority from Washington, he placed an order one afternoon 
for $50,000,000 worth of airplanes, because he thought Washington was 
too slow, and did not cable the fact until too late for Washington to 
countermand it, had they been so disposed, which they were not.  He did it 
without winking an eye, as easily as though ordering a postage stamp,-and 
it involved the sum which Congress voted for National Defense at the 
beginning of 1898 just after the Maine was blown up, and which we all 
then considered a very large transaction.15
 
Despite their good relationship, Harbord found Pershing particularly trying at 
times.  The AEF commander knew that some of his staff officers had intimate friends 
who would use those relationships to influence AEF policies.  This knowledge made 
Pershing overly wary when listening to information being presented him when he was 
uncertain of its source and of what was not being said.  Pershing took to the habit of 
sending out “trial balloons or smoke screens” on a subject to judge reactions, making it 
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impossible for Harbord, or anyone else, to know his true feelings on the issue.16  In that 
difficult first summer, Pershing accepted nothing out of hand, but had to be convinced 
before his decided on a course of action. 
Another challenge to Harbord was Pershing’s propensity to forget, or reverse 
without warning, some of his more mundane directives.  While he held steady on the 
important decisions, the AEF commander would on occasion change his own orders on a 
whim, much to the chagrin of whichever officer had worked to satisfy the original plan.  
One such instance involved James Hazen Hyde, a wealthy American businessman living 
in Paris, who sought a commission in the AEF.  Upon first hearing of Hyde’s desire, 
Pershing accepted and ordered Harbord to arrange for a meeting with Hyde at which 
Pershing would offer the commission.  After two days of trying, Harbord finally got in 
contact with Hyde and set up the meeting.  Just before the scheduled meeting, Pershing 
called Harbord into his office and informed his chief of staff that he had changed his 
mind on Hyde’s proposed commission.  Exasperated, Harbord complained that it was 
now left to him to break the bad news after working for two days to set up and was only 
twenty minutes away.  Pershing simply replied, “Yes, I know it.  I am sorry for you, but I 
don’t want him.”17  Harbord was left to break the bad news to Hyde.  Such were the 
duties of the chief of staff. 
By far the most aggravating of Pershing’s traits to Harbord was the AEF 
commander’s complete lack of any concept of time.  For one who demanded promptness 
and attention to detail, Pershing had little consideration for his own schedule, or that of 
others.  Regarding this annoyance, Harbord lamented: 
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[Pershing’s] great fault is his utter lack of any idea of time.  He is 
without it, as utterly without it as a color-blind person is without a sense of 
color, or a deaf man is without the sound of music.  He is most trying in 
that respect.  An American untried Major General may not keep a Field 
Marshal waiting; or miss an appointment with a Prime Minister; or be an 
hour late to an Ambassador’s dinner; and those of us immediately around 
him are forever his guardians and trying to get him over the line on time.  
He has a similar lack of comprehension as to guests, and with dinner 
prepared for ten may bring home sixteen.18
 
 Even with these challenges, Harbord never faltered in his devotion to Pershing.  
Though he owed much to Major General Wood, Harbord realized that his future would 
forever bear the imprint of his service in the World War.  Harbord needed Pershing to 
trust him implicitly if they were to be successful, and to gain that trust Harbord dedicated 
himself to Pershing’s service, linking his career’s rise or fall to the AEF commander. 
 
The Baker Mission 
 
 There was little time to let the effects of G.O. No. 8 sink in before circumstances 
arose that threatened the stability of Pershing’s authority in Europe.  On 28 May, the 
same day Pershing sailed for England, the War Department sanctioned the creation of an 
independent mission to Europe to study the French and British war efforts and make 
recommendations for the proper organization of American combat forces.  Led by 
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Colonel Chauncey B. Baker of the Quartermaster Corps with orders to “make such 
observations as may seem of value for the organization, training, transportation, 
operations, supply, and administration of our forces in view of their participation in the 
war,” the Baker Mission operated free from Pershing’s authority.19  Consequently, it had 
the potential to set military policy for the War Department and the AEF without 
Pershing’s approval.  Historian Harvey DeWeerd rightly called the mission “one of 
[Secretary of War] Baker’s few unhelpful decisions” as it created competing agencies in 
Europe and made several on Pershing’s staff question the War Department’s thinking.20
 Immediately suspicious of the Baker Mission, Harbord worried that its 
recommendations, to be delivered to Secretary Baker in person, would carry more weight 
than those Pershing sent via wire.  Should the two views differ, it was highly probable 
that Pershing would find himself tied to an organization he did not endorse.  “The 
responsibility for the job would be [Pershing’s],” Harbord argued, “but the tools would 
be the choice of a Mission hurried through the Allied countries like a party of tourists.  It 
was a situation that called for extreme tact.  The Mission had to be lined up and the two 
recommendations must agree.”21  To Harbord’s relief, Chauncey Baker was a classmate 
of Pershing’s and had no intention of making any report to Washington without first 
conferring with the AEF commander and his staff. 
 The two groups came together for a conference that lasted the better part of 7-8 
July.  Pershing took no chances that the conference would decide any issue against his 
wishes, and overloaded the group with AEF officers.  Of the thirty-one officers who 
participated, the Baker Mission supplied twelve while the AEF General Staff provided 
the remaining nineteen, including Pershing.22  The groups agreed to submit common 
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recommendations to the War Department, and Pershing assured that AEF officers would 
carry any votes.  It proved a moot point for the most part, as the conferees quickly agreed 
on issues dealing with infantry.  The only serious disagreement that arose regarded the 
proper amount of artillery allotted to each division.  Colonel Charles P. Summerall, a 
fiery and outspoken member of the Baker Mission, argued vehemently that the 
organization favored by the AEF General Staff had serious deficiencies in its proportion 
of artillery to infantry.  Summerall insisted that the AEF should adopt the smaller, more 
mobile style artillery used in the British Army over the larger French guns championed 
by representatives of the AEF Operations section.  In words that Harbord thought came 
“as nearly to the limit of courtesy as I have ever seen an officer go and escape 
unrebuked,” Summerall contended that the AEF plan would put soldiers’ lives at risk 
unnecessarily.23  Knowing that he had no authority over Summerall, Pershing kept his 
temper.  He instead let Colonel Fox Conner from the Operations section argue the point.  
When no consensus could be reached, Pershing called for a vote, where the AEF position 
was carried, sixteen to five.24
 It was a tense moment for the conference and Pershing ably diffused it with his 
patience and forethought.  But in doing so, he also supported a faulty policy that possibly 
cost the lives of thousands of American soldiers.  Time would ultimately show 
Summerall correct in his thinking on the amount of artillery in the American divisions 
and its need for mobility.  A year later at the battle of Soissons, American soldiers and 
Marines advanced with virtually no artillery support due to the artillery’s inability to 
displace fast enough.  At the moment, however, Pershing was more concerned with 
securing the primacy of his and his staff’s views.  Harbord readily concurred, believing 
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that the inflated numbers Summerall insisted upon were due to a misconception of British 
artillery.  Like his chief, Harbord thought it more important that the commission support 
the organization Pershing recommended, calling it “the most critical moment of his 
command in some respects.”25
 With the disagreement over artillery settled, the conference proceeded to a 
conclusion without further incident.  Just as Harbord had hoped, the Baker Mission-AEF 
General Staff conference produced a single set of recommendations for the War 
Department.  Known as the General Organization Project, the conference report based its 
recommendations on a force of one million men, with the understanding that “the 
adoption of this size force as a basis for this study should not be construed as representing 
the maximum force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France.”  The 
million man goal was chosen to allow for offensive operations to begin in 1918.  The 
report stated that, “Plans for the future should be based . . . on three times this force, i.e., 
at least three million men,” to be filled within two years.26
 Once settled, the conference’s decision on the organization of American combat 
troops brought immediate skepticism, in particular the proposed size of an AEF division.  
With an operational strength of around 28,000 officers and men, the AEF division almost 
doubled the size of its Allied counterparts.  There were serious concerns that the 
Americans were not up to the logistical challenges of supporting and maneuvering such a 
massive division, and questions about how well the American division could be used in 
conjunction with the smaller French and British units.  The Americans, however, had 
several reasons for their choice of the mass division. 
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 First, whereas the Allies utilized a smaller division due to limited manpower 
reserves, the Americans had to contend with a paucity of trained officers. Though 
training centers were quickly being established to furnish the necessary officers to lead 
the new army into combat, it would be many months, if not years, before they would be 
ready.  Combat commanders and divisional staff officers were at a premium and 
American planners sought to stretch their limited resources by having fewer, larger 
divisions, requiring far fewer officers to operate.27  In addition, few officers in the AEF 
put much faith in the ability of the National Guard.  Pershing, in particular, had a low 
opinion of the Guard, perhaps remembering the debacle of its mobilization during the 
Spanish-American War.  As such, AEF planners sought to reduce their reliance upon the 
Guard by grouping their troops together in large divisions commanded by U.S. 
Regulars.28
 The final, and ultimately most important factor supporting the larger division was 
Pershing’s desire that the American division be able to remain in the line long enough to 
break out of the trenches and take the fight into the open.  “We were engaging in trench 
warfare,” explained Harbord, “and it was quite a problem to replace with another a 
division already in line” without risking battlefield continuity.  In order to succeed where 
previous attacks had failed, the attacking division needed to remain in the line for several 
days “before [a] decision was reached.”29  As far as Pershing was concerned, the size of 
the American division and its ability to stay in the fight long enough to break through the 
trenches represented the key to ultimate victory in the war.  After watching the 
combatants on the Western Front turn trenches into graves for three years, Pershing 
believed none had enough aggressive spirit left to free themselves from the snarled 
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network of trenches stretching across Western Europe and fight as men should: out in the 
open.  “It was my opinion,” Pershing later wrote, “that the victory could not be won by 
the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open 
and engaging him in a war of movement.”30  In their years of fighting, Pershing 
surmised, the Allies had become so inured to defensive warfare that they began to rely 
exclusively on machine-guns, hand and rifle grenades, mortars, and artillery at the 
expense of the common soldier with a rifle and bayonet.  The result of this error in focus 
were the Allied trenches that consumed hundreds of thousands of brave soldiers.  
Pershing had no intention of making this same mistake.  Instead, he would rely on the 
style of fighting described in the U.S. Army Infantry Drill Regulations (IDR), which 
preached the primacy of the infantryman and his rifle. 
In its most recent edition (1911), the IDR stated that “Attacking troops must first 
gain fire superiority in order to reach the hostile position.”31  The only method the IDR 
indicated for gaining this fire superiority was the massing of well-trained rifle fire.  As 
James W. Rainey points out, “The 1911 edition of the IDR [sic] does not evince much 
appreciation of the lethality of the machine gun.”32  This is not a great surprise, as up to 
that point the United States had never been involved in combat that utilized machine-
guns to the degree that the World War did.  But even with this technological addition to 
the battlefield, Pershing believed that his infantrymen could overcome any position by 
concentrating their rifle fire, supported by the artillery, and push the enemy out of his 
trenches into the open where his army could be destroyed.  In this instance, “[Pershing’s] 
professional psyche was bound to a faith in American marksmen, be they the masses of 
riflemen employed by [Ulysses S.] Grant in his bloody battles of attrition or the more 
 
 104
individualistic marksmen of Pershing’s own experiences.”33  He could not envision 
ceding primacy on the battlefield to the machine-gun, or any other technological 
contrivance for that matter, and made it the mission of his officers to instill in the 
American soldier the necessary aggressive spirit to again make the rifle and bayonet 
masters of the battlefield.  With a suitably motivated army, dedicated to the offensive, 
Pershing and his doughboys would succeed where the Europeans had failed; they would 
break through the German lines and carry the battle into the open, where victory was all 
but assured.  This became Pershing’s conception of “open” warfare, and he needed a 
massive division to accomplish it.34
 The argument supporting the staying power of this larger division came with 
several problems that Pershing and his officers, including Harbord, refused to 
acknowledge.  The first was a simple matter of composition.  The AEF division was 
made up of two brigades with an effective strength of eight thousand infantrymen, each 
scarcely less than the size a French or British division.  If the Americans used one 
brigade on the front line and held the other in reserve, switching them out would present 
the same logistical difficulties as exchanging full divisions in the British or French 
Armies.  While the American system kept the same command network in place, such 
advantages were questionable in an attack across no-man’s-land where command and 
control were difficult to maintain. 
 More to the point, with the defense-in-depth35 utilized along the Western Front, 
the larger division did not assure longer stays in the line.  As seen time and time again, 
the principal reason attacks lost momentum was not due to a lack of infantry, as 
evidenced by the massive casualties they inflicted on the attacker, but because they 
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outran their artillery and logistical support.  The mass division did not address this 
problem, but in fact exacerbated it by reducing the ratio of artillery to infantry from that 
of the Allies.  In other words, more men would go over the top with less artillery 
providing them cover, making the likelihood of increased casualties considerably greater.  
Many American doughboys would die before AEF commanders learned this lesson.  But 
with the AEF’s combat troops still months away from entering the trenches, Pershing and 
his officers could advance any theoretical combat style they chose.  If the Allies raised 
any opposition or points of contention, the Americans could simply write it off as another 
example of over-reliance on defensive tactics.  Pershing had total control over how the 
AEF would fight, and no one could change his mind on the efficacy of “open” warfare, 
no matter how reasonable the argument. 
 
At British G.H.Q. 
 
With the conferences over and the policies agreed upon, the Baker Mission left 
for the United States on 11 July, bringing an added sense of relief to the officers in the 
AEF General Staff.  Harbord was especially happy to see them go.  He could never 
accept their presence in France as anything more than the Secretary of War meddling in 
the AEF’s affairs, and found their persistence increasingly arrogant at times.  Yet despite 
these feelings, Harbord held out hope that their visit would pay dividends in the end.  
“We shall now breathe more freely that they are gone, but while they have been of some 
bother I am sure their visit will make things easier for us after they return [to America] 
with the knowledge they have gained.”36  Perhaps they could instill in the War 
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Department the sense of urgency that now hung over the AEF with growing insistence.  
Again, Harbord could only hope. 
 Only time would tell, but for now the Americans took a moment of pleasure to 
witness their first Bastille Day on 14 July.  Honoring the storming of the dreaded Bastille 
prison in 1789, the holiday represents the same revolutionary spirit to the French that the 
4th of July does to Americans.  For the members of the AEF, it offered another 
opportunity for social and official intercourse with the French.  Seeing as how nearly a 
month after Pershing’s arrival only one American division had landed in France, it was 
important to take advantage of any boosts to morale. 
 Harbord took considerable pleasure in the day’s events.  There was another 
parade through the streets of Paris, this time by representatives of various French 
regiments.  Harbord noticed that the French troops were not provided new uniforms for 
the event, instead marching in their trench-stained clothes with bayonets fixed, presenting 
a very business-like appearance.  Each man wore a chevron on his uniform indicating 
being wounded, with many showing multiple distinctions.  They were an impressive 
sight, commanding a great deal of respect from the gallery.37
 The day concluded with an afternoon performance at the Théâtre Trocadero.  
Witnessed by an audience of three thousand, the performance was mainly musical and 
paid particular honor to the Americans.  Harbord and the other staff members in 
attendance joined Pershing, the American Ambassador, the Military Governor, and the 
Prince of Monaco in a special box.  The hall was draped in both French and American 
flags and the orchestra made a point to play both the “Marseillaise” and the “Star-
Spangled Banner.”  An elderly woman sitting next to Harbord informed him that “‘the 
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Marseillaise’ is the very soul of the French people.  It is France.  I can never hear it 
without tears.”38  For an American army slow to take shape, such patriotic fervor was 
needed to keep the Allies going until the Doughboys began to arrive. 
 That night, Harbord received a stark reminder of just how far they still had to go.  
At dinner, newly arrived Brigadier General Peyton C. March, commanding the 1st 
Artillery Brigade, described conditions in the War Department for members of the staff.  
He did not paint an encouraging picture, telling of piles of unopened mail six feet high in 
the Mail and Record Room of the Adjutant General’s Office and a general lack of 
purpose in the entire department.  Even more alarming was the news that it took six days 
for Pershing’s telegram requesting March’s presence in France to travel from the adjutant 
general to the chief of staff, a few offices down.  March concluded by recounting how the 
acting chief of staff, Major General Tasker Bliss, wrote everything in longhand, spending 
hours on matters March thought should take but seconds.  Such news weighed heavily on 
those present, who were themselves struggling with the ever-growing workload.39
 It was ironic that March delivered the distressing news of conditions in the War 
Department, for in the early months of 1918, Secretary of War Baker requested that 
March return to the United States to become the chief of staff for the U.S. Army with the 
expressed goal of improving conditions in the War Department, a task he carried out with 
ruthless tenacity.  In doing so, March would draw the ire of both Pershing and Harbord, 
which eventually developed into a deep seated hatred between the men.  At present, 
though, March was a member of the AEF, and quickly proved himself a valuable asset.  
Over the next several weeks, March toured the British and French artillery units while he 
waited for his troops to arrive.  By early August, after the arrival of the 1st Artillery 
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Brigade, March moved his headquarters to Le Valdahon and set up an artillery training 
center, where he earned a reputation as a “driver with character.”40
 March was not the only member of the AEF to busy himself with tours of the 
French and British operations.  Dennis Nolan and John L. Hines spent time in late July at 
British General Headquarters observing Intelligence operations.  Though highly 
informative, Nolan found the British attitude towards the French disconcerting.  When 
discussing what sort of permanent relationship the French intelligence officers should 
have at GHQ AEF, the British Chief of Intelligence responded curtly, “Don’t even give 
them a desk.”41  Nolan and Hines quietly noted that centuries of hatred did not simply 
melt away over a few years’ time, even during war. 
 A visit by Fox Conner and Hugh Drum to Pétain’s headquarters in late June also 
revealed Allied misconceptions regarding the AEF’s present abilities.  Hoping to discuss 
plans for training facilities for the AEF, the Americans were surprised to find the French 
thinking only in terms of the 1st Division.  When Conner informed them that the AEF 
needed facilities for a million men in France by the spring of 1918, the French fell 
deathly silent.  They had no idea that the Americans required such extensive training, and 
asked for a recess while they work up some kind of solution.  Eventually the French 
returned with a plan for the adjusted requirements, but both Conner and Drum could not 
help but note the difference between perception and reality concerning the state of the 
American Army.42
 On 20 July, Harbord accompanied Pershing and several other staff officers on 
their own visit to British GHQ.43  Riding in two automobiles, the men made the ninety- 
mile drive to Montreuil, site of the 2d Echelon of British GHQ.  Harbord found the 
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journey particularly enjoyable, as they rode through the ancient burial sites of the French 
kings at St. Denis, making two lengthy stops so as not to arrive too early.  It was one of 
the few times Harbord worried about Pershing being early anywhere.  Over the next four 
days, the group toured British G.H.Q., observing artillery operations, interviewing several 
soldiers, and generally socializing with their British counterparts.  When presented to the 
various chiefs of sections, Harbord noted they all seemed to be major and brigadier 
generals, tarnishing the luster of his own recent promotion to lieutenant colonel just a bit.  
He did, however, have a most enlightening discussion with Major General Birch, Haig’s 
Chief of Artillery.  He told the AEF chief of staff that the artillery needed the confidence 
of the infantry to be successful.  The only way it could be gained was by dropping its fire 
just over the heads of the infantry without raining shells down upon them.  It was good 
advice, for the close cooperation between arms was a new facet of warfare and the 
Americans needed to become proficient at an accelerated pace.44
 The most important portion of the tour, of course, was the meeting between 
Pershing and the British commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig.  The 
moment came on the evening of 20 July.  Upon arriving at Haig’s residence of 
Blendecques, an elegant chateau only a bit smaller than Ogden Mills’s, the party was met 
at the door by Haig himself.  Much to Harbord’s delight, the two commanders hit it off 
immediately; not a surprise given how much they shared in common.  Both were strong, 
handsome-looking soldiers, immaculately groomed with a reserved nature based upon a 
quiet shyness.  Though friendly, neither went for the gushing sentimentality so prevalent 
amongst the French.  Each had the particular task of leading an expeditionary force in a 
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foreign country.  Haig found Pershing appreciative of the task ahead, writing in his diary 
that AEF commander had a “quiet gentlemanly bearing – so unusual for an American.”45
 As the two men talked, Harbord took stock of the moment.  Ever the student of 
history, he found the contrast between the men intriguing.  Haig, the old Norman captain, 
was the very embodiment of the Old World.  Though small in stature, Haig had already 
secured his place in history as one of England’s most famous soldiers, and his proper 
manner and unbending determination were the very definition of the British.  On the 
other hand there was Pershing, an untested quantity in the war, yet possessing great 
promise.  The product of frontier stock, he was the very picture of the rugged American, 
with his strong jaw, steely posture, and gruff manner.  It was a meeting between the old 
and the new, but with a sense of brotherhood between them as the representatives of the 
English-speaking nations.  Harbord noticed more similarities between them as well: 
 
 They held the same ideas on discipline, realizing the importance of 
such aids as attention to personal soldier habits, daily shaving and bathing, 
smart turnouts, and meticulous care of leather and metal equipment.  Both 
insisted on observance of the punctilio of courtesy between members of 
the military establishment.  Both were men of the highest character, 
serious minded, loyal and patriotic.  Each was coldly impersonal and 
sometimes impassive – the Scot preserving that certain reserve which 
seems to characterize the high-bred Briton; the American the certain 
aloofness of his cadet days.46
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 The Americans returned to Paris on 23 July fully satisfied with their journey, and 
bolstered by the hopes of an amicable relationship with the British.  Although serious 
disagreements between Pershing and the British leadership over the training and 
employment of American troops would strain relations over the next year and a half, for 
now all was well between the two commands.  Inundated with accounts of the war weary 
French, it was refreshing to see a British Army firmly carrying its own load. 
 
Line of Communications and AEF Supply 
 
 Prior to their visit to Haig’s headquarters, the Americans worked to address the 
logistical concerns facing the American Expeditionary Forces.  Even before their arrival 
in France, Pershing ordered studies of the shipping situation in France.  He sent various 
officers on numerous inspections of French ports to see which facilities could handle the 
millions of men and tons of supplies that the Americans intended to bring to France.  Not 
only did the ports need sufficient berths and storage capabilities to handle American 
soldiers and equipment, but they needed to have access to road and rail networks that 
connected them with the AEF’s area of operations in Lorraine.  The creation of an 
efficient supply system was of preeminent importance in the early days of the war, for 
mistakes could mean the breakdown of supply once the AEF began combat operations. 
 When the 1st Division moved to its training facilities around the village of 
Gondrecourt, it presented an early indication of the supply problems facing the AEF.  
Located over one hundred miles east of Paris and some four hundred miles from the 
French Atlantic ports, the challenge of keeping the division supplied was no small task.  
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When the French intimated their desire that other American units train in the same 
vicinity, the need for a working supply network became immediate. 
 In describing the organization of a supply system for field operations, the Field 
Service Regulations described a system operating within the continental United States.  It 
broke down the theater of operations into two sections: the Zone of the Line of 
Communications, and the Zone of the Advance.  The second of these was the purview of 
the field commander, or commanders, who directed supply to their individual units.  The 
Zone of the Line of Communications (LOC) connected “all territory from and including 
the base to the point or points where contact is made with the trains of the combatant 
field forces.”47  Commanding the entire LOC was a general officer, the Commanding 
General Line of Communications, with an assistant chief of staff representing him at the 
various bases within the network.  This assistant oversaw the supply, sanitation, and 
telegraph services of the LOC, coordinated the rail system servicing the supply points, 
and commanded such troops as necessary to defend the supply lines.  The FSR further 
envisioned that each field army would maintain its own line of communications linked to 
dedicated supply bases.48
But the situation in France was more complex that that envisioned by the FSR.  
Here, the supply system had to support not an army but an expeditionary force of at least 
a million men, with plans for three million.  Moreover, the system needed to be modified 
to take into account supplying an army across three thousand miles of submarine infested 
ocean, operating in a foreign country the size of the state of Texas where millions of 
foreign soldiers were already fighting and maintaining their own supply system.  And if 
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these challenges were not enough, the system needed to function immediately, regardless 
of whatever infrastructure it needed to create. 
 As with the basic organization for the AEF, the supply system presented some 
very basic questions that required complex solutions.  What size of reserve needed to be 
maintained in the case of an interruption in the flow of supplies?  How and where would 
the supplies be stored?  How would tonnage be allocated for supplies and troops?  What 
would the breakdown of supplies look like?  How were supplies to be unloaded at the 
ports and then forwarded to the front or to storage areas?  What would the ultimate 
supply organization look like?  After an exhaustive study, the General Staff formulated a 
basic organizational structure for the AEF’s supply system.  On 13 July, General Orders 
No. 20 established that the “geographical limits of the [Line of Communications] will 
extend from the sea to the points where delivery of supplies is made to the field 
transportation of the combat field forces,” with its headquarters located in Paris.49  
Whereas the FSR called for the LOC to be divided between a Base Section and an 
Advance Section, G.O. No. 20 made an alteration due to the four hundred mile span 
between the French ports and the American combat zones, breaking the LOC into three 
sections: Base, Intermediate and Advance.  Additionally, the AEF would utilize not one 
but several Base Sections, each centered around a port or port network.  While initially 
limiting itself to only three Base Sections, the LOC would eventually increase the number 
to eight. 
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Base Section  No 1 – St. Nazaire 
No 2 – Bordeaux 
No 3 – London 
No. 4 – Le Havre 
No. 5 – Brest 
No. 6 – Marseille 
No. 7 – La Pallice 
No. 8 – Italy 
  
The Intermediate Section, based around the large supply depot to be built at 
Gievres, located about one hundred miles south of Paris, acted as the principle storage 
area for supplies for the AEF.  From there, supplies could be better divided to meet 
specific needs for combat units.  Closest to the troops was the Advance Section, located 
in the area occupied by the American troops in the Zones des Armies.  The center point of 
the Advance Section was the Regulating Station at Is-sur-Tille, roughly one hundred and 
fifty miles southwest of Paris.  The Regulating Station was a particular construct of the 
French rail system, and it presented a new challenge to American supply officers. 
 A major problem for the LOC AEF was command over the entire system.  The 
goal of any supply organization is to relieve the commanding general of as much 
administrative work as possible in order to allow him to focus the majority of his efforts 
on directing combat operations.  Prior to the creation of the LOC, supply in the AEF was 
left to the various technical and administrative services, but that system quickly proved 
ill-suited for the task due to a lack of coordination between the different agencies and 
commands in France.  Under the LOC, all supply matters were ostensibly brought under 
the command of one man, the Commanding General, Line of Communications 
(CGLOC).  Initially filled by Brigadier General R.M. Blatchford, the post rarely exerted 
the type of overall authority envisioned by the AEF General Staff.  The problem stemmed 
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from the General Staff’s decision to divide authority over various stages of the LOC 
between the Base Commanders, the Regulating Officer (who commanded the Regulating 
Station at Is-sur-Tille), the CGLOC, and the Coordination section of the General Staff.  
Though the CGLOC was responsible for the entire system, he did not have command 
authority over each stage.  The rail lines fell under the direction of the Director General 
of Transportation, and the Regulating Stations were under the authority of the General 
Staff’s Coordination section.  Over the next eighteen months, the General Staff worked to 
improve the system, but it could not break away from this division of command authority, 
resulting in continual confusion and delays.50
For a basic goal, Pershing and Harbord decided that, given the dangers of 
interruption of supplies over land and sea, the LOC needed to maintain a standing ninety-
day reserve of food, clothing, and other supplies at all times.  These would be divided in 
various storage facilities along the Line of Communication in France.  It was a good idea, 
but the reality seldom matched the plan, and the supply system rarely reached half the 
stated goal.  By 1918, a concession was finally made to the system’s failings, and the 
reserve goal was reduced to forty-five days.51  Due to its unfamiliarity with maintaining 
an extensive supply network in a foreign country, the General Staff never established the 
lines of demarcation regarding control over supply.  Instead, the General Staff and the 
CGLOC battled over operational authority, resulting in serious problems and confusion.  
The situation became so dire that Harbord took command of the entire LOC in August 
1918, but even he could not make the system work efficiently before the end of the war.52
 Thankfully, the Line of Communication was not the only supply organization 
created in the AEF.  Pershing realized early on that, considering the shortage of available 
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tonnage, it was important for the AEF to secure as many supplies in Europe as possible.  
Each supply department in the army had its own purchasing agents, who sought out the 
needed supplies and often found themselves in competition with other departments, as 
well as Allied purchasing agents.  To stem the tide of competitive bidding and overlap in 
purchasing, Pershing created an organization to centralize control of the AEF purchasing 
agents.  Known as the General Purchasing Board (GPB), it was headed up by a General 
Purchasing Agent (GPA), whose role was to act as the “representative of the C.-in-C. in 
liaison with the various Allied purchasing agencies and . . . co-ordinate and supervise all 
purchasing agents of the A.E.F.”53  It was a bold move for Pershing.  Prior to his 
decision, a board commissioned to study the problem advised against establishing such 
an organization.  The board report suggested that creating a centralized agency to control 
purchases would be illegal due to the fact that Pershing had no expressed authority to do 
so.  Undaunted, the AEF commander did it any way.  He believed the GPB necessary for 
the success of the AEF, arguing that “an emergency confronted us and it was no time to 
discuss technicalities.”54  He would simply rely upon his broad letter of instruction from 
Secretary Baker to cover him against any question of authority.   
For the critical position of General Purchasing Agent, Pershing called upon one of 
his oldest friends: Charles G. Dawes.  The former Comptroller of the Currency in the 
McKinley Administration, Dawes was a well-known and well-respected member of the 
American financial community, gaining renown as the head of the Central Trust 
Company of Chicago.  He was a man of savvy leadership and irrepressible drive who 
hated inefficiency as much as Pershing did.  His immense talents were highly desirable in 
Washington, but Dawes refused positions on grain boards and food committees, 
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preferring instead to do his duty in uniform.  He secured a commission as a major in the 
17th Engineers, ostensibly due to the fact that he had, years earlier, spent a few weeks as a 
surveyor for a small railroad in Ohio.  But his real reason for coming to Europe was to 
serve with Pershing.  In fact, Dawes’ biographer Bascom Timmons postulates that “it is 
doubtful that Pershing would have established the [General Purchasing Board] if he had 
not felt that he had in Dawes the man who could accomplish the task he had in mind.”55
It was a wise choice, as Dawes proved himself invaluable to Pershing and the 
AEF.  Over the course of the war, he and the GPB gathered some ten million tons of 
military material for the AEF, compared to seven million tons brought over from the 
United States.  This was accomplished on a European continent supposedly stripped of 
any excess supplies.56  Dawes went on to serve admirably on the Liquidation 
Commission, saving the United States millions of dollars during the postwar 
demobilization.  “His was an extraordinary war career,” Harbord wrote later, “and his 
usefulness to the American Expeditionary Forces can hardly be overstated.”57
For Dawes, to serve in the AEF was a dream come true.  He idolized Pershing, 
writing in his journal, “Pershing is the man for this great emergency.  He has immense 
faculty for disposing of things.  He is not only a great soldier, but he has great common 
sense and tremendous energy.”58  Dawes held the unique distinction of being perhaps 
Pershing’s oldest and closest friend.  One could say that Pershing owed his career to 
Dawes, who, years earlier in Nebraska, advised the future AEF commander against 
resigning from the military to become a lawyer.  Dawes achieved a rapport with Pershing 
unmatched in the AEF, which was a good thing due to Dawes’s failure to make any effort 
to adhere to military protocol and behavior.  One of Pershing’s aides recalled times when 
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Dawes came to see Pershing, only to find the general in a meeting.  Without batting an 
eye, Dawes would walk into Pershing’s office anyway, causing the AEF commander to 
simply shake his head in amusement.59
As Pershing’s closest military advisor and confidant, Harbord found Dawes’s 
initial appearance in the AEF somewhat troubling.  Ever protective of his own 
relationship with Pershing, Harbord was leery of a potential challenge for the General’s 
ear.  The AEF chief of staff considered Dawes’s rejection of military convention 
especially irritating, describing him as “outspoken and apparently impulsive, he generally 
thinks things over in detail and then puts them out in an impulsive manner.”60  Another 
irritation was Dawes’s inability to wear his uniform correctly, often forgetting to button 
his top button.  On one occasion, Dawes was standing across a road from Harbord, 
Pershing and Marshal Foch.  Dawes noticed Pershing staring at him with a gleam in his 
eye indicating something was amiss with Dawes’s appearance.  Quickly scanning 
himself, Dawes could not find anything objectionable.  Pershing then leaned over and 
said something to Harbord, who immediately crossed the street and began buttoning up 
Dawes’s overcoat, including the top hooks, muttering, “This is a hell of a job for the 
Chief of Staff – but the General told me to do it.”61
Despite these little annoyances, Harbord soon took a liking to Dawes.  Over the 
course of the war the two men worked closely with each other and developed a close-knit 
friendship, spending many a night together enjoying the streets of Paris.  For Harbord, 
Dawes became “one of the finest characters I have ever known; generous, high-minded, 
straightforward, courageous and very able. . . . He is a winning personality, very much of 
a special pleader, and master of the art of insidious approach.”62  Dawes returned the 
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sentiment, saying, “There are no better men made than Harbord.  A great soldier and a 
great man, he is a faithful, loyal friend to those in whom he believes, and the waning 
fortunes of a friend only make him his stronger advocate.”63
 
Chaumont 
 
 With work picking up at GHQ, the officers of the AEF General Staff began to 
grow weary of their cramped quarters in Paris.  Pershing was especially agitated with the 
constant interruptions from visitors and the toll Paris’s social distractions were taking on 
his command.  One of his aides recounted in his diary Pershing furiously storming into 
the office swearing to “get out of Paris as soon as possible.”64  On 31 July, Pershing, 
accompanied by Harbord, Colonel de Chambrun and Captain George S. Patton left Paris 
by motor car on a quest for a new location for GHQ AEF.  The site needed to be within 
the Zone des Armies and not too far from where the American troops would train.  After a 
three-day tour of locations including Vittel and Joinville they finally settled on the town 
of Chaumont.65
 Located roughly 150 miles east of Paris in the upper Marne, Chaumont was home 
to fifteen thousand citizens, but had added some twenty thousand refugees and garrison 
troops to its population.  Its main attraction for the site of AEF General Headquarters was 
the existence of a large regimental barracks, the Caserne Damremont.  They provided 
enough office space for the entire headquarters, and ample billet space in local housing 
for all but the enlisted men, who would be housed in temporary barracks.  The French 
Regional Commander, Major General Wirbel, protective of his personal fiefdom, 
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objected to the move, arguing that the city was already at maximum capacity.  On the 
other hand, the town mayor, M. Lévy-Alphandéry, supported the AEF’s coming.  
Satisfied with the location, Pershing ordered the GHQ moved on 1 September.66
 The selection of Chaumont turned out to be a good one.  With the exception of the 
challenges of communicating with Paris over the antiquated French telephone system, the 
town met all the requirements for a general headquarters.  Unlike their time in Paris, life 
at Chaumont quickly settled into a simple routine.  Pershing’ office was located on the 
second floor of the main building.  Harbord was located across the hall, with easy access 
to both the C-in-C and the Secretary of the General Staff.  Visitors to Pershing either 
went through his various aides or through Harbord, while those coming to see Harbord 
habitually went through the Secretary of the General Staff’s office. 
 Harbord’s daily routine began with a perusal of the day’s mail, followed by a 
meeting with the five assistant chiefs of staff, the adjutant general, and the inspector 
general.  Frank McCoy, secretary of the General Staff, was also usually present.  The 
officers went over the previous day’s progress and discussed new difficulties and 
challenges, with Harbord handing out instructions and advice.  While the current military 
situation was the usual topic of the day, Harbord also took the opportunity to fill in the 
staff with Pershing’s movements, as he was often on the road conducting inspection tours 
or meeting with the Allies.  When Pershing was at Chaumont, he and Harbord met every 
day after the staff conference, at which time Harbord presented him with whatever item 
needed his signature, and received orders and decisions that required more explanation 
than available in written correspondence. 
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 The move to Chaumont signaled a new phase in the General Staff.  Through much 
trial and error, those in the upper echelons of command in the AEF began to streamline 
their workload.  Harbord admitted the difficulties of those first few months, saying: 
 
The summer of 1917 was a difficult one for all of us.  In other days 
Staff officers were given a definite mission.  This was not often 
practicable now, for none of us had the experience to be all-seeing and to 
be able to fix a definite objective for expanding problems. . . . Staff 
officers had to be given a situation with the expectation that they would do 
all there was to be done, and follow it to a logical conclusion, without 
more definite instructions, and generally without further guidance or more 
than quite desultory supervision.  No one working under my supervision 
as Chief of Staff was expected to take to a superior for decision any matter 
that he was competent to settle for or by himself. . . . It could hardly be 
otherwise under such circumstances.  Time did not permit the 
Commander-in-Chief of his Chief of Staff to become submerged in an 
ocean of detail [emphasis added].67
 
 With the basic organizational structure of the American Expeditionary Forces in 
place by the end of August 1917, its commanders could now turn their attention to 
bringing the divisions so desperately anticipated by the Allies.  For Pershing and his staff, 
bringing the men and training them for combat would prove even more daunting a task 
than anything encountered during that first summer. 
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CHAPTER V 
BRINGING THE MEN, SLOWLY (SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1917) 
 
 The fall of 1917 marked a period of waiting and frustration for the American 
Expeditionary Forces (AEF) and its Allies.  The euphoria that accompanied the AEF’s 
arrival the previous June was beginning to wane as the vast American manpower reserves 
were slow to materialize.  As Russia crumbled under the tide of revolution, the entire 
Eastern Front drifted closer to collapse.  Such a turn of events would allow the Germans 
to concentrate their remaining forces on the Western Front for a new offensive that could 
push the war weary Allies to the brink of annihilation.  Gone were the days when the 
mere appearance of the American flag in France brought satisfaction.  What the Allies 
needed were boots on the ground, and quickly. 
 For the Americans, progress came slowly.  Though they had created an 
organizational structure for the AEF, it still needed fine-tuning, as officers showed 
themselves unsuited to their tasks and various policies proved unworkable. The poor state 
of the American Army prior to the war demanded a period of rapid catch-up to the 
Europeans, which meant losing valuable time.  Compounding this was Pershing’s desire 
that the AEF free itself from the mindset of trench warfare and work to break through the 
German lines and fight in the open.  While a noble goal, this meant more time for 
preparation, as Pershing ordered an extensive training program for the coming AEF 
divisions.  The time requirements for the American training policies also exacerbated 
growing problems between the Americans and the Allies.  Irritation over American 
delays brought an increase in calls for the amalgamation of American manpower into 
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Allied units, which in turn led to an emerging hostility between Allies and the AEF 
leadership.  Efforts to improve inter-allied relations culminated in the creation of an 
advisory board, known as the Supreme War Council, but this change was slow in coming 
and operated with varying degrees of effectiveness.  The difficulties of coalition warfare 
were in full effect in the fall of 1917. 
 An additional challenge for AEF officers came from the growing disunity 
between their policies and goals and those of the War Department.  As time passed, it 
became readily apparent that the two organizations were often at odds in their respective 
efforts to build up the American military presence in Europe.  Disagreements over 
training, supply, and coordination with Allies threatened to further impede the American 
war effort, and caused considerable consternation amongst individuals both at home and 
abroad.  The failure to fully address these issues caused a stark deterioration in the 
relationship between the War Department and the AEF in 1918. 
 These problems and difficulties made the fall and winter of 1917 the true Valley 
Forge of the American Expeditionary Forces.  The full scope of shifting a peacetime 
nation and army to a war footing made rapid action impossible, and improvements had to 
be made under the watchful scrutiny of the British and French, who fought to take over 
control of the coming doughboys.  If Pershing and the other officers of the AEF hoped to 
effectively contribute militarily in 1918, and to do so under their own flag, they needed to 
bear down and get to work, even as time, the AEF’s most precious commodity, grew 
shorter with each passing day. 
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Growing Pains for the AEF 
 
 As the AEF General Staff settled into its new headquarters, it busied itself with 
details while awaiting troop shipments to fill the AEF’s ranks.  With the 1st Division 
arriving at the end of June, and the first units of the 26th (National Guard) Division 
coming in late September, the American supply system slowly creaked into motion.  In 
the meantime, an odd assortment of troops arrived throughout August, including base 
hospitals, several engineer regiments, and eight air squadrons.  But this slow trickle of 
soldiers sparked concern amongst the Allies, and brought added anxiety to the already 
overworked officers at Chaumont.1  In an effort to improve coordination and 
communication, the Allies and the AEF maintained various liaison missions at their 
respective headquarters.2  While the missions had value, Harbord grew weary of the 
inflated rank of the foreign officers assigned to GHQ AEF.  Still a lieutenant colonel, 
Harbord found it irritating that, though Chief of Staff, he still had to rise and stand at 
attention for every foreign general who walked through the door.  The generals often 
enjoyed this display and increased the frequency of their visits, slowing the pace of work 
and creating resentment amongst the AEF General Staff.  Making the situation even more 
frustrating was the fact that Pershing had recommended Harbord and several others for 
promotion at the beginning of August, but had not received word as yet.3  Pershing 
resubmitted his recommendations in late September, and the promotions finally came 
through in early October.  Though Pershing finally got what he wanted, the AEF 
commander thought the process unnecessarily difficult, and hoped the next go round 
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would be simpler.  He would be sorely disappointed, as promotions became a constant 
battle between the AEF and the War Department.4
 More troubling for Harbord than the promotion issue was the fact that, without an 
army to command, Pershing busied himself by supervising the General Staff.  He fired 
off memoranda asking Harbord to look into this matter or that.  He set up proper rules 
and guidelines for writing cables, going into such detail as instructing that they “be in the 
third person, and the personal pronoun first person should not be used except where 
absolutely necessary.”  Pershing’s ultimate goal was to create a “regular scientific 
method of writing cables,” but he managed to annoy many on his staff in the process.5  
Another memo banned small talk amongst General Staff and other staff officers 
concerning visits to the front, insisting that if there was anything of interest to report it 
would be done in a full briefing.  “The time of our officers,” Pershing admonished, “is 
quite too precious to waste two hours listening to what might be said in ten minutes if 
details with which all are familiar are left out.”6
 Through his increased attention to the workings of the General Staff, Pershing 
grew concerned over what he sensed was an inefficient handling of cables between the 
staff and the War Department.  There seemed to be a habit emerging amongst the staff to 
hold onto questions for an indeterminate length of time, contributing to a general 
slowdown in communication.  Expressing his concerns, Pershing told Harbord, “Let us 
not fall into the habit which seems to prevail in the War Department of allowing these 
things to become buried in the General Staff.”7  Seeking to defend his fellow staff 
officers, Harbord pointed out that the present arrangement of having all cables go through 
the Adjutant General caused the offending delays.  Too often cables contained paragraphs 
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that needed forwarding to multiple sections and departments, which slowed their 
distribution.  He further complained that, as chief of staff, he did not have an officer at his 
immediate disposal to supply information regarding cables that Pershing routinely 
inquired on.  As a remedy, Harbord suggested that Colonel McCoy, the Secretary of the 
General Staff, should direct cable traffic due to his intimate knowledge of the inner 
workings of the General Staff.8
These myriad complaints were only natural given the newness of the General 
Staff.  The AEF was in a vetting out period, and Pershing was committed to make it a 
first-rate organization.  The trivial nature of some of Pershing’s directives belies the 
seriousness of his feelings.  As the AEF got down to work, Pershing had the opportunity 
to observe its officers in action for the first time and he did not like what he saw, 
particularly in the General Staff.  The various delays and inefficiencies that seemed 
never-ending combined to instill in Pershing a belief that unless serious improvements 
were made, he would have to begin winnowing away the dead wood amongst his officers.  
“Either our officers are overworked,” he told Harbord, “or else they are not the class of 
officers we would wish.  Of course I know the latter, to a large extent, is unavoidably 
true.”9  Anticipating the need to make some changes, Pershing requested that Harbord 
provide a clear report covering the current organization of the General Staff, including 
recommendations for officers that could be brought in.  Though unfair to expect the 
General Staff to spring to life with a well-developed routine, haste required that Pershing 
dispense with niceties and push his officers even harder to perform to his standards. 
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Personnel Issues 
 
Pershing did not confine his time to obsessing over the General Staff, but also 
made routine inspection trips throughout the AEF, often taking along his chief of staff.  
Initially the tours provided Harbord an opportunity to get out of Chaumont and 
experience the French countryside, but they also allowed him to better comprehend the 
inner workings and complexities of the vast organization they sought to create.  If 
nothing else they provided a clearer perspective than could be gained sitting at his desk at 
Chaumont. 
In late October, Harbord accompanied Pershing on a five-day tour of the Line of 
Communications, stopping first at the port of St. Nazaire, located at the mouth of the 
Loire River.  One of the first ports to process American troops and supplies, it remained 
an essential link in the AEF supply chain throughout the war.  This did not mean, 
however, that it was well suited for the task.  Located in a small, walled harbor, with 
locks providing increased depth, the port could not handle a great number of ships.  The 
presence of the unfinished hull Paris, which the French envisioned as the jewel of their 
passenger liner fleet, further hindered operations.  The hull represented a great moral and 
economic gamble to the French, and it remained docked at the port until the last weeks of 
the war, despite American pleas for its removal.10
The next few days progressed in much the same way, with detailed inspections of 
various facilities, each repeating the same theme: operations were beginning to bog 
down.  Whether due to inexperienced officers, insufficient facilities, inadequate rail 
service, or an overall lack of enthusiasm, the Line of Communications could not keep up 
 
 132
with the slow increase in troop and supply shipments.  By the end of the tour, Pershing 
resigned himself to replace the commander of the LOC, Major General Blatchford, who 
had joined the group at Bordeaux.  As a temporary replacement, Pershing turned to his 
West Point classmate, Brigadier General Mason M. Patrick, and eventually appointed 
Major General Francis J. Kernan to permanent command of the Line of Communications 
after securing War Department approval.11
Other high-ranking officers were soon found wanting under Pershing’s sharp eye.  
Consumed with his vision of an AEF officer, Pershing gave short shrift to those who did 
not measure up.  The most prominent of these, Major General William L. Sibert, 
commanded the 1st Division now training near Gondrecourt.  Though well liked by 
subordinates for his pleasant and even temperament, he did not possess the personal drive 
that Pershing wanted.   Sibert’s frumpy appearance and time-worn face that showed every 
one of his fifty-seven years also worked against him, countering Pershing’s vision of the 
slim, robust officer.  In addition, though a competent officer, Sibert had an air of 
indifference about him, running contrary to Pershing’s desire for aggressive combat 
commanders.  Sibert’s promotion to major general surprised Harbord, and it stunned the 
AEF chief of staff when Sibert received command of the 1st Division.  Harbord knew that 
such an officer would not last long in the AEF, the only question was the timing of his 
relief.12
That relief, however, became a slow, arduous process stretching over many 
months.  Sibert had the unfortunate position of commanding what Harbord believed to be 
Pershing’s favorite division.  It was also the first division to arrive in France, and 
received considerable attention from both Pershing and the Allies.  Every poor progress 
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report became a black mark against Sibert, further reducing Pershing’s opinion of him.  
In early September, Pershing and French President Raymond Poincare, inspected the 
division.  It did not go well.  The soldiers did their best, but poorly chosen ground and 
inadequate preparation time combined to produce a shoddy review.13  Pershing surmised 
that Poincare’s impression of the American troops “could not have been particularly 
favorable,” and blamed Sibert for the embarrassment.14
On 3 October, Pershing’s displeasure with the 1st Division finally boiled over.  
After observing a demonstration of an attack against an entrenched position, Pershing 
asked for Sibert’s critiques.  When neither Sibert nor a junior officer could provide 
satisfactory answers Pershing’s patience ran out.  As one witnessed described, the AEF 
commander “just gave everybody hell,” with the brunt of his wrath falling on Sibert, who 
received a severe dressing down in front of several junior officers.  Pershing’s attack was 
so vitriolic that the division’s acting chief of staff, Captain George C. Marshall, Jr., leapt 
to a torrid defense of his division and fellow officers.  After a tirade that many present 
believed would result in Marshall’s immediate removal, Pershing freed himself and 
withdrew.  Much to Marshall’s surprise, he remained with the division.  In fact, Pershing 
made a point to take Marshall aside on future visits for a frank discussion of the 
division’s progress.  The future Army chief of staff quickly learned something that 
Harbord already knew: Pershing did not shrink away from criticism or direct speech from 
subordinates, so long as it had a point, and the officer delivering it got the job done.15
While Marshall gained from his encounters with Pershing, eventually becoming 
the General’s protégé, Sibert did not.  The day after his blowup, Pershing wrote a 
confidential letter to Secretary of War Baker, stating, “I fear that we have a some general 
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officers who have neither the experience, the energy, nor the aggressive spirit to prepare 
their units or to handle them under battle conditions as they exist to-day.”16  Enclosed 
with the letter was a memorandum listing several generals Pershing wanted recalled from 
Europe for one reason or another, with Sibert’s name listed prominently at the top.  
Baker’s reluctance to remove a prominent division commander kept Sibert in place for 
the time being, but he could not deny Pershing’s wishes forever.  The final blow against 
Sibert came in December.  Prompted by several negative reports from American visitors 
to the AEF, Pershing sent out a stinging letter to several of his officers under the heading: 
“Pessimism.”  In it he wrote: 
 
Americans recently visiting our training areas and coming into 
contact with officers in high command have received a note of deep 
pessimism, including apprehension of undue hardships to be undergone . . 
. a belief in the impregnability of [the enemy’s] lines . . . and generally 
have come away with an impression that the war is already well along 
toward defeat for our arms. . . . 
While realizing that optimism cannot be created by order, it should 
be unnecessary to point out that such a state of mind on the part of officers 
in responsible positions is at once reflected among their troops, and it is 
not an over statement to say no officer worthy of command would give 
expression to thoughts of depression, much less communicate to untutored 
civilians false ideas of the morale of our troops.  A conservative firmness 
and faith in our cause is not inconsistent with a serious estimate of an 
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enemy’s forces or even of a grave strategic or tactical situation, but I 
hardly need add that a temperament which gives way to weak 
complaining; which views with apprehension the contact with the enemy; 
which carps at the individuality of our Allies, and querulously protests at 
hardships such as all soldiers must expect to endure, marks an unfitness 
for command of such an officer, and indicates his practical defeat before 
he goes to battle. 
The officer who cannot read hope in the conditions that confront 
us; who is not inspired and uplifted by the knowledge that under the 
leadership of our chief executive, the heart of our nation in this war; who 
shrinks from hardship; who does not exert his own personal influence to 
encourage his men; and who fails in the lofty attitude which should 
characterize the General that expects to succeed, should yield his position 
to others with more of our national courage.  The consciousness of such an 
attitude should in honor dictate an application for relief.  Whenever the 
visible effects of it on the command of such an officer reach me in the 
future, it will constitute grounds for his removal without application.17
 
Pershing removed Sibert the day after sending the letter.  Though sound in his 
reasoning, Pershing’s methods left something to be desired.  Historian Donald Smythe 
notes that the letter’s original target was not Sibert, but Major General Clarence Edwards, 
the commander of the 26th Division and criticizes Pershing for unjustly characterizing 
Sibert as a defeatist.  Right or not, Pershing wanted to deliver a shock to his officers, 
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letting them know exactly what he expected of them.  He certainly got their attention. 
Marshall believed the move unfair and blamed Pershing’s staff for trying to outdo the 
AEF commander in severity despite not knowing “what they were being severe about.”18  
Hugh Drum noted that with the relief of Blatchford, Sibert, and Major General William 
A. Mann, commander of the 42nd “Rainbow” Division, “the first step of weeding out poor 
material has started.”19  He knew these three would not be the only ones to go.  Sibert’s 
replacement, Major General Robert L. Bullard, took particular note of his predecessor’s 
fate, reflecting a newfound fear of Pershing in his diary: “[Pershing] is looking for 
results.  He intends to have them.  He will sacrifice any man who does not bring them.”20
Ever watchful of potential threats to the General, Harbord had a different reaction 
to Sibert’s removal.  He worried that Pershing’s actions could have unforeseen political 
ramifications.  Despite his inexperience leading troops, Sibert remained a physically 
vigorous officer, and his status as the second highest ranking officer on the regular list in 
Europe made his removal politically dangerous.  Should Pershing’s popularity falter, or 
should the AEF encounter unforeseen setbacks, the General would open himself up to 
attacks from the rear.  Harbord noted that as the first relief from high command, “General 
Sibert’s friends will not recognize its wisdom, so apparent to us here, and may claim that 
he was made a sacrifice in order to clear him off as a possible successor.”21  Though no 
such claims materialized, it would not be the last time Harbord fretted over possible 
challenges to Pershing’s authority emanating from the home front, nor the last time 
Pershing sent home a politically dangerous general. 
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The Case of John McAuley Palmer 
 
 While Pershing relieved officers he considered unsatisfactory, others began to 
show signs of fatigue, especially at GHQ.  Perpetually overworked in their efforts to 
build an American army virtually from scratch, the officers at Chaumont had nowhere to 
turn for aid.  The Allies were happy to offer advice, but often couched it in language 
reminiscent of a school instructor lecturing a pupil.  They did not have time to baby-sit 
the Americans, and their officious tone often made the Americans reluctant to ask for 
help.  Instead, they sallied forth on their own, operating without a net as it were, all the 
while holding the nation’s reputation in the balance.  Under these considerable stresses, it 
is little wonder that some of the Americans began to crack. 
 The most prominent member of GHQ AEF to run aground was the chief of 
Operations, Lieutenant Colonel John McAuley Palmer.  Since their journey aboard the 
Baltic, no officer in the AEF worked harder than Palmer.  As head of Operations, he 
needed to establish the policies for the rest of his colleagues to follow.  Palmer carried the 
load admirably, but by mid July the strain took its toll and he suffered a mental 
breakdown, necessitating a leave of absence from general headquarters.  As chief of staff, 
Harbord took the news particularly hard.  Ever watchful of those on the General Staff, he 
sought to protect them as best he could.  Harbord took responsibility for Palmer’s state, 
admitting, “I have been piling too much on you,” and looked for ways to lighten his 
load.22  Harbord instructed Palmer to take a break, ten days to two weeks and then return 
if ready.  Even if laced with a bit of personal guilt, it was a most considerate offer.  
Harbord knew how important Palmer was to GHQ and the entire AEF, but he also took 
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into consideration Palmer’s personal aspirations.  Should he go down for an extended 
period, Pershing would have no choice but to replace him as head of Operations.  Such a 
turn of events could effectively end Palmer’s career, and Harbord wanted to spare his 
friend that fate. 
Despite these good intentions, the senior medical officer, Colonel Merritte W. 
Ireland stepped in, saying that the measures Harbord prescribed were too little, too late, 
and instructed Palmer to take a more extended convalescence.  Palmer took up residence 
in a hotel near Louis XIV’s grand palace at Versailles and tried to regain his strength.  
Members of the General Staff, still a month from the move to Chaumont, visited often, 
aiding in Palmer’s recovery.  Harbord and Colonel Benjamin Alvord, the AEF’s Adjutant 
General, even took Palmer to a wonderful dinner at the home of the French liaison to 
General Pershing, Lieutenant Colonel de Chambrun.  The cure seemed to take, as Palmer 
returned to GHQ within a fortnight.23
Palmer’s case is a good example of the care and consideration Harbord exercised 
as chief of staff.  He knew the strain his fellow officers were under and looked out for 
them as best he could.  As Palmer’s biographer, I.B. Holley Jr., states, Harbord “showed 
unusual sensitivity in his role as a leader of men.  Correctly perceiving that Palmer’s 
undeniable gifts were exploited best when his needlessly wavering self-confidence was 
bolstered, the Chief of Staff made a point of demonstrating his high regard overtly and 
officially.”24  In an effort to highlight Palmer’s importance, Harbord left the chief of 
Operations nominally in charge of GHQ soon after his return while the chief of staff 
accompanied Pershing on a three-day tour of the front.  But even with these reassurances, 
Palmer was not ready to come back.  When GHQ AEF moved to Chaumont in 
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September, Palmer’s health again failed him, necessitating another leave of absence.  
This one lasted over a month.  Palmer journeyed to the coastal city of Cannes to 
recuperate, again buoyed by visitors and letters from friends.  Harbord made it a point to 
try and keep Palmer’s spirits high, even suggesting the possibility of an official trip to the 
United States as part of his recovery.25  Despite the best intentions, however, Harbord let 
slip that Fox Conner, Palmer’s assistant at Operations, was down with an appendicitis.  
As if this news was not distressing enough, Harbord added, “I think that things are very 
much in need of a leader in your Section, and wish you were back.  To lose you and Fox 
Conner at the same time is a severe blow.”26  Though undoubtedly an effort to impress 
upon Palmer his continued importance and desirability, it instead caused a fit of 
nervousness, and pushed him to return to duty before he was ready. 
His return was a happy one, celebrated by his compatriots at Chaumont.  Harbord 
met Palmer at the train station and took him to the new headquarters where he enjoyed a 
dinner with the new members of the Operations Section, and caught up with his old co-
workers.  Harbord then pulled Palmer aside for a long talk after dinner, a tactic Pershing 
used when a new high-ranking officer arrived at Chaumont.  Both knew that Palmer was 
not yet ready to return to the grind of GHQ, and discussed Palmer’s temporary position as 
advisor to the commandant of the new General Staff School at Langres.  Harbord wanted 
to do everything he could to keep Palmer in the loop, and to ensure that his confidence 
did not take another turn for the worse.27
With the new position, Palmer knew that he could no longer direct the Operations 
Section.  While he appreciated Pershing and Harbord’s decision to keep him on as an 
assistant chief of staff through his periods of recovery, it was time for Fox Conner to 
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assume full control of Operations.  Conner tried his best to bolster his former section 
chief’s spirits, telling Palmer that “the problem with you is that for the last ten years you 
have done twice as much for the Army as the Army has done for you, and everybody 
knows it,” but nothing could soothe his disappointment.28  Harbord also tried to 
encourage his friend, holding out the possibility of a combat command upon his return, 
which would almost certainly bring with it a promotion to the rank of brigadier general.  
It was a touching offer to a man whose career looked to be slipping away from him.  
Palmer knew and appreciated his friends’ efforts, especially Harbord’s.  In late 
November, Palmer wrote Harbord to keep him abreast of his progress.  He assured the 
chief of staff that the duty was just what the doctor ordered, and made a point to express 
his personal gratitude for Harbord’s faithfulness and support over the previous months.  
“I came over here,” Palmer wrote, “full of admiration for you and glad of an opportunity 
to serve under you.  But as things have developed I find myself under deeper obligations 
to you than anyone else in my acquaintance.  If I were your own brother I could not have 
received more thoughtful consideration and kindness.”29
Palmer’s strong emotions for the chief of staff reflect well on the latter’s 
command style.  Harbord used his strong sense of personal loyalty to maintain 
relationships with other officers, and to inspire them in order to utilize their abilities to 
the greatest extent.  While he could breathe fire as well as the next man, Harbord often 
found such tactics detrimental in the long run.  He instead used his warm and friendly 
nature to instill in subordinates a desire to perform.  It exemplifies Harbord’s method of 
driving the staff though inspiration rather than fear, which Pershing supplied in ample 
measures. 
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Emerging Problems with the War Department 
 
 With work and pressure mounting with each passing week, the last thing the 
members of the AEF needed was a lack of support on the home front.  But like 
everything else in those confusing days, problems emerged at the most inopportune 
moments, adding a considerable amount of stress to an already difficult situation.  In 
terms of the relationship between the War Department and AEF, the problems boiled 
down to the fact that both organizations were in a process of rapid expansion 
simultaneously, and neither was overly sympathetic to their counterpart’s needs.  The 
main point of contention between the two organizations was shipping.  In early October, 
the AEF General Staff produced a Priority Schedule for shipments to France, breaking 
down the transport schedule for a one million man AEF into six phases in order “to 
provide a proper balance between the various elements of the expeditionary forces.”30  
The first five phases would concentrate on the shipment of a complete Army Corps, 
including requisite numbers of Line of Communication troops and auxiliary personnel.  
The final phase included only LOC personnel, projecting the final size of the AEF at 
roughly 1,250,000 men after the schedule’s completion.31
 Problems quickly arose regarding the availability of the necessary shipping to 
fulfill the Priority Schedule’s projections.  Pershing believed that the Allies should 
provide additional tonnage to aid in the buildup of the AEF, but neither the French nor 
British supported transporting anything but combat personnel (hopefully to be added to 
their armies), and put pressure on Washington to acquiesce.  Pershing flatly refused to 
 
 142
accept the persistent arguments for amalgamation, but continuing delays in shipping 
American soldiers to France worked to undermine his plan for an independent army.  The 
AEF needed to show that it could build up a military force in a timely manner before the 
Allies would contribute any excess shipping, and to do so it required additional shipping. 
Adding to Pershing’s problems, the Supply Bureaus in the War Department 
continually interfered with AEF purchases, discussing AEF supply requests with the 
Allies, and generally creating a situation that Harbord called “co-operation in 
ignorance.”32  Much to Pershing and Harbord’s irritation, it appeared that the Supply 
Bureaus took Pershing’s requests as little more than suggestions, basing the final 
decisions upon their own analysis.  Even more shocking, it seemed either the Army Chief 
of Staff or the Supply Chiefs were referring supply questions to the Allied representatives 
in Washington.  These officials sent the requests back to their home governments, who 
forwarded them on to Pershing for comment.  Since Pershing started the cycle in the first 
place with his initial request, he found the process incredibly frustrating.  “Such 
procedure,” Pershing growled, “discredited my recommendations and placed my entire 
staff in an embarrassing position in the eyes of the foreign Government concerned, to say 
nothing of the delay in complying with our requests.”33
To Pershing and Harbord, the fact that the Supply Chiefs made their own 
assessments as to the AEF’s real needs and advised the War Department and Allied 
representatives based upon those assessments, despite having the AEF commander’s 
requests in front of them, smacked of gross interference with Pershing’s command.  Both 
men found the procedure illogical and an unnecessary challenge to Pershing’s authority.  
An officer three thousand miles from the front could not know the daily needs of the 
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AEF, and to presume otherwise reeked of professional arrogance.  Additionally, the 
practice allowed the bureaus, notorious for their desire for independence, to operate 
outside of Pershing’s control and subverted the AEF’s position as an autonomous 
command.  The AEF was charged with conducting combat operations against Germany, 
and its success depended on getting the men to Europe, training them, and keeping them 
supplied well enough to carry out their mission.  As Pershing saw it, the role of the War 
Department was simply “to furnish the army overseas what it asked for, if possible, as 
otherwise we could not be held responsible for results.”  Pershing at least acknowledged 
the possibility of the failure to meet all requests.  Harbord took a far less amenable 
approach, insisting that the War Department “had small reason for existence at that time 
except to make it possible for the American Expeditionary Forces to do that for which 
they were sent to Europe.”34  Neither man could envision the War Department as 
anything other than a support organization for the AEF; a view that only grew stronger as 
the war continued. 
Further contributing to Pershing’s irritation with the War Department was the lack 
of information flowing out of it.  As described by General Peyton March upon his arrival 
in France, the War Department and the Office of the Chief of Staff were distressingly 
slow in making decisions.  Cables went unanswered for days, weeks even, causing further 
delays in France.  When information was forthcoming, it did not suit Pershing’s needs.  
In one example, the War Department continued to provide information to the Allies 
regarding troop ships before giving it to Pershing, creating a situation where the officers 
at GHQ AEF could get better information from the Allies than from their own 
government.  Though embarrassing, the practice was also dangerous.  Germany had spies 
 
 144
strewn across France, and the French were not known for their ability to keep secrets.  
Harbord made note of this fact in his diary, saying, “There are no secrets in France, 
apparently. . . . especially when they concern the queer and uncoördinated [sic] efforts of 
those amusing Americans who are trying to make war like real soldiers.”35  In Harbord’s 
view, to entrust the French with information vital to the AEF undermined Pershing’s 
position, and made it easier for the Allies to go around the AEF commander and deal 
directly with the War Department.  Though mildly annoying when dealing with shipping 
information, the policy could quickly turn serious if it involved more sensitive policies, 
like amalgamation. 
For the moment, however, shipping continued to be the main problem facing the 
AEF.  Harbord watched in ghastly amusement as horses arrived without harnesses; 
wagons without horses, trucks without engines, all accompanied by the occasional 
upholstered chair for some medical unit.  Compounding the problem was a critical 
shortage of supply personnel.  Ships sat in ports for days as they awaited unloading.  
Hugh Drum grew so concerned over the matter that he suspected they would soon be 
forced to transfer combat troops to supply duties, and halt all troop shipments until the 
labor situation could be straightened out.  When supply troops did arrive, they often came 
sans tools, and had to wait idly for their equipment to arrive on a later transport.36  
Though Pershing understood the need for auxiliary personnel, there were simply not 
enough ships to fill the needs, and the AEF commander continued to focus on combat 
soldiers over support troops. 
Some of the cargo arriving from the United States was so idiotic that it was 
almost humorous.  Especially long pilings requested for dock construction were found 
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sawed in half to fit in a particular ship’s cargo hold, thus making them useless.  Another 
ship arrived loaded to the hilt with shavings for a cold storage plant, although tons of the 
material was easily attainable in France.  An irate Pershing sent what was certainly a 
bewildering telegram, requesting no further shipment of “bath bricks, book cases, bath 
tubs, cabinets for blanks, chairs except folding chairs, cuspidors, office desks, floor wax, 
hoses except fire hose, step ladders, lawn mowers, refrigerators, safes except iron field 
safes, settees, sickles, stools, window shades.”37  One can only imagine his reaction at 
learning that a ship returning to the United States with 800 tons of sand as ballast, 
docked, loaded its supplies, and returned to France still carrying the sand in its hold.  A 
dazed Harbord confessed, “Think of the shoes, the toothpaste, cartridges, socks, etc., etc., 
crowded out by 800 tons of French sand.  Wow-wow, and then wow!!!!!!!!!!”38
The source of the supply difficulties was twofold.  On the one hand, the War 
Department focused on raising and training troops above supplying them on the 
battlefield.  The Allies could provide some of the supplies, with the rest finding its way to 
the front somehow.  This mindset, more reminiscent of the nineteenth-century armies that 
subsisted off the land, impeded War Department thinking regarding the necessities of a 
massive army operating overseas.  Department planners found it difficult to reconcile the 
conflicting demands of combat and logistics, and repeatedly focussed on the former to the 
detriment of the latter.39
On the other hand, in their rush to get organized, Pershing and the officers at 
GHQ AEF added to their own problems in making supply requests.  In their haste, AEF 
officers often sent confusing and conflicting requests to the War Department, who then 
had to decipher what was actually needed.  Pershing asked for supplies for programs not 
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yet approved by the War Department, and exploded when his requests were not promptly 
filled.  He changed requests as circumstances changed, but failed to understand the 
resultant delays these changes caused.  In one case, the War Department received an 
urgent order for sixty five-ton gantry cranes in July 1917.  The manufacturers went to 
work, constructing the cranes and preparing them for shipment.  While under 
construction, one AEF board decided to cancel the order at the same time another 
confirmed it.  In May 1918, as the first eight cranes were on their way to France, the AEF 
cancelled the order, leaving the fifty-two remaining cranes on the docks.  By August, 
however, the War Department received word that the eight cranes that did arrive proved 
worthwhile and requested the remaining fifty-two cranes with all possible speed.40  In 
another instance, Pershing put in a request for an eight-cylinder Liberty motor.  Just as it 
was ready to go into production, he changed the order to a twelve-cylinder motor instead.  
After retooling, the company again started to begin production when Pershing changed 
his request back to the original eight-cylinder version. 41  Such changes made it 
impossible for the War Department to efficiently meet the AEF’s needs, causing Pershing 
to become even more frustrated. 
While it is undeniable that war is a fluid entity, with ever-changing demands, one 
can hardly place all off the blame for delays in these cases on the War Department.  It is 
more indicative of Pershing’s view of the War Department’s role in the military 
framework.  As evidenced in earlier statements, Pershing considered the War Department 
as a support system for his forces in Europe.  It was there to give him what he wanted 
when he wanted it (a view quickly disseminated throughout his staff).  When Pershing 
published his memoirs after the war, he made a point to dwell upon every instance where 
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the War Department made some error in shipping, as though that was all it did.  
Somewhat wounded by the criticism, Secretary of War Newton Baker complained that 
Pershing “saw his own problems but seems wholly to have failed to grasp ours.”42
It is easy to sympathize with Baker, but in reality, he was a victim of his own 
creation.  By giving Pershing a free hand in Europe, he established the precedent for the 
AEF commander to think of himself and his command as a truly autonomous entity.  
Chiefs of Staff Hugh Scott and Tasker Bliss added to this sentiment by subjugating their 
own authority to Pershing’s, and never standing up in the War Department’s defense.  
When Peyton March became chief of staff in March of 1918, he refused to kow-tow to 
Pershing as his predecessors had, with foreseeable results: the two men clashed routinely.  
But the ultimate blame must fall on Secretary of War Baker.  It was his job to coordinate 
the military at home and abroad, and he failed to do so.  From his readings on the Civil 
War, he believed it his job as secretary of war to give Pershing everything he needed and 
to stay out of his way.  That may have been the case fifty years earlier, but in the summer 
and fall of 1917 the United States military needed coordination and direction, and it was 
Baker’s job to provide it43
However, it is unfair to lay too much blame on any one individual for the 
difficulties encountered in the early months of the American involvement in the war.  The 
main problem was that the United States simply was not prepared to go to war in April of 
1917, and could hardly expect a smooth and rapid transition to a war footing.  The 
Army’s logistical system, designed to satisfy a force of roughly 150,000, now had to 
recruit, train, equip, transport, and support millions of men within a year’s time.  It was 
far too much to ask of any organization.  The lack of preparedness in the prewar years 
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hamstrung the American military after the war declaration, and the Army General Staff, 
the Bureau System, and the War Department required complete reorganization 
simultaneous to the buildup of the AEF, which caused serious friction between the two 
organizations.  Whether or not this situation could have been avoided is the subject of 
another study entirely.44
 
Training 
 
 As problems emerged between the War Department and the AEF, events 
developed that fall that put increased pressure on the AEF to put soldiers in the line as 
quickly as possible.  Circumstances looked bleak on the three major European fronts, 
forcing the Allies to take a more aggressive interest in AEF development.  The British 
called off their Flanders offensive, which had raged since July and accomplished little 
more than costing a quarter of a million casualties.  The French, still recovering from the 
disastrous Nivelle offensive of the previous spring and its resulting mutinies, resigned 
themselves to limited offensive operations until the Americans could enter the lines in 
numbers.  In November, the Italians suffered a crushing defeat at Caporetto in northern 
Italy, retreating 70 miles to the Piave River and nearly losing their entire army in the 
process.  Even more distressing, the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in overthrowing 
the provisional government of Alexander Kerensky meant Russia would soon withdraw 
from the Alliance against Germany.  The collapse of the Eastern Front would release 
hundreds of thousands of German troops for an offensive in the West.  Despite the 
jubilant rhetoric and warm feelings that accompanied American involvement in the war, 
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German successes brought an increased debate over the proper usage of the American 
Expeditionary Forces. 
Unfortunately for the Allies, American soldiers were arriving slower than 
anticipated.  On 1 October, the AEF had only 65,000 men in France.  Though the figure 
continued to rise (to 104,000 in November and 129,000 in December), the rate of 
increase was so slow that it seemed the Americans would never reach the numbers 
necessary to turn the tide in the war.45  Yet even with this slow buildup, the arrival of 
American soldiers brought to the forefront serious disagreements between Pershing and 
the Allies over training.  Pershing concluded that ultimate success on the Western Front 
depended on the AEF’s ability to free itself from the confines of the trenches and engage 
the Germans in the open.  For all the advancements made in artillery and mechanization, 
Pershing still believed that success on the battlefield came down to a soldier and his rifle.  
He insisted that the Allies had allowed themselves to become bogged down in the 
trenches, both literally and figuratively.  Three years of attrition had left them overly 
enamoured with the defensive, resulting in the goal of gaining territory supplanting the 
true objective of a military force, namely the destruction of the enemy’s army.46
 
To bring about a decision, [the enemy’s] army must be driven from the 
trenches and the fighting carried into the open.  It is here that the 
infantryman with his rifle, supported by machine guns, the tanks, the 
artillery, the airplanes and all auxiliary arms, determines the issue.  
Through adherence to this principle, the American soldier, taught how to 
shoot, how to take advantage of the terrain, and how to rely upon hasty 
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entrenchment, shall retain the ability to drive the enemy from his trenches 
and, by the same tactics, defeat him in the open.47
  
 In advocating “open” warfare, Pershing argued that, “while trench warfare [is] 
somewhat complicated so far as the work of staff is concerned, it makes relatively small 
demands upon initiative and resource of subordinate commanders and troops.” 
Offensives in trench warfare were set-piece affairs with limited goals, planned out on 
delicate timetables that sought to make war a carefully rehearsed routine.  “Open warfare 
on the other hand demands initiative, resource, and decision upon part of all commanders 
from highest to lowest, and requires that all organizations be made into highly developed 
flexible teams capable [of] rapid manoeuvering [sic] to meet swift changes in 
situation.”48  Pershing believed that too often gains achieved in trench warfare were lost 
because the soldiers’ training did not prepare them to exploit successes and carry the fight 
into the interior. 
Harbord echoed his chief’s assessment of combat tactics on the Western Front.  
He could hardly fathom adopting the emphasis on trench fighting that dominated French 
and British training methods, and found their over-reliance on grenades and close quarter 
drill anathema to the American fighting spirit.  He insisted that, “The authentic story of 
an Allied soldier with a rifle strapped on his back, chasing an enemy to get close enough 
to throw a hand grenade would never have been true of any American.”  Such a 
circumstance would only prolong the stalemate that had gripped the Allies for the better 
part of three years.  “Some day someone somewhere would come out of his trenches and 
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start forward,” Harbord argued,  “and thus a stalemate would be broken and the War 
would eventually be won,” and he believed the Americans were the ones to do it.49
 For proof of his views, Pershing looked no further than the German breakthrough 
at Caporetto on the Italian Front.  The Germans employed tactics developed by the 
German General von Hutier, whereby a short, violent artillery bombardment was 
followed by an attack of specially trained combat teams.  Heavily loaded with machine 
guns, grenades, and implements for close-in fighting,50 these teams probed for 
weaknesses in the Italian line, penetrated them once found, and then attacked strong 
points in the line from the rear.  Once the holes in the line were secured, units of waiting 
infantry poured through the breeches, forcing the entire line to collapse.  Such actions 
required a certain amount of boldness and aggression that Pershing could not help but 
admire.  It was the exact type of operation he envisioned the AEF undertaking, once it 
was adequately trained to do so.51
 The new German tactics were not a cure-all, however.  Time would show that, 
while they could open tremendous holes in the line, it was difficult to maintain the 
initiative.  As the troops pushed forward, the advance units began to outrun their 
logistical base, eventually causing the push to slow to a point where the enemy could 
rally his forces and present an effective defense.  To effectively, and permanently, push 
the enemy out of his trenches required a massive, highly-skilled army with a well-oiled 
logistical network that could advance at a rate commensurate with the infantry.  Likewise 
the artillery and support troops needed to be highly mobile, something not yet achieved 
on the Western Front.  To achieve such efficiency, the AEF needed many months, if not 
years of training, and required the Allies to hold out until the AEF divisions completed 
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their preparations.  It was an extraordinary expectation given that the Americans knew 
full well that the Allies were at the point of breaking and needed help immediately.  If 
they did not know, the French and British were more than willing to tell them.52
 Undaunted by critics, Pershing pushed ahead with his plan to train the AEF for 
open warfare.  To break out of the trenches, Pershing wanted an army thoroughly 
indoctrinated in aggressiveness.  He refused to accept that the new machinery of war had 
rendered his infantry obsolete, and set out to prove himself right.  To do so necessitated a 
sharp break from the training methods utilized by the French and British, which 
emphasized artillery and machine-guns at the expense of the infantry.  Pershing put forth 
his philosophy on the general principles for training the AEF with a clear picture of what 
was expected: “All instructions must contemplate the assumption of a vigorous offensive.  
This purpose will be emphasized in every phase of training until it becomes a settled 
habit of thought.”53
 Pershing insisted upon an ambitious program for the AEF, and, with the aid of his 
assistant chief of staff for Training, Colonel Harold B. Fiske, developed a multi-stage-
training regimen designed to make up for the Americans’ lack of military preparedness. 
Pershing wanted training in the United States limited to basic soldiering skills and 
instruction in the tenets of open warfare.  When the divisions reached Europe, they would 
undergo an additional training period, this time focussing on the intricacies of trench 
warfare.  There was a very practical reasoning behind this division.  The wide-open 
spaces in the United States allowed for extensive exercises in movement warfare.  
Training facilities for trench warfare already existed in France, thus relieving the War 
Department of the burden of constructing them.  France also presented the opportunity 
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for soldiers to serve in quiet sectors of the front, providing a level of on-the-job training 
impossible in the United States.54
 Once the soldiers were in Europe, their training would progress in three stages.  
As outlined in Pershing’s final report, “One month was allotted for the instruction in 
small units from battalion down, a second month of experience in quiet sectors by 
battalions, and a third month for field practice in open warfare tactics by division, 
including artillery.”55  The plan took into account the advanced timetable under which 
the AEF was operating.  In order to get the men to France as quickly as possible, 
Pershing agreed to train the first four divisions (1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd) in both open and 
trench warfare, with the later divisions following the three stage training schedule.  The 
final goal was to have AEF soldiers receive between three and six months of training, 
three months of which would be in France, prior to entering combat.56
 It was an ambitious program, but problems quickly emerged that soon derailed the 
finely honed schedule Pershing envisioned.  The first problem was the amount of training 
soldiers received in the United States.  AEF planners assumed recruits arriving in Europe 
would have completed the preemptory four-week training program in the United States.  
Due to the considerable need to embark divisions as rapidly as possible, however, the 
War Department often cut corners on training.  While irresponsible, it is understandable.  
Reports from France repeated again and again the dire circumstances affecting the Allies 
and their desperate need for American boots on the ground.57
 Some of the blame for deficiencies in training must also be placed on the decision 
to send whole divisions to France instead of unattached soldiers.  When a division 
completed its training program in the United States, it underwent a culling as troops were 
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withdrawn for duty with the staff corps and as service as replacements for divisions 
already in Europe.  This left holes in the divisions that needed filling, and the only source 
from which to draw were soldiers still in training.  As more and more men went to 
France, the problem continued to increase, prompting Chief of Staff Peyton March to 
request that Pershing adjust the AEF program to make compensations for the varying 
levels of training in the new divisions, another case where the AEF or the War 
Department had to readjust their policies due to circumstances in the other organization.58
 A second obstacle to Pershing’s training program was the AEF school system.  
Initially, Pershing intended American regimental, brigade, and division staff officers to 
receive supplemental instruction on staff procedures by observing the Allies.  Though a 
good idea, the plan soon proved itself too ambitious.  It required officers busy training on 
staff matters to attend the various 13 army-level schools established in France.  Charged 
with training officer specialists from each division and corps, the schools also sought to 
turn out future instructors for the corps-level schools.  As each corps became activated, it 
created nine additional schools to train replacements and unit commanders.  Add to this a 
level of divisional schools training a core number of experts expected to provide further 
instruction to their division, and the entire system soon became overloaded.59  Officers 
could hardly train with their troops, serve on Allied staffs, and attend courses at the 
numerous AEF schools simultaneously.  To meet all of these requirements independently 
would take several months, further delaying AEF training.  Pershing and the AEF 
Training Section struggled to find a workable solution, but time constraints continued to 
disrupt the program throughout the war. 
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 A final complication in the AEF training program was the reliance upon the Allies 
for instruction that resulted in conflicting points of emphasis.  As Laurence Stallings 
writes, “Neither the British nor the French wanted to revive an art lost when the Old 
Contemptibles perished; they thought exercises in minor tactics, where a rifleman did not 
feel isolated if he had no convenient trench to jump into, were a waste of precious 
time.”60  If he could secure enough trained instructors, Pershing would not have to worry 
about what the Allies thought about American training procedures.  But the miniscule 
number of trained officers and NCO’s in the AEF demanded reliance upon Allied 
instructors, at least in the beginning.61
 As the situation progressed, Pershing and his staff grew increasingly dissatisfied 
with Allied training methods, particularly the French.  In the summer of 1918, Fiske 
complained that the French were secretly seeking to undermine American training policy 
in order to “impregnate the American units with French methods and doctrine.”  That the 
French instructors did not intend to follow AEF guidelines was well known, but only 
recently had a French officer admitted as much to Fiske.  Neither the British nor the 
French had faith in the Americans to train their own men and Fiske believed the sooner 
they were taken out of the AEF training program the better.  He summed it up succinctly: 
“An American army cannot be made by Frenchmen or Englishmen.”62
 Of course, the Allies considered American bull-headedness in refusing to rely 
upon their vast experience irritating as well.  Had the Europeans not been fighting the war 
for three years now?  Harbord noticed “considerable sensitiveness among the French 
about our not adopting in toto their methods of training to the exclusion of and even 
complete abandonment of our own.”63  After inspecting the American 1st Division, 
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Georges M. Clemenceau, the next French premier, thought the division ready for 
immediate service in the line.  When informed that the division needed more training, 
Clemenceau insisted that the Americans were missing the point.  No soldier was ever 
ready for combat.  What was important was that the French desperately needed some 
form of relief.  The Americans had been in Europe going on six months now, and the 
French needed to see the doughboys at the front, not marching in the streets.  With 
dramatic reverses on the Italian Front and the collapse of the Eastern Front the Allies 
wanted men, not excuses from the AEF.  If the Americans could not deliver on their own, 
then the French and British were more than willing to take over control of the American 
soldiers until the AEF could catch up.64
 
Amalgamation and the Problems of Coalition Warfare 
 
 When the United States entered the war, the French and British quickly began 
salivating over their new ally’s vast manpower reserves.  The Europeans understood that 
the American military had serious deficiencies that would take time to correct, and in the 
meantime, the French and British wanted to utilize American soldiers within their own 
ranks through amalgamation.  The British military attaché put it clearly to Chief of Staff 
Scott, “If you ask me how your force could most quickly make itself felt in Europe, I 
would say by sending 500,000 untrained men at once to our depots in England to be 
trained there, and drafted into our armies in France.”65  The French Mission echoed the 
call for troops to be infused into their weakening divisions, if only for training purposes.  
Of course once in French and British units, it would take a considerable effort to 
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withdraw the doughboys, especially if they were engaged in combat.  General Tasker 
Bliss pointed out to Secretary Baker: “When the war is over it may be a literal fact that 
the American flag may not have appeared anywhere on the line because our organizations 
will simply be parts of battalions and regiments of the Entente Allies.  We might have a 
million men there and yet no American army and no American commander.”66  The 
Americans decided early on that they would not allow the Allies to turn the United States 
into a “recruiting agency” for their own forces.67
 But while Baker and Pershing quickly rejected the idea of amalgamation, the 
Allies did not.  As delays mounted in the arrival of American troops in the fall of 1917, 
both the French and the British began to look to amalgamation as a temporary solution 
until the AEF could adequately establish itself.  The argument had merit.  The Allies had 
the training facilities, and the divisional, corps, and army staff operations already in place 
to absorb American recruits.  The AEF needed time to build its administrative and 
logistical operations, and to train its soldiers for Pershing’s goal of open warfare.  With 
the collapse of Russia and the prospect of German divisions being transferred to the 
Western Front for a spring offensive, the idea of waiting for the Americans to build an 
independent force seemed a recipe for disaster to the Allies.68
 Additional arguments supported amalgamation, and the Allies made them.  Raw 
American recruits were unsuited for service in the lines against a veteran German army.  
Such a circumstance would undoubtedly result in American mistakes costing lives 
needlessly.  Better to have the Americans surrounded by veteran Allies, providing 
valuable experience before being called upon to carry the load themselves.  
Amalgamation could also solve the tonnage problem, as the United States would not need 
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to send over support troops, nor the multitude of materials needed to sustain an 
independent army.  Tonnage was at a premium, and it made sense to the Allies to use it 
transporting America’s most valuable commodity: combat soldiers.  It was a valid point, 
especially given the above mentioned difficulties incurred by the AEF and War 
Department in their shipping program.69
 The Allies did not discount the arguments supporting the need to preserve the 
national identity of the American soldiers, but in their view circumstances warranted 
putting aside such concerns for fear that they would ultimately cost the Allies the war.  
Even Pershing’s staunchest supporter, Harbord, conceded that the Allies had a point.  “I 
have no doubt,” he said “that as a Frenchman or a Briton my views on amalgamation 
would have been the same as theirs.  From their standpoint their logic could have no 
answer.”70  Given the validity of the arguments, Pershing’s opposition represented a 
considerable risk.  Harbord admitted, “[Pershing] took the chance of being cursed to the 
latest generation if for want of his cooperation the War was lost.  For the sake of history, 
and as the responsible man on the ground, he had to justify his refusal by something more 
than a mere gesture towards written orders.”71
 Harbord knew that Pershing’s orders to maintain American identity and create an 
independent force for service in Europe constituted “the wall against which General 
Pershing braced his back for the long months of struggle to keep his men under their own 
flag.”72  But it was not the only ammunition Pershing used to fight off amalgamation.  
Serious questions of national pride warranted consideration.  How motivated would the 
soldiers be fighting for foreign leaders?  What would amalgamation say about the 
capability of American officers?  Additional arguments against amalgamation relied on 
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cultural factors.  Irish-Americans were already distressed at the British treatment of 
Ireland during the war, and many doubted that they would serve under the British 
willingly.  It was even more problematic to have Americans serve in French ranks given 
the language barrier.  Amalgamation also posed a diplomatic threat to the United States at 
the peace table.  Should the war end before the American flag appeared on the battlefield, 
the United States could be marginalized at the peace talks, a scenario President Wilson 
desperately wanted to avoid in this war for democracy.  Finally, as the casualties 
mounted, it was uncertain how long the American people would to support the war if it 
appeared that foreign leaders were using Americans as cannon fodder.73
For all these reasons, Pershing continued to oppose amalgamation.  It was not an 
easy fight, as the Allies presented an uncommonly unified front.  As intelligence reports 
increasingly pointed to a major German offensive in the spring, General Pétain called for 
American troops to train with French divisions.  His reasoning was to speed up the AEF’s 
training so they could be called upon to block the coming offensive.  But a French officer 
intimated to Harbord that “what [Pétain] really wished to do was to reinforce his depleted 
divisions with American regiments.  The loss of [American] national identity in the war . 
. . meant nothing to him.”74  Hence the Allies used a variety of tactics to try and 
persuade, cajole, or simply get around Pershing in the struggle over amalgamation.  
Given the degree to which President Wilson and the War Department relied upon 
Pershing’s judgement, it was clear to the Allies that they would have to either change 
Pershing’s mind, or persuade the American leadership that he was wrong and change it 
for him.  Consequently, as the Allies grew increasingly persistent, Pershing found himself 
fighting amalgamation both in Europe, and in a rear-guard action in the United States. 
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Like the French, the British used the issue of training as a way to push through 
amalgamation.  Pershing contended that while the American recruits must be trained 
according to American doctrine, he would be willing to commit them to service with the 
Allies should an emergency arise.  In December, the British took this small opening to 
suggest that Pershing turn over several battalions for training with the British army, at 
least until the present situation calmed down.  Not wanting to provoke further 
competition between the French and the British over the prospects of using American 
troops, Pershing flatly refused.75  Undaunted, the British came back with a significant 
modification.  They offered to supply the tonnage necessary to bring the Americans over, 
provided they train with the British and serve in British units until the forthcoming crisis 
had passed.  It was quite the carrot from a nation claiming to be on the brink of starvation 
due to the German submarines.  Pershing replied with typical abruptness.  If the British 
had tonnage available, why were they not turning it over for the shipment of entire 
divisions instead of just battalions?  To Pershing, the British “were playing for advantage 
to themselves in the offering to transport our troops. . . . Their purpose was to build up 
their own units instead of aiding the cause in general by augmenting the number of 
complete divisions on the Western Front.”76  It was selfishness personified, and Pershing 
would not compromise the integrity of his command to assuage the Europeans. 
Compounding Pershing’s troubles with the British, signs emerged that he was 
beginning to lose the battle for amalgamation on the home front.  On 18 December, 
Secretary Baker intimated that feelings in Washington were softening regarding Allied 
requests for American troops.  Baker explained that, “Both English and French are 
pressing upon the President their desires to have your forces amalgamated with theirs by 
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regiments and companies.”  Though not a great surprise to Pershing, the Secretary then 
dropped a bombshell.  “We do not desire loss of identity of our forces but regard that as 
secondary to the meeting of any critical situation by the most helpful use possible of the 
troops at your command.”  Pershing was dumbstruck.  Though Baker’s message assured 
that the AEF commander still had “full authority to use the forces at your command as 
you deem wise,” he could sense his control over the AEF ebbing away.77
Pershing’s fears were not unfounded.  Yes Baker and President Wilson were 
committed to building up an independent American army in France, but they would not 
risk the collapse of the British and French armies in the meantime.  Should the situation 
demand, they thought it only reasonable to use American soldiers in any way necessary 
to prevent a German victory.  Pershing, however, could not disagree more.  In his mind, 
the autonomy of the AEF was essential to overall victory, and any plan that threatened his 
command authority was tantamount to disaster.  Though battered, he believed the French 
and British armies could hold off the Germans long enough for an American army to 
appear on the battlefield, and he was determined to hold his ground. 
Not long after receiving the Baker cable, Pershing sat down with General Pétain 
to discuss the matter.  Pétain called for the American 1st Division to go into the line 
immediately, and pushed for the rapid amalgamation of remaining American regiments 
into French divisions.  Again Pershing took a defensive position, claiming that the 1st 
Division needed more time, and reiterated his objections to the entire idea of 
amalgamation.  Pétain pointed out that under Pershing’s schedule, the 1st Division would 
receive eight months of training before going into the line.  Amalgamation into French 
divisions, Pétain claimed, could cut that figure in half for future regiments.  Given the 
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present threat and the need for haste, surely Pershing could see the logic behind Pétain’s 
proposal.  But Pershing remained unconvinced, thinking the plan simply meant “the 
building up of French divisions by American regiments and carried with it the probability 
that we should not be able to get them back” without crippling the French.  The two men 
parted without any resolution, both knowing the issue was far from settled.78
Pershing tried to reinforce his position by sending a cable to the War Department, 
spelling out his arguments against amalgamation.  He stated explicitly: 
 
Do not think emergency now exists that would warrant our putting 
companies or battalions into British or French divisions, and would not do 
so except in grave crisis.  Main objections are first, troops would lose their 
national identity; second, they probably could not be relieved for service 
with us without disrupting the Allied divisions to which assigned, 
especially if engaged in active service; third, the methods of training and 
instruction in both Allied armies are very different from our own which 
would produce some confusion at the start and also when troops return for 
service with us.  Attention should be called to prejudices existing between 
French and British Governments and armies, and the desire of each to 
have American units assigned to them to the exclusion of similar 
assignment to the other.  Also each army regards its own methods as best 
and they do not hesitate to criticise [sic] each other accordingly.  We have 
selected what we consider best in each and added it to our own basic 
system of instruction.79
 
 163
 
Despite Pershing’s best hopes, however, the amalgamation issue persisted.  Soon 
after his meeting with Pershing, Pétain sat down with French Premier Georges 
Clemenceau to formulate a policy for dealing with the Americans.  Harbord records in his 
diary that, “with no warrant of military knowledge to justify him taking sides, 
[Clemenceau] sent a cablegram to Ambassador Jusserand in Washington to the effect that 
Pershing and Pétain could not get along.” The cablegram also accused Pershing of being 
less than forthright in his description of the meeting to Clemenceau, which the 
Frenchman took great offense to.  The War Department responded by cabling Pershing 
that the French Premier “stated that General Pershing had reported himself and General 
Pétain in substantial agreement after conference on this subject [amalgamation]; but 
General Pétain conveyed to M. Clemenceau an opposite opinion.”80  Upon reading the 
cable, Pershing became furious, both at the questioning of his honor and that the French 
were going behind his back to Wilson and the War Department.  He wrote to the War 
Department immediately, insisting that the “French have not been entirely frank, as 
unofficial information indicates they really want to incorporate our regiments into their 
divisions for such service in the trenches as they desire.”  He assured Washington that he 
would have a “frank discussion” with Clemenceau on the entire matter and try to arrive at 
a “satisfactory agreement consistent with maintenance of our own national military 
identity.”81
Pershing also directed his anger at the Clemenceau.  He wrote the old Tiger a 
pointed letter, and enclosed copies of the various cables received from the War 
Department regarding Clemenceau’s action.  In polite but stern language, Pershing told 
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the Frenchman, “These questions must all be settled here, eventually, on their merits, 
through friendly conference between General Pétain and myself, and cables of this sort 
are very likely, I fear, to convey the impression in Washington of serious disagreements 
between us when such is not the case.”82  Not one to shy away from a fight, Clemenceau 
wrote Pershing the next day defending his actions.  He informed the General that he 
wrote to his own ambassador in order to clarify their position regarding seemingly 
contradictory information, so that the ambassador could then accurately represent 
Clemenceau’s wishes to President Wilson and Secretary Baker.  While assuring Pershing 
that he did not direct his statement to the American government, he defended his right to 
do so.  Though to Pershing it may have seemed Clemenceau was splitting hairs, to the old 
politician it was an important distinction.  Clemenceau concluded his letter, “I shall 
exercise all the patience of which I am capable in awaiting the good news that the 
American commander and the French commander have finally agreed on a question 
which may be vital to the outcome of the war.”83
Whatever else Pershing may have thought, he could not deny that the aged French 
Premier still had some fight left in him.  The letters indicate deep divisions over the 
amalgamation issue and the increasingly strained nature of the relationship between the 
AEF commander and the French government.  While Clemenceau was clearly meddling, 
he believed his nation’s survival was at stake and Pershing’s inflexibility stood in the way 
of a possible source of relief.  Pershing, however, cannot get off so lightly.  He was naïve 
to think the amalgamation issue a purely military matter, with no political ramifications.  
Determined to stay out of politics, Pershing failed to grasp that his position as head of the 
AEF had clear political implications whether he acknowledged them or not.  His saving 
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grace was the protection Secretary Baker continued to give him from more-skilled 
politicians.84
Indeed, just when it seemed Wilson and Baker were reconsidering their position 
in favor of aiding the Allies, Baker indicated a growing concern that the French were 
being duplicitous in their dealings with the Americans.  Though troubled by the reported 
rift between Pershing and Pétain, Baker told Wilson, “The disinterested ground urged by 
the French Ambassador, to the effect that it was for our good and was merely an 
accommodation on the part of the French, seems hardly to cover the whole case.”85  
Baker suggested that, without more information, they defer to Pershing on the matter and 
rely on his judgement, to which Wilson agreed. 
With the decision to back their military commander, Baker and Wilson ensured 
that future discussions on amalgamation would have to go through Pershing.  Though the 
issue was far from settled, Pershing could rest easy regarding support from Washington.  
Future discussions, and there were certain to be some, would be resolved according to his 
terms or not at all.  It was a welcome respite, for there were other matters facing the AEF 
that winter that demanded attention.
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CHAPTER VI 
REORGANIZATION (JANUARY - MARCH 1918) 
 
 As the calendar rolled over to 1918, the AEF entered into the most precarious 
period in its short history.  The Bolshevik Revolution the previous November saw the 
Eastern Front collapse as Russia exited the war.  The Allies could only watch and wait as 
the Germans began shifting divisions to the West in preparation for a major offensive 
sometime in the spring.  With the French and British reaching the end of their manpower 
limits, the pressure to amalgamate American soldiers into the Allied armies grew to new 
heights.  The AEF commander-in-chief, General John J. Pershing, did what he could to 
maintain the independent identity of his forces in France, but the AEF’s agonizingly slow 
buildup made it increasingly difficult to assuage the Allies.  Though troop shipments 
promised to pick up over the next few months as draftees completed their training in the 
United States, it became readily apparent that the AEF’s organizational and logistical 
structure was not ready to handle the increased load.  When combined with the persistent 
delays in the War Department, it appeared that even after ten months in the war, the 
United States remained a long way from making a significant contribution on the 
Western Front. 
 With these challenges facing American policymakers, the first few months of 
1918 became a period of examination and reorganization within both the American 
Expeditionary Forces and the War Department.  In France, the AEF General Staff and the 
Line of Communications underwent serious overhauls to improve efficiency before the 
soldiers began arriving in larger numbers.  Changes in the War Department centered on 
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the selection of a new chief of staff, and his consolidation of power in the Army General 
Staff.  When the Germans finally launched their anticipated offensive in late March, both 
the AEF and the War Department had made significant administrative improvements, but 
an unforeseen side effect of these efforts was a growing rift between the two 
organizations. 
 
Mounting Problems 
 
 The new year presented Brigadier General James Harbord with an opportunity to 
look over the staff organization created the previous July.  As it was based loosely upon 
the doctrines put forth in the Field Service Regulations, Harbord found the AEF staff and 
supply system an excellent first effort given the inexperience of everyone involved.  But 
Harbord noted a small problem: “As long as we had no troops it worked well.”1  With the 
increased duties that accompanied the arrival of the AEF’s soldiers, the staff found itself 
stretched too thin, as organizations that looked good on paper proved unworkable in 
practice.  Harbord spent the first month of 1918 studying the staff operation with an eye 
on making improvements before the troops began arriving in large numbers. 
He soon found a fundamental problem in the initial organization’s utilization of 
Pershing.  With staff officers creating their own services virtually from scratch, each man 
needed considerable access to Pershing to insure that their particular organization fell in 
line with his grand design for the AEF.  Consequently, a number of officers felt entitled 
to take their problems directly to the commander-in-chief, or at the very least the chief of 
staff.  Included amongst this group were the Adjutant General, the Inspector General, the 
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Chief Ordnance Officer, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief Quartermaster, and the 
Chief Signal Officer.  Added to this list were new titular offices, such as the General 
Purchasing Agent, the Director General of Transportation, the Chief of Aviation, the 
Commanding General of the Line of Communications, and the five heads of the General 
Staff sections to name a few.2  For each officer to receive just thirty minutes a day would 
consume half of Pershing and Harbord’s daily schedule, not counting the time in and out 
of the office.  Neither man could afford to dedicate that much time to the staff at GHQ, 
which meant the system needed streamlining.3
 Harbord also worried that under the current organization, Pershing was too often 
dealing with details and minutia instead of focussing on building up the AEF.  Not only 
did Harbord seek to lessen the amount of administrative chatter being pushed on the AEF 
commander, but he also tried to manage his own duties more effectively.  This became 
more difficult when Pershing left GHQ AEF.  On those occasions, Harbord assumed 
Pershing’s routine administrative duties, putting off his own work in the process.  He 
believed much of the work could be handled by a subordinate, and advocated creating an 
assistant or deputy chief of staff to do just that.  Such an officer would allow Harbord to 
visit the troops more frequently, supervise training to a greater extent, form better 
relationships with higher level officers in the AEF, keep up with the progress of the 
schools, and do all the other things that required his attention as chief of staff.  It would 
also provide better command continuity at GHQ.  Under the current system, whenever 
Pershing and Harbord were both away from Chaumont one of the assistant chief’s of staff 
filled in as chief of staff.  None had the necessary knowledge or authority to make any 
but the most basic decisions, which caused the entire system to slow down.  Harbord 
 
 174
wanted someone who could step in and keep things moving if he and Pershing were 
away, and suggested his old friend, Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. McCoy, the current 
Secretary of the General Staff for the job.4
 While Pershing mulled over Harbord’s suggestions, matters in the Line of 
Communications (LOC) began to reach critical levels.  In a letter to the War Department 
in early January, Pershing warned of serious problems affecting the LOC base ports.  The 
supply departments in Washington had failed to provide the material needed to build up 
the port facilities to handle the increased shipments from the United States.  These delays 
put port construction several months behind schedule, resulting in docks not being ready 
to process the amount of tonnage coming into the ports.  An acute shortage of rolling 
stock for the railroads also caused supplies to pile up in warehouses or on the docks (a 
common problem amongst the Allies, as rolling stock was in limited supply throughout 
France and Italy).  The AEF requested engines and rail cars from the United States, but 
none were available at present.  Adding to the congestion at the ports was the AEF’s 
inability to direct incoming shipments to specific ports.  Officials at home determined the 
final destinations for outgoing ships without any consideration for efficiency in the Line 
of Communications or port congestion levels.  At one point there were some sixteen 
transports berthed at St. Nazaire, while the ports of Brest and Bordeaux had only three 
each.5
 These were not the only problems causing delays in the LOC.  Secrecy 
restrictions resulted in supplies being shipped without a clearly indicated final 
destination, forcing officials at the ports to search through orders to ascertain where to 
send the material.  In one instance, fifty carloads of flour were sent seventy-five miles out 
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of the way before their ultimate destination could be determined.  Once the error was 
discovered, however, a tug-of-war developed between the local French authorities and 
the Americans over the flour.  After a month of arguing, during which the French refused 
to back-track any freight to free up the disputed train, the Americans consented and 
turned it over on the stipulation that the French replace it.6  Further gumming up the 
works were repetitious and overlapping supply requests from various AEF units.  When 
the initial divisions arrived in France, they attempted to bring with them six months 
worth of supplies.  The LOC did not possess the necessary storage and distribution 
network to handle the supplies at the time, so they were strewn about France, distributed 
anywhere there was room.  Later, when the divisions looked for their supplies they were 
nowhere to be found.  The divisional quartermaster then put in a request to the War 
Department for supplies that were already in France, only no one knew where.  These 
same quartermasters would send multiple requests to the United States for the same 
items, usually from various stops along the line as a division moved to its billeting area.  
The authorities at home tried to fill each request as quickly as possible, resulting in 
surplus shipments clogging the supply lines.  These shipments ran months behind 
schedule, with the end result being that by the time the supplies finally arrived, they were 
either no longer needed or ill-suited to satisfy the unit’s updated requirements.7
Everyone at GHQ AEF was aware of the troubling situation in the Line of 
Communications, most of all Harbord.  In November, he received a long letter from 
Colonel Johnson Hagood, chief of the Coordinating section of what was to be the General 
Staff, 1st Army, and commander of the Advance Section, LOC.  Hagood possessed a gift 
for organization, and he was not afraid to offer his opinions on any given situation.  In his 
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letter, Hagood spelled out what he perceived to be the requirements of the Advance 
Section, addressing the difficulties facing the entire Line of Communications, and 
offering up specific remedies.  He began with a grand summation of the problems in the 
LOC: 
 
1. The line of communications [L. of C.] is the most important 
problem now confronting the American army.  Upon its successful 
operation, more than upon the successful operations of all other 
agencies combined, depends the outcome of the war.  Both sides 
realize this.  The Germans are trying to defeat the Allies by their 
submarine campaign against Great Britain and the Allies are trying to 
defeat the Germans by starving them out.  It is common knowledge 
that the greatest weapon Germany has is her wonderful organization of 
supplies and transportation. 
2. Our own incompetence: If the United States does not actually fail, 
its efficiency is certainly going to be tremendously decreased by the 
sheer incompetence of its line of communications, beginning in the 
U.S. and ending at the French front.  This incompetence not only 
applies to the machine as a whole but, we may as well admit, applies 
to the individual officers and employees, none of whom has had 
experience in solving such a problem.  In this, of course, I include 
myself. . . .  
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4. Not only has the L. of C. failed, so far, to function properly in the 
supply of our own men but it has so clogged the French railway yards, 
storehouses and quays in this section as to cause an official complaint 
to be made to the Commander-in-Chief, with the unofficial statement 
to me that they were being embarrassed in their movement of troops to 
the Italian front. 
5. How much longer? The question naturally arises as to how much 
longer these conditions are going to last and as to whether or not, with 
troops arriving at the rate of 50,000 a month, we shall be in a better 
position to handle the problem a year from now that we are to-day.8 
 
Of the problems Hagood spelled out, the most serious was a failure by GHQ to 
put enough emphasis on the LOC, favoring instead the more traditional line and staff 
organizations.  The LOC needed total control over AEF supply, but bureaucratic 
obstinacy proved difficult to overcome.  Hagood also lamented the AEF’s failure to 
develop adequate plans for the creation of a suitable Advance Section, with clearly 
defined responsibilities, and a dangerous lack of facilities.  The men in the Advance 
Section were working long hours, sometimes as many as twelve to sixteen hour days, 
with little opportunity to plan for the future.  Without help from above, the situation 
would only get worse over the coming months. 
To remedy the situation, Hagood offered several suggestions.  He wanted more 
emphasis put on service in the Line of Communications by GHQ.  Though unglamorous, 
an efficient logistical branch was essential to ultimate victory, and the men needed to 
 
 178
know that they were appreciated.  The LOC also needed additional personnel.  The AEF 
could not bring combat troops to France without the requisite support network already in 
place.  The longer it took to secure additional auxiliary troops the longer it would be 
before the LOC worked properly.  Better to delay operations now than to wait for the 
situation to deteriorate further, causing additional delays.  Lastly, GHQ needed to 
establish a clear line of authority throughout the LOC.  As in any military operation, it is 
essential that everyone understand who sits in authority in any given situation.  The 
General Staff had created the Line of Communications without any consideration for how 
its varied and overlapping sections would interact over time.  Consequently, unit 
quartermasters quarreled with transportation officers, who in turn fought with regulating 
agents, and so on and so forth.  Without correction, the problem would only get worse as 
more and more troops arrived in France.9
All in all, Hagood’s observations effectively described the confusion gripping the 
AEF’s supply system.  Though it fell on Pershing and his officers to provide direction, 
there was only so much they could do.  The problems facing GHQ and the LOC were 
larger than anything they had previously experienced, and it showed.  Established Army 
policies did not cover the challenges presented by the World War, so new solutions had 
to be formulated, which took time.  In an effort to speed up the process in early 
December, Pershing put together a conference at Chaumont of several division 
quartermasters and Colonel W. D. Conner, head of the Coordination Section, General 
Staff.  Included in the group was Johnson Hagood, whose knowledge of supply matters 
made him a logical contributor.  After a prolonged discussion, Harbord took their 
suggestions and issued a new general order concerning supply.10
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Issued as General Orders No. 73 (12 December 1917), the order stated that “the 
function of the L. of C. is to relieve the combatant field forces from every consideration 
except defeating the enemy.”  It went on to instruct that “all agencies established for that 
purpose belong to the L. of C. unless otherwise specially assigned.”11  This made the 
LOC an enormous organization, reaching from the ports to the trenches across multiple 
zones of authority.  In an attempt to clear up responsibility in the LOC, the order divided 
AEF supply into three phases: procurement, care and storage, and transportation.  Each 
one of these fell under a separate authority.  Procurement was the purview of the Chiefs 
of Supply Departments, AEF, as well as the General Purchasing Agent, while the 
Director General of Transportation (DGT) handled all transportation matters.  Although 
ostensibly responsible for the entire LOC, the Commanding General, Line of 
Communications (CGLOC) had command authority over only the care and storage of 
supplies.  The Coordinating Section of the General Staff supervised the entire system, but 
the General Order did not clearly articulate the relationship between officers at GHQ and 
those commanding elements of the LOC, who theoretically reported directly to 
Pershing.12
Despite the provisions outlined in G.O. 73, the system still had serious problems.  
The most notable was what happened when supplies reached the Regulating Stations.  All 
goods proceeding to the front had to go through a Regulating Station, which separated 
shipments and constructed supply trains for individual divisions.  Commanding the 
Regulating Station was the Regulating Officer, who oversaw all supply movements in the 
Advance Section.  Operating under the Coordination Section, General Staff, the 
Regulating Officer’s authority superceded that of both the CGLOC and the DGT.  Thus, 
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the DGT lost control over transportation and the CGLOC lost overall control over 
supplies once they reached the Regulating Stations.  This caused a considerable degree of 
frustration within the LOC, as it still bore any blame for supply problems despite not 
controlling their movements past a certain point, and both the CGLOC and DGT 
complained incessantly about being stripped of their authority.  At the time, however, 
GHQ thought the new system a step in the right direction.13
  
The Hagood Board 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, following rapidly on the heels of General 
Order No. 73, Pershing decided to change the officer in charge of the Line of 
Communications.  He brought in Major General Francis Kernan as the new Commanding 
General Line of Communication, who in turn selected Hagood to be his new chief of 
staff.  Whether Hagood’s letter factored into the decision is unclear, but he certainly 
made himself known as a man in touch with the specific problems and challenges facing 
the AEF’s supply system.  Kernan was impressed with the way Hagood carried out his 
duties as the Commander of the LOC, Advance Section, and thought him just the man to 
help straighten out the LOC.14  But despite the efforts to improve the efficiency of the 
Line of Communications, problems continued to surface.  Soon after the issuance of 
General Orders No. 73, the CGLOC and the DGT began to clash over supply transport.  
When a load of feed took over two weeks to reach its destination Pershing sent a letter to 
Kernan expressing his displeasure over the continuing delays.  The AEF commander 
informed Kernan that, even though the Transportation Department had taken over the 
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supplies, it was still the CGLOC’s responsibility to make sure they reached their 
destination in a timely manner.  Kernan and Hagood complained that under the current 
organizational framework, the CGLOC had no authority over transport, and the DGT had 
no authority over railheads, which were under the command of local military 
commanders.  Compounding these problems were French railroad officials, who could 
trap a supply train in its tracks for days on end without any way for the Americans to 
move it along.  The entire system was still an absurd mix of jumbled authority.  The only 
thing for sure was who received the blame when supplies did not reach the front: 
members of the LOC.15
 A further problem came with the relocation of the LOC’s headquarters.  While 
Pershing originally intended the LOC to stay with GHQ AEF, it became clear that 
Chaumont had neither the office space, nor the billets necessary to adequately house both 
organizations.  For most of the fall the LOC Headquarters remained in Paris, but this 
proved unworkable for the same reasons as it did for Pershing’s GHQ.  When Kernan 
took over the LOC, he began looking for a suitable new home.  The officers in the 
General Staff favored a move to Orleans, but Kernan pushed for Tours.  One of the oldest 
cities in France, it was located one hundred miles south-southwest of Paris along the 
main rail line running between the ports of St. Nazaire, Brest, and La Rochelle and the 
Regulating Station at Is-sur-Tille.16  Sitting on the Loire River, Tours was about equal 
distance between Paris and the coast, and had good rail and road connections.  Though 
the city dated back to the Roman era, it possessed a modern section with wide streets, 
ample parking, and street-car lines, in addition to buildings with the necessary electric 
and telegraphic infrastructure to support a bureaucratic organization the size of the 
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LOC.17  It was also conveniently located close to other AEF installations, such as the 
Ordnance Depot at Mehun, the Officer Reclassification Center at Blois, the Field 
Artillery School at Saumur, and the tremendous Intermediate Storage facility at Gièvres. 
 All of these attributes made it the perfect location to build what Harbord called 
the “second city of the American Expeditionary Forces – second only in rank, first in its 
military population and the humming multiplicity of its activities.”18  After ordering a 
brief inspection of possible locations, Kernan formally recommended Tours.19  
Pershing’s approval came so rapidly that CGLOC had to check again just to be sure.  He 
was unused to GHQ showing any willingness to listen to sound reasoning if the proposal 
conflicted with their original plan.  The move finally came in early January, with Kernan 
and Hagood setting up their offices on 13 January.  The population of the city quickly 
swelled, with some twenty thousand officers and soldiers assigned to Tours by war’s end, 
adding to the sixty thousand citizens of the town.  In little time at all, Tours became the 
“heart of the largest military industrial enterprise ever undertaken by a nation.”20
 However, even with a new commander and a new headquarters, efficiency in the 
LOC remained a problem.  By late January, it became clear that the problem was not 
isolated in the LOC, but hindered the overall organization of the AEF.  The staff at the 
AEF’s various facilities, institutions, and field units were still too raw to handle their own 
administrative responsibilities, which meant that GHQ had to carry the additional load.  
The General Staff could handle things when Pershing and Harbord were both in the 
office, but should one be away (often touring some installation or unit or visiting Paris), 
the situation became unworkable.  Brigadier General Robert C. Davis, the AEF’s acting 
Adjutant General, noted a “tendency on the part of the staff departments to centralize at 
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these headquarters much work which should not be handled here.”21  The chief of the 
Coordination section, W.D. Conner, called it “as faulty an organization as could have 
been set up,” and believed everyone at GHQ desperately wanted the entire system 
reorganized, including the commander-in-chief.22
 Though Pershing found the congestion of GHQ irritating as well, he was more 
concerned with the performance of his general staff officers.  The problem, as he saw it, 
came down to training.  General Staff training in the U.S. Army was a relatively new 
entity in 1918, and it did not address the challenges faced by the AEF in France.23  “So 
faulty had been the training of the General Staff as members of a great directive group,” 
wrote Pershing, “that both individuals and the group lacked initiative and purpose for 
want of a clear conception of their tasks.”24  Pershing tried to rectify the situation by 
giving well-defined powers of direction, but the General Staff’s organization simply did 
not meet the AEF commander’s approval.  Changes needed to be made, and the time was 
rapidly approaching for action.  
 Growing increasingly weary of the congestion at Chaumont and the incessant 
struggles with minute details, Harbord welcomed any opportunity to leave GHQ and 
travel amongst the men.  He longed to get away from paperwork and administrative 
minutia and feel like a soldier again.  “We staff soldiers who are fighting the war at desks 
must throw a little camouflage now and then and at least give the impression of 
activity.”25  One of his favorite destinations was the town of Nancy, with its good hotel, 
hot baths and beautiful buildings, and a night there provided a week’s worth of 
recuperation.  But the sojourns were not always as relaxing as Harbord intended.  There 
was always the danger of a random shell falling on one’s position (or an aimed one if the 
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party was not careful).  Even the hotel in Nancy was not always secure, as Harbord 
experienced one night when the Germans conducted a moonlight raid complete with 
bombers and long-range guns.  Shrapnel raining on the roof of Harbord’s auto welcomed 
him into town, provoking his driver to advise that Harbord put on his helmet.  The firing 
ceased when they reached the hotel, prompting the men to congratulate each other for 
surviving the raid. 
 Later that night the shelling began again, this time more concentrated.  Harbord’s 
sixth floor room was rocked from concussion blasts, one of which spoiled his bath by 
spraying glass from the window into the tub just prior to his entry.  French anti-aircraft 
guns chased the bombers away, but they returned throughout the night.  Harbord and his 
travelling companion, Colonel de Chambrum, took to sleeping in their clothing while 
they waited for the next raid.  Despite the ever-present danger, Harbord could not help 
but feel exhilarated by the affair.  He wrote later in his diary, “It was a lively night.  
Doubtless the thing to do [was] to get into a cellar, but how [could] a Brigadier General 
in the National Army do that!!”26  The next morning they found that several bombs had 
landed within thirty yards of their room, and the pair decided to return to the safety of 
Chaumont. 
Even with these tours providing Pershing and Harbord some respite from the 
hectic life in Chaumont, both knew the AEF organizational structure required serious 
revisions.  In February, Pershing finally acted on his growing dissatisfaction with the 
LOC and the AEF’s organization, directing Harbord to put together a committee to study 
the problem and find a solution.  Harbord quickly set about selecting the board’s 
members and outlining its mission.  To chair the committee, Harbord set his sights on 
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Hagood, whose position as Kernan’s chief of staff and previous calls for reform made 
him imminently suited to the task.  Harbord brought Hagood to Chaumont on 8 February 
and spelled out the latter’s assignment, which was to examine the “desirability of any 
changes in the present organization of the Headquarters A.E.F., including a revision of 
[General Orders No. 8],” which created the current AEF organization.27  Luckily for 
Hagood, he had already begun thinking about ways to reorganize the General Staff and 
the LOC before Harbord’s summons. 
In late January, the LOC faced a distressing lack of general staff officers capable 
of improving the organization’s efficiency.  On 31 January, Colonel James Logan, chief 
of the Administrative section, GHQ, paid a visit to Hagood at Tours.  The two men 
discussed the present state of the LOC, hoping to correct the problems caused by its 
shortage of general staff officers.  Logan agreed to do what he could to locate officers for 
duty with the LOC, and told Hagood that there was a move afoot to restructure the LOC 
by bringing the DGT and the Bureau Chiefs into its operational folds.28  A few days later, 
Hagood received a letter from Colonel George Van Horn Moseley, assistant to the chief 
of the Coordination section, GHQ, which echoed Logan’s suggestion for strengthening 
the LOC.  Moseley’s letter also floated the idea of combining the Coordination and 
Administrative sections of the General Staff and bringing the headquarters of the LOC to 
Chaumont to be in closer contact with Pershing.  Hagood supported the idea of bringing 
into LOC the General Staff’s administrative sphere.  He wrote to Moseley that he was 
“quite sure that with proper personnel I could organize the thing on a big scale and make 
it work.”  These discussions inspired Hagood to think the time was at hand to do 
something to correct the problems plaguing the GHQ AEF.  He told Moseley, “I think 
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this a wonderful opportunity for substituting a sound military organization for one which 
is certainly a hodge-podge, and, in my judgement, sure to break down as soon as the 
strain begins to bear.”29
Hagood’s boldness in criticizing the AEF’s organization to those responsible for 
its development is representative of his character.  An efficient staff officer with 
tremendous insights into the workings of military organizations, Hagood was not timid in 
pointing out structural errors where he saw them.  He was equally ready to suggest some 
remedy, often strengthening his own organization, that he believed would improve 
efficiency and streamline the organization in question.  That his ideas were based on 
sound reasoning won him considerable support amongst his superiors, but also threatened 
to instill a sense of resentment in his colleagues.  Hagood’s attitude that he knew best in 
every situation could be a bit overbearing, and eventually led to a clash with Moseley 
over control over the AEF’s logistics, but for now Hagood’s ability and self-confidence 
made him just the man to head up the reorganization of the AEF. 
Dubbed the Hagood Board for its chairman, the board consisted of five officers 
representing different elements of the AEF.  Hagood, from the LOC, was joined by 
Colonel A.D. Andrews of the Transportation Department, Lieutenant Colonel Frank 
McCoy of the General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Davis, the Adjutant General, and 
Major S.P. Wetherill, a bright young officer from the Quartermaster Department who was 
an efficiency expert from the private sector before the war.  All agreed on a primary goal 
to “relieve that Commander-in-Chief from the immediate direction of the administration 
of supply and place direct and complete responsibility therefor upon some other 
authority,” and to “make such changes in the General Staff as were necessary to carry this 
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into effect.”30  Meeting in Colonel McCoy’s office at GHQ, the board members 
examined written documents from various branches of the LOC and supply departments, 
and conducted interviews with essential members of the General Staff and the AEF 
supply bureaus.31  After a series of five meetings, the board issued its report on 14 
February.  They found, as expected, that a “great diversity of opinion and practice existed 
among the different chiefs of services with respect to the degree of personal 
responsibility assumed and methods employed in the matter of supply.”  No where was 
there a single authority that could coordinate the various heads and branches of the AEF’s 
supply system.  Many of those interviewed could not even agree on the current system of 
authority over supply matters.32  By way of reforms, the board made a series of 
suggestions addressing both the AEF’s supply system and the General Staff. 
In regard to supply, the board reorganized the LOC into the Services of the Rear 
(SOR), with headquarters remaining at Tours.  The board called for the transfer of the 
staff departments dealing with supply matters (i.e. ordnance, quartermaster, engineers, 
etc.) to the new organization, leaving the Adjutant General, the Inspector General, the 
Judge Advocate, and the new Chief of Tank Corps at GHQ AEF.  The relocated 
departments would leave a representative at Chaumont to coordinate with the General 
Staff and act as liaison between Pershing’s staff and Tours.  The CGLOC would become 
the Commanding General, Services of the Rear (CGSOR), and continue to report directly 
to General Pershing.  Despite the push for concentration, the board deemed the General 
Purchasing Board more valuable in its present location in Paris, but suggested that the 
SOR supervise its activities. 
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In terms of the AEF’s administrative organization, the board recommended key 
changes to improve efficiency.  Chief amongst these was a re-designation of the General 
Staff sections, forgoing the traditional Administrative, Intelligence, Operations, 
Coordination, and Supply for the new titles: 1st Section, General Staff, 2nd Section, 
General Staff, etc.  The new sections would carry the abbreviations: G-1, G-2, and so on, 
headed up by an assistant chief of staff (ACS, G-1; ACS, G-2; ACS, G-3, etc.).  These 
new designations highlighted the General Staff’s position as the AEF’s controlling body, 
breaking away from the Army’s traditional Bureau system.  Additionally, the board 
provided each assistant chief of staff the authority to designate an officer to represent him 
in each General Staff section, improving inter-staff coordination and communication.  A 
final modification to the General Staff was the addition of a deputy chief of staff, to act as 
chief of staff when Pershing and Harbord were both away from Chaumont.33
These suggestions represented a significant departure from the hallowed Field 
Service Regulations.  The CGSOR garnered more power over supply than anything 
previously seen in the American Army, which Harbord believed, “[gave] the 
Commanding General of the Services of [the Rear] an unequivocal definition of his 
mission; and [clothed] him in all the authority necessary to fulfill it.”34  Given the 
report’s stark contrast with established Army policy, the reforms required great care in 
implementation.  When Harbord took the report to Pershing, the two worried that the 
bureaus, long-established in relative independence, would resist their incorporation into 
the SOR.  Harbord wrote Hagood on the matter, reminding the board to “bear in mind 
that to obtain efficient and willing service on the part of the staff departments, care 
should be taken to leave them with as much initiative as possible and still insure 
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coordination.”35  The board members took note of the concern, but decided that the 
bureaus would have to adapt to the new organization for the greater good of the AEF. 
For the most part both Harbord and Pershing embraced the suggestions spelled 
out in the report.  They wanted to make it clear that the “essentials of the organization of 
the service of the rear are the prompt procurement and forwarding of necessary supplies 
for the troops at the front.”  To facilitate this mission, “The line of responsibility of staff 
departments should be as clearly defined as possible and the control of the general staff 
should be to the extent of insuring expedition and promptness in carrying out the purpose 
of this organization.”36  Believing the board understood these concerns, Pershing ordered 
Harbord to commission a general order putting the report’s suggestions into effect.  The 
result, General Orders No. 31 (16 February 1918), followed the board’s recommendations 
concerning the new organization of the General Staff and the Services of the Rear 
(renamed the Services of Supply in the final draft).  The Services of Supply brought 
together the ten services that dealt with supplies on a regular basis.37  The Commanding 
General, Services of Supply (CGSOS) was given command over the staff bureaus, but it 
was left to his discretion how he managed them.  As Harbord explained, “It was not the 
intention to tie [the CGSOS’s] hands or to limit him in methods and means.  He was told 
what to do but not how to do it.”38  The CGSOS also gained control over the 
Transportation Department, which joined the Forestry Service and the Motor Transport 
Service to form a new Service of Utilities, which would hopefully solve the problem of 
competing authority between the DGT and the now CGSOS.39
Though Hagood supported the new general order, he did not find it completely 
satisfactory.  He saw a potential problem in the order’s provisions on the relationship 
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between the CGSOS and the new ACS, G-4 (formerly the chief of the Coordination 
section).  Under General Order No. 31, G-4 retained supervisory authority over “[supply], 
construction and transportation in France,” and “[all] operations of the Services of Supply 
not assigned to other sections of the General Staff.”40  But the CGSOS existed in an 
amorphous position reporting directly to Pershing, but also under the authority of G-4.  
With the SOS separated from GHQ by nearly two hundred miles, Pershing had no direct 
contact with his supply organization below the CGSOS.  The logic of keeping Pershing 
and the General Staff separated from the SOS was deemed necessary to “prevent the 
Commander-in-Chief from availing himself of the personal services of the chiefs of 
services whenever needed.”41  Presumably the CGSOS was responsible for the AEF’s 
entire supply system, but his physical separation from GHQ and the ASC, G-4’s 
supervisory authority over supply allowed Pershing to rely on G-4 to administer the 
supply system.  This created a situation where the CGSOS operated under the same 
ambiguous authority that the Hagood Board sought to eliminate.  To avoid the problem, 
Hagood initially tried to move the bulk of G-1 and G-4 to Tours with the rest of the SOS, 
but both Pershing and the board rejected the idea.42  
General Orders No. 31 also failed to spell out exactly how the new supply system 
would work.  What was the area of its authority?  Who had responsibility for supply in 
the AEF?  How would the Regulating Stations fit into the system?  To answer these and 
other questions, the General Staff developed a new general order covering supply.  Issued 
on 23 March 1918, General Orders No. 44, it established that the CGSOS was 
responsible for the procurement, storage, maintenance, transportation, and distribution of 
supplies.  Much to Hagood’s dismay, the order also stated that “[the] general supervision 
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of all these functions is exercised by the General Staff, as a rule through G-4 thereof.”43  
Therefore, G-4 remained in supervisory control over the SOS, despite responsibility 
resting on the CGSOS.  Though no different than any other large bureaucratic 
organization, this system had a significant defect.  The CGSOS could direct all operations 
in the SOS under the supervision of G-4 if he had authority over the entire supply system.  
But he did not.  The CGSOS’s command authority did not extend into the Advance 
Section where the combat units operated.  Instead, his authority stopped at the Regulating 
Stations, where the Regulating Officer, under the authority of G-4, controlled all supply 
matters from the Regulating Stations to the trenches.  The CGSOS retained 
administrative control over SOS personnel in the Advance Section, but he had no 
jurisdiction over supply operations.  Hence, any supply problems experienced by the 
front line units were the responsibility of G-4, except that Pershing considered the 
CGSOS responsible for the entire SOS.  This discrepancy would come back to haunt 
Hagood and the SOS in the fall of 1918 when Moseley (as ACS, G-4) increasingly took 
over responsibility for supply, directly challenging the CGSOS in the process.  The fact 
that Harbord had assumed control of the SOS by that time made the situation especially 
divisive, and threatened to create a serious rift between GHQ AEF and the SOS at Tours.  
But in March, Pershing was happy with the new system created by General Orders No. 
44, and quickly turned to other matters.44
 
Personnel Matters 
 
 
 While the Hagood Board and the General Staff reworked the AEF’s 
administrative and logistical organizations, Harbord and Pershing worked on the problem 
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of finding capable officers for staff work throughout the AEF.  The AEF had an 
embarrassingly large number of potential brigade and division commanders to choose 
from, but lacked units for them to command and trained officers to fill out their staffs.  
Pershing had to wait for the War Department to supply the soldiers to fill out the AEF’s 
ranks, but, in the meantime, he took steps to secure more officers for staff work.  At first 
he relied on the AEF’s vast network of schools, capped by the General Staff School at 
Langres, to train officers.  But these institutions could not, in and of themselves, provide 
the number of officers the AEF needed.  Pershing, therefore, decided that the AEF had to 
make more efficient use of the officers it had.  The AEF already had a reclassification 
system in place, located at the Reclassification Center at Blois, and Pershing ordered his 
Adjutant General, Robert Davis, and Inspector General, Major General Andre Brewster, 
to create a complex, multi-level system of evaluation and classification to discern what 
duties individual officers were most suited for.  The pair worked up a detailed evaluation 
form that kept up-to-date information concerning an officer’s performance on file, easily 
accessible by Pershing and the General Staff.45
The system worked well for junior officers, but Harbord believed the AEF 
commander needed to make a more concerted effort in regard to the AEF’s senior 
leadership.  Though Pershing considered the relief of a general officer a serious matter, 
he did not have an established program to regulate it.  Harbord thought the evaluation 
system could provide valuable information, and take a more active approach in molding 
the AEF’s corps of general officers into a tight-knit unit.  With Secretary of War Baker 
arriving soon in France for a tour of the AEF, Harbord believed Pershing should take the 
opportunity to discuss the matter with him, and made his case in a long memorandum: 
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I believe that the most important matter for you to consider just 
now and to discuss with the Secretary of War is the question of higher 
personnel.  Certainly the time has arrived when you must cease to deal 
with divisions and other units and deal with Generals. 
You are confronted with conditions where you have to exact 
results without partiality, favor or affection for the claims of any 
individual, be they based on seniority or any other thing except efficiency.  
The War Department has not denied any important request which you 
have made for promotions.  Until they do deny such request, you are 
absolutely responsible in their eyes, in the eyes of the nation, for the 
selection of General Officers to command your units.  You cannot divest 
yourself of this responsibility for selection.  If any say that you have no 
proper material for Corps and Division Commanders, the inevitable 
answer is “Why do you not submit the names of the officers you wish?”.  
The fact that individuals are sent to you in certain grades will be accepted 
as an excuse by neither the country nor the War Department if you have 
not secured yourself by presenting substitutes and denouncing as 
incompetents officers recognized to be such. . . .  
If there is any General Officer in your command who has not your 
entire confidence, he should be relieved and your responsibility met by 
naming to the War Department the man you want for the place, if he is not 
already in your command. . . . 
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The time has come when you should in cold blood throw 
overboard all considerations of seniority and reach for the men you want if 
you have to go as low as the grade of Captain or lower to get him.46
 
 But as Harbord wrote out his vision for dealing with general officers, he began to 
waver a bit.  He knew that Pershing had to be firm in getting the men he needed and 
putting them where he wanted, but Harbord began to worry that Pershing could alienate 
his senior officers by treating them too harshly.  The AEF commander could not 
command if his generals did not respect him, and Harbord wanted to make sure that that 
did not happen.  He knew that Pershing was not a warm individual, though he did have 
his moments, and wanted to make the General aware of how his senior officers felt about 
him.  In a separate memo, Harbord softly explained: 
 
[The current opinion amongst officers] is that you are considered 
to show little confidence in your Generals; that this lack of confidence is 
evident to the Generals themselves; that there is consequently not the close 
feeling which there should be on the part of those Generals toward you.  
They respect you and are afraid of you, but I fear are drifting into the latter 
attitude too much to the exclusion of a warmer feeling which means so 
much in the soldier business, and which you, better than any other man, 
know how to win when you choose to exert yourself.  I think it is time to 
go after more personal loyalty and enthusiasm from your command.47
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 Harbord’s belief in Pershing’s ability to win the loyalty of subordinates speaks as 
much to Harbord’s own feelings as they do to his commander’s personality.  Pershing 
was a hard man, plain and simple, and though he did possess a certain charm amongst 
those closest to him, he would never be the beloved commander along the lines of a 
Robert E. Lee or even a Marshal Joffre.  Instead, Pershing was fair (tough, but fair).  
From the very beginning he expected no more from his officers than he could do himself, 
and Harbord wanted his Chief to develop this persona further to secure a solid support 
base amongst his generals.  To a certain extent Pershing did just this, personally 
reviewing each general’s files and expressing his support for each man he considered 
valuable.  When he found it necessary to remove a general, he preferred to transfer him to 
an unimportant command before sending him back to the United States so that the man 
would not leave Europe under a cloud of failure.  Harbord believed Pershing’s fair-
mindedness could inspire loyalty and affection as well as a personable nature, and events 
seemingly supported this belief, as Pershing remained a revered figure amongst his 
General Staff officers and upper level commanders for decades after the war.48
However, the more likely source behind the loyalty Pershing inspired was his 
perceived control over promotions in the AEF.  As the war continued, the AEF 
commander increasingly believed he could dictate policy on promotions to the War 
Department; a belief that Harbord routinely encouraged.  Though justified in his desire to 
manage his own officers, Pershing’s perception of his command did not fit with the view 
that the AEF was only one part of the U.S. Army as a whole.  As long as Baker and the 
chief of staff in Washington allowed Pershing to act on this conception of the American 
military structure there was no problem, but in March of 1918 a new chief of staff arrived 
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in Washington who had no intention of being Pershing’s rubber stamp in the War 
Department.49
 
 Chief of Staff Peyton March 
 
The efficiency problems that plagued the AEF in 1917 were mirrored in the War 
Department as it also expanded to meet the challenges of raising an army for service in 
France.  One of the main problems was a lack of effective leadership in the Office of the 
Chief of Staff.  Both General Hugh Scott and Tasker Bliss were near retirement during 
their tenures in the office, and neither possessed the force of character necessary to push 
the War Department through the pains of mobilization.  Each believed his position 
secondary in importance to Pershing’s, and considered it their primary duty to provide the 
AEF with all that it needed to carry out operations in Europe.  Bliss even confessed later 
that he believed himself to be the “Assistant Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff of the 
A.E.F.”50  In other words, he thought of himself as Harbord’s assistant. 
 As Bliss closed in on retirement in September of 1917, Secretary Baker petitioned 
Pershing for his input on who should be the new chief of staff.  Baker wanted Major 
General John Biddle, an engineer of long experience, for the position but also floated the 
possibility of Peyton March, whom the Secretary thought very highly of.  Pershing 
approved of Biddle’s selection, and thought March a good choice for assistant chief of 
staff.  Baker agreed and brought Biddle to the War Department in the fall of 1917.  But 
the Secretary soon discovered that Biddle lacked the ability to put the War Department on 
track, and requested in February that March be sent home.51
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 Arriving on 4 March, the new chief of staff immediately went to work putting the 
War Department in order.  As those in the Washington and the AEF soon learned, March 
was an entirely different type of officer than his predecessors.  A true martinet, he 
breathed efficiency and had little patience for those who could not keep up.  Working up 
to sixteen hours in a day, he quickly transformed the lackadaisical War Department into a 
well-oiled machine, and forced the entire military engine in the United States to operate 
more efficiently almost by will alone.  One subordinate observed, “[March] took the War 
Department like a dog takes a cat by the neck, and he shook it.”52  Decisions that had 
taken hours or days were now made in seconds, as March barked out orders and 
delegated responsibility to men he expected to do the job.  His arrival in Washington 
marked a turning point in the American war effort, as he instilled a firm sense of 
direction in a War Department mired in delays and red tape that accompanied the massive 
buildup of the United States Army. 
 In many ways, March’s rise to chief of staff was the best thing to happen to 
Pershing and the AEF.  Over the next few months, the rate of shipments increased 
precipitously.  The number of soldiers sailing for France during March’s first month at 
the War Department nearly doubled the previous month’s total.  By the summer, troop 
shipments rose to the level where 10,000 American soldiers arrived in France every 
day.53  Yet despite his ability, March’s selection as chief of staff brought new challenges 
to Pershing and the AEF, and proved considerably irritating to Harbord.  This is not to 
say that Pershing and Harbord did not recognize March’s ability, for they surely did.  
Pershing had known him for several years, and thought March “a very able man.”54  
After a visit to the artillery training center at Valdahon in the fall, Harbord commented in 
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his diary that he thought March “a live and energetic man, full of energy and 
aggressiveness,” who would “go far in the war if he gets a chance.”55  When Baker 
requested him, Pershing replied, “He will be a difficult man to replace but I feel that you 
need the best man we can find, so I cheerfully let him go.”56  But there was certainly a 
degree of trepidation at Chaumont upon hearing of March’s promotion.  James C. 
Collins, Pershing’s aide, could not help but think March would be trouble for the AEF 
commander.  He wrote in his diary, “I thought [March] would play General Pershing’s 
game as long as it suited him, but not a day longer.”  Pershing admitted to another officer 
that he knew March was potentially troublesome, but believed him a capable officer.57
The friction that arose between the generals stemmed from March’s attitude 
towards his new office.  Whereas his predecessors viewed themselves as subordinates to 
Pershing, March considered himself the military head of the Army.  While it is accepted 
policy today that the chief of staff is the highest position in the Army, the same could not 
be said in 1918.  The position of chief of staff had existed for less than twenty years, and 
its role during wartime remained largely unclear.  Nor was the relationship between the 
chief of staff and the line clearly defined.  The concept of a military commander dictating 
policy to the armies in the field while he remained in Washington seemed ludicrous to 
many in the Army.  There was a long tradition in the American military of the 
commander leading from the head of his army, and few officers could understand the 
logic of March’s presumed military seniority.  For his part, Pershing rejected any 
challenge to his authority out of hand.  He refused to accept any intermediary between 
himself and President Wilson other than Secretary Baker.  Harbord supported Pershing’s 
view of the Army’s command structure and called March’s claims of seniority pure 
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“hallucination” brought upon by the “intoxicating aura that surrounds the office of the 
Secretary of War.”58  Both he and Pershing conceived of the chief of staff as having 
direct authority over the War Department General Staff only.  Any other actions he took 
were under the authority of the secretary of war.  To Harbord, March was simply 
Secretary Baker’s mouthpiece in the Army, having no authorized voice of his own.59
 Much of the blame for the AEF leadership’s disdain for March’s position falls 
upon Secretary Baker.  By allowing Pershing to operate with full autonomy, Baker 
supported the idea of the AEF as a separate entity from the rest of the U.S. Army.  Baker 
thought of Pershing in the romantic mold of a Ulysses S. Grant, commanding from the 
head of his army without interruption from Washington.  It is perhaps one of the reasons 
Pershing and the officers in the AEF believed Baker to be a great secretary of war.  He 
did not understand the necessity of a single officer directing operations both at home and 
abroad.  While the chief of staff should not make operational decisions for the combat 
forces, he did need the authority to synchronize the field operations and the efforts on the 
home front.  But Baker refused to interfere with Pershing’s command of the AEF.  Nor 
did he think it a matter of great importance that the chief of staff do so.  He thought the 
conflict between March and Pershing was an “unimportant” row over military 
technicalities for which “nobody will ever attach the slightest importance.”60  When 
Pershing failed to consider needs of the War Department when developing policies for 
the AEF, Baker became a victim of his own creation.  He tacitly supported the position 
that Pershing could dictate policy to the War Department, and was then surprised when 
Pershing failed to understand its problems.  But Pershing operated with blinders on, 
raging against any situation or circumstance that presented an obstacle to the AEF.  He 
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did not care what the War Department needed to do, as long as it delivered supplies and 
soldiers to France and then stayed out of the AEF’s way.  Baker enabled this situation by 
his timidity to rein in the AEF commander, and in the process contributed greatly to the 
hard feelings that developed between March and the AEF.61
 Just after March took over at the War Department, Baker arrived in France for a 
month-long tour of the AEF’s facilities.  Pershing and General Bliss, serving as the 
American representative on the Supreme War Council (SWC), met Baker in Paris and the 
two traded off escorting the Secretary to the SWC, Chaumont, and numerous installations 
in the SOS.  While Pershing was away, many of his social responsibilities fell to Harbord, 
who enjoyed the distraction they provided from the daily grind of the war.  When 
Secretary Baker came to Chaumont to meet with members of the General Staff before 
heading out to see the trenches, Pershing gave Harbord a chance for more time away 
from GHQ.  The AEF commander needed to attend to other matters, so he tapped 
Harbord to accompany Baker on the next leg of his tour.  Taking Colonel de Chambrun 
and Frederick Palmer of the Press Corps with them, Harbord and Baker left by motor-car 
on a two-day journey of the front.  They headed to Lorraine, where the party saw 
elements of the 42nd “Rainbow” Division and the 2nd Division.  Harbord found it amusing 
that the group tried to travel incognito since there was little secret about the trip, as the 
Secretary’s necessary entourage and security detail attracted attention wherever they 
went.  Baker made a good showing, though, as he calmly brushed off the occasional near-
miss from artillery shells and took every opportunity to speak to the ordinary soldiers on 
what he called “the very frontier of freedom.”62
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 The group made several other stops over the next two days, at one point attending 
the funeral for a soldier recently killed by artillery-fire.  When Baker learned that a young 
officer nearby was wearing an as-yet-unauthorized Croix de Guerre, he respectfully told 
the man, “If anyone questions your right to wear it, refer him to me.”63  Such displays 
caused Harbord’s esteem for the diminutive politician to grow increasingly stronger as 
the tour continued, and he decided to show his and the AEF’s appreciation for the 
Secretary.  While visiting with the 2nd Division, Baker mentioned his desire to see a 
young soldier who had lived across the street from him in Cleveland and had enlisted in 
the Marines.  Knowing that the Marine Brigade was a part of the division, Harbord made 
it a point to secure the boy’s presence the next day, which Baker greatly enjoyed.  He and 
Harbord spent much of the trip conversing on several topics, each man growing 
increasingly impressed with the other, and in the process laid the groundwork for a 
friendship that would last for many years after the war’s end.64
 Upon arriving back at Chaumont, Baker had the opportunity to witness the first 
instance of friction between Pershing and March.  On 14 March, the new chief of staff 
sent a cable to Pershing asking that thirty general staff officers be sent back to the United 
States, to be replaced with thirty officers from home.  March wanted officers from both 
sides of the Atlantic to gain a better understanding of the issues facing their counterparts, 
and to give officers from home valuable foreign service credit to aid their careers.65  
Upon hearing the request, Harbord immediately raised a flurry of objections.  As he 
understood it, March called for Pershing to surrender thirty officers from the General 
Staff at Chaumont, or just under half of the total number on duty there, for service in 
Washington.  As compliance meant gutting the AEF’s General Staff, Harbord thought the 
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request “a distinctly unfriendly act.”  He told Pershing that, “It shows no consideration 
for your needs, and undermines your well-laid foundations, with what wild ambition in 
mind we can only guess.  The best that could be said, if it is not hostile, is that it is 
selfish, inconsiderate, and ordered with no thought for your organization or intelligent 
comprehension of the task immediately before you.”66  Harbord could not understand the 
logic behind replacing half of the AEF General Staff with officers new to the Western 
Front.  It was a valid complaint if that was what March wanted to do.  But Harbord 
misunderstood March’s request.  The chief of staff did not want Pershing to eviscerate his 
own GHQ, but called for him to send officers from the numerous general staffs in the 
AEF.  Such a program could be accomplished without causing much disruption in daily 
routines, and would provide valuable coordination between the War Department and the 
AEF.  Of course, Harbord would have most likely objected to even this level of 
cooperation.  He did not trust March, nor the War Department, and took offense to any 
suggestion that either could interfere with the operations of the AEF.  “All you wish from 
America,” he wrote Pershing, “is such Staff Service there as will insure you a steady flow 
of troops and supplies.  You do not want there a Staff dealing with any phase of your 
business here.”67  As historian Donald Smythe has rightly stated, “It would be hard to 
find a more concise statement of a field command desiring independence from General 
Staff control.”68
 Pershing initially agreed with Harbord’s reading of March’s request, and sent a 
reply agreeing with the idea in principle but rejecting its implementation: 
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Coming at a time of prospective early German offensive and just 
as our first corps is about to take its place in our own sector it might be 
disastrous.  The limited number of trained staff men at my disposition has 
already, as you know, been a serious handicap and has caused much 
anxiety.  Training here in France under active conditions is absolutely 
necessary to prepare officers for work. . . . I earnestly recommend that you 
send over the number of staff men you can now spare for actual service 
and training here.  As soon as possible thereafter, when these men have 
had some experience, I could return a like number to you for duty in 
Washington.  This could be carried out within three or four months and the 
system repeated as often as advisable. . . . I do not fail to appreciate fully 
your difficulties but think the requirements of our fighting forces should 
be our immediate concern.69
 
 Remarkably, not only did Pershing refuse to send any of his officers to the United 
States, but suggested that March go ahead and send more staff officers to the AEF.  
Regardless of his statements to the contrary, the AEF commander showed little 
consideration for the War Department’s problems, which he presumed to be minor 
compared to those facing the AEF.  After March informed Pershing of the true 
stipulations of the plan, namely that the officers requested were not all to come from the 
General Staff at Chaumont, Pershing finally relented.  He agreed to send the officers, but 
did so only half-heartedly.  When the men arrived in Washington in May, only three of 
the thirty were deemed fit for General Staff assignment.  Though frustrated by the AEF 
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commander’s lack of cooperation, March could only accept Pershing’s position and allow 
the plan to die.  The chief of staff did not have the power to challenge Pershing directly 
without Secretary Baker’s support (who was in France).  Nor could he do so with the 
AEF about to go into the line to help block the long-awaited German Spring Offensive.  
March simply filed the situation away and went back to work.  There would be other 
clashes, and March had no intention of being bullied by Pershing again, but for now he 
settled in to support the AEF as best he could.70
 While frustration simmered on both sides of the Atlantic, the German Army 
decided the time was at hand to finally make their long-expected push on the Western 
Front.  The collapse of the Eastern Front and the subsequent transfer of thousands of 
German troops to the West gave the Germans their best advantage since 1914, and with 
food shortages gripping the German home front, the Germans decided to gamble on one 
last great offensive that would either bring victory or disaster.  The only questions would 
be if the Allies could withstand the barrage, and if there were enough American boots on 
the ground to tip the balance once and for all against the Germans.  The answer to both 
questions would ultimately be yes. 
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CHAPTER VII 
WEATHERING THE STORM (MARCH - MAY 1918) 
 
 The last weeks of March 1918 saw the eruption of the much-anticipated German 
Spring Offensive along the Western Front.  Scrambling to block the most serious crisis of 
the war since the initial German advance on Paris in 1914, the Allies mounted a feverish 
defense against the German onslaught.  To improve coordination, they moved to form a 
unified command structure under the leadership of French Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch, 
and stepped up their calls for the amalgamation of American soldiers in the Allied forces.  
General Pershing agreed to help, but continued his opposition to the wholesale infusion 
of AEF units into the Allied lines.  He spent the next month wrangling with the Allies 
over shipping, AEF training doctrine, and the utilization of those divisions the AEF had 
ready for service. 
 AEF Chief of Staff James Harbord spent March and April splitting his time 
between overseeing the transformation of the AEF General Staff, helping Pershing deal 
with the Allies, and searching for his own combat command.  After a year at GHQ AEF, 
Harbord tired of life behind a desk and wanted to join the fight in the greatest of all 
military struggles.  After a month of searching, he finally secured a position with the 4th 
“Marine” Brigade, bringing a fundamental change to his service in the AEF and the 
structure of the Pershing’s General Staff.  For Harbord and the Allies as a whole, the 
months of April and May brought a turning point on the Western Front, as the combatants 
unknowingly approached the war’s endgame.  One of the critical questions remaining 
was the role of the American Expeditionary Forces in the endeavor. 
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The German Spring Offensive 
 
 On the morning of 21 March, the long awaited German offensive exploded 
through the Allied lines.  In the Somme River valley, German artillery rained death and 
destruction on the British lines for five hours in such ferocity that the roar could be heard 
at General Pétain’s headquarters some thirty-five miles to the rear.  Utilizing the same 
tactics of penetration that secured the smashing victories at Caporetto and Riga, seventy-
one German divisions slammed into twenty-six British divisions.  Carrying light 
machine-guns, flame-throwers, satchel charges, and hand grenades, the German elite 
storm troops penetrated the British lines, turned, and then attacked the positions from the 
rear.  The British quickly collapsed, opening huge holes for the German infantry to 
stream through.  As the thunderstruck British reformed their lines, the Germans attacked 
again, overrunning the new positions as easily as the original, while their artillery 
displaced to bring the barrage ever-forward.  Through repetition, the Germans opened a 
gaping hole in the line forty miles wide and advanced forty miles through a front that had 
remained virtually stagnant for three years.1
The assault lasted the better part of two weeks before stopping due to exhaustion.  
It created a massive salient along the Somme, running between Vimy and Noyon, and 
threatened to cut the juncture point between the British and French Armies.  If the 
Germans could take Amiens, twenty-miles to the rear, the severance would be complete, 
for the Somme ran bridgeless from Amiens all the way to the English Channel.  This 
prospect sent the Allies into a panic.  If the Germans could isolate the two armies, they 
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could defeat them in detail, or corral the British in front of the channel ports and turn 
their full force against the French.  The Americans did not have sufficient numbers in 
France to make up the difference, and few on either side of the lines believed the French 
could stand up to the Germans alone. 
Looking at the situation, Pershing knew that he could no longer reject all calls for 
amalgamation.  The Allies needed aid, and the AEF commander had it to give.  On 25 
March, Pershing journeyed to Pétain’s headquarters at Compiègne.  Arriving after 10:00 
p.m., he found the French general rather disheveled, looking more forlorn than at any 
point in their brief relationship.  With the French about to shift their headquarters to 
Chantilly, Pershing recalled that “No time was wasted; everyone talked fast.”2  Pétain 
wanted to know what troops Pershing could give him.  The AEF commander replied that 
Pétain could have the four dull American divisions now training in France, which the 
thankful Frenchman requested go into the lines immediately.  Pershing agreed, but 
intimated that he preferred the units to combine to form a corps.  Pétain rejected the idea 
given the inexperience of the American soldiers.  Better to use them to relieve specific 
veteran French units then serving in quiet sectors.  Sensing that it was not the time to 
quibble over details, Pershing acquiesced and quickly departed to oversee the 
movements.3
With Pershing away handling the crisis, AEF Chief of Staff James Harbord 
continued to improve efficiency at GHQ.  Since the issuance of General Orders No. 31, 
Harbord created a set routine for the senior members of the General Staff.  With a good 
portion of the staff now at Tours, Harbord brought together the remaining G staff, the 
adjutant general, the inspector general, and the judge advocate general for daily meetings.  
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Harbord ran the meetings, which began at 9:00 a.m. and lasted thirty minutes to an hour.  
Dennis Nolan, ACS, G-2, usually began with a ten-minute report on the most recent 
intelligence from the front, and then each ACS took turns updating the staff members 
about their own sections.  Thus, Harbord kept everyone informed of the current situation 
in the various sections to improve staff coordination.  When Pershing was at Chaumont, 
he met with Nolan directly after the meeting to go over the intelligence reports in detail.  
If he was away, Harbord handled everything.4
 Harbord’s management of the staff allowed Pershing to concentrate more of his 
time and energies on meeting the current crisis.  He communicated frequently with 
Pétain, French Premier Clemenceau, and Marshall Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the 
British forces.  But with all of these men involved in military decisions for the Allies, the 
system became too unwieldy to provide adequate coordination to block the German 
offensive.  What the Allies needed was a unified command structure.  To that end, a hasty 
conference at Doullens on 26 March 1918 brought together the senior Allied leadership, 
who voted to make Marshal Ferdinand Foch coordinator of Allied action on the Western 
Front.5  A month later the group decided that coordination during battle was not enough, 
and made Foch the Allied commander-in-chief.  However, Foch’s title was somewhat 
misleading.  Though he had coordinate authority, Foch was not a commander in the same 
vein as General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Second World War.  Instead, Foch advised 
and coordinated activities between the Allies.  He could suggest, plead, and cajole his 
fellow commanders, and direct their forces to the most needed points on the battlefield, 
but he did not have the power to set policy for either the British or the Americans.6
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 These restrictions prevented Foch from doing that which he most wanted: 
amalgamating the American soldiers into the Allied ranks.  But this irritation diminished 
considerably when Pershing visited the new Allied commander-in-chief on 28 March to 
make an offer of American aid in the time of crisis.  Leery of the American commander, 
Foch inquired as to the limits of Pershing’s benevolence.  In true martial spirit, Pershing 
replied, “At this moment there are no other questions but of fighting.  Infantry, artillery, 
aviation, all that we have is yours; use them as you will.”7  A few hours later, General 
Tasker Bliss, the American representative to the Supreme War Council, echoed 
Pershing’s sentiments, exclaiming to Foch: “We have come over here to get ourselves 
killed; if you want to use us, what are you waiting for?”8  It was a remarkable offer from 
the men who had for so long blocked any form of amalgamation.  Foch, Pétain and 
Clemenceau probably took Pershing’s offer to mean a final capitulation on the 
amalgamation question.  If so, they were mistaken.  Pershing’s offer referred only to 
those forces the AEF currently had in France, totaling four combat divisions.  Since he 
had made the same offer to Pétain several days earlier, the current pronouncement 
represented no great change.  Pershing remained committed to building up an 
independent American Army with divisions coming soon, but until they reached Europe, 
he would throw in what he had to help the Allies block the German advance.  As it 
happened, the German offensive ground to a halt before Foch could use the American 
divisions, and with the crisis averted, Pershing returned to his policy of strict opposition 
to amalgamation.9
 
 
 
 214
Searching for a Combat Command 
 
 As the German offensive pounded away at the British and French in the Somme, 
Harbord began to look for an opportunity to get into the fight.  Though proud of his 
service over the past ten months, Harbord had several reasons for wanting to leave GHQ 
AEF.  He longed to prove himself in combat.  Over the course of his thirty-year career in 
the Army he had commanded only small cavalry and infantry units in San Francisco and 
the Philippines.  The World War provided the opportunity to finally see combat on a 
large scale, and he desperately wanted to contribute his fair share in the contest.  He 
could not spend the war behind a desk, as the “slavish nature of the staff work” was 
beginning to wear on him.10  The constant irritations, the never-ending bureaucratic 
morass, and the overall stress of building the American Expeditionary Forces made 
Harbord worry that he would either lose his strive for efficiency or break down 
completely as John McAuley Palmer had.  Finally, Harbord desired professional 
advancement.  Though a brigadier general in the National Army, he remained a colonel 
on the Regular list.  He knew that to make his star permanent, he needed combat 
experience, for promotion came far quicker for those in the field commanding troops.11
If Harbord needed any proof of this fact, it came when Pershing called for a list of 
recommendations for promotion to brigadier and major general.  Harbord coordinated the 
compilation of a list of ten candidates for major general and seventeen for brigadier.  He 
left his own name off the list, fearing it improper to push for his own advancement, but 
an assistant added his name to the final draft.  Embarrassed, Harbord turned the list over 
to an amused Pershing, who stated that he had already intended to speak with Harbord 
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about the promotion.  Pershing believed Harbord deserved another star, but confessed his 
own reluctance in forwarding the request due to their close relationship.  The general did 
not want any charges of favoritism attached to his chief of staff and thought it better for 
Harbord to spend some time in a combat command before having his name sent to the 
War Department for promotion.12  
 The prospect of Harbord receiving a combat command caused Pershing to pause 
for another reason.  For close to a year now, Harbord had been Pershing’s most capable 
subordinate in the AEF, and the AEF commander had come to rely on Harbord to control 
the staff and act as a sounding board for Pershing’s ideas and frustrations.  Pershing never 
doubted for a moment that Harbord gave him all that any chief could ask for both 
personally and professionally.  When Pershing expressed his feelings on the matter, 
Harbord replied that he had given the AEF commander “the best I have in me,” but 
acknowledged his desire for a combat command.13  As reluctant as Pershing was to give 
up his chief of staff, he understood the need to prove oneself in the field.  He could not 
deny his friend the chance for advancement simply to keep him at GHQ.  While he hoped 
the move would not be permanent, expressing a desire to bring Harbord back to GHQ in 
three or four months, Pershing agreed to the transfer. 
 With Pershing’s blessing, Harbord began looking for the best possible position 
opening soon.  He knew that Pershing often held out the promise of a command for his 
subordinates as a reward for loyalty and service, and wanted to take full advantage of the 
policy before the AEF commander changed his mind.  Even if Pershing was not 
interested in exchanging officers with the War Department, he did want a system of 
rotation within the AEF.  The policy suited Harbord, who believed that the “military 
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doctrines of a nation are from and of the fighting line” and thought a good staff officer 
needed to know the challenges of field command.  Those fresh from such duty could then 
“bring to the Staff the psychology and practice of the Line,” thus making him a more 
effective administrator.14
 Harbord also knew that if he left the matter to Pershing it could be mid-summer or 
autumn before he gained an assignment.  He feared that Pershing’s reluctance to let him 
go could cause the AEF commander to drag his feet, so Harbord decided to press the 
issue.  On 31 March, he sent Pershing a letter outlining several options for his 
assignment, and suggested that Major General James “Dad” McAndrew, commanding the 
Staff College at Langres, come to Chaumont at once as his successor as chief of staff.  
Harbord did not want to leave his command assignment to chance.  He wanted a position 
in which he could excel, and began looking for just such an opportunity.  He did not have 
to look far.  Brigadier General George B. Duncan, a competent officer whom Harbord 
had known since the Philippines, was on the list of those recommended for promotion 
and both Harbord and Pershing knew he would get it.  This would open a space in one of 
the more experienced and high profile brigades in the AEF, 1st Brigade, 1st Division.15  
Harbord wanted the assignment, pointing out to Pershing that “it will be an open-warfare 
proposition and I believe I know as much about that as any inexperienced American 
brigadier in France.”16  It was a fair statement given his intimate knowledge of Pershing’s 
vision for the type of combat doctrine.  The fact that neither Pershing, Harbord, nor 
anyone else in the AEF knew exactly how to get the enemy out in the open if he did not 
want to go there did not enter into the conversation.  Harbord believed in the tenet of 
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open-warfare, and felt confident that he could make it the fighting principle of the 1st 
Brigade. 
 Of course, Harbord knew better than to provide only one option for his 
assignment.  He told Pershing that if the 1st Brigade was not available then he would like 
to be considered for the 51st Brigade.  As a part of the 26th Division, the 51st Brigade had 
several attributes that made it ideally suited to Harbord.  He suspected its commander, 
Brigadier General Peter E. Traub, would soon receive a promotion.  With the division’s 
other brigadier being a National Guardsman, Harbord thought the division could use a 
solid regular officer leading one of its combat brigades.  More to the point, the 26th 
Division did not rate highly in Pershing’s opinion.  Both Traub and the division 
commander, Major General Clarence Edwards, received Pershing’s “Pessimism” letter, 
and while neither had prompted further complaints from the commander-in-chief, they 
could still benefit from the addition of Pershing’s number two man.17  Harbord had 
served under Edwards in the Philippine Constabulary, and did not share Pershing’s low 
opinion of the man.  He believed he could “exert a steadying influence under him in 
many matters,” and hoped to turn the 26th Division into one of the AEF’s finest.18
 The 51st Brigade remained a fallback option, though, as Harbord kept his sights 
set on the 1st Brigade.  He sought to improve his chances of getting the command by 
observing the Brigade’s routine, and suggested that he join the division for several days.  
The request had an air of haste to it due to the fact that the 1st Division was moving 
towards the Amiens sector where it would most likely go into the line.  With the division 
making a stop near Picardy for some additional training in open-warfare, Harbord wanted 
to join up before it was too late.  Pershing could appreciate the need for haste, for he had 
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gone ahead and put Harbord’s name in for promotion to brigadier general in the Regular 
Army.  Chief of Staff Peyton March replied that there were no openings at present, but 
would hold Harbord’s name for “future consideration.”19  Recognizing that his concerns 
about Harbord’s lack of combat experience were justified, Pershing approved Harbord’s 
request to join the 1st Division for an observation tour. 
 Harbord left Paris on 5 April to join the 1st Division at Menaucourt.  Upon his 
arrival, he found the 1st Brigade loading up for its journey to the training sector.  This was 
Harbord’s first experience travelling with a brigade, and he witnessed how the soldiers 
crammed into the standard French “Forty and Eight” rail cars (named for the number of 
men or horses they could carry).  Harbord learned that the officers traveled in a day coach 
that held thirty-two persons.  With thirty in their party, the quarters were a bit cramped.  
Not being one to frown at discomfort, Harbord “took a blanket out from my bedding roll, 
tied a handkerchief around my bald head à la Filipino-with-a-headache, and passed a 
fairly comfortable night in an erect position.”20  Having dealt with troop movements on a 
regular basis as chief of staff, Harbord now enjoyed watching the process up close.  The 
fighting men constituted the heart of the American Army, and he was thrilled to be with 
them at last, even if it was only in an observational capacity. 
 Despite his enjoyment, Harbord also noted the logistical difficulty involved in 
moving nine thousand men, and the importance of coordination between units.  Upon 
detraining, the various units in the 1st Brigade had to conduct several marches before 
reaching their billets up to thirty-five miles away.  With rain turning the roads into muddy 
bogs, the marches became an exercise in misery.  The confusion continued as the brigade 
arrived at its billets in stages, receiving various amounts of rest along the way.  To make 
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matters worse, the long marches in the rain and mud brought many men, up to fifteen 
percent, to their billets with feet so sore that they required extra rest.  The men remained 
in high spirits and attacked their training regimen with appropriate enthusiasm, but the 
delays along the route caused the units to receive varied levels of training as none began 
at the same time.21  Harbord watched this confusion with a sense of dismay, filing the 
knowledge away for future consideration.  He stayed with Duncan’s command in a local 
château near Trie-Château, studying the brigade for six days, and learning all he could 
about being a brigade commander from Duncan.  He made the most of his time away 
from Chaumont, relishing the fresh air and the joys of riding a horse again.  It was a 
heady and much needed vacation for on old cavalryman, and he enjoyed the experience 
so much that he forgot to keep in contact with GHQ, eliciting a friendly note from 
Pershing asking for word on the division.22
Remembering that he was not on holiday, Harbord paid close attention to the 
training’s emphasis on “open-warfare.”  Since the AEF’s arrival in France, Pershing 
maintained that it would differentiate itself from the Allies by refusing to be hamstrung 
by a doctrine of trench warfare.  The recent German successes appeared to vindicate 
Pershing’s feelings on the matter.  He noted that the British soldiers could not mount an 
effective defensive after the initial German thrust.  “[The British soldiers] get out in the 
open and act as though they were suddenly thrust naked into the public view and didn’t 
know what to do with themselves, as if something were radically wrong and that there 
ought to be another trench somewhere for them to get into.”23  Pershing could take pride 
in the fact that the 1st Division made plans to focus on the combat of movement so critical 
to “open” warfare.  This initial plan called for three or four days of movement training 
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ending in a full division maneuver.  Unfortunately for the Americans, the training came 
under the direction of General Micheler’s French 5th Army.  Even with the current crisis 
along the Somme, the French showed little interest in open warfare, and failed to provide 
a schedule for the training regimen.  A frustrated General Duncan decided to set the 
program himself according to AEF doctrine, emphasizing company and battalion attack 
formations and close order drills.  As the training progressed, however, a problem arose 
with the divisional maneuver.  Though responsible for overseeing the exercise, the 
French failed to adequately survey the terrain before designating it for use.  When the 
leaders of the 1st Division finally saw the ground, they found it covered in crops.  Sensing 
it a bad idea to have doughboys trampling through French crops on a training exercise, 
they cancelled the maneuver.  The Americans held a terrain exercise instead, which 
Major George C. Marshall called “mobile warfare adapted to emphasize the lessons 
which had just been learned by the French in opposing the enemy’s great offensive.”24  
Though not a full return to a trench warfare doctrine, the plan hardly fit with Pershing’s 
desire for a commitment to aggressive movement.  But like the rest of the AEF’s training 
program, unanticipated hindrances forced a change in focus, limiting the amount of time 
spent learning open warfare techniques.  These changes left the American soldiers with 
varied levels of training in both trench and open warfare tactics, but mastery (or in some 
cases basic competence) in neither.  It was not an encouraging set of circumstances given 
the crisis of the German offensive, but the situation dictated that the men do the best they 
could.25
As enjoyable as Harbord’s time with the 1st Division was, work finally caught up 
with him on 12 April when he received word that Pershing sought to talk with him via 
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telephone.  Since the nearest receiver was in Paris, some sixty mile away, Harbord set out 
at once.  When he arrived in Paris he found that the General had already handled the 
matter himself and their urgent discussion amounted to a ten-minute conversation of 
Pershing explaining what he had done.  He concluded their talk by ordering Harbord to 
go to Foch’s new headquarters the next day.  While a bit irritated, Harbord was glad to 
receive something to do that justified the trip.  And since his car needed repairs, he 
decided to spend the evening in Paris before leaving the next day.26
 A night in Paris meant the opportunity to spend some time with Charles Dawes, 
whose company Harbord thoroughly enjoyed whenever the chance presented itself.  The 
two enjoyed dinner and a bit of theatre, both reveling in the fact that Paris was still a 
delightful locale, despite the war.  The evening also presented Harbord with a unique 
look into the character of the French people.  During the show, an air alert sounded 
signaling the presence of enemy planes overhead.  The manager of the theatre appeared 
and announced that with bombs falling on the city, the performance had to end.  As the 
audience began to leave, the orchestra started to play the “Marseillaise,” giving the 
moment a touch of peace and solidarity.  Harbord marveled at the scene, wondering, 
“What can you,- if you are a Boche,-hope to do with a people like that?  You drop your 
bombs . . . you kill people and maim others, but while you are busy with your little errand 
the French people are marching to the strains of ‘La Marseillaise’; and no one can run 
away when the ‘Marseillaise’ is playing.”27  It was a stark reminder that, whatever 
frustrations he felt with the French leadership, Harbord could not help but admire these 
people who had endured so much already and yet continued to fight. 
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 That same admiration was tested the next day, as the journey to Foch’s 
headquarters devolved into an exercise in inefficiency and frustration.  Thinking that 
Foch’s headquarters was in the town of Beauvais, Harbord began the two-hour trip the 
next morning.  After a pleasant ride, he arrived at their destination only to learn that Foch 
had moved fifteen miles away.  Harbord and his driver set out at once, but when they 
reached the new location, an official said that Foch’s headquarters was forty miles in the 
other direction.  A frustrated Harbord set out again, growing increasingly irritated as the 
day went on.  The confusion did not end when he finally found Foch’s headquarters.  One 
of the staff officers stated that Foch was away and would not return until 6:30 p.m.  
Though only 2:30 p.m., Harbord had little choice but to wait and hope that Foch would 
return earlier than expected.  As with everything else that day, the initial information 
proved false.  Harbord did not get in to see Foch until about nine-thirty that evening, met 
with the Allied commander-in-chief for about ten minutes, and was back at Trie-Château 
by 1:30 a.m., with a considerably less favorable impression of the French than the night 
before.28
 The long wait at Foch’s headquarters was not completely fruitless, as it gave 
Harbord some time to consider his proposed assignment to the line.  The more he thought 
about it, the more appealing the idea of the 1st Brigade became.  As Harbord saw it, he 
was in a prime position to take over if Duncan was promoted.  Harbord’s time with the 
brigade showed him several things: which units Duncan considered strong and weak, the 
brigade’s overall level of training, Duncan’s method of dealing with individuals and 
units, and the coordination between the Infantry and Artillery.  He could not think of a 
better officer to take over command should the spot open up.  He wrote to Pershing 
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explaining these points and saying how the brigade “looks mighty attractive to me, and 
the chance of going in with this 1st Division is one that any man might covet.”  He 
assured the general, “I believe I can deliver the goods if you give me the chance.”29
 After his marathon journey to see Marshall Foch, Harbord met briefly with the 1st 
Division commander, Major General Robert L. Bullard, who had just returned from the 
First Evacuation Hospital at Toul.30  The two observed an exercise in “open” warfare 
training, paying particular attention to its impact on the skeptical French observers. 
Pershing had arrived in time to witness the exercises, and was suitably pleased with the 
division’s progress.  The three men then retired to enjoy an extended chat to discuss the 
day’s events.  Sitting in their shirtsleeves by a fire, they shared their general observations, 
which were favorable, and discussed the impending movement into the line.  An orderly 
observing the men thought they could be mistaken for being back in the Philippines in the 
jungles of Mindanao.31  The next day, Pershing made an address to the division’s officers 
that captured the very essence of the AEF. 
 
 I believe that you are well prepared to take your place along with 
the seasoned troops of our Allies.  But let us not for a moment forget that, 
while study and preparation are necessary, war itself is the real school 
where the art of war is learned.  Whatever your previous instructions may 
have been, you must learn, in the actual experience of war, the practical 
application of the tactical principles that you have been taught during your 
preliminary training.  Those principles are as absolute as they are 
immutable . . .. When confronted with a new situation, do not try to recall 
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examples given in any particular book on the subject; do not try to 
remember what your instructor has said in discussing some special 
problem; do not try to carry in your minds patterns of particular exercises 
of battles, thinking they will fit new cases, because no two sets of 
circumstances are alike; but bear in mind constantly . . . those well-
established general principles, so that you may apply them when the time 
comes.32
 
 Pershing concluded his speech with patriotic flair, pointing out that “Our people 
to-day are hanging expectant upon your deeds” and assuring them that he and the 
American public held a “strong belief in your success . . . with a feeling of certainty in 
our hearts that you are going to make a record of which your country will be proud.”33  
The address was short and full of vigor, displaying the best of Pershing’s forceful 
personality.  Colonel Hines likened it to a talk from a football coach just before his team 
took the field in the championship game.  Harbord thought it “a very stirring talk made in 
that direct, simple manner which is supposed to appeal to the American soldier and in 
which General Pershing quite excelled.”  Of course, some in the audience failed to 
become wrapped up in the moment, as a few lieutenants in the rear had to suppress a 
laugh when a bored teamster asked who it was speaking.34
 
The London Agreement 
 
Despite Harbord’s campaigning for the 1st Brigade, Pershing was not ready to 
make the move at the present, so Harbord ended his brief foray with the 1st Division and 
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reassumed his duties at GHQ.  After a quick return to Chaumont, he joined Pershing for a 
trip to London after a stop at British GHQ to meet with Marshall Haig.  A road weary 
Harbord met his Chief on 19 April for the trip to Haig’s Headquarters with Pershing’s 
aide-de-camp, Colonel Boyd, in tow.  Once there, Harbord noted that Haig was beginning 
to show the strain of the war, as “there were a few more lines in his fine Scotch face than 
at our last meeting.”35  It was not a great surprise, considering the Germans had launched 
a second offensive across the Lys River in Flanders on 9 April.  Though not as successful 
as the Somme campaign, the gains meant that the British were falling back on both ends 
of their front.  If they could not stop the Germans, the British would have to establish a 
defensive position around the channel ports or risk being cut off from England.36
The Allies spent an enjoyable evening discussing the current situation.  Joining 
them was the outgoing British Secretary of State for War, Lord Derby, on his way to take 
over as the new ambassador to France.  Harbord found Derby’s frank statements 
regarding President Wilson’s administration of the war a bit distressing.  Derby believed 
the American government failed to give Pershing adequate support, resulting in the AEF 
commander being overloaded with responsibilities.  “He thought seventy five per cent. of 
General Pershing’s worries,” Harbord recalled, “could be saved him by a different 
administration of our War Department.”37  An admitted supporter of autocratic rule, 
Derby thought it unfortunate that Wilson, who he viewed as the most powerful autocrat 
in the world, did not utilize his power more efficiently and was hampered by the War 
Department’s practice of “passing the buck.”  Such talk must have been a unique 
experience for Harbord, whose own views of government ran further towards autocracy 
than he would like to admit.  The evening ended with a good laugh as all agreed that 
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politicians could not be trusted with anything as important as war.  This was quite the 
consensus opinion coming from the military heads of two thirds of the coalition fighting 
to make the world safe for democracy!38
After bidding a fond farewell to Haig, Pershing and Harbord set out for London 
the next morning.  They had not been in England since the previous June, and noted a 
sharp decline in the adulation that had greeted them on their first visit.  They again stayed 
at the Savoy, enduring a brief moment of discomfort when they went to dinner and the 
orchestra began playing the American national anthem.  As per custom, Pershing and 
Harbord stood at attention while the musicians labored through the song, presenting the 
sight of two American officers standing tall in the middle of the restaurant while other 
guests frittered about, making Pershing feel rather conspicuous.  The embarrassment 
continued at dinner when they discovered they did not have the necessary coupons and 
had to borrow butter from the party of an American actress at the next table.  It was not 
exactly how Harbord envisioned his return to England.39
Pershing’s party spent three days in London, making the rounds to see 
Ambassador Page, Admiral Sims, and various others.  When they finally made it to the 
British War Office, they met with the new Secretary of State for War, Lord Milner and 
General Sir Henry Wilson, General Robertson’s replacement as Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff.  The purpose of the meeting was to go over the various shipping 
arrangements made over the previous month.  In this regard, Pershing and Harbord found 
themselves at a decided disadvantage given their inefficient communication with 
Secretary Baker and the War Department.  The problem arose from Baker’s change of 
heart concerning the American shipping program for the near future.  Before sailing for 
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home, Baker supported Pershing’s decision to limit their agreement with the British for 
the shipment of infantry and machine-gun troops to 60,000 for the month of April, and to 
make no provisions for later months.40  Once back in the United States, however, Baker 
had apparently reconsidered the plan.  With the Germans catching the British off-guard at 
Lys, Baker sensed the emergency now represented a greater threat to the British than 
previously believed.  Consequently, he approved a change to the previous agreement, 
allowing 120,000 infantry and machine-gun personnel to be shipped in British tonnage 
for the months of April, May, June and July.  Historian Daniel Beaver called the new 
plan “a masterpiece of studied ambiguity” due to its pronouncement that it was “not to be 
regarded as a commitment from which the government of the United States is not free to 
depart when the exigency no longer requires it.”41  But it did represent a much greater 
commitment to the British than the one Pershing had agreed to.  It was also decided 
without the AEF commander’s input, leaving Pershing completely in the dark as he met 
with the British. 
Armed with the new agreement, Milner and Wilson sought to finally draw some 
concessions out of the resolute American commander.  They spoke of the possibility of 
transporting some 750,000 men in British vessels by the end of July but questioned the 
ability of the United States to raise such an amount.  Harbord found the figure 
“astounding,” considering that there was “nothing in past records of troop transportation 
which justify the present estimate.”42  The British routinely claimed that turning over as 
much as a freighter to the United States could threaten the entire British Isles with 
starvation.  Now they were offering roughly twenty-five ships per month, capable of 
carrying 10,000 men each.  Harbord could barely hold back his irritation.  “Where has 
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such an amount of shipping been?” he later wrote to Pershing.  “Why has it needed a 
German menace to the Channel ports to make it available?”43   
In Harbord’s mind, the current crisis did not justify scrapping the entire plan for 
building an independent American army.  Whatever claims the French and British made 
to the contrary, it was clear what they wanted: the full amalgamation of American 
infantry and machine gunners into their ranks.  If the Americans allowed the Allies 
control over AEF training and shipping, even for a little while, it would tie the AEF to the 
Allies for the foreseeable future and further delay the creation of an independent 
American army.44  Harbord could barely contemplate such a circumstance, telling 
Pershing, “It is not conceded that the end of the present emergency will be the end of the 
war.  To secure a satisfactory peace the war must continue and American forces be built 
up to that end.”45  Pershing agreed with his chief of staff’s assessment, and spent the 
remainder of the discussions blocking all requests for the expansion of the original plan.  
At the final meeting, the British played their trump card.  They produced a telegram from 
Lord Reading outlining the new agreement approved by Secretary Baker.  Though 
undoubtedly confused, Pershing handled it with his traditional calm.  He stated that since 
he had received no word of the cable from his own government (which was true), he felt 
no obligation to honor the terms it stipulated.  The stunned British were left with little 
recourse but to negotiate a new deal with Pershing.  The final product, termed the London 
Agreement, allowed for the shipment of 120,000 infantry and machine gunners in British 
bottoms, but limited it only to the month of May.  Any excess shipping would bring the 
artillery and additional troops necessary to complete the divisions.46
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Bolstered by Pershing’s firm stance against the British, Harbord focused his 
attention on Washington.  It angered him that the President and the War Department 
would commit the United States to a certain course of action and then “throw the 
responsibility for the really important decision on General Pershing by attaching his 
consent as a condition to the way it is to be carried out.”  It seemed another example the 
War Department working against Pershing and the AEF when it should be giving its full 
support.  Harbord could not understand any agreement that Pershing did not agree to 
himself.  The fact that neither he nor Pershing had received any word of the agreement 
with Lord Reading was simply the icing on the cake.  Did the Administration not grasp 
the fragile nature of the British war effort?  “I wonder if the President realizes,” he wrote 
in his diary, “what it will mean to get a division or two annihilated under the British flag 
with Ireland in arms against conscription, and our people none too warmly inclined to the 
British Alliance, and our equally strong obligations to our other Allies, the gallant 
French.”47  Wilson appeared willing to sacrifice everything they had worked towards on 
this rash gamble with the British. 
Harbord’s frustration is understandable, to a point.  Pershing had enough 
responsibilities and pressures weighing on him already without the Administration 
undercutting his authority.  Dealing with the Allies was a constant headache as they 
continually sought to use the Americans for their own purposes, and the fact that the AEF 
continued to grow at an agonizingly slow rate did not help matters.  Having Wilson, 
Baker, and the War Department setting policies that affected the AEF was a nuisance, 
and to do so without consulting Pershing was an added difficulty that few commanders 
would happily tolerate.  However, whether Harbord liked it or not, the President was free 
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to negotiate any diplomatic agreement he saw fit.  If the Secretary of War or the War 
Department made the AEF’s job more difficult, it was unfortunate.  But as much as 
Pershing and Harbord denied it, control over the American army, including the AEF, 
resided in Washington, not Chaumont.  Whatever role Pershing had in American 
diplomatic decisions and the formation of policy was at the President’s discretion.  It was 
only by Pershing’s good fortune that Wilson and Baker gave him as much control as they 
did.   
When Baker learned the particulars of the London Agreement, he immediately 
retracted his agreement with Lord Reading and deferred to the AEF commander, 
believing he had a better understanding of the situation.  Whether he knew that Pershing 
had yet to receive official notification of the original deal is unclear, but Baker 
recognized the problem of carrying out negotiations on both sides of the Atlantic.  He 
recommended to President Wilson that, in the future, General Pershing should oversee all 
agreements with the Allies to avoid further confusion.  Pershing and Harbord got the 
control they wanted, but both grew increasingly wary of the Administration in the 
process.48
The Americans returned to France on 25 April, heading immediately to Sarcus 
and Foch’s Headquarters to discuss the new arrangement.  Foch echoed the British call 
for infantry and machine-gun units, which Pershing again refused.  Harbord argued that if 
the AEF sent only combat troops it would be sometime in October or November before 
the necessary auxiliary troops could be brought over to form an independent American 
army.  Foch conceded the need for the American soldiers to fight under their flag, but 
feared that the wait risked defeat in the present crisis, and ultimately the war.  Pershing, 
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however, would not budge in his refusal to renegotiate the plan.  He tried to assuage 
Foch’s fears by detailing the particulars of the London Agreement.  Though not happy 
with any deal that purported to help only the British, Foch finally signed off on the plan 
when Pershing told him of the additional tonnage promised by the British.49
Thinking Foch satisfied for the moment, the Americans returned to Chaumont, 
where Harbord found the cable from the War Department that the British had sprung on 
them in London.  Pershing was shocked to learn that he had been so poorly informed, and 
equally unsettled to read the full concessions made by his government.  After reading the 
cable thoroughly, the AEF commander scrawled in the margins, “If this is not 
amalgamation, what is it?”50  Though it superseded his own agreement, Pershing 
resigned himself to continue his refusal to allow for the amalgamation of his forces, 
assuming that Baker’s intentions were misrepresented or confused in the memorandum.51  
Harbord was not as generous.  He believed it further proof that the War Department was 
actively working against the AEF.  Since the proposed exchange of general staff officers 
between the War Department and GHQ, Harbord had grown increasingly suspicious of 
the new chief of staff, General Peyton March.  He heard rumors that March left France 
feeling unappreciated by Pershing and GHQ.  Considering the short shrift given to 
artillery in Pershing’s vision of open warfare, this was not an unreasonable statement, but 
Harbord dismissed such thoughts.  He told Pershing that “the Army Artillery apparently 
was not visualized by [March] as the important command which we know it to be.”52  
Harbord instead thought March ungrateful for his time in the AEF, and believed the chief 
of staff had become consumed with a desire for since taking over the War Department. 
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In this instance, Harbord is guilty of selective memory regarding March’s tenure 
in the AEF.  As chief of AEF artillery, March ran into difficulty with Pershing’s staff 
over training policies and censorship restrictions.  He also sought to have the chief of 
artillery made a permanent member of the General Staff.  The plan died under opposition 
from GHQ in which historian James Cooke sees “the hand of James Harbord.”53  The 
General Staff did not willingly accept interference in creating policy, even from within 
the AEF itself.  While it is unclear if March felt any animosity towards the staff at GHQ, 
there is evidence of friction in the relationship, with a sizable portion of it coming from 
Harbord’s domain at Chaumont.54
It now appeared to Harbord that March was allowing his supposed feelings of 
bitterness to affect his dealings with Pershing and the AEF.  Just a week before, Pershing 
received a chiding cable from the chief of staff regarding promotions.  Pershing had sent 
March a cable expressing his frustration over the current promotion list and requested 
that Congress hold off on confirmation hearings until the Secretary of War could review 
Pershing’s reservations.  March’s reply lectured the AEF commander like an errant 
schoolboy: 
 
The American Expeditionary Forces is only a part of the American army 
and whatever promotions to the grades of Major General and Brigadier 
General are necessary will be made by [the Secretary of War] from the 
entire army.  You were directed to submit recommendations as were other 
general officers. . . . Your recommendations are regarded as especially 
valuable as far as they are limited to the American Expeditionary Forces, 
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but the efficiency of senior officers at home is determined by what there is 
actually accomplished here . . . The Secretary of War demands the utmost 
efficiency in his generals and is going to get it, regardless of rank and 
seniority in appointments.  There will be no change in the nominations 
already sent to the Senate.55
 
The cable’s tone shocked Pershing, who quickly retreated from his earlier request 
in his response.  He explained that he was very anxious regarding promotions, and 
thought it necessary that he and March “appear before the army at large as being in 
accord on this question of promotions, and we must reach a thorough understanding so 
that there may be a very clear policy.”56  Not wanting Pershing to back down too much, 
Harbord advised the General to take a different approach with the chief of staff.  He 
suggested that in Pershing’s first personal letter to March he should “play up the Army 
Artillery a little,” thinking it “good business” to sooth March’s perceived bruised ego.57  
Harbord did not care for March personally, but recognized that Pershing needed to 
remain on good terms with the chief of staff.  In this regard, Harbord was doing his job as 
AEF chief of staff; he was protecting his commanding officer, even from the War 
Department.  Pershing agreed to Harbord’s advice in spirit, and though his next letter did 
not mention the artillery, it did convey a congenial tone.  The brief dust up quickly 
subsided, but the relationship continued to strain under the clash of wills.58
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A Farewell to GHQ AEF 
 
 After addressing the issue with March, Harbord turned his attention to more 
pressing matters.  He had been at his desk only intermittently over the past month, and 
the work piled up.  Amongst the stack of papers waiting for him were the results of the 
latest round of physicals for general officers.  Of the half dozen names on the list of 
generals found physically deficient, Harbord noticed one name in particular, that of 
Brigadier General Charles Doyen, USMC.59  Doyen commanded the AEF’s contingent of 
Marines, made up of the Fifth and Sixth Regiments, forming the 4th “Marine” Brigade.  
As a part of the 2nd Division, the brigade would soon go into the line and needed an able 
commander.  Harbord gave Pershing his recommendations for the now vacant 
commands, again leaving his own name off the list.  He suggested Brigadier General 
Robert Alexander for the Marine Brigade and Hines for the 1st Brigade.60  Pershing, 
however, had a different idea.  He sensed in the Marine Brigade a promising opportunity 
for his chief of staff, saying “he could give [Harbord] no better command in France than 
to let [him] succeed General Doyen with the Marines.”61  With that it was settled.  
Harbord finally had his desired command, now it was now upon him to make good. 
 With his assignment to the line, Harbord joined a small exodus from the AEF 
General Staff, as several other members who joined GHQ in the summer of 1917 were 
leaving as well.  After failing their physical examinations, Brigadier Generals Benjamin 
Alvord and Alfred E. Bradley were to returning to the United States.  Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert “Corky” Davis and Colonel Merritte W. Ireland filled their positions as Adjutant 
General and Surgeon General, respectively.  Others were leaving with Harbord for duty 
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with the troops.  Colonel George Van Horn Moseley replaced Colonel William D. 
Conner as assistant chief of staff, G-4, and Major James L. Collins succeeded Colonel 
Frank McCoy as the Secretary of the General Staff.  Pershing made a final change in the 
General Staff, approving the position of Deputy Chief of Staff.  Colonel LeRoy Eltinge 
came on board inn the new role.62
 With all of these changes at GHQ, Harbord agreed to stay on for a few days to 
oversee the transition and to bring his successor, Major General James McAndrew, up to 
speed.  A graduate of the Military Academy, Class of ’88, McAndrew commanded the 
AEF General Staff College at Langres before coming to Chaumont.  Several years older 
than Harbord, one historian called McAndrew “less of a driver than Harbord,” but 
thought his loyalty and ability to adapt to his commander’s personality made him an 
excellent choice for AEF chief of staff.63  Harbord knew McAndrew to be a highly 
educated officer of “admirable character” who thought Pershing a gift of Providence in 
the nation’s time of need, and thought he would compliment the AEF commander well 
over the coming months.64
 McAndrew’s addition as AEF chief of staff gave the AEF General Staff an 
entirely different character than the one Pershing had grown accustomed to.  While 
Logan and Dennis Nolan remained at G-1 and G-2, the rest of the Assistant Chief’s of 
Staff were different.  Fox Conner permanently replaced John McAuley Palmer as head of 
G-3, Moseley took over G-4, and Harold Fiske oversaw training as assistant chief of 
staff, G-5.  All were imminently capable and efficient officers, but the loss of Harbord 
deprived the General Staff of its coordinating force.  For the first year of the AEF’s 
existence, Harbord was the glue that held the staff together, soothing egos, defusing 
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potential problems, and driving the staff on to give Pershing all the support he needed.  
With a mixture of charm and ferocity, Harbord kept the staff running smoothly.  He 
provided Pershing an outlet to voice his frustrations and a confidential advisor who was 
not afraid to speak his mind.  With Harbord gone, a new dynamic developed within 
GHQ.  An inner circle emerged within the AEF that operated as an advisory council to 
Pershing.  Known as the “GHQ Clique,” it consisted of Fox Conner, “Corky” Davis, John 
Hines, and Malin Craig.65  Conner and Davis remained at Chaumont while Hines and 
Craig gave Pershing an inroad into the needs of the line.  The four communicated 
regularly on policy decisions and formed a wall of absolute loyalty and support around 
Pershing.66  What allowed the group to function, and even necessitated it somewhat, was 
McAndrew’s managerial style.  Whereas Harbord took matters into his own hands, 
issuing decisions rapidly and with Pershing’s support, McAndrew deliberated excessively 
and delegated much of his authority to the staff.  Brigadier General Johnson Hagood 
noted that McAndrew and the new Deputy Chief of Staff LeRoy Eltinge “attend[ed] to 
too much detail themselves and [allowed] too much concurrent jurisdiction.”67  
McAndrew ran the General Staff like a democracy, giving the five assistant chiefs of staff 
a vote on promotions and requiring a consensus approval before an officer was detailed to 
the General Staff.  Though it worked, McAndrew’s management by committee was a far 
cry from Harbord’s authoritative yet personable style.68
While he planned to keep an eye on the General Staff after he left, Harbord 
directed most of his attention to preparing for his own departure.  With Pershing 
attending a conference of the SWC at Abbeville, Harbord brought McAndrew to 
Chaumont to work out the last details of the change.  When Pershing returned on the 
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evening of 4 May, the three men spent the better part of the next day working together to 
make the transition a smooth one.  That evening Pershing and Harbord had a private 
moment to say their good-byes.  Both recognized the significance of their separation, 
looking back at their time spent building an Army and getting it ready to fight.  With the 
fight now at hand, it was only fitting that their relationship change as well.  Pershing 
reiterated that he considered the move as only temporary, hoping to bring Harbord back 
to Chaumont within a few months.  Knowing his own limited history commanding troops 
in the field, Harbord requested that Pershing not commit himself to such a promise, 
pointing out that should he fail in his command it would not do for him to return to the 
General Staff.  On a brighter note, Harbord reminded the General that if he succeeded, he 
could be more valuable in the field than behind a desk.  Regretting his promise to let his 
friend leave, Pershing attempted his own bit of levity, telling Harbord, “I’m giving you 
the best Brigade in France and if things don’t work out I’ll know who to blame.”69  With 
that, the two men parted with a handshake and a salute. 
The next morning Harbord fulfilled his last duty, selecting his first ever aide-de-
camp, a young lieutenant of Field Artillery, Richard Norris Williams.  Educated in 
Switzerland and Harvard, Lieutenant Williams had attended the Field Artillery School at 
Saumer and served as an instructor at the French Artillery School at Senlis before the 
German offensive put it out of business.  Harbord liked the young man and took great 
pleasure in his ability as a French scholar.  On the morning of 5 May, the two men 
departed GHQ, heading east-southeast towards Verdun where his brigade held a portion 
of the line.  Harbord would eventually return to Chaumont as chief of staff, but not for 
another year.  For now, the promise of joining in the fight filled Harbord with joyous 
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anticipation.  At long last, it was his turn to stand in the face of the enemy and direct men 
in combat, and in this he mirrored the AEF as a whole.  He had spent the last twenty-five 
plus years preparing for this moment, but he held his excitement in check.  There were 
hard days ahead, and Harbord knew that that his own success was far from assured.70
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CHAPTER VIII 
WITH THE MARINE BRIGADE (MAY – JUNE 1918) 
 
 May of 1918 brought with it a tenuous calm to the Allied powers on the Western 
Front.  The first two acts of the German Spring Offensive had achieved tremendous 
territorial gains over the past six weeks, but failed to sever the line between the French 
and British Armies and did not isolate the British in front of the Channel ports.  After 
their second offensive ground to a halt at the end of April, the Germans dug in to 
consolidate their new positions and rebuild their strength before resuming the attack.  The 
Allies took this brief lull in German operations as an opportunity to form their own lines 
and prepare for future offensive operations of their own.  With the Germans providing 
time to prepare, the Allies now sought men to rebuild their strength, and they again 
turned to the Americans as the most promising source of manpower.  Scraping the bottom 
of their own manpower reserves, the French and British believed that only the immediate 
amalgamation of American soldiers into their own depleted ranks would enable them to 
block any future German offensive or launch their own counteroffensive.  Ready or not, 
after months of rhetoric, argument and debate, it was now time for the Americans to 
make their mark.  Though sympathetic to Allied concerns, American General John J. 
Pershing rallied his own considerable determination to maintain control of his forces and 
to hold out for an independent American Army.  He would agree to lend aid in a crisis, 
but would not abandon his presidential mandate to show the American flag on the 
battlefields of France.  It was a dangerous game, but Pershing committed himself to 
playing it.  Everyone knew that the Germans would renew their offensive at some point.  
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The only questions were where, and could the Allies hold out long enough for the 
Americans to finally appear on the front in force. 
 For newly minted Brigadier General James Harbord, May was a turning point in 
his career.  Serving as Pershing’s chief of staff since the American Expeditionary Forces’ 
inception, he had spent the last year organizing and managing the AEF General Staff.  
With Pershing’s approval of a transfer to the line, the number two man in the AEF now 
faced the duty for which all military officers dream, a wartime combat command.  All his 
training, all his years of service, everything he had ever worked for prepared Harbord for 
this moment.  Much like the AEF, it was time for Harbord to toe the line in the face of the 
enemy.  And like the army in which he served, Harbord had to work on an accelerated 
timetable that made adequate preparation extremely difficult.  He would have only three 
weeks in his new command before moving to block the Germans’ third major offensive 
in as many months, with the fate of the war seemingly hanging in the balance. 
 
Backs to the Wall 
 
 Facing spectacular German gains across the Somme and in Flanders over the 
previous month, the Allies came together for the fifth session of the Supreme War 
Council on 1 May.  Convening at Abbeville, the meeting included all the major players: 
prime ministers, war ministers, permanent military representatives, chiefs of staff, army 
commanders, and an assortment of others.  Considering the rank of participants and the 
seriousness of the situation, Harbord called the meeting “one of the great historic 
conferences of the World War,” and deeply regretted his inability to attend.1  Had he 
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been there, Harbord would have witnessed a titanic struggle of wills between Pershing 
and the combined representatives of the Allied nations.  After the near collapse of their 
armies under the first two German onslaughts, the Allies turned the meeting into a unified 
effort to persuade Pershing to accept the amalgamation of his units into the Allied armies.  
Taking their cues from the recent London Agreement between Pershing and the British, 
the French, led by Premier Clemenceau and Allied Commander-in-Chief Ferdinand Foch, 
pushed to have the plan for the United States to ship only infantry and machine-gun units 
to France in May extended to June and July.  For two days, Pershing fought off every 
argument, every plea for reason, every challenge to honor and duty.  At one point, the 
AEF commander stormed out of one meeting after pounding the table to emphasize his 
firm objection to the plan.2  At another, he conceded a willingness to sacrifice Paris by 
falling back to the Loire River if it would secure the time needed to form his army.3
Though he sympathized with Pershing’s desire to build his own army, Foch could 
not understand the AEF commander’s intransigence with the very issue of the war at 
stake.  British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George added that if the Germans could not 
be pushed back, then the Allies would surely fall.  If that happened, history would forever 
remember that the United States failed to act at the crucial juncture because of Pershing’s 
prideful opposition.  Weary of the struggle, and recognizing the limited contribution of 
the AEF to date, Pershing finally agreed to a compromise.  He would allow the London 
Agreement’s provisions extended to June, but would not speak to July.  He suggested the 
group meet again in a month’s time to reevaluate the situation and see if it warranted 
continuing the new plan.  Sensing that this was as much blood as they could extract from 
the stony AEF commander, the Allies begrudgingly accepted the proposal.  The 
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Abbeville Agreement, as it was known, provided for the shipment of 130,000 infantry 
and machine-gun units by the British in May and another 150,000 in June.  Whatever 
American shipping could be found would bring over the artillery and auxiliary troops to 
fill out and support the new divisions.4
As is the case in most compromises between two determined parties, neither side 
found the agreement reached on 2 May particularly satisfying.  It failed to turn over 
control of American soldiers to the Allies, who believed it essential to their survival, let 
alone hopes for victory.  The agreement also delayed the formation of an American 
Army, which Pershing thought equally necessary for an eventual victory.  But each side 
had to accept half a loaf, for neither would fully abandon its position.  As it worked out, 
the Allies came out ahead in the deal.  They were able to infuse enough American units 
into their lines to block the next series of German offensives and launch a counterattack 
to erase the German gains.  But the deal also created enormous difficulties for the AEF’s 
Services of Supply.  By placing the focus on infantry and machine-gun units and 
postponing the shipment of auxiliary and supply personnel, the agreement forced the 
numerically stagnant SOS to supply the ever-increasing AEF over the summer months 
causing serious confusion in the supply lines.  When Pershing finally established the First 
Army, AEF, in August, the SOS would not have the necessary personnel to adequately 
support it.  By the fall, the excess load on the SOS threatened to collapse the entire 
American logistical system in France.  The Allies did not anticipate these problems, nor 
did they particularly care.  They needed American soldiers in the trenches now.  If that 
delayed the formation of an independent American Army, then so be it.  The AEF needed 
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time, but the Western Front would not wait for them, and the Americans would simply 
have to make do. 
 
The Marine Brigade 
 
 Soon after Abbeville, Harbord departed Chaumont and the General Staff to take 
command of the 4th Brigade, U.S. Marines.  With his aide, Lieutenant Richard N. 
Williams, accompanying him, Harbord arrived at the 4th Brigade’s Headquarters along 
the northern edge of the St. Mihiel salient southeast of Verdun on 6 May.  In a simple 
ceremony he assumed command from the outgoing brigade commander, Brigadier 
General Charles A. Doyen, and met with his officers.5  The 4th Brigade consisted of the 
5th and 6th Marines, commanded by Colonels Wendell C. Neville and Albertus W. Catlin, 
respectively.  Harbord knew Catlin from the Army War College before both joined the 
AEF.  He did not know Neville, but the two found they worked well together and 
eventually became close friends.  As a new and untried brigade commander, Harbord felt 
somewhat apprehensive of his new subordinates.  Both were Regular colonels in the 
Marine Corps, and had each earned the Congressional Medal of Honor earlier in their 
careers.  Only a Regular lieutenant colonel of Cavalry, Harbord worried that his replacing 
the respected Doyen as brigade commander would not be well received.6  As though 
sensing Harbord’s fears, Neville pointed out the Marine Corps motto, “Semper Fidelis,” 
and promised that the new commander could depend on them to do their duty.7  It was a 
warm gesture, but it did not sooth Harbord’s trepidation.  The Marines knew that Harbord 
was Pershing’s former chief of staff, and they understood that with him came the added 
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attention of the commander-in-chief and increased pressure to perform extraordinarily in 
combat.  Likewise, Harbord knew that he was getting a top-notch brigade, filled with “a 
fine body of officers and men.”  His status as an unproven entity with a considerable 
amount of expectations would make anyone slightly worried.  Though not hostile to his 
coming, the Marines were not exactly thrilled.  Harbord could only hope that, “If I make 
good I shall probably never know anything more about it that I do now.”8  With that, the 
men entered into a silent agreement to do their best to see that everyone benefited from 
the awkward situation. 
 There were other reasons for Harbord to be anxious about taking over the 4th 
Brigade.  The existence of a Marine unit within the AEF was a point of some controversy 
and contention for members of both services.  Soon after the United States declared war 
on Germany in April of 1917, Marine Corps Commandant George Barnett petitioned the 
War Department and President Wilson to include a unit of Marines in the original force 
sent overseas.  Overloaded with the task of forming the initial American Expeditionary 
Forces, the War Department agreed to Barnett’s request, and the 5th Marine regiment 
accompanied the 1st Division to France in June 1917.  Bound by War Department 
directive, Pershing had a certain level of misgiving towards the Marines.  Though he 
admired their discipline and spirit, he was unsure how they would fit in with Regular 
Army units.  Likewise, Barnett had concerns about sending his Marines to France with 
the AEF.  He intended his men to fight, and worried that the AEF and War Department 
would relegate them to a second-class status once in France.9  They were valid concerns, 
for relations between the Marines and the Army remained tenuous during the summer of 
1917.  Though attached to the 1st Division, the 5th Marines was assigned to duty in the 
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AEF’s support system, serving as sentries, guards, and various other tasks.  It was not a 
malicious decision, simply an expedient one.  The AEF desperately needed auxiliary 
personnel in those early days, and the Marines fit the bill.  While the Marines accepted 
the duty as part of fitting in with the Army, their displeasure was obvious.  When war 
correspondent Frederick Palmer asked a Marine sentry how he like his duty, the man 
replied tersely, “Very well, sir.  It will fit me for a job after the war.  I can wear a striped 
waistcoat and open cab doors in front of a New York hotel.”10  The indignity proved only 
temporary, however, as the 5th Marines joined 9th and 23rd Infantry regiments to form the 
2nd Division in October of 1917.  When the third and final battalion of the 6th Marines 
reached France in February 1918, it and the 5th combined to form the 4th Infantry 
Brigade.11
As the Marines sought to keep their place on the combat line within the AEF, they 
also worked to maintain their service identity.  With the badge of honor, “First to Fight,” 
inscribed in Marine Corps lore, the Marines of the World War made a concerted effort to 
distinguish themselves from the soldiers they served with.  They wore their distinctive 
forest green uniforms with pride, setting themselves apart from their Army brethren.  
When those uniforms wore out, the Marines sowed their Marine buttons onto Army 
khakis, and attached insignias on their caps, helmets, or anywhere else they thought 
fitting.  One needed to look only briefly at these figures emblazoned with the globe and 
anchor to recognize them as Marines.  Commandant Barnett went a step further to 
maintain the Corps’ identity.  He made a special request to Pershing, asking that the 
Marine brigade be listed as the 4th Brigade (U.S. Marines), with each regiment keeping its 
service distinction.  Recognizing the need to maintain the Marines’ famous morale, 
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Pershing agreed.  It seemed a small concession at the time, but the decision would come 
back to haunt the AEF commander when the Marines went into action near at Belleau 
Wood in late May 1918.12
 Thus formed, the 4th “Marine” Brigade combined with the 3rd Regular Army 
Brigade under Brigadier General E. M. Lewis to form the 2nd Division, U.S. Army.  The 
2nd Division also consisted of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Machine Gun Battalions, the 2nd Field 
Artillery Brigade, the 2d Engineers, the 1st Field Signal Battalion, and an assortment of 
support units and trains.13  Commanding the entire division was Major General Omar 
Bundy, with the aid of the tenacious Colonel Preston Brown as chief of staff.  Eventually 
assuming the “Indian Head” insignia, the division began its training in late October 1917.  
Though a Regular division, the 2nd had an overwhelming number of new recruits in its 
ranks, who needed months of basic training in marksmanship, combined-arms 
coordination, and drills in both trench and open warfare.14  After an extended period of 
organization and basic training, the division finally began a training regimen in small 
units in January of 1918 under the tutelage both American and French officers.  By early 
March, the division was deemed ready for more extensive training in trench warfare 
under French instruction, moving from its initial sector around Bourmont – Haute-Marne 
to the Sommerdine and Toulon region of Lorraine in Eastern France.15  The division’s 
regiments went into quiet sectors under the French 33rd, 34th, and 52nd Divisions.  There 
they received their first taste of life in the trenches, conducting and repelling raids, 
enduring artillery-fire, and generally learning the tenets of trench warfare.  After a two-
month stint with the French, the 2nd Division made plans to recombine and move to a new 
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sector for training in “open” warfare.  Such was the division’s status when Harbord 
joined.16
 After taking command of the 4th Brigade on 6 May, Harbord went about adjusting 
to the routine of billet life.  He learned that the men were unaccustomed to seeing a star 
in the front line and decided to make it a facet of his command style, touring the entire 
sector observing his men, and letting them see him.  His quarters consisted of a small hut 
with two rooms, one for sleeping and an office, with a double-sided fireplace providing 
heat for both.  The mess was considerably better than one had any right to expect in the 
field, as the Brigade Headquarters possessed a French chef who had worked at the Ritz-
Carlton in London before the war.  The French interpreter, Martin Legasse, ran the mess 
like a true Frenchman, bossing the chef around incessantly.  Harbord took such pleasure 
in these men that they joined his permanent staff, staying with him for the rest of the war.  
He also acquired a new aide, Lieutenant Fielding S. Robinson, U.S.M.C., whose fondness 
for riding made him a welcome addition to Harbord’s growing entourage17
 Having spent the previous year working to create the AEF and keeping pace with 
Pershing, Harbord found welcome relief in his new routine.  The work was hard and the 
hours were long, but life in the billets had a quiet serenity about it that was noticeably 
absent from Chaumont.  “It is fine to be able to know that your duty lies in certain 
established lines,” Harbord wrote in his diary, “and that your meals will be served when 
the hour comes, etc.  I admire General Pershing more than any officer in the army, but his 
utter lack of consciousness of time and his irregular habits are extremely trying.”  The 
physical labor of directing troops and the never-ending inspections were a welcome 
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change from the grind at GHQ, and though Harbord admitted that he may one day 
welcome a return to staff duty, he found life “much more enjoyable with the brigade.”18
 The holiday could not last as events caught up with the new brigade commander.  
The absence of German activity gave Foch the chance to begin planning a counter 
offensive against the Somme salient.  In keeping with his new position as Allied 
commander-in-chief, Foch wanted the 2nd Division to take part in the upcoming 
operations.  It made sense, for after spending the last two months drilling in trench 
warfare, AEF inspectors reported the 4th Brigade “probably the best” American unit in 
France in terms of discipline and appearance.19  However, there was still much work to 
be done.  For all its time in the trenches, the brigade still had serious deficiencies in its 
tactical proficiency, coordination of machine-guns and artillery in support of the infantry, 
and unit communication.  No one denied that the Marines had spirit, but they needed 
considerable improvement in their attack skills, which only time and additional training 
could provide.  Of course, time was one thing the Allies were running woefully short of, 
and the 4th Brigade would be called upon to move into the lines before most of these 
deficiencies could be addressed.  The result would be the loss of many good Marines due 
to inadequate training.20
 Within four days of taking command, Harbord received word of the 2nd Division’s 
impending relief from the Verdun sector.  In accordance with Pershing’s desire to have 
his units schooled in open warfare, the division was moving to the region surrounding 
Chaumont-en-Vixen, some thirty-five miles northwest of Paris, for additional training.  
Foch hoped that after a few weeks spent learning the techniques of maneuver warfare, the 
division would be ready to contribute to the reduction of the Somme salient.  Though 
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Harbord had experienced a brigade movement with the 1st Division, this time he was 
responsible for the entire operation.  Accustomed to having his finger on the pulse for the 
entire AEF, Harbord found the limited intelligence he received regarding the move 
disconcerting.  He had no advance knowledge of his brigade’s final destination or their 
eventual battle sector.  The plan called for the final destination to be wired to the brigade 
en route.21  “With the usual ostrich precautions,” Harbord recalled later, “apparently 
everybody in the world, except us who should have known, was told where we were 
going.”22  Making matters worse, General Bundy ordered his brigade commanders to 
remain in place to oversee the entraining process while their units went ahead.  
Consequently, when the first trains began arriving at their destination, they had no 
commanding officer to direct their movements, assign billets, or begin training exercises.  
Harbord chafed at the idea that, “my Brigade Headquarters in the new area had no head, 
and every one did as he pleased and wasted four valuable days while I watched the guns 
and gunners get on their trains."23  One of the hardest lessons Harbord still needed to 
learn was the lack of control he had over his men.  Bundy set policies for the division, 
which Harbord had to follow, no matter how inefficient.  He also had to learn the limits 
of command and control in modern war.  Once in motion, there was only so much he 
could actually control given the brigade’s size and problems with communications.  Such 
lessons were all a part of the advanced learning curve Harbord had to work on with the 
4th Brigade.24
 When Harbord finally reached the new region, he was delighted to see it was the 
same where he had served with the 1st Brigade in April.  He found his headquarters 
established at Le Bout de Bois, the home of a local nobleman and his family, and took 
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full advantage of the setting to enjoy a more active lifestyle than the one he had at 
Chaumont.  When not over-seeing the brigade’s training, Harbord enjoyed the steady 
stream of teas, dinners, and entertainment supplied by the local gentry.  In the meantime, 
the 2nd Division abandoned their training in fixed positional warfare and began 
conducting a series of field maneuvers, each growing in size and complexity.  The goal 
was to have the entire division spend several weeks learning attack maneuvers free from 
the trenches, but events again conspired against the Americans.  The division had reached 
the point of brigade maneuvers on 29 May when word began to spread that they would 
soon move out for the line.  No one knew the circumstances or direction of the move, but 
it appeared that their training in open warfare was over after only two weeks.25
 
On to Château-Thierry 
 
 During the 2nd Division’s training at Chaumont-en-Vexin, the French worked out 
several plans for the its move to the front.  The first developed in conjunction with the 1st 
Division’s operations at the point of the Somme salient.  Attached to the French X Corps, 
the division received permission on 25 May to seize Cantigny, a small town just west of 
Montdidier.  Pushed back three days due to a German gas attack, the assault went off 
flawlessly, employing a combination of the 28th Infantry, the division’s artillery, and a 
new entity on the American battlefield: tanks.  During the attack’s planning stages, the 
French intended to move the 2nd Division up to Cantigny to relieve the 1st Division after 
the operation.  As with all things in war, however, the enemy had other plans.26  Just 
before the assault on Cantigny, the Germans prepared to renew their offensive.  The first 
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two attacks, across the Somme in March, and in Flanders in April had ground to a halt as 
the French rushed reserves north.  The chief strategist behind the offensive, German 
General Erich von Ludendorff, wanted to either drive the British towards the sea, or 
extend the Somme salient and sever the connection between the British and French 
Armies.  Both goals presented problems.  The British were reinforcing their position in 
Flanders daily, and the Somme region provided too little cover for the necessary 
preliminary work.  Ludendorff needed to draw the Allies’ attention, and reserves, farther 
south to open Flanders and the Somme to a renewed assault.  The best way to accomplish 
this would be an attack towards Paris.  The French would respond in full to any threat on 
their capital, and pull their reserves away from the weakened British.  After studying the 
lines, Ludendorff decided that the best place to make just such a push was across the 
Chemin des Dames north of the Aisne River.  A naturally strong defensive position, the 
French and British had transferred several worn out units there to regain their strength.  
This made the region ripe for an attack, which the Germans carried out on 27 May.27
 The attack was a masterpiece as eighteen German divisions from three armies 
slammed into the French Sixth Army, a combination of seven tired French and British 
divisions.  Crossing the Aisne on bridges left standing by the retreating French, and 
Germans drove twelve miles into the interior on the first day.  By the end of the third day, 
the Germans had advanced thirty miles and were closing in on the Marne River for the 
first time since 1914.  Ludendorff’s grand diversion had resulted in the most spectacular 
gains on the Western Front since the first months of the war.  If they could capture the 
Paris-Metz highway and cross the Marne, the Germans would be in a position to march 
on Paris.  Though the operation was only intended as a means of drawing Allied reserves 
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away from Flanders, the gains were so great that Ludendorff changed his plans and 
decided to press the advantage with the hope of advancing on Paris and winning the 
war.28
 The German breakthrough did not initially alter the 2nd Division’s planned move 
towards Montdidier.  Scheduled to commence at 6:00 a.m. on 31 May, orders were issued 
covering every detail for the move.  Billeting parties were sent ahead, and all the 
arrangements had been made except actually putting the division in motion.  With the 
situation well in hand by 30 May, Harbord and his aide, Lt. Robinson, prepared for an 
afternoon ride.  At the same time, a French staff car came racing to General Bundy’s 
headquarters with orders for the division to depart immediately for Meaux, which would 
put it between the Germans and Paris.  Bundy forwarded the orders to his brigade 
commanders and began making preparations to transfer the division’s headquarters.  
Harbord first learned of the change when a sergeant came sprinting up with the new 
orders as he walked his horse back to the château.  He immediately issued orders to his 
regiments to make ready to move out and started his headquarters staff packing at a 
furious pace.29  With everything well in hand, Harbord hurried to Bundy’s headquarters 
at Chaumont-en-Vexin, some twenty miles away, for a meeting of the division’s senior 
commanders.  Arriving at around 8 p.m., he was greeted with a scene of considerable 
excitement and confusion.  Staff officers hurried past arranging for the new move, 
everywhere a sense of urgency gripping the officers.  Bundy ordered the division’s 
infantry units to embark by motor transport early the next morning, with the artillery, 
animals, and support trains traveling by rail.  General officers were to proceed by motor-
car to Meaux where they would receive further orders as to the distribution of their units.  
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The meeting finally broke up at midnight, leaving five hours for the commanders to get 
their men aboard the French camions taking them to the battle.  It proved to be a very 
busy night.30
 As the Marines reversed their route of a few weeks past, Harbord and his staff 
headed out, stopping in Paris around 9 a.m. for breakfast, then proceeding on to Meaux 
where they arrived shortly after noon.  Expecting to find a staff officer with orders, they 
instead found the city in the grips of a general panic.  Rumors that the Germans were only 
a few miles away sent the city’s citizens scrambling to evacuate, with retreating French 
officers and soldiers scattered about contributing to the confusion.  Without any word as 
to orders, and not knowing when their next meal would come, Harbord and his aides 
found a small hotel café for a bite to eat.31  Orders were slow in coming, as the French 
had their hands full holding the crumbling Seventh Army together.  Early that afternoon, 
Harbord finally received orders to move his brigade, if he could find it, north to the 
western bank of the Ourcq River, ten miles from Château-Thierry (on the western side of 
the new salient).  Moving proved problematic, as “hundreds of refugees crowded the 
roads, fleeing before the German advance.”  The sight was equally heart wrenching and 
bothersome, as men, women and children hurried toward the rear, their faces showing a 
combination of terror and exhaustion.  “Everything that a frightened peasantry fleeing 
before a barbarian invader would be likely to think of bringing . . . was to be seen on that 
congested highway.”32  People crowded the roads with livestock and carts filled with all 
the worldly possessions they could carry.  The Americans struggled through this sea of 
desperation, hoping to reach their positions before the Germans did. 
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 Confusion gripped the French Sixth Army just as it did the citizens fleeing to the 
south and west.  Over the next twelve hours, Harbord received two more sets of orders, 
one shifting his brigade east of the Ourcq, instead of west, and another several hours later 
redirecting them southeast to the vicinity of Montreuil-aux-Lions on the Paris-Metz 
highway.33  One of the Marines on his staff tried to put the conflicting orders into 
perspective, telling the beleaguered general, “When it comes to the French, General 
Harbord, a good Marine never goes into motion until he gets the third edition.”34  With 
night coming on, Harbord hurried off to turn his tired Marines around and point them 
towards their new destination.  The Marines were exhausted, having been up nearly 
eighteen hours, and spending the entire day jammed into trucks.  Harbord spent the next 
few hours on the road trying to get his men assembled, but it became increasingly 
difficult with night coming on.  After a German plane bombed the highway, Harbord 
finally gave up and ordered his men to get some rest and be ready to move out at 4:30 
a.m.  Worn from the long day, Harbord made his way to General Bundy’s temporary 
headquarters a little after 1 a.m. for a couple hours of sleep.35
 Early the next morning the American column began moving towards Château-
Thierry.  After a brief rest, Harbord headed to the headquarters of French General Joseph 
Degoutte, commander of the XXI French Corps, to which the 2nd Division was assigned.  
Along the way he came upon the 6th Marines, who, after hours riding in the camions and 
marching on the dusty roads, looked “more like miners emerging from an all-night shift 
than like fresh troops ready to plunge into battle.”36  The men had had little rest over the 
past twenty-four hours and no hot food, as the rolling kitchens were still en route.  
Nothing could be done, however, so Harbord pushed his men on with promises of rest 
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and food to come.  As he watched the grumbling Marines begin their journey, Harbord 
decided to make his own way forward to see if he could find any information regarding 
their final destination.  He overtook Colonel Le Roy Upton’s 9th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 
just a few miles shy of Montreuil.  After receiving their orders, the regiment had 
abandoned the roads and marched all night through the French countryside.  The decision 
worked well, as the regiment now constituted the most advanced unit of the entire 2nd 
Division.  Harbord passed them and headed into Coupru, where he found the corps 
commander, General Degoutte, by 6 a.m.  Still not knowing exactly where his men were 
going, Harbord inquired as to the location of the French lines and orders for the 4th 
Brigade.  After a long pause and with a weary seriousness in his eyes, Degoutte replied: 
  
Things have been going very badly with us.  They have been pressing us 
since the morning of the 27th and have advanced over fifty kilometers in 
seventy-two hours.  I know that your men need rest.  Let them get 
something to eat.  If it can be avoided I shall not call on you today.  But it 
may become necessary.  Your troops must be ready to go into the line any 
time after 11:00 if called upon.37
 
 Harbord assured the French general that the Americans would be ready then 
hurried out to deliver the orders to General Bundy.  He need not have bothered, as 
Bundy, Upton, and Preston Brown arrived shortly for a meeting with Degoutte.  The 
French commander restated his position, adding that he thought it best for the 2nd 
Division to head east towards Château-Thierry where the Germans were making a push 
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and prepare to make a counterattack.  Considering the state of the division, Brown 
strenuously objected.  Of the division’s four regiments, only the 9th Infantry was in line, 
the other three being somewhere on the road.  The division’s artillery and supply trains 
were still a day away, and none of the men had received any rest or hot food to speak of, 
subsisting instead on their two day supply of rations.  But Degoutte was unconvinced.  A 
fervent apostle of the offensive oriented Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Degoutte wanted the 
Americans to go on the attack.38  His front was in ruins, his men were exhausted, and he 
had been staring at defeat for the last three days.  The 2nd Division’s arrival brought with 
it a glimmer of hope, and Degoutte wanted to seize the advantage, whether the Americans 
were ready or not.  Undeterred, Brown argued that if the French could only hold on till 
the full division came together, they would take over the line and block the route to Paris.  
Degoutte confessed that he doubted that the untried division could hold the line; better to 
use them going forward than waste them standing still.  An incensed Brown replied, 
“General, these are American regulars.  In a hundred and fifty years they have never been 
beaten.  They will hold.”39  Degoutte relented and ordered the Americans to take up 
position along the Paris-Metz highway. 
 Having carried the argument, Bundy and Brown headed back to Montreuil where 
they met up with Harbord and General E.M. Lewis, the 3rd Brigade commander for a 
council of war at the Hôtel de Ville.  While deciding on their order of battle, a French 
officer arrived with word that the Germans were making a push near the town of 
Bouresches, four miles east of Château-Thierry and almost two miles north of the Paris-
Metz highway.  He ordered Bundy to fill the gap with the 23rd Infantry or some other unit 
“without a moment’s delay.”40  Bundy immediately ordered the 23rd put into the line, but 
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Brown informed the division commander that aside from reports that the regiment was on 
the march, no one knew its exact location.  Bundy then turned to Harbord and told him to 
send in one of his regiments.  Despite his men’s road-weary state, Harbord agreed, and 
suggested that Bundy assign the 4th Brigade the section of the 2nd Division’s line running 
northwest from the Pariz-Metz highway so as not to divide his command.  Bundy agreed, 
and in doing so put the Marines in position for immortality when the division went on the 
attack five days later.41
 
Into the Lines 
 
 With his task before him, Harbord hurried out to find the 6th Marines, the closest 
of his two regiments to the front.  He found them on the road just east of Montreuil, 
unloading rations from several trucks.  Harbord ordered the trucks to throw out the 
rations on the road and head to the rear to pick up the trailing battalion.  The other two 
battalions were to make all possible speed to the brigade’s position between Le Thiolet 
on the highway and the little village of Lucy-le-Bocage.  Once the battalions were on 
their way, Harbord headed to Lucy to meet with the General Michel, the commander of 
the 43rd French Division, currently holding the line against the Germans directly in front 
of the American positions.  Once there, the Frenchman explained to Harbord that his men 
must “hold the line at all hazards.”  Harbord had just transmitted orders to his men when 
General Michel sent word that the Americans should dig trenches several hundred yards 
to their rear, “just in case.”  Indignantly, Harbord replied, “We will dig no trenches to fall 
back to.  The Marines will hold where they stand.”42
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 Harbord quickly established his command center at an abandoned farm and spent 
the rest of the day directing his men into position.  Just after 5:00 p.m., he reported to 
Bundy that the 6th Marines had two battalions in line, one running north from Le Thiolet 
to Triangle Farm, the other extending the line west from Triangle to Lucy.43  Even with 
the arrival of the 5th Marines that night, it was a thin line.  The men were tired and 
hungry, having traveled over seventy miles in the last thirty-six hours.  To their front, the 
48th French Division was slowly falling back in the face of the German push, meaning the 
untested 2nd Division would soon become the only fresh unit standing between the 
Germans and the road to Paris.  News that the Germans had taken Château-Thierry that 
same day put even more pressure on the 4th Brigade to hold the line.  The situation looked 
bleak indeed for the Allies as 1 June came to an end.44
 Unknown to Harbord at the time, elements of Major General Joseph T. Dickman’s 
3rd Division were holding up the German advance through Château-Thierry, providing 
time for the French divisions to the west to withdraw, and allowing the 2nd Division time 
to strengthen its lines.  The day before, one of the 3rd Division’s machine-gun battalions 
took up a position along the Marne River in Château-Thierry.  After blowing up the 
remaining bridges, the valiant gunners deployed along the Marne’s southern bank and 
repelled several German attempts to cross the river.  The 3rd Division’s infantry regiments 
meanwhile came up and helped plug the gaps in the French line, stopping the Germans at 
the Marne and forcing them to look elsewhere for a possible breakthrough.  They decided 
to move west, directly in the path of the 48th French Division, backed up by the 4th 
Brigade (U.S. Marines).45
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 With the 3rd Division making a stand to the east, Harbord’s Marines spent most of 
2 June digging in, displacing, and digging in again in an effort to shore up their lines.  
With all three battalions in position, the 6th Marines held a line over two miles long while 
the 5th Marines stood ready in division reserve.  The 9th Infantry locked in the 4th 
Brigade’s right flank, and elements of the 23rd extended the left flank northwest to Hill 
142, just south of Torcy.46  All told, by nightfall on 2 June the 2nd Division’s three 
regiments held a line twelve miles long.  Due to their proximity to the Paris-Metz 
highway, the position allowed only local defense in depth, but the units were slowly 
consolidating and strengthening their defenses.  Communication proved difficult for the 
inexperienced division, made more problematic by unfamiliarity with the terrain.  
Harbord had to communicate with his regimental and battalion commanders through 
runners, who usually took too long delivering their messages if they got through at all.  
This problem continued to plague the 4th Brigade during the coming battle as the fog of 
war strained an already poor communication system.47
 During the night of 2-3 June, German General von Conta, commanding the IV 
Reserve Corps ordered an attack to create a breakthrough west of Château-Thierry.  All 
day the French had stood their ground against German probes and now von Conta wanted 
to push through from Torcy towards Lucy-le-Bocage, eventually driving west towards the 
town of Marigny.48  In their path was a small wood known as the Bois de Belleau, or 
Belleau Wood.  Covering roughly a square mile of dense undergrowth, rolling, boulder-
covered terrain, and thick trees, the wood ran north south about a mile-and-a-half in an 
irregular kidney shape, spanning roughly a half mile in the middle.  It sat nestled between 
Lucy-le-Bocage to the southwest, the town of Bouresches to the east, and the town of 
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Belleau to the north.  A small road ran between the wood and Triangle farm and from 
Lucy to Bouresches.  Another road ran just west of the wood from Lucy to Torcy to the 
northwest.  Though possessing no critical strategic significance, the wood offered 
excellent cover from which to launch an attack on the Paris-Metz highway and the 
surrounding area.  It was a nice position to hold, but not one that anyone considered so 
important as to dominate the terrain and hold up the entire German offensive.  Hence, as 
of 2 June the wood remained unoccupied, both sides planning to take it in the process of 
other operations.  It would not remain obscure for very long. 
 The German assault on 3 June hit the French hard, causing the center of the 43rd 
Division to crumble under the pressure.  Though the Germans failed to achieve a 
breakthrough, they did occupy Bouresches and pushed the French beyond Belleau Wood.  
By nightfall, the American lines were filled with retreating French soldiers.  In the 
confusion, a French major approached Marine Captain Corbin and scribbled a quick 
order to retreat on a pad of paper.  Corbin passed the note along to Captain Lloyd 
Williams, who snorted in disgust, “Retreat, hell.  We just got here.”49  The sentiment 
permeated through the American line.  They had not come this far to fall back in the face 
of the enemy without bloodying their noses.  The Marines wanted a fight, and had no 
intention of leaving until they got one.  That afternoon, a German barrage fell on the 4th 
Brigade’s lines, followed by the initial wave of von Conta’s advancing corps.  With 
tremendous precision, the Marines and their rifles stopped the Germans cold, picking off 
men with deadly accuracy.  Already slowing after several days of fighting, the Germans 
fell back before the withering fire from the fresh Americans.  The display seemed to 
prove Pershing’s faith in the individual soldier and his rifle, and gave Harbord a rather 
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inflated opinion of his men’s capabilities. The Marines carried their first true encounter 
with the Germans not by their skill in the trenches or the support of the artillery, but by 
sheer tenacity.  Harbord would come to rely on that tenacity in the coming weeks, often 
at the expense of his own men.50
 That night, General Degoutte studied the situation and deemed the 43rd Division 
too weak to stay in the line.  He ordered it to withdraw, and called on the 2nd Division to 
take its place.  The Americans moved through the French lines on the night of 3-4 June, 
with Bundy taking control of the sector at 8:00 a.m. that morning.  It was just in time, for 
the Germans launched another attack against what was now an American position, which 
the Marines fought off as effectively as the day before.  Each side lost roughly 225 
casualties, but the action proved the Americans would indeed hold.  It also proved that 
the German offensive, much like the previous two, was running out of steam.  All along 
the salient, the Germans began to dig in and reform their lines.  But Ludendorff needed to 
keep going.  His great diversion looked so close to achieving ultimate victory that he 
could not abandon it and renew his efforts in the north.  If the Germans could push into 
the plains west of Château-Thierry, they would have an open road to Paris, and could end 
the bloody carnage once and for all.  But they needed to push further south before making 
the turn west, and in their way stood the remnants of a tired French army and a few 
American divisions.  While Ludendorff searched for an avenue to Paris, the Allies 
mounted a stiff defense and counterattack, anchored by the Marines at Belleau Wood.51
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CHAPTER IX 
BELLEAU WOOD (5 – 25 JUNE 1918) 
 
 Unbeknownst to those involved, 5 June 1918 began a minor shift in momentum in 
the sector west of Château-Thierry that would eventually resonate along the entire 
Western Front.  A week before, the Germans launched their assault across the Chemin 
des Dames, advancing as far south as the Marne River.  The offensive represented the 
most serious threat to Paris since the initial German attack in the fall of 1914.  Luckily for 
the Allies, stiffening French resistance and the arrival of two American divisions sapped 
the strength from the German juggernaut, and brought the offensive to halt just shy of the 
Marne.  All along the German line, the over-extended 7th German Army began digging in 
to concentrate their lines and give their worn soldiers a chance to rest and recuperate in 
anticipation of renewing the offensive to the west along the Noyon-Montdidier line on 9 
June.1  The brief respite gave General Degoutte, commander of the XXI French Corps 
the opportunity he had long awaited.  After over a week of falling back in front of the 
German advance, Degoutte now had to chance to make a move of his own.  Not content 
to repair his lines, the Frenchman deemed it time to attack. 
 The ensuing Allied counter-attack would involve the entire American 2nd Division 
in the region west of Château-Thierry.  Of the division’s two combat brigades, the 4th 
“Marine” Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General James Harbord, would 
engage in the epic battle for Belleau Wood.  The battle would take part in three phases, as 
the Marines made their initial push to take the wood, which was unsuccessful, were 
temporarily relieved by a unit from the American 3rd Division, and then returned to 
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complete the capture of the wood.  It would be the largest engagement of American 
Marines to date, and offered Harbord an opportunity to employ the “open” warfare tactics 
long trumpeted by Pershing as the solution to the static trenches cutting across France and 
Belgium.  The effort would bring tragedy and glory to the Marines, and some hard 
lessons to their new commander. 
 
 Phase I: 5-8 June 
  
General Degoutte’s attack plan of 5 June called for the 167th French Division, 
bordering the 2nd Division on the left, to attack toward the Clignon River.  Units from the 
2nd Division would advance on the 167th’s right, along the crest of Hill 142.  The order 
continued that, “as soon as possible after the execution of the first operation . . . an 
analogous operation will be executed by the American 2nd Division, for the purpose of 
seizing the Bois de BELLEAU.”2  The first phase of the attack was set for 3:45 a.m. on 6 
June, or roughly twelve hours after the order was issued.3
 Everything being equal, it was a good plan.  If the French could gain the heights 
above the Glignon River, they would be in position to prevent a German surprise attack.  
Likewise, capturing Belleau Wood meant denying the enemy a position of natural 
concealment from which it could mount a strong defensive or launch future attacks.  The 
problem lay in the timing.  Just that day, the 2nd Division, and the 4th Brigade in 
particular, was in the process of reorganizing its lines for a strong defense.  Harbord, who 
had moved his headquarters to La Loge Farm during the day, ordered several of his 
battalions to shift places that night in an effort to relieve tired units and strengthen his 
 
 271
lines.  Not expecting to go on the attack, Harbord had no clear intelligence of the enemy, 
no good maps of the terrain, and spotty communications with his front-line units.  To 
mount an offensive in its present state would be difficult for the 4th Brigade, but that is 
exactly what Degoutte called upon it to do. 
 With the exception of small trench raids and the 1st Division’s actions at 
Cantigny, the 4th Brigade’s assault on 6 June would be the first offensive action by the 
AEF in the war.  The pressure to perform was immense; significantly greater in 
importance than the tactical objective warranted.  Harbord claimed after the war that 
“every man in the Marine Brigade realized that America was on trial as to the courage 
and fighting quality of her sons.”4  One of the German division commanders facing the 
Americans understood the moment as well, stating: “In the fighting that now confronts 
us, we are not concerned with the occupation or non-occupation of this or that 
unimportant wood or village, but with the question as to whether the Anglo-American 
propaganda that the American Army is equal to or even superior to the German, will be 
successful.”5  Even General Ludendorff recognized the significance of the Americans 
arriving on the battlefield.  If the Germans were to be victorious, they needed to maintain 
their momentum and stay on the offensive.  This meant delaying the formation of the 
American Army as long as possible.  Consequently, two days after the attack on Belleau 
Wood began, Ludendorff told his Army Group commanders: “American units appearing 
on the front should be hit particularly hard.”6
 Considering how much was riding on the operations of 6 June, one could 
reasonably expect the general commanding the action to take every care to see that the 
operations were planned, supported, and executed well enough to assure success.  But 
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several factors conspired against Harbord at this crucial moment, including his own 
inexperience.  First and foremost was the acute lack of time provided for preparation.  
Degoutte wanted an attack, and he wanted it on 6 June whether the Americans were ready 
or not.  When the Americans requested more time to prepare Degoutte refused, claiming 
the need to strike before the enemy could reinforce his artillery.  While a reasonable 
concern, Degoutte’s desire to go on the offensive prevented him from objectively 
considering the effect of granting the 2nd Division more time to prepare.  He wanted a 
fight and would not let American inexperience delay his chance.7  Second, the apparent 
scarcity of intelligence concerning the German forces, and a failure to pay attention to 
what was available, led Harbord to severely underestimate the forces opposing him.  He 
relied upon French intelligence that reported Belleau Wood largely unoccupied, “except 
by a very short line across the northeast corner which was entrenched.  Little or no 
reconnaissance or scouting appears to have been done . . . between June 4th and 6th . . . . 
probably due to inexperience.”8  There was intelligence available that suggested the 
wood was more heavily defended, but Harbord failed to seek it out.  He believed success 
all but assured, and proceeded with the information at hand, not bothering to ascertain its 
accuracy. 9
 Finally, Harbord’s understanding of combat tactics gave him a false appreciation 
for the abilities of his Marines to carry the field.  A true believer in Pershing’s advocacy 
of open warfare, Harbord seemed to know, without question, that his men could take their 
objectives regardless of the opposition.  Their defense against the German attacks on 3-4 
June proved the deadly capability of a motivated Marine and his rifle.  While machine-
gun and artillery fire were valuable tools for supporting the infantry, it was the rifle and 
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bayonet that would carried the day, driven forward by the irresistible esprit de corps of 
the Marines.  Consequently, Harbord ordered little artillery fire in support of the attacks 
of 6 June.  Hoping “not to attrack [sic] the attention of the enemy,” only a sparse “raking 
fire” was ordered for the attack on Hill 142 during the night of 5-6 June, with the attacks 
preceded by five minutes of “violent annihilating fire. . . . [shifting] to more distant 
targets the minute the Marines jumped-off.”10  Harbord was putting the outcome of the 
attack in the hands of his Marines and their rifles.  The next day would show that to be a 
mistake. 
 At 3:00 p.m. on 5 June Harbord met with division chief of staff, Preston Brown, 
to discuss the 4th Brigade’s role in the upcoming attack.  Brown talked about using 
infiltration tactics in the attack as opposed to sending the men in waves, as well as the 
importance of coordinating the artillery to support the infantry.  They were good ideas, 
but the 4th Brigade had no training in the style of attack Brown suggested, and liaison in 
the entire 2nd Division was spotty at best.  Even so, Brown and Harbord were confident in 
the men and departed to their respective command centers to prepare for the attack.  
Apparently, they did not feel the need to discuss the second phase of Degoutte’s plan: the 
attack on the Bois de Belleau proper.11
 Harbord issued his Field Order No. 1, covering the first phase of the next day’s 
attack, at 10:25 p.m. on 5 June.  It called for the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (I/5)∗ under 
Major Julius S. Turrill to attack north from Hill 142 toward the Lucy-Torcy road.  
Elements of Major Benjamin Berry’s 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines would support the action 
on the right, in preparation for taking part in the supplemental attack on Belleau Wood.12  
                                                          
∗ Hereafter battalion designations will be abbreviated as such: battalion/regiment (e.g. - I/5 = 1st Battalion, 
5th Marines, or III/7 = 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry) 
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Harbord sent the orders to Colonel Neville, commander of the 5th Marines, who broke it 
down for his battalion commanders, at which time they noticed a glaring oversight.  The 
orders assumed that the I/5 was in place and ready to attack.  This was not the case, 
however, as several companies were delayed in getting into line.  Nor had the battalion 
tied its flanks in with the French on the left or the III/5 on the right.  Still, time would not 
wait, for at the appointed hour the artillery roared to life and the Marines went over the 
top.13
 All things considered, the attack over Hill 142 went well.  After stepping off at 
3:45 a.m., the I/5 reached its objectives by 7:00 a.m.  However, soon after the attack 
commenced, communication within the brigade began to break down.  Telephones went 
down at 5:00 a.m., requiring reliance upon runners and field messages.  This made it 
impossible for Harbord, or his regimental commanders, to attain any real-time 
intelligence about the attack.  It would be a continual problem over the next few hours (in 
fact the next two weeks), as the phone lines worked only intermittently.  Pressing on 
despite the sketchy communications, reports filtered in that both battalions had reached 
their objectives and were consolidating their positions with “a few men killed and a 
number wounded but only lightly.”14  The encouraging message prompted Harbord to 
send a celebratory note to Col. Neville at 9:00 a.m.: “I congratulate you and 1st Bn. and 
the 3rd Bn. on doing so well what we all knew they would.”15
Such reports gave Harbord what one historian called “a dangerously optimistic 
picture” of the battle.16  Turrill’s battalion had indeed reached its objective, but at a heavy 
cost.  One company commander was killed, and the battalion lost numerous officers and 
NCO’s.  The battalion outran the French on their left (not surprising considering the poor 
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liaison at the start of the battle) which required Harbord to authorize sending in a 
company from another battalion.  Likewise, on Turrill’s right the III/5 did not move as 
fast, leaving the entire I/5 exposed to German enfilade fire.  All over the field, the 
Marines were holding on, but only tenuously.  For the rest of the day the Marines and 
Germans battled on Hill 142.  At one point, the Marines almost took Torcy, at another 
they were almost driven off the hill.  The I/5 lost nearly half its numbers as casualties by 
day’s end, forcing Harbord to send in another battalion to hold the position.  Even so, the 
Marines held Hill 142 at the end of 6 June.17
The staunch German defense of Hill 142 notwithstanding, preparations for the 
second phase of the attack began the morning of 6 June.  Strengthened by reports of the 
morning’s actions, Degoutte ordered Bundy to initiate the second phase for that 
afternoon.18  At 2:05 p.m., Harbord issued Field Order No.2, covering the attack on 
Belleau Wood and Bouresches.  It called for Berry’s III/5, already holding the line to the 
right of Turrill’s I/5, to turn and attack Belleau Wood from the west.  At the same time, 
Major Sibley’s 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines would assault the wood from the south with the 
aid of a company from Major Thomas Holcomb’s 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Logan Feland, second in command of the 5th Marines, commanded the attack on 
the left, while Colonel Catlin, the 6th Marines commander, directed the overall operation.  
Once the Marines reached their first objective, Catlin was to shift his assault to the 
northeast and take Bouresches, with Berry’s III/5 pushing through the northern portion of 
the wood to extend the line northwest out of Bouresches.  As with the morning attack, no 
additional artillery was provided for either phase of the afternoon attack, again hoping to 
maintain the element of surprise.19
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It was an ambitious plan.  The entire 4th Brigade, minus one and a half battalions 
held in various reserves, would attack in a sweeping pivot to the northeast, anchored by 
the II/6’s contact with the 3rd Brigade on the far right of the line at Triangle Farm.  Both 
the III/5 and II/6 would advance nearly a mile through Belleau Wood, linking up in the 
middle of the wood, while staying in contact with the assault on Bouresches.  The entire 
attack was precipitated upon Harbord’s belief that the Germans did not hold Belleau 
Wood in strength and could be pushed out with “self-reliant infantry.”20  It was a grave 
mistake.  As he wrote after the war, “The Bois proved to be very fully occupied, with 
many machine-gun nests, in positions well chosen among the giant boulders.”21  But at 
the moment of decision Harbord relied on the intelligence provided him without taking 
the time to gain a better appreciation of what faced the 4th Brigade. What resulted from 
this haste was an unmitigated tragedy for the Marines. 
At 5:00 p.m. on 6 June, the Marines launched their assault on the Bois de Belleau.  
Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly, leading a platoon in the attack, spoke to his men and to 
history, roaring, “Come on you sons of bitches.  Do you want to live forever?”22  Moving 
out “in beautiful line” of deployment, the Marines marched towards the Bois.23  Major 
Berry’s III/5 had to advance nearly a half-mile through a wheat field before reaching the 
edge of the wood.  Halfway across the German machine guns opened up, tearing the 
beautiful lines to shreds, and only a few Marines made it to the wood.  Reports filtered in 
to 4th Brigade HQ that “What is left of battalion [III/5] is in the woods close by.  Do not 
know whether will be able to stand or not.”24  Major Berry was seriously wounded in the 
attack, but pressed on with the fight.  The rest of his Marines did the same, braving the 
deadly fire and capturing a foothold on the wood’s western edge.25
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To the south, Sibley’s battalion had more success reaching the wood.  Watching 
the attack, Colonel Catlin recalled,  “I say they went in as if on parade, and that is 
literally true.  There was no yell and wild rush, but a deliberate forward march, with lines 
at right dress.”26  Having less distance to travel in the open than Berry, Catlin watched 
Sibley’s III/6 close in on the wood’s edge.  Just then a bullet tore into his chest, sending 
him to the ground.  Though not dead, Catlin was critically wounded and was immediately 
evacuated to an aid station.  Upon hearing the news, Harbord ordered Lieutenant Colonel 
Harry Lee to take command of the 6th Marines if Catlin was “too badly wounded to 
continue.”27
As Lee moved to take over the 6th Marines, initial reports began to reach 4th 
Brigade Headquarters.  Though Harbord learned that Berry was badly injured, other 
reports made the attack appear a glowing success.  Reports of Americans “on the road 
from Bouresches to Belleau” and occupying the town of Torcy combined with 
observations of Germans running in retreat to make it seem that the 4th Brigade had 
achieved a great success.  Most of the reports proved erroneous, but clarification would 
take time and Harbord was well satisfied with his Marines at the present.28  His feelings 
towards Lieutenant Colonel Lee were another matter entirely.  After hearing that Lee was 
on the way to take charge of the 6th Marines at 7:34 p.m., Harbord wondered why he was 
receiving reports of units in the woods awaiting further instructions from the battle 
commander.  At 8:55 p.m., he sent a blistering note to Lee explaining his displeasure: 
 
I am not satisfied with the way you have conducted your engagement this 
afternoon.  Your own regimental headquarters and this office have not had 
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a word of report from you as to your orders or your positions.  Major 
Sibley under your command is asking your regimental adjutant for orders.  
Major Berry, over whom you should have asserted your authority, is 
reporting to his own regimental commander.  I want you to take charge 
and to push this attack with vigor.  Carry the attack through the woods 
from Hill 133 [on the northwestern edge of the wood] south along the 
Bouresches-Torcy road and send Sibley to take Bouresches. . . . If as 
reported Sibley had a small nest of machine guns surrounded in the wood, 
leave somebody to contain them, go around it and go on with the attack in 
the second phase.  I want reports from you every fifteen minutes.  Send 
them by runner if necessary.  Major Sibley has had telephone connection 
with your regimental headquarters all afternoon.29
 
It was a revealing note, speaking more to Harbord’s ignorance of the situation 
than any failure on Lee’s part.  At present Lee was in Belleau Wood, trying to ascertain 
exactly what was going on for himself and did not receive Harbord’s message.  If he had, 
he could not report much, as the Marines in the woods were in total confusion.  Contrary 
to reports reaching Harbord, the III/6 was nowhere near the wood’s northern edge, but 
had barely breached the southern portion.  Nor was Berry’s battalion (III/5) anywhere 
near the eastern edge of the wood, as Harbord believed them to be.  As was the case that 
morning, communications in the 4th Brigade had completely broken down under the fog 
of war on the evening of 6 June.30
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The only partially correct piece of intelligence to reach Harbord was a report that 
Marines had entered Bouresches and were holding the village temporarily.  Elements of 
Holcomb’s II/6 had indeed advanced on Bouresches that evening, taking a portion of the 
village by 11:28 p.m.  Although there was some confusion as to exactly who commanded 
the Marines in Bouresches,31 the fact remained that Marines were there, and Harbord 
moved to support them.  He ordered Colonel Lee to have Sibley link up with Berry, and 
then extend his line west to Bouresches.  The order displayed Harbord’s continuing 
misunderstanding of the situation.  It assumed that Berry was in the eastern portion of the 
wood, which was false.  Nor was Sibley’s battalion for that matter.  Compensating for 
these errors, Lee moved a company of engineers to support Sibley and sent another to 
bolster the Marines in Boureshces.32
As night fell, Harbord finally gained some appreciation for the confusion in the 
woods.  He sent his aid, Fielding Robinson, to deliver a message to Sibley and Holcomb 
instructing both men to hold their current positions and consolidate their lines.  However, 
the order still betrayed Harbord’s confusion regarding unit positioning, as it presumed 
Berry’s III/5 to be somewhere near the northern end of the wood, which it was not.33  As 
he ordered his two battalions in the Bois de Belleau to dig in for the night, Harbord 
moved to bring in one of his reserve battalions to reinforce the III/5’s position.  The 2nd 
Battalion, 5th Marines under Major Frederic Wise was waiting in reserve south of Hill 
142.  Harbord ordered it to move up the road towards Torcy and fall in line next to 
Berry’s battalion, supposedly on the northern edge of Belleau Wood.  The II/5 would 
then establish a liaison with Feland who was presumably with Turrill’s I/5 somewhere 
around Torcy.  After the war, Wise recorded his thoughts towards Harbord’s directive: 
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That was the damndest [sic]order I ever got in my life—or anyone else 
ever got.  It went on the calm assumption that all the objectives of the First 
and Third Battalion had been secured. . . . I was between the devil and the 
deep sea.  If I didn’t move, I knew I’d catch hell.  If I did move, I knew I 
was going right down into Germany.  It was dark as pitch.  Finding Feland 
would be a miracle. . . That might have been a fine order to have sent out 
on a maneuver field.  I didn’t see exactly how it was going to work in war.  
But, being disciplined, we started.  I had received no word from Feland.  
Evidently my runners hadn’t been able to find him.34
 
Wise moved his battalion up the Lucy-Torcy road, with Belleau Wood to his right 
and a small wooded area on the slope of Hill 142 on his left.  Just before the road 
bottlenecked between the two woods, the battalion came under heavy rifle and machine 
gun fire from the Germans still occupying the northern portion of Belleau Wood, as well 
as German artillery fire.  Wise at first ordered his men to fall back, but they were 
reluctant to do so (true Marines to the end).  Eventually he had the battalion take up 
position in the woods just west of the road and established a liaison with Berry’s 
battalion.35
With that the attacks on 6 June mercifully came to an end.  In the twelve-hour 
span, the 4th Brigade suffered more casualties (just over one thousand officers and men) 
than the Marine Corps had in its entire history.36  Berry’s battalion was smashed up, and 
the others held on despite significant casualties.  Harbord reported the tactical situation to 
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Bundy early the next morning.  He intended to withdraw the III/5, having Wise’s II/5 
extend it’s line to make up the difference, and planned a general consolidation for the 
time being.  Harbord went on to report, “No numbers as to casualties are available.  
Losses known to be heavy. . . . The Brigade can hold at present position but it is not able 
to advance at present.”37
The next day, 7 June, was equally harrowing for the Marines of the 4th Brigade 
still in the Bois de Belleau.  German sniper and machine-gun fire continually harassed 
their lines, and German artillery rained several barrages down upon them, stretching their 
already tattered nerves.  The dead and the dying laid about the ground, giving the wood 
the noxious odor of decay.  Stretcher-bearers and medical corpsmen were overworked 
trying to retrieve the wounded.  Food and water were scarce as support units drew enemy 
artillery fire whenever they attempted to enter the wood from the south.  Adding to the 
misery, that afternoon the Germans launched a brief counterattack through the woods, 
which the Marines halted with a combination of rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire at 
the cost of even more men.38
Still not entirely convinced that the Germans held the wood in considerable 
strength, Harbord ordered Sibley to push his battalion forward early on 8 June in an effort 
to straighten the line running west from Bouresches to Hill 142.  Thinking there were 
only “18 machine guns and some infantry in the woods,” Harbord again ordered only 
preparatory artillery fire before the attack.39  The Marines charged valiantly forward at 
the appointed hour on the morning of 8 June, and were again stopped by vicious 
machine-gun fire.  By 12:30 p.m., Harbord finally decided to halt his battalions and 
conduct a general appraisal of his entire situation.  He sent word to Sibley, “Get cover for 
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your men in the ravine (gully) at the south edge of the woods.  Let your men rest.  I will 
have artillery play on the wood.”40
With the end to operations on 8 June, the Marines held a line running from 
Bouresches west through the southeastern edge of Belleau Wood, then up the wood’s 
western edge turning west to Hill 142.  The attack that was to carry the entire wood on 6 
June had rapidly turned into a deadly struggle for mere yards of wooded, boulder strewn, 
machine-gun infested terrain.  And unbeknownst to all involved, the fight for Belleau 
Wood was only just beginning. 
 
Phase II: 9-16 June 
 
 Although the attacks by the Marine Brigade on 6-8 June failed to capture the Bois 
de Belleau, they did produce a significant amount of news reports hailing the Marines, 
proclaiming their exploits in newspapers around the globe.  The reports also created 
considerable embitterment on the part of several Regular officers and a small controversy 
over what was actually happening around Château-Thierry.  The grumbling arose due to 
Pershing’s policy towards censoring all news from the front.  Seeking to keep tight 
control over all information regarding his forces, Pershing had established strict 
guidelines regarding coverage of American operations.  Reporters were forbidden to 
mention specific units, nor could they divulge the geographic origins of the troops 
involved.  Such restrictions made for particularly bland copy and frustrated the press 
corps covering the AEF.  But even without these draconian censorship regulations, the 
American experience in the World War up to that point provided only limited instances 
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of real news.  There were only so many times reporters could describe men in training, 
and when the Americans did go into the lines it was in quiet sectors without any real 
opportunity for action.  The attacks on Belleau Wood were the first major news story to 
emerge from the AEF in months, and reporters latched on to it with a frenzy.41
 Contributing to the attention given the attacks on Belleau Wood was a 
modification of the AEF’s censorship regulations.  When the attack was made, reporters 
asked officials at G-2 in Paris whether the same restrictions regarding naming individual 
units applied equally to members of other services: namely the Marines.  Thinking it 
reasonable to specify individual services, the censors allowed reporters to mention the 
Marines by name, so long as they did not provide specifics regarding units.  The fact that 
there was only one brigade of Marines in France apparently escaped their attention, but 
the reporters were not about to point out this bit of information.  With the eased 
restrictions, the entire action around Château-Thierry became a Marine affair.  Headlines 
around the world proclaimed the Marines’ exploits, describing courageous attacks, 
crumbling German resistance, and a general turn in Allied fortunes all along the front.  
As one contemporary in the AEF put it, press reports shouted Marines “until the word 
resounded over the whole earth and made the inhabitants thereof, except a few Americans 
in the army in France, believe that there was nothing in the 2nd Division, and, indeed, 
nothing in front of the Germans, but Marines.”42
 The Marine legend also benefited from the wounding of war correspondent Floyd 
Gibbons.  Following the brigades’ exploits, Gibbons accompanied Berry’s III/6 on its 
disastrous attack through the wheat field on 6 June.  After sending initial sketches of the 
battle to the censors in Paris, with the intention to provide a more detailed account later, 
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Gibbons was critically wounded when a German bullet hit him in the left eye.  In the 
confusion, word quickly circulated that Gibbons was dead, and the initial report became 
his “last story.”  One of the Paris censors, who was a friend of Gibbons, released the 
dispatch without alteration as a tribute to the (erroneously) fallen reporter.43
 The coverage provided the Marines at Belleau Wood ultimately proved a source 
of embarrassment for Harbord.  Though his Marines had shown remarkable courage in 
the attack, Harbord knew that they were not the only Americans fighting in the region 
and did not like the idea of his men receiving credit for the exploits of others.  He wrote 
later, “The wounds inflicted by publicity received by someone else do not rate a wound 
stripe but they are a long time healing.”44  Those wounds apparently cut deeply into 
Major General Robert L. Bullard, the commander of the 1st Division.  At a dinner in Paris 
in the days after the battle, Bullard commented to Pershing, “‘I see that the 2nd Marines’ 
(emphasizing the 2nd as though that division was all Marines) ‘have won the war at 
Belleau Wood.’”  Pershing understood the backhanded remark and indicated that he had 
already put a stop to such reports.45
 Regardless of its accuracy, the news emanating from Belleau Wood provided a 
much-needed boost to Allied morale.  All over France people talked of the glorious 
Marines with an optimism not seen since the beginning of the German offensive two 
months earlier.  Major Paul H. Clark, Chief of the American Military Mission at French 
GHQ, reported to Pershing that the French military commanders were abuzz with talk of 
the Americans near Château-Thierry.  He described how these men, so critical of the AEF 
in the past, now believed that “the beneficial moral [sic] effect produced on the French 
troops at seeing Americans fighting at their side, and fighting with such success and 
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valor, could not be overestimated.”  Likewise, Clark observed that “the presence of so 
many Americans, fighting vigorously, must be a very unwelcome and disheartening 
realization to the Germans.”46
 Ludendorff was not so quick to give credit to the Americans.  He observed that, 
“At Château-Thierry, Americans who had been a long time in France had bravely 
attacked our thinly held fronts, but they were unskillfully led, attacked in dense masses, 
and failed.  Here, too, our men felt themselves superior.  Our tactics had proved sound in 
every way, our losses, compared with those of the enemy . . . had been very slight.”47  
Though technically correct in his tactical assessment, Ludendorff failed to grasp the 
strategic value of the American stand at Château-Thierry.  So long thought to be a paper 
tiger, the weight of American manpower reserves was finally beginning to make an 
impact on the Western Front.  When the French quickly blunted Ludendorff’s fourth 
offensive, launched between Montdidier and Noyon on 9 June, it appeared to all that the 
grand German push against Paris was losing steam.48
 With reports of the Marines’ success echoing along the front, Harbord knew that 
he could not let up the pressure on Belleau Wood.  If nothing else, he had to secure the 
successes already reported.  To do so, Harbord looked to correct some of the mistakes of 
the past.  In a memorandum issued on 8 June, he outlined the problems he wanted 
rectified. 
 
 The following suggestions occur from considerations of the week’s 
fighting and are published for the information and action of company, 
battalion, and regimental commanders: 
 
 286
1. Reports that do not show the time of sending are worthless. 
2. “Losses are heavy” may mean anything.  Percentages or numbers are 
desired. 
3. Figures or conditions that are only estimates should be so stated. 
4. Flanks of positions and any important peculiarities such as re-entrants, 
salients and refusals, should be described by coordinates as far as 
practicable.  Artillery cannot be called for with safety unless position 
of our infantry is accurately known. . . . 
5. The number of Machine Guns and prisoners captured to hour of 
writing reports is information that ought to be included in them. 
6. Dispersion of troops is the fault of beginners as pointed out by all 
military authorities, and has in our Brigade, with the length of our line, 
deprived us of the necessary echelon in depth. 
7. Officers given a task must plan to execute it with forces at their own 
command, and not count on reinforcements which may not be 
available.  Only a grave emergency not apparent when the task is 
begun will justify requests for help.  Supporters have been thrown in 
during this first week at a rate not to be expected hereafter. 
8. The enemy have been told that Americans do not take prisoners, which 
makes their men fight to the death rather than surrender when they 
think they will be given no quarter.  This idea we do not take prisoners 
undoubtedly costs us many lives. 
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9. The heavy losses of officers compared to those among the men are 
most eloquent as to the gallantry of our officers, and correspond nearly 
to the proportions suffered by both the Allies and the enemy in 1914-
15.  Officers of experience are a most valuable asset and must not be 
wasted. 
10. Recommendations for decorations should be made with discretion but 
as promptly as possible.  The “extraordinary heroism” which calls for 
the [Distinguished Service Cross] must be liberally interpreted in case 
of officers and men who have met death or suffered the loss of a leg, 
an arm, or an eye in action. 
11. The French Corps Commander has asked for recommendations for 
awards of the Croix de Guerre.  This should be submitted promptly 
and in good faith.49 
 
Harbord’s memorandum was a remarkable document given his own limited 
understanding of the events going on in the Bois de Belleau.  It probably elicited choice 
words in response from unit commanders holding thin lines against brutal enemy fire, but 
such is war.  At the very least, it shows Harbord trying to achieve better control of events.  
More appreciated by the men, however, was his decision to finally direct significant 
artillery fire on the wood. 
Before the artillery barrage scheduled for 9 June, Harbord worked to reorganize 
his brigade.  He shifted Major Maurice Shearer from command of the 1st Battalion, 6th 
Marines to the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, relieving the wounded Berry.  He also ordered 
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Major Wise to withdraw the remnants of the II/5 to the west of the Lucy-Torcy road in 
anticipation of the artillery barrage.  As for the men holding the line in the southern 
portion of the wood, Harbord initially called for Major John Hughes, now in command of 
the I/6, to move up to relieve Sibley’s battered battalion.  He later reversed the order and 
instructed Sibley to withdraw his battalion from the wood before the coming barrage.  
Elements of the I/6 would then move into position for an attack after the barrage’s 
conclusion.  At the moment, Harbord was unable to relieve Major Holcomb’s II/6, 
desperately holding on to Bouresches, but informed the battalion commander that relief 
would come from Shearer’s III/6 the following night.50
At dawn on 9 June, Chamberlaine’s guns opened fire on Belleau Wood.  All 160 
guns concentrated their fire on the southern portion of the wood, ostensibly clearing it of 
German resistance.  An hour before the attack, the artillery would shift to target suspected 
machine-gun positions within the wood.51  While the artillery pounded away, the Marines 
prepared for the coming assault.  At 6:30 p.m., Harbord issued Field Order No. 3, 
outlining the attack planned for 10 June.  After a violent artillery barrage, Major 
Hughes’s I/6 was to retake Sibley’s line in the southern portion of Belleau Wood and 
then push north through the wood’s narrow center where it would establish a new 
position just shy of the wood’s northern section.  Machine-gun fire from Bouresches 
would cover the eastern edge of the wood, protecting Hughes’s flank52
At 4:15 a.m., the brigade’s artillery began to roll forward slowly, making way for 
the I/6’s attack.  After the battalion stepped off at 4:30 a.m., Hughes reported in: 
“Artillery barrage working beautifully.”  By 5:20 a.m., Colonel Lee sent word that “All 
quiet in Bois de Belleau.”  Twenty five minutes later he relayed word that a captain in the 
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advancing battalion thought the wood cleared of machine-guns.  This was soon countered 
with reports of machine-gun fire from the center of the wood, but still things appeared to 
be going smoothly.  At 6:20 a.m., Hughes’s reported that his battalion had reached its 
objective and was consolidating.53
Emboldened by the news coming in to his headquarters, Harbord ordered 
Hughes’s to conduct a reconnaissance of the wood’s northern section in anticipation of a 
renewed attack.  Unknown to Harbord, however, Hughes’s attack had not gone as well as 
reported.  Hughes’s unfamiliarity with the wood, combined with poor maps and the 
dense, rocky terrain contributed to the battalion commander mistaking his actual position.  
Instead of reaching his objective, Hughes had stopped his battalion at Sibley’s former 
line, some 800 yards to the rear of the I/6’s objective.  Though some members of the 
brigade’s intelligence service gained some inkling of this after conducting personal 
reconnaissance, their reports did not reach Harbord, and the general continued to press 
the attack.54
In addition to the positive reports coming in regarding the attack, Harbord found 
another reason to press his advantage.  In response to the German attack between 
Montidier and Noyon the previous day, the French requested the removal of a regiment 
of field artillery from the Belleau Wood sector.  Harbord wired Division Headquarters 
that with the progress of the current operation, he planned to conduct another attack 
either that evening or the next morning and requested that the French artillery not be 
withdrawn for another 24 hours.55
With time of the essence, Harbord set to work drafting orders for his next assault.  
Issued that evening as Field Order No. 4, the plan called for Wise’s II/5 to again attack 
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the wood from the west, through the murderous wheat field.  Thinking the I/6 positioned 
somewhere in the wood’s center, Harbord’s plan instructed Wise to establish a liaison 
with Hughes, and then to pivot his battalion left to make a drive north, where it would 
finally emerge on the wood’s northern edge.  It was a complex plan, relying on 
incomplete information and put together with a sense of urgency that prevented adequate 
intelligence.  Harbord again called for an artillery barrage like the one preceding 
Hughes’s attack that morning, but this time there would not be a full day of destructive 
fire laid down due to the French threat of withdrawing their artillery.  The artillery units 
were further limited by having to adjust their fire so as not to hit the Marines already in 
the wood.  These factors combined to make the barrage significantly less effective than 
the previous day’s, reducing the likelihood of success for the attack.56
On the morning of 11 June, Wise’s 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines stepped off, 
attacking the Bois de Belleau from the west.  Covered by a hovering mist, the battalion 
made it across the Lucy-Torcy road and halfway through the wheat field before the 
Germans opened fire.  Unfortunately, the battalion commander did not realize that his 
men were headed straight into the German lines.  He incorrectly believed that Hughes 
had cleared the area the day before.  A sergeant sent by Hughes to find Wise described 
what he saw: “About half-way from our line in the southern part of the wood to where 
Wise was supposed to be, I heard a hell of a lot of firing.  I climbed a slope, saw Wise 
and his command group in a wheatfield ahead.  On his left and slightly forward the 
attacking waves were moving through the field, the men falling left and right.”57  The 
Marines valiantly pushed on through the deadly machine-gun fire and finally entered the 
wood. 
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What followed was the most controversial moment of the battle for Belleau 
Wood.  Soon after entering the wood, Wise’s command lost cohesion under withering 
German fire.  The Marines pressed on, but failed to make the designated turn to the left, 
and instead drove straight through the wood’s center.  A little after 6:00 a.m., Wise 
emerged on the eastern edge of the Bois.  Thinking it the northern rim, he sent word back 
to Brigade Headquarters, “All objectives reached and am mopping up with machine 
guns.”58  Not knowing the truth, Harbord reported to Bundy that “the northern half of the 
BOIS DE BELLEAU belongs to 5th Marines.”59
For the rest of the morning, reports filtered in describing a smashing, but 
erroneous success.  Harbord was briefly concerned over unconfirmed reports that 
Bouresches had fallen to a German counter attack, but surer intelligence soon dispelled 
the myth.  By mid-day, Harbord was convinced they had at last taken the wood.  He sent 
a congratulatory message to Wise, saying: 
 
The Division Commander is at Brigade Headquarters and sends his hearty 
congratulations to you and your gallant men.  He says the task could not 
have been performed any better.  The objectives of the Brigade have been 
attained everywhere after days of fighting which the Division Commander 
has never known to be excelled.  To this I add my warm personal 
greetings and congratulations.60
 
With all the congratulations and handshakes going around, however, no one 
seemed to wonder why the II/5 continued to face significant opposition, not even 
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Lieutenant Colonel Wise.  For the rest of 11 June, Wise’s battalion held a thin line across 
the center of Belleau Wood, and withered brutal artillery and machine-gun fire from the 
still potent German positions in the as yet unoccupied northern section.  Wise 
increasingly sent word of growing casualties and the need for artillery support, which 
Harbord provided.  But the brigade commander thought Wise to be nearly 1000 yards 
further north than he actually was, and the artillery fell well behind the German line.  
Still, Wise maintained that he had reached his objective and kept reporting that he was 
consolidating his position.61
For the next two days, the Marines in Belleau Wood fought on in what was 
thought to be mopping up actions.  So sure were Harbord and Bundy of their success that 
they sent word to Pershing indicating that the Marines had reached the wood’s northern 
and eastern edge.  Pershing’s headquarters wasted little time relaying the massage to the 
waiting public, and the New York Times headline on 12 June reported, “OUR MEN 
TAKE BELLEAU WOOD, 300 CAPTIVES.”62
That same day, Harbord moved to finish off what he supposed was an already 
decided battle.  His men were wearing out, and needed a break desperately, but Harbord 
understood that there was work remaining to be done (though he did not realize how 
much that truly was).  He ordered Wise and Hughes to link up and push north in an effort 
to clear out the remaining Germans.  Still, neither Harbord, Colonel Neville, commander 
of the 5th Marines, nor Wise understood how far south the II/5 actually was.  In the 
ensuing drive, Wise soon learned how staunch the remaining German positions were.  In 
vicious, hand-to-hand fighting, the II/6 pushed north until fatigue and casualties forced 
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them to stop.  The battalion now held a line along the southern edge of the wood’s 
northern third.  In the process, Wise lost over sixty percent of his battalion’s strength.63
Though a bit of an exaggeration, it may as well have been true.  Increasing 
casualties, fatigue, and a German gas attack on 14 June were wearing down the proud 
unit.  Even Harbord’s enthusiasm was beginning to waver.  As though sensing this, 
Colonel Neville made an effort to brighten the brigade commander’s spirits on one of his 
morning visits.  Neville unceremoniously handed Harbord a pair of Marine Corps collar 
devices, saying, “Here, we think it is about time you put these one.”64  The gesture 
touched Harbord greatly, and after the war he recalled, 
 
. . . I was as much thrilled by his brusque remark and his subsequent 
pinning them on my collar the next few minutes as I have ever been by 
any decoration of the several that have come to me.  I wore those Marine 
Corps devices until after I became a Major General, and I still cherish 
them as among my most valued possessions.  I think no officer can fail to 
understand what that little recognition meant to me, an Army officer 
commanding troops of a sister service in battle.  It seemed to me to set the 
seal of approval by my comrades of the Marine Corps, and knowing the 
circumstances, it meant everything to me.65
 
After the brief interlude, Harbord returned to the battle, but events were quickly 
showing that his men were reaching the end of their abilities.  Mounting casualties and a 
general loss of momentum finally convinced Harbord and Bundy that the 4th Brigade 
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needed a rest.  Though still proclaiming the spirit of his men to be high, Harbord accepted 
relief on his left by the 167th French Division.  On 15 June, General Naulin, the new 
commander of the French XXI Army Corps after General Degoutte moved up to 
command the French Sixth Army the day before, agreed to transfer the 7th Infantry from 
the 3rd Division to the 2nd to provide relief for the 4th Brigade.66
Harbord then prepared to withdraw his men.  The decision to pull the Marines off 
the line was bittersweet for Harbord.  He knew that there was still work to do in Belleau 
Wood, but he could not deny that the Marines had given their all and needed time to 
recover before retaking the field.  Over two weeks of fighting, four of his battalions lost 
at least forty percent of their strength.67  In writing to Bundy just before his brigade’s 
relief, Harbord summarized his command’s status, stating: “I am very glad to report that 
notwithstanding their physical exhaustion, which is almost total, and the adverse 
circumstance of gas, the spirit of the Brigade remains unshaken.”68  Whether writing for 
Bundy or himself the message was clear, the 4th Brigade could do no more.  Though they 
were not finished with the Bois de Belleau, the Marines were moving to the rear for the 
time being for a period of rest and reorganization.  The men received hot food, warm 
bathes, new clothes, and replacements to swell their withered ranks.  In the meantime, the 
7th Infantry took over the heavy lifting in Belleau Wood.69
 
Phase III: 17-25 June 
  
 Between 15-17 June, the 7th Infantry under Colonel Thomas Anderson relieved 
the 4th Brigade from its lines in the Bois de Belleau.  As 3rd Division commander Major 
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General Joseph Dickman observed, “All three battalions of the regiment were in front 
line [sic], from Bouresches to Torcy, and under the command of a colonel of marines 
[sic].”70  Much to Dickman’s and Anderson’s dismay, the 7th Infantry would not be 
directed by its own officers while in Belleau Wood.  Instead, Colonel Neville took 
control of its dispensation, and Colonel Feland retained tactical command of operations 
in Belleau Wood.  Dickman considered the breaking up of one of his brigades a poor 
strategy by the French.  “It was bad military ethics and was bound to leave sore spots,” he 
wrote later.  “But, the controversy was very great, and nothing could be gained by protest 
or controversy.  We could only bide our time.”71
 While the Americans exchanged Marines for soldiers, the Germans strengthened 
their positions in the wood’s northwest corner.  By the time the 7th Infantry was in line, 
the Germans had created a massive machine-gun nest, with a full battalion occupying 
Belleau Wood, another in close support, and a third in reserve.72  Meanwhile, the 1st 
Battalion, 7th Infantry took up position in Wise’s old lines.  Uncertain of the ground, and 
of their intended activities, the soldiers began rebuilding their trenches and laying wire.  
Upon hearing of their actions, Harbord sent a quick message to the commander of the I/7, 
Lieutenant Colonel Adams: 
  
It is understood that you are wiring an east and west line through 
the woods between you and the party of Germans on whom you are 
supposed to exert pressure.  It is not believed that you have anything to 
fear from any aggression on the part of these people and it is not desired 
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that you wire yourself in to prevent the pressure which it is desired you 
exert steadily until those people are killed or driven out. 
 There has been nothing heard from you in the way of reports since 
early morning.  You are supposed to report at least once each day whether 
anything is happening or not to keep your C.O. informed of exactly what 
is going on.73
 
Harbord was getting increasingly irritated.  He wanted Belleau Wood very badly 
and began pressing those below him to secure the victory that had been reported just days 
before.  He pushed for a new attack on what he still believed to be a relatively weak 
position in the wood’s northwest corner, but as though falling into old habits, again failed 
to provide much artillery support.  On 20 June, the soldiers made their first serious 
advance on the Germans.  Like those of the Marines before them, the attack proved futile.  
Without artillery support the soldiers could not breach the German position, with its 
numerous machine-guns arranged in depth.  Harbord was still not convinced of the 
German strength, and wired Bundy claiming the attack failed “because companies of the 
7th Infantry fell back when a few casualties occurred.”74
Sensing the 7th Infantry was not up to the task, Harbord tried an appeal to honor as 
a motivational tool.  He wired Lieutenant Colonel Adams the morning of 21 June, saying: 
“Your battalion will be relieved tomorrow night.  Tomorrow morning is its only chance 
to redeem the failure made this morning.  If you clear the northern half of the Bois de 
Belleau the credit will belong to the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, and will be freely given.  
The battalion cannot afford to fail again.”75  A bit resentfully, Adams prepared to attack, 
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but he made sure to express his concerns to Harbord beforehand.  The battalion 
commander sent a confidential message outlining the German position, concluding: 
  
Under the conditions noted I do not believe any attack without a heavy 
artillery fire preceding can move the guns from the woods. . . . The wood 
is almost a thicket and the throwing of troops into the woods is filtering 
away men with nothing gained. . . . I can assure you that the orders to 
attack will stand as given, but it can not succeed.  This is only my 
individual expression and has not reached the ears of any one else.76
 
In response to Adams’s statement, Harbord ordered an artillery barrage of the 
northern wood from 2:00 a.m. to 3:15 a.m.  He informed Adams that, “There will be 
irregular artillery fire around the northwestern, northern and northeastern edge of the 
Bois after midnight to prevent entrance from outside to lines vacated by you.  Your 
troops will attack at 3:15 and capture or destroy the enemy.”77  At the designated hour, 
the soldiers of the 7th Infantry launched their attack.  From the very beginning the 
operation ran into problems.  Adams and the other battalion commanders deemed the 
artillery preparation “light in volume and ineffective,” but charged ahead anyway.  
Confusion soon ensued as German artillery and machine-gun fire scattered the attackers.  
One company became so disoriented that it established a position outside of the wood’s 
western edge.  Harbord received the first news of the attack at 7:00 a.m. when Adams 
reported “everything is not going well.”  Major Jesse Gaston, commanding the 3rd 
Battalion, 7th Infantry, added that one of his companies was “all shot up to pieces.”78
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Wanting to get a clearer understanding of what was fast becoming a disaster, 
Harbord moved up to the 5th Marines command position.  While there he listened to the 
report of Lieutenant Helms, commanding Company A, III/7, who described the confusion 
in the woods.  Harbord looked upon the man with suspicion, noting that, “This officer has 
no marks of any kind on himself or his clothing.”  Finally, word came at 11:25 a.m. that 
the attack had failed with losses totaling 170 men.79  Harbord had had enough.  He 
ordered Major Shearer to reconnoiter the lines in anticipation of sending the III/5 back 
into the woods that night.  He then sat down to write his report to Bundy.  In it he 
described the day’s action and gave his general impressions of the 7th Infantry. 
 
This whole situation arises in my opinion from the inefficiency of the 
officers of the 7th Inf. and the lack of instruction of the men.  The 1st Bn. is 
untrustworthy for front line work at this time.  The 2nd Bn. has given 
satisfaction in the south end of the Bois de Belleau where there has been 
nothing but watching required of it, suffering some casualties from shell 
fire. 
The 3rd Bn. (Major Jesse Gaston) has accomplished what was 
required of it, except that it has shown no enterprise in carrying out orders 
for outpost patrols in the region between the LUCY-TORCY Road and the 
BOIS de BELLEAU. . . .The 7th Infantry needs a period of instruction 
under a strong commanding officer, with disciplinary drills and the 
weeding out of inefficient officers.  It is unreliable at present.80
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It was an unfair assessment.  Though the 7th Infantry was an untested unit, several 
factors combined to produce their failures in Belleau Wood.  As General Dickman later 
argued in defense of his men, the 7th Infantry had not completed its training, for which it 
could hardly be blamed.  Much like the Marines on 6 June, the operations of 20-21 June 
were the first time the unit was in action.  They were not given adequate time to 
familiarize themselves with the terrain, which contributed to difficulties in orientation 
and coordination.  And finally, the regiment received “inadequate artillery preparation, 
far below what was promised and expected.”81  Given these factors, one can hardly lay 
the full blame on the 7th Infantry for their performance.  They fought hard, suffering 350 
casualties in their two days of difficult combat, but could not overcome their own 
inexperience or the lack of support given them. 
Harbord’s continuing uncertainty regarding the actual strength of the German 
position in the northwest corner of the wood should have caused greater concern to 
Bundy than the failure of the 7th Infantry to clear the woods.  But the division commander 
had no better sense of the situation in the Bois de Belleau than his brigade commander, 
and he thus supported Harbord’s assessments.  Content to blame the 7th Infantry for the 
failure of the 20-21 June attacks, Harbord sent Shearer’s battalion (II/5) back into the 
wood on 21 June.  Estimates from Lieutenant Colonel Adams stated that the Germans 
had between 150 and 200 men in the wood, over ground that was “exceedingly rough, 
ravined [sic], covered with dense underbrush and all trails and paths in the direction of 
this stronghold seem to be covered by machine gun fire and in one or two cases by 37 
MM [cannon].”82  Unfazed, Harbord advised Shearer that “by the judicious use of 
sharpshooting snipers you can reduce the German positions without much expenditure of 
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men.”  The men were to go out in pairs, carrying water and rations, and “crawl out 
toward the German position exerting every effort, exercising the patience of Indians and 
waiting for shots without exposing themselves."83
Amazingly, Harbord believed that sharpshooters, without any support or artillery 
preparation, could overcome what by that time was a massive machine-gun nest covering 
every point of advance.  As if to add insult to injury, Harbord told Shearer that, “It is not 
practicable to withdraw again and give further artillery preparation.  With the sniping 
which should worry the enemy you should be endeavoring to get the machine gun nests 
surrounded so you can rush them when ready and put an end to them.”84  This was 
“open” warfare at its finest, as Harbord understood it.  A spirited infantryman with his 
rifle and bayonet could overpower a machine-gun through sniping and infiltration. 
As Shearer prepared his men for another suicide assault, reports trickled in to 
Brigade Headquarters of the true German strength.  Taking the initiative, Lieutenant 
Colonel Feland conducted a personal reconnaissance of the northern wood on 22 June 
and reported that the Germans actually held the entire northwestern portion.  As though 
in disbelief, Harbord requested that Shearer send out a patrol to ascertain the actual 
situation.  He instructed the battalion commander to “select men who will do what they 
are told and whose reports can be relied upon, and if possible get some positive 
identifications, dead or alive.”85  When their reports matched Feland’s, Harbord almost 
exploded.  In a remarkable example of passing-the-buck, he wrote to Bundy that he had 
“been misled as to affairs in [the northwest corner] of the woods, either consciously or 
unconsciously, ever since its first occupation by the battalion under command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Wise and later by the battalion of the 7th Infantry.”86
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Harbord was being more than a little disingenuous.  While reports from the front 
were confused and often more optimistic than the situation warranted, the brigade 
commander relied too heavily upon those reports, even though they were from men under 
constant fire, operating in terrain that made accurate assessments almost impossible.  
Harbord had his own intelligence officers, but he failed to use them.  Despite continually 
conflicting reports during the attacks, he did not take the time to gain a clear 
understanding of what was actually going on in the Bois de Belleau.  He relied instead on 
the spirit and courage of his Marines to accomplish any task, no matter how difficult. 
Holding true to form, Harbord pushed forward with his plans for an attack on 23 
June.  Still convinced that Shearer’s men could dislodge the enemy with envelopment 
tactics, Harbord provided no significant artillery support to the operation.  It was a 
lamentable error in judgment.  The III/5 moved out and ran into the same machine-gun 
fire that blunted the 7th Infantry’s attacks just days before.  Shearer reported slow 
progress through the wood before being stopped by enemy fire.  By 1:00 a.m. (24 June), 
Colonel Neville reported that things were “rather bad,” with almost an entire company 
wiped out before Shearer eventually pulled his men back and dug in for the night.  He 
wired headquarters the next morning, saying, as though in response to Harbord’s orders, 
“The enemy seems to have unlimited alternate gun positions and many guns.  Each gun 
position covered by others.  I know of no other way of attacking these positions with 
chance of success than one attempted and am of opinion that infantry alone cannot 
dislodge enemy guns [emphasis added].87
At last Harbord realized the impossibility of his orders.  He called together his 
regimental and battalion commanders and the group devised a new plan.  Shearer would 
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withdraw his men to a line further south in the wood, and then Chamberlaine’s guns, 
supplemented by the French, would rain a destructive fire upon the northern wood from 
3:00 a.m. to 5 p.m.  Upon completion of the barrage, the III/5 would advance north 
slowly, clearing out any German positions not destroyed by the artillery.  At the same 
time, Major Ralph Keyser, now in command of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, would 
move up between the III/5 and the French occupying Hill 142.88
Just before dawn the next morning, the American guns finally brought their full 
fury to bear upon Belleau Wood.  For thirteen hours, the guns pummeled the woods, 
making any German movement impossible.  In the last hour, Chamberlaine’s guns fired 
for maximum effect, obliterating the area so long fought over.  At 5:00 p.m., the guns 
began a rolling barrage as Shearer’s battalion moved slowly forward.  They met pockets 
of German resistance, especially on the right, and took numerous prisoners dazed by the 
artillery barrage.  Interrogations provided proof that the Germans had held the wood with 
three companies, and Harbord ordered Neville to send two platoons, or possibly a full 
company, from Sibley’s battalion to strengthen Shearer’s advance.  Meanwhile Shearer 
continued to press forward, taking as many as 150 prisoners and losing a number of men 
in the exchange before the German batteries began firing on the wood, causing significant 
casualties in the American lines.  Shearer wired Neville at 9:30 p.m. that three of his 
companies were either at their objectives or approaching them.  He also reported: “Our 
casualties so heavy can’t spare men to patrol to rear. Any counter attack by enemy would 
be fatal to us in our present condition. . . We have taken practically all of woods but do 
need help to clean it up and hold it.  Do we get it?”89
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They would get it.  As Keyser’s battalion moved up from the west, Harbord 
ordered Neville to send a platoon to aid Shearer.  It was a sound measure given Shearer’s 
growing anxiety, but now it was a battalion commander’s turn to overestimate the danger 
in front of him.  While his men were still struggling with sporadic German resistance, 
Shearer did not realize that, for all intents and purposes, he had cleared the woods.  
Though his anxiety would last the remainder of the night, by the next morning Shearer 
finally sent the message so long anticipated at Brigade Headquarters: “Woods now U.S. 
Marine Corps entirely.”90
 
Mopping Up 
 
The Marines of the 4th Brigade spent the next several days consolidating their 
long sought gains in the Bois de Belleau.  Harbord’s headquarters was inundated with 
visitors wishing to register their congratulations to the victorious brigadier general and 
his fine men.  Notes arrived from General Pershing, Marshal Foch, and numerous others 
seeking to join in the celebration.  Harbord, Neville and Lieutenant Colonel Lee each 
received the Croix de Guerre with Palm.  On 30 June, the French Army Corps paid the 
Marines a lasting tribute, officially changing the name of the Bois de Belleau to the “Bois 
de la Brigade de Marine.”91
The tributes were well intentioned, and received with due thanks, but the Marines 
of the 4th Brigade would gladly have exchanged all the bright ribbon and kind regards in 
France for a speedy exit from those death-strewn woods.  It was not to be, however, as 
the 2nd Division was not yet through in the Château-Thierry sector.  Not wanting to be 
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left out of the action, the 3rd Brigade launched an attack on the city of Vaux to the east of 
Belleau Wood on 1 July.  Unlike the brutal and disjointed fighting that defined the 
Marine operations, the attack on Vaux went off like a training maneuver.  The artillery 
was provided ample time to scout their targets, and the division’s intelligence service 
created detailed maps of the city.  When everything was in place, the 3rd Brigade’s 
artillery and infantry took the city in a single day.92
Harbord listened to his Marines grumble as they sat in their trenches while the 3rd 
Brigade prepared.  Most of the men did not know why they were still in line, but they 
could guess.  He noted that, “You could not possibly convince a member of the Marine 
Brigade that” they were not relieved earlier “because [General Bundy] had made up his 
mind to stay until the 3rd Brigade also had a chance to ‘pull off a stunt.’”93  Though an 
understatement of the Vaux operation, the frustrations are understandable.  For close to a 
month his Marines had done the heavy lifting for the 2nd Division and they desperately 
needed relief.  While they received the lion’s share of the glory, it came at a price.  In 
their month of fighting in the Meaux sector, the 4th Brigade lost 126 officers and 5,057 
men (3,400 of those coming in Belleau Wood).  The 3rd Brigade lost just over 3,000 men 
over the same period, bringing the casualties for the 2nd Division to just over 9,500 men.  
After enduring such losses, it is little wonder that both the soldiers and Marines of the 2nd 
Division desperately wanted to leave the region surrounding Belleau Wood, but they 
would stay in their trenches for another week, nursing their wounds and contemplating 
the events of the past month.94
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The action in Belleau Wood touched Harbord deeply.  He looked upon the 
Marines of his command with a sense of respect and affection that would remain 
throughout his life.  Without a sense of hyperbole, he believed that 
 
The Marine Brigade had added another name to Tripoli, Mexico and 
China, and a score of others that are written on the tablets of Marine 
history and immortalized in the traditions of the Corps. . . . 
More than the Bois de Belleau was at stake in those June days.  
More indeed than standing between the invader and fair Paris.  It was a 
struggle for psychological mastery.  The man from overseas was untried in 
the eyes of his Allies world; the man from over the Rhine had the prestige 
of victory on a hundred fields.  Who now would prove the master in 
stubborn, hand-to-hand struggle?  Who would first recoil when next they 
met?  It was a small stage, perhaps, but the audience was the world of 
1918.  The odds in experience, in terrain and in prestige were with the 
Germans; the honors at the end lay with the American.95
 
As to his own part in the battle, Harbord wrote years later: 
 
The recollections of a Brigade Commander are only valuable as the 
testimony of an official reporter of the Homeric deeds of other men.  The 
world is little concerned with the feelings of such a witness, and his 
impressions at the time.  Yet it is true that the responsibility for orders that 
 
 306
send men into battle, when it may mean death to men that you know 
personally, when it may maim and destroy men with whom you have 
spoken within the hour, is not lightly borne by any man.  It leaves invisible 
scars, and the very recollection of it brings a spiritual humility of soul that 
during a varied life has come to me in no other circumstance.96
 
Harbord’s sincere feelings for the Marines that were wounded or killed under his 
command are commendable, but such sympathies cannot erase the fact that much of the 
suffering in the Bois de Belleau came not only from staunch German opposition, but poor 
American tactics.  Harbord’s commitment to “open” warfare meant thousands of Marines 
charged directly into the face of German machine-guns with little or no artillery support, 
and were mowed down accordingly.  Though his men lacked neither discipline, nor 
courage, they did lack the training necessary to carry out the type of engagement Harbord 
sought.  Additionally, with its dense foliage, rocky terrain, and natural points of 
concealment, Belleau Wood was not suited to the tactics of movement and envelopment 
that Harbord called for.  The fact that the Marines still tried is a mark not against them, 
but against their commander.  However, while some in the AEF lamented the manner in 
which the 4th Brigade fought at Belleau Wood, to the victor go the accolades, and 
Harbord received nothing but praise from his compatriots and superiors.97
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CHAPTER X 
THE TIDE TURNS: SOISSONS (JULY 1918) 
 
 With the successful stoppage of the German advance towards the Marne in June 
1918, momentum on the Western Front shifted to the Allies.  Allied Commander-in-Chief 
Ferdinand Foch deemed it time to take the initiative and reverse the German gains of the 
previous spring.  Along these lines, Foch began planning his own offensive against the 
German position that most threatened Paris: the Marne Salient.  The arrival of the 
Americans on the field at Château-Thierry provided Foch with a new weapon in his 
arsenal, and he looked to utilize the long awaited American divisions in the upcoming 
assault.  Included amongst these would be the 2nd Division, the toast of France after its 
valiant performance in Belleau Wood. 
 But for all its recent fame, the 2nd Division was hardly ready for another major 
operation in July 1918.  Its month of fighting in June had left the division battered and 
broken, with each of its combat brigades losing over forty percent of their strength.  What 
the men of the 2nd Division needed most was time for rest, replenishment, and training.  
But events conspired against them, and the division would be called upon to play a 
significant part in what many historians argue to be the turning of the tide in the World 
War: the battle of Soissons. 
 For Brigadier General James G. Harbord, July 1918 proved to be the most 
glorious and heartbreaking of his career.  Fresh off the successes as commander of the 
Marine Brigade in the Bois de Belleau, Harbord found himself promoted to major 
general, assigned command of the entire 2nd Division, and engaged in the type of “open” 
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warfare campaign long sought by General John J. Pershing.  With the 2nd Division 
performing admirably in its short time in the lines at Soissons, Harbord began to think of 
future glories as a corps commander, and perhaps one day as commander of an army.  
But such dreams were not to be, as soon after the battle Harbord was pulled off the line to 
command the logistical services of the American Expeditionary Forces.  So for Harbord, 
his two weeks commanding the 2nd Division were the culmination of his military career 
as a combat commander.  Thankfully for him, they proved a remarkable two weeks. 
 
Planning a Counterattack 
 
 For Ferdinand Foch, July opened with a sense of opportunity.  The Germans had 
cut a massive salient in the French line from a point just west of the town of Soissons to 
Reims on the Paris-Metz Highway.  But after a month of fighting their momentum was 
failing.  Just days after the German advance across the Chemin-des-Dames, Foch and 
Pershing discussed the possibility of a counter offensive against the shoulders of the 
salient.  The logical place for such an attack was the salient’s western shoulder, south of 
Soissons.  A successful thrust there would threaten the Soissons – Château-Thierry 
highway, which operated as the main artery supplying the German forces in the salient.  
If that artery could be cut, the entire salient would collapse.  By mid-July, Foch moved to 
do just that.1
 What became known as the Aisne Offensive began with a letter from Foch to 
General Henri P. Pétain, commander of the French forces, on 14 June.  In it Foch called 
attention to the critical highway and railhead juncture of Soissons and expressed a desire 
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to bring it under bombardment from the air and long-range artillery.  Should 
circumstances permit, Foch suggested a counter-offensive targeted to cut the supply for 
the German forces operating around Château-Thierry.  As if anticipating a change in 
fortune, Foch called for plans to be “prepared immediately, its execution being deferred 
until the time when the necessary forces may be assembled.”2  Over the next month, the 
French High Command worked diligently to formulate a plan for Foch’s offensive 
operation against Soissons.  Included in the process were French General Marie Emile 
Fayolle, commander of the French Group of Armies of the Reserve (GAR), and Major 
General Charles M.E. Mangin, commander of the French Tenth Army.  What emerged 
was a grand operation involving four French armies (Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth) 
attacking across the entire salient.   The main drive would come from the Tenth Army 
southwest of Soissons, while the other three would make assaults along the southern end 
of the bulge.3
 Meanwhile, Pershing continued to pester Foch for the establishment of an 
independent American Army, or at the very least the organization of an American sector.  
At a meeting on 10 July, Pershing pushed his plan, to which Foch responded that he 
intended to bring together thirteen American divisions at the end of July.  The news 
certainly sounded good to Pershing, “but as to the details of carrying out this idea [Foch] 
was very vague.  He said he did not see how we could proceed till we see what the 
Germans are going to do.”4  Pershing could only shrug and wonder how long the Allies 
would continue to cede the initiative to the Germans.  As it turned out, it would not be 
much longer. 
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 One thing Pershing definitely wanted was increased experience for his division 
and corps commanders, and this Foch would gladly supply.  Hoping to utilize the most 
seasoned American troops in the coming attack, the French ordered the 1st Division 
moved from Beauvais north of Paris to Nanteuil, southwest of Château-Thierry as part of 
the American I Corps.5  Several days later, the 1st and 2nd Divisions were added to 
Mangin’s Tenth French Army.  The two divisions would be under the aegis of the 
American III Corps, commanded by Major General Robert L. Bullard who moved up 
from command of the 1st Division.  The motivation behind the move was General 
Mangin’s desire to utilize the massive American divisions, combined with a French 
Colonial division, as shock troops in his coming assault.  Time was of the essence, and 
the American units immediately began moving to their new sectors.6  However, when 
Bullard took over his new command, he found III Corps little more than an 
organizational shell.  It was seriously understaffed, functioning more as a paper 
organization than a combat command.  Although he worked diligently to get his 
headquarters ready for the approaching operation, there was simply too much to do and 
not enough time.  With the attack looming, Bullard decided to leave control of the 1st and 
2nd Divisions in the hands of the Tenth Army.7
 A potential obstacle to Foch’s attack came when the Germans launched their fifth 
offensive in the Champagne-Marne region on 15 July.  Timed to catch the French in the 
holiday lull after Bastille Day (14 July), the Germans sent three armies under the 
command of the German Crown Prince against the eastern edge of the Marne Salient 
from Château-Thierry to Rheims and along the line south of Mont Blanc running east of 
Rheims.  Luckily for the Allies, intelligence gained from prisoners revealed the location 
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and hour of attack, allowing the French to instill a defense in depth, with the front lines 
held only lightly and the main strength located in the intermediate trenches to the rear.  
Consequently, the German artillery barrage on the night of 14 July fell on the sparse 
French front lines, and the German infantry rant into the ready the French defenders.  
After three hard days of fighting, the attack eventually collapsed.8
 Though it did not last long, the German offensive threatened to derail the 
preparations for the Soissons attack and the entire Aisne Offensive.  The reports from the 
front initially alarmed Pétain, who feared they were again on the brink of losing the 
Marne River, opening the route to Paris to the Germans.  He ordered Fayolle to suspend 
the preparations for the Mangin operation so the reserves being assembled could be sent 
south of the Marne in case the Germans crossed the river.  Included in this order was the 
2nd Field Artillery Brigade from the 2nd Division, already on the road to Mangin’s sector.9  
When Foch heard of the order he immediately countermanded it.  With the situation on 
the Marne temporarily under control, he did not want to cancel the entire operation.  
Spelling out his wishes plainly, Foch told Pétain that “there can be no question at all of 
slowing up and less so of stopping the Mangin preparations.  In case of absolute and 
imperative necessity you will employ such troops as are absolutely indispensable to meet 
the situation, informing me at once.”10  And so the attack would proceed.  Of course, no 
one involved in planning the operation took the time to inform the men actually doing the 
fighting as to the details.  Instead, they left such matters until later, resulting in several 
confusing days for the 2nd Division, which almost missed the attack entirely. 
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Taking Command of the 2nd Division 
 
 For Harbord and the Marine Brigade, July found them still entrenched along the 
line in the Bois de Belleau.  Word finally came on 2 July that the 26th “Yankee” Division 
would relieve the 2nd Division within a few days.  It could not come soon enough for the 
exhausted Marines and soldiers.  Even after the fighting for Belleau Wood ended, the 
front lines were no place to rest.  As Harbord noted in his diary, “There is little 
opportunity to sleep . . . shells burst every minute at night; there is the noise of one’s own 
artillery; the air is full of ‘going’ or ‘arriving’ [shells]; the officers and men in the front 
line in this region are without opportunity to wash their faces and hands . . .. One of my 
majors did not have his clothes off for seventeen days.”11  The men of the 2nd Division 
hoped they would be sent to a rest area, and rumors circulated that they would receive 
leave time in Paris, but such was not to be the case.  The continued German threat 
necessitated keeping the division nearby, and it moved to the French Second Line, a few 
miles to the rear.  That was enough for one Marine, who replied to the news without a 
sense of disappointment: “It’s enough to get out of here.  This place is like the wrath of 
God!”12
 Harbord moved his own headquarters from La Loge Farm to the village of 
Nanteuil-sur-Marne, located on the Marne’s northern bank.  He had a lovely house about 
two hundred yards above the river, and enjoyed the pleasant surroundings tremendously.  
Though the sound of artillery still pierced the nights and German planes dropped bombs 
on the American positions, Harbord’s Marines did their best to relax.  They lustily took 
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the opportunity to revel in the Marne, just below a bridge wired to explode in case the 
Germans pushed through the sector.  Such is war.13
 While the men rested, Harbord turned his thoughts to his own career.  On 4 July, a 
letter arrived from his wife addressed to Major General Harbord.  Still wearing only one 
star on his shoulder, the title raised an eyebrow or two.  Pershing had revealed several 
weeks before that Harbord’s name was being put in for a second star, but no word had 
come of it to date.  He wrote playfully that, “while anything my wife says is official 
enough for her husband . . . one has to go through certain formalities before he can take 
over new rank and responsibilities, even on her say-so.”14  Official word of his promotion 
came a week later.  On the night of 11 July, Harbord was roused while reading in his 
quarters by news that someone wanted to speak with him outside.  Irritated that whoever 
it was could not come indoors, Harbord made his way outside where he was met with an 
unexpected sight.  Before him were his regimental commanders and their staffs, the 6th 
Marines band, and several hundred Marines gathered to congratulate him on his 
promotion.  The band struck up the Marine Hymn as Colonels Neville and Lee presented 
Harbord with his new set of stars.  A few minutes later, the officers went inside, “and we 
had what is usually on hand on such occasions in a land of vineyards.”15
 The next day Pershing arrived to offer his own congratulations.  Several weeks 
had passed since the men had seen each other and they enjoyed a long talk over lunch.  
After expressing his complete satisfaction with Harbord’s performance at Belleau Wood, 
the AEF commander explained that he was relieving the 2nd Division’s commander, 
Major General Omar Bundy.  In fact, Pershing had long been dissatisfied with Bundy and 
planned to make a change back in early June.  The opportunity now presented itself to 
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remove an unsatisfactory division commander and replace him with a close friend and 
trusted subordinate.16  Content with their plan, the two men quickly settled into their old 
routine of discussing administrative matters in the AEF.  Pershing described his 
displeasure at the recent list for promotions to brigadiers, particularly the absence of the 
names of some of his most loyal officers who had worked long and hard at General 
Headquarters.17  Being somewhat out of the loop, Harbord decided to look into the matter 
to see how his fellow officers reacted to the promotions.  After several days, he felt 
confident enough to send Pershing a letter relating his general impressions.  In the same 
frank manner in which he advised Pershing as AEF chief of staff, Harbord wrote: 
  
 I feel that you ought to know that the recent promotions to 
Brigadier General are the subject of very frank adverse comment among 
your troops.  You cannot safely disregard public opinion in an army of 
Americans, and public opinion in this army demanded the promotion of 
such men as [Malone, McCoy, Manus MacCloskey, Preston Brown, 
Eltinge, Nolan, Fiske, Conner, and Upton]. . . . I do not know who is to 
blame, but you are held responsible as the channel through which the 
merits of the men who serve under you must be made known to the 
Secretary of War.  Once your people think you do not reward merit by 
your recommendations, or that your recommendations are not followed by 
the War Department, your influence is on the wane.  I speak plainly, but 
the situation in my judgement is serious and demands it.  The April list of 
Brigadiers received unfavorable comment, but the last one has caused 
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more. . . . You are just now in the hard position of being discredited either 
way one looks at it.  Either you are unappreciative of the fine work of men 
around you, or if not your recommendations do not carry weight at 
home.18
 
In truth Harbord knew exactly who to blame, but did not feel free enough to 
mention him by name, at least not in a letter.  Writing in his diary several days later he 
felt no such restraints, commenting acerbically, “The amiable General March is not very 
strong for any of us who ventured to differ with him while on the Staff of the A.E.F.”19  
The Army chief of staff was certainly becoming the villain to the hero Pershing in 
Harbord’s mind. 
 For now, however, Harbord had other matters of more pressing concern.  With the 
understanding that he would take over the 2nd Division within a few days, it occurred to 
him that now would be a good time for a few days of rest and replenishment in Paris.  A 
request for such a leave was quickly granted, and on 13 July he departed with his two 
aides and a Marine orderly in tow.  Once there, Harbord gave his orderly several hours to 
enjoy Paris and set out to do some shopping of his own, having run low on some personal 
effects.  As always Paris brought with it the opportunity to enjoy the company of Charles 
Dawes, who as General Purchasing Agent was making American supply acquisition in 
Europe his own personal fiefdom.  The men had not seen each other since Harbord’s 
transfer to the line, but had kept up their correspondence.  It was a good thing, too, for 
Dawes grew concerned when a rumor circulated during the fight in Belleau Wood that a 
general officer with the Marines was killed.  When Dawes mentioned the rumor to 
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Pershing, the commander-in-chief responded, “There is no officer in the service who 
means as much of a loss to me.”  Relief came when Dawes learned that the officer was 
killed prior to a letter sent from Harbord on 8 June.  Dawes cheerfully wrote his friend 
that, “as the letter was not postmarked ‘Hell’, we knew you were alive.”20  Glad to still 
reside in the land of the living, Harbord’s party joined Dawes for a night of dinner and 
the theatre.21
 The next morning, Bastille Day, Harbord reported in to GHQ AEF by telephone.  
In speaking to Chief of Staff James McAndrew, he learned that Pershing had issued 
orders assigning him to command of the 2nd Division that day, and wished Harbord to 
verbally relieve General Bundy if he arrived back at the division before the orders could 
be transmitted.  As the division was presently only fifty miles from Chaumont, Harbord 
surmised that his time in Paris was at an end.  He went that night to a dinner in his honor 
given by Dawes at the Inter-Allied club, and made plans to make for his new command 
the next morning.  Events, however, hastened the timetable, for around midnight he 
received a telephone call from Colonel Preston Brown, the 2nd Division’s chief of staff, 
informing him of an important conference the next day at French High Command where 
the 2nd Division commander was expected to attend.  Thinking it best that the French 
receive the new division commander, Harbord sent his driver to the hotel where his aides 
were staying, to inform them of his plans to depart at 5:30 a.m. the next morning.  With 
that he went back to bed for a few hours of anxious sleep before returning once more to 
the line.  At present, he knew nothing of the plans for his division, nor did he realize that 
it would be called upon to take part in a major offensive in four days’ time22
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The Road to Soissons 
 
 Harbord left Paris early on Monday, 15 July, heading for 2nd Division 
Headquarters at Chamigny.  With the roads congested with marching soldiers and 
civilians out enjoying the holiday, it took most of the morning to reach the division.  
Once there, he relieved General Bundy, who, much to Harbord’s irritation, took the rest 
of the day to gather his personal effects and exit the headquarters.  Bundy’s foot dragging 
made everyone uneasy and delayed Harbord’s getting settled as division commander.  “I 
regard it as a cardinal principle that when a man is relieved and ceases to be ‘it,’” 
Harbord said, “the sooner he gets away the better. . . . General Bundy stayed until after 
dinner the day of his relief, forgetting several times that he was no longer in command.”23  
Perhaps lacking the personal experience of being unceremoniously relieved made 
Harbord a bit unsympathetic towards Bundy, but the outgoing division commander’s 
slow departure was only the first of many frustrations Harbord would endure during the 
next week. 
 Harbord’s ascension to divisional command was not the only change in the 2nd 
Division since Belleau Wood.  The commander of the 3rd Brigade, Brigadier General 
E.M. Lewis, was also promoted to major general and sent to command the 30th Division.  
Brigadier General Hanson E. Ely, late colonel of the 29th Infantry, 1st Division, took over 
command of the 3rd Brigade.  In the 4th Brigade, Colonel Neville received his first star 
and took over command.  However, with Neville sick in the hospital since their relief 
from Belleau Wood, Colonel Harry Lee ran the brigade in his place.  The senior battalion 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holcomb, rose to command the 6th Marines, and 
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Colonel Logan Feland moved over to command of the 5th Marines.  Colonel William A. 
Mitchell took command of the 2nd Engineer Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel George A, 
Herbert replaced Colonel A.L. Conger on the division’s staff.  All of these changes meant 
that the 2nd Division would go into battle with a bevy of new unit commanders who had 
yet to establish themselves in their new positions.24
Still awaiting Bundy’s departure, Harbord went briefly to the conference at 
French High Command, but, as the German offensive had started just that morning, the 
French were occupied with other matters and Harbord left without gaining any 
knowledge of his division’s orders for the next several days.  He decided to return to 
Chamigny and familiarize himself with the division’s status.  He learned from the 
division’s staff that the 2nd Field Artillery (F.A.) Brigade, now under the command of 
Brigadier General Albert J. Bowley, had been ordered on 14 July to move to the area 
around Betz where it would be at the disposal of the French Tenth Army.25
The movement of the 2nd F.A. Brigade was a harbinger of things to come. 
Notified of the orders the evening of 14 July, Bowley directed his three regiments (12th, 
15th, and 17th) to begin their all-night march to Betz, some twenty miles away.26  The 
next morning, Bowley motored to the Tenth Army Headquarters at Chantilly seeking 
further orders for his brigade.  There he met with General Mangin and received a brief 
synopsis of the plan for the offensive near Soissons (the first officer in the 2nd Division to 
do so).  While awaiting his brigade’s arrival, Bowley received orders from General 
Fayolle, commander of the GAR, directing his brigade to reverse its direction of march 
and return to the 2nd Division to aid in the defense of the Marne.  By this time, his 
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columns were on the road approaching Betz, so Bowley issued orders for a counter-
march that night after a few hours of rest.27
The decision to have the columns rest proved felicitous, for another order arrived 
countermanding the return to the 2nd Division, and directing the 2nd F.A. to continue its 
movement to Betz.  Unknown to Bowley, his brigade was caught in Pétain’s attempt to 
halt preparations for the Mangin operation and return the reserves to aid in blocking the 
latest German offensive.  Pétain issued the orders to Fayolle, who passed them along to 
Bowley before Foch stepped in and countermanded the suspension of Mangin’s 
offensive.  All of this went on above Bowley and his men, who luckily lost nothing in the 
confusion other than a little respect for the French High Command.  Accepting the 
change as a minor irritation, Bowley issued the new orders for the men to resume their 
original movement, then waited to see if the French would change their minds again.28
Back at Chamigny, Harbord was having even less success discerning what was 
going on with the division.  The artillery units were gone and General Joseph Degoutte, 
commander of the French Sixth Army, ordered the divisional trains withdrawn to a point 
six miles away to make ready for a general movement to the west.  “Thus when the new 
Division Commander joined on Monday [15 July] morning he found a command short of 
its artillery and trains,” Harbord wrote in his diary, “and no one on authority who had the 
slightest information as to the purpose of those movements, or when the division might 
expect to be brought together again.”29  Word finally reached Harbord that evening that 
the entire division was to move the next day to an unknown destination presumably in the 
region west of Soissons.  Responsibility for transporting the division fell to the French 
Sixth Army, with the Tenth Army handling the disembarkation.30
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The next morning, 16 July, the 2nd Division prepared to move: destination still 
unknown.  Harbord issued Field Orders No. 14 that set the departure time for the infantry 
at 4:00 p.m., with the machine gun units and all trains to depart at 9:00 p.m.  Division 
Headquarters would remain at Chamigny until the next morning, when it would move to 
Carrefour-de-Nemours.31  The rolling kitchens served the last hot meal that the men in 
the 2nd Division would have for several days, and then packed up for the journey.  French 
camions attached to the Sixth Army began arriving around noon to transport the infantry, 
which departed at the scheduled time.  Sensing no reason to remain, Harbord, his aides, 
and the division’s chief of staff, Colonel Preston Brown, decided to head out for their 
new headquarters, intending to stop at the Tenth Army Headquarters along the way to 
find some divination as to their orders.  Unsure of where the Tenth Army was, they 
decided to travel to Villers-Cotterêts, a town located just west of the Foret de Retz [Forest 
of Retz], a large forest southwest of Soissons along the Maubeuge road.  It was the only 
village of significance in the region and a likely spot to attain more information.32
With his men and staff somewhere on the road, Harbord reached Villers-Cotterêts 
around 7:00 p.m.  Along the way they learned that headquarters for the French XX Corps 
was at Retheuil, a few miles away, so the group made it their next destination.  The trip 
took them through the Forest of Retz, a majestic old-grown forest of deciduous trees with 
thick undergrowth.  The roads were filled with an assortment of travelers indicating the 
presence of some large military force operating in the region.  Though the route covered 
only about five miles, the congested roads required several hours to navigate.  Harbord 
finally arrived at Corps Headquarters well after dark, but found the corps commander, 
General Berdoulet, still awake.  A most gracious host, the general invited Harbord and 
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his party to dinner, at which he explained that the 2nd Division was scheduled to 
contribute a major role in an attack at daybreak on 18 July, but could offer no other 
specifics.  The news struck Harbord hard, and he recorded his thoughts in his diary a few 
days later: 
 
A division of twenty-eight thousand men, the size of a European army 
corps, had been completely removed from the control of its responsible 
commander, and deflected by marching and by truck, through France to 
destination unknown to any of the authorities responsible either for its 
supply, its safety, or its efficiency in the coming attack.  The French Corps 
Commander and his staff were unable to state the points at which the 
division would be debussed [sic] or where orders could reach which would 
move it promptly to its attack position.  This within thirty hours of a 
decisive battle. [emphasis added]33
 
Once again Harbord was in the position of having his troops moving to an 
engagement with little or no exact knowledge of what awaited them, and no readily 
apparent means of gaining any information given the alarmingly brief time frame they 
were working under.  “That may be war,” Harbord later observed, “but it never happened 
to me often enough to convince me that it was common sense.”34  The only assistance 
Berdoulet’s staff could provide was a copy of the Corps Attack Orders and a liberal 
supply of maps.  This constituted the sum total of intelligence Harbord received before 
writing his own attack order.  However, while at Corps Headquarters, Berdoulet’s 
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Operations Officer put Harbord in a rather awkward position by offering to write the 
battle orders for the 2nd Division.  It was quite a situation for a new division commander.  
Harbord had no knowledge of the exact location of any of his units, nor did he have any 
idea of the order or location of their arrival.  He knew the parameters of his command, 
and its objective, but had only cursory intelligence regarding the ground over which he 
was to fight, and the defenders opposing him.  Before him was a man with the trust of the 
corps commander, who obviously knew more about the situation than Harbord did.  He 
knew the ground, and the support units available, and could write orders that fit the 
situation better than any Harbord could produce.  The success of the operation could very 
well hang on the 2nd Division completing its mission, and these orders might offer the 
best chance for success.  Despite all of this, Harbord refused.  “To draw Battle Orders 
requires not only professional knowledge and tactical judgement,” Harbord later 
explained, “but an estimate of the morale and efficiency of the commanders and units 
affected.  It also involved a knowledge of the American temperament and character.  No 
French officer had these special qualifications.”35  The 2nd Division was Harbord’s 
responsibility, and it would succeed or fail under his command.  However innocent and 
well-meaning the offer of aid, which it undoubtedly was, personal, professional, and 
national pride could not allow Harbord to accept.  He thanked the officer and left, hoping 
that he was not making a terrible mistake.36
Still unsure of his division’s location, Harbord decided to make for the village of 
Taillefontaine.  Less than ten miles to the north of Villers-Cotterêts, Tailletontaine was 
serving as the temporary headquarters of General Bullard’s III Corps.  Arriving after 
midnight, Harbord and Colonel Brown found a mimeograph machine, a few 
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stenographers, and a good deal of paper and set down to write attack orders for the 
division.  Aiding them was a French officer attached to Bullard’s Headquarters who had 
fought over the ground previously and offered some insight as to the terrain.  Without 
adequate details, the officers approached the task as though trying to solve a map 
problem at the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.  Theoretically, they knew the area they 
were responsible for, their objectives, and the units chosen with which to get the job 
done.  They needed only to study the map and the corps orders to develop a plan of 
attack.37
As explained in the corps orders, the French Tenth Army would attack along a 
plateau between the Aisne River to the north and the Ourcq River to the south.  Once 
taken, this plateau would allow the Allies to dominate the approaches to Soissons, 
effectively cutting the German supply line.  Running out of Soissons were two major 
highways and several rail lines.  The most important road was the Soissons – Château-
Thierry highway, running north-south about five miles behind the German line of 18 
July.  The other road, the Maubeuge highway, which ran between Paris and Soissons, 
crossed the proposed path of attack from the northeast to the southwest, cutting through 
the 2nd Division’s jumping-off point.  The assembly area for the attack was in the Forest 
of Retz, which stopped just to the west of the German line except for one outgrowth that 
reached into the zone of attack on the northern end of the 2nd Division’s proposed sector.  
The plateau itself represented the watershed divide between the Aisne and Ourcq Rivers.  
It was cut by deep ravines and several small roads that provided every natural advantage 
to the defense, and supplied abundant cover for the concentration and movement of 
reserves.  Luckily, the terrain over which the 2nd Division was to attack was rather 
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forgiving.  Once out of the forest there were wide fields of farmland all the way to the 
village of Tigny, five miles east of the starting line and just west of the Soissons – 
Château-Thierry highway.  In between it and the jump-off line were several farms, and 
the small villages of Vierzny and Vauxcastille.38
The battle orders for the XX Corps specified that the Tenth Army would attack 
with three divisions along a five mile front.  The 1st Division, in place since 16 July, 
would occupy the northern portion of the line; the 1st Moroccan Division (French 
Colonial troops) would take up the center, and the 2nd Division would attack along the 
southern section.  Two divisions, the French 69th and 59th, represented the second line of 
attack, following the main attack wave and operating as corps reserve.  Each division 
would have its own artillery, reinforced by French artillery units.  All three divisions 
were to attack eastward, followed by a general bend to the southeast in an attempt to turn 
the German flanks.  Special attention was called to the boundary between the 2nd Division 
and the 1st Moroccan, which, for the first mile, ran through the outgrowth of the Forest of 
Retz and into a small wood known as the Bois de Quesnay.  The dense woods required 
“particularly strong” liaison between the American and Moroccan divisions lest they 
become intermixed (which eventually happened).  Seeking to preserve the element of 
surprise, no artillery preparation would be made.  Instead, the divisions would attack 
behind a rolling barrage only.  The orders concluded: “At H hour, supporting, 
counterbattery and prohibition fires contemplated in the plans of engagement will start 
with the utmost violence and infantry will rush up in groups made for speed, so as to get 
rapidly in touch with the enemy, to outflank him and to drive him back relentlessly.”39
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Early on the morning of 17 July, twenty-four hours before the start of the attack, 
Harbord issued Field Order No. 15.  It placed the 3rd Brigade on the right (the 9th Infantry 
to the north and the 23rd Infantry to the south) and the 5th Marines on the left of the 
division’s line of attack.  The 6th Marines, 2nd Engineers, and 4th Machine Gun Battalion 
would be held back as division reserve.  Each man would carry two days reserve rations, 
and 220 round of ammunition.  To make up for the lack of preparatory artillery, the 
French provided two groupings of heavy tanks (twenty-seven tanks in each) to 
accompany each brigade.  Harbord assigned the 11th Grouping to the 3rd Brigade, and the 
12th Grouping to the 5th Marines.40
With the attack order written, Harbord left Taillefontaine before dawn on 17 July 
to try and find his division.  Only the 2nd F.A. Brigade’s location was known, as it had 
arrived several days earlier.  Making his way through the agonizingly narrow and 
crowded forest roads, Harbord first came upon Colonel Paul Malone, whose 23rd Infantry 
was the first unit to arrive.  Harbord quickly gave him a copy of the attack orders and sent 
him off to get the regiment moving, then proceeded on his quest to find the remaining 
units.  “The entire day of the seventeenth was spent by every officer of the staff, and by 
others hastily attached, in a desperate effort to gather up remnants, searching for lost 
platoons and companies, and in locating ammunition.”41  One regiment was delayed 
along the route some two hours by a diligent French staff officer who demanded signing 
of a receipt for the successful transportation of 15,000 men.  The American officers 
forcefully declined to sign on the basis that the movement was not yet completed.  Two 
hours and numerous epithets later, the French officer relented and the American column 
continued on its way, having lost valuable time.42
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The corps orders called for the attack units to approach the jump-off line under 
cover of night so as not to arouse suspicion.  As a result, the 2nd Division’s infantry were 
unloaded an average of twelve miles from the German lines, requiring a forced night 
march to make it in time to follow the artillery’s rolling barrage.  To add to the 
excitement for the 5th Marines’s machine-gun units, the French provided no motor 
transportation to the front, so the men had to carry their equipment across miles of 
plowed fields and dense trees in the dark of night.43  Such was the glory of war.  Only 
through superhuman effort were the men in the first wave able to reach the attack line 
when the artillery roared to life.  The 9th Infantry did so with five minutes to spare, but 
elements of the 5th Marines had to double-time it to the line, at which point they kept 
running to keep up with the artillery.  All of this with little to no sleep over two nights, no 
water except what they carried, and only reserve rations to sustain them.  Such was the 
manner in which the 2nd Division launched their portion of the Battle of Soissons.44
 
Soissons: The First Day (18 July) 
 
 At 4:35 a.m. on 18 July the French and American guns along the attack front 
unleashed a devastating fire.  The Germans, caught completely by surprise, recoiled 
under the withering barrage and struggled to prepare for the coming infantry assault.  The 
Americans in the 2nd Division stepped off under the blanket of artillery and pushed 
forward on a front nearly a mile long.  The French tanks, supposed to aid in the advance, 
were held up on the congested roads of the Forest of Retz and did not make the attack 
line on time, but did come up later in the day.  Even without artillery preparation, the 
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rolling barrage provided good support for the advancing units, and they all moved at a 
brisk pace. 
 Harbord’s attack orders outlined three successive objective lines for the attack 
that day.  Each line ran north-south with a distinct point of capture: the first being 
Beaurepaire Farm, the second Vauxcastille, and the third the village of Vierzy.  The 
advance on the first objective called for a push to the northeast, then a turn towards the 
southeast for the drive to the second and third objectives.  At the beginning of the attack, 
the division’s artillery support could only reach as far as the first objective line.  Once 
gained, the guns would have to move forward to provide cover for the assault on the 
second objective.  Thus the attack required good liaison between the American regiments 
and the French forces on their flanks, as well as clear communication with the artillery to 
arrange for timely support from the displacing guns.  But as seen in the attacks at Belleau 
Wood, unit liaison and communication with the rear were not the 2nd Division’s strong 
suit, and the attack on 18 July proved no different.45
 The 2nd Division’s three regiments pushed forward in good order towards the first 
objective after the initial scramble to reach the jump-off line.  The first word Harbord 
received from the front was a report from an artillery observer who stated “Everything 
going satisfactory.  The men went over in perfect order.  Tanks have reached 
BEAUREPAIRE FARM.  Enemy artillery fire extremely weak.  Only few scattered shots 
have been able to be observed from this post.”46  The encouraging messages continued all 
morning.  As at Belleau Wood, everything seemed to go swimmingly as the troops 
reached their first objective, the line running through Beaurepaire Farm, in short order.  
Just after 9:00 a.m., reports came in that the 5th Marines had advanced seven kilometers, 
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bringing it close to the division’s third objective line.47  The only problems reported 
stemmed from the battle’s rapid preparation, resulting in the men running beyond their 
artillery support.  At 9:55, Colonel Paul Malone, commanding the 23rd Infantry, sent a 
blistering message regarding the need for artillery ammunition to the 3rd Brigade 
headquarters: 
 
Our artillery advances.  We will advance as soon as it comes up if 
ammunition lasts.  You shove that ammunition to those people with all 
possible speed; shove them 9 trucks right away and if necessary hold them 
there to see how she goes. . . . Get that ammunition to those people with 
all possible speed and get the artillery together in liaison with our infantry 
and pass the town of VIERZY and the trenches.  Be sure that they get it.  
It is too important.  We are going to change and come out there in a little 
while.  Notify the troops we are coming. . . . Get word to the artillery some 
way or other.48
 
 Malone’s urgent plea for the artillery to move up illustrates the basic flaw in the 
Soisson’s battle plan.  It called for the artillery, located well behind the jump-off line, to 
fire its initial barrage, displace forward, then begin firing again, all the while maintaining 
communication with the infantry so as not to fire on friendly troops.  Just as at Belleau 
Wood, telephone communication with the advancing troops was exceedingly difficult, 
and most units had to rely on runners.  When the men got through, which was not a 
given, it was usually hours after the message was sent, making the coordinates delivered 
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no longer accurate.  Hence, once the 2nd Division passed its first objective line, it lost all 
effective artillery support.49
 Upon reaching the first objective, the attack orders called for the three regiments 
to turn to the southeast and push towards the village of Vierzy.  Whereas the initial drive 
went particularly smoothly, unit cohesion soon broke down with the turn.  Some units 
made the shift while others continued in their original directions, causing a massive 
breakdown of command and control as the exact location of units became impossible to 
determine.  Elements of the 23rd Infantry turned too far south and strayed into the 38th 
French Division’s sector.  On the 2nd Division’s extreme left, units of the 5th Marines 
crossed over into the 1st Moroccan sector to suppress fire coming from the village of 
Chaudun, eventually coming into contact with soldiers from the 18th Infantry, 1st 
Division.  Units from both American divisions had crossed into the 1st Moroccan’s front 
and were meeting in the middle, confusing the advance of the French colonials.50
 Though scattered and running beyond the effective range of their artillery, the 2nd 
Division continued to press forward, relying on overwhelming numbers and individual 
determination to carry the attack.  The sheer violence of the 2nd Division’s thrust 
shattered the German lines, destroying entire units in the onslaught, and creating a 
massive salient along the division’s line of advance.  Neither French division on the 2nd 
Division’s flanks could keep pace with the Americans, resulting in the exposure of the 5th 
Marines and 23rd Infantry to deadly enfilade fire from outside their respective sectors.  
Colonel Logan Feland, commanding the 5th Marines, blamed the failure of the 
Moroccan’s to keep up as the reason for his units’ straying from their sector: “Those units 
of the regiment which went out of the sector did so in order to better attack the enemy 
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and were forced to do so by the presence of [other elements of brigades and divisions 
coming into our sector] and by the great narrowing of our sector at the first intermediate 
objective.”51
 Contributing to the American confusion was the distance between the advancing 
infantry and the brigade and division headquarters.  For most of the morning of 18 July, 
Harbord remained at his command position at Carrefour de Nemours, twelve miles to the 
rear.  Both Brigadier Generals Ely and Neville, commanding the 3rd and 4th Brigades 
respectively, remained at their command centers in between Division Headquarters and 
the front line, but still well to the rear.  With the absence of reliable telephonic or radio 
communication, all information had to be relayed by runners (either on foot or in 
whatever motorized vehicle was at hand).  As described by an official history of the 
battle: 
 
 It is not too much to say that [on 18 July] liaison within the [2nd] division 
broke down completely, and that the usual means of communication failed 
to function from the first.  Generals and colonels delivered their orders in 
person. . . . Over the action as a whole, the division command had no 
control whatever, nor any accurate knowledge of its progress except that 
obtained by the casual encounter of the division commander and brigade 
commander on the battlefield.52
 
  In an attempt to improve control of their units, Colonels Upton and Malone 
moved to Beaurepaire Farm as the front approached the second objective.  Though 3rd 
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Brigade Headquarters remained well behind the lines, General Ely went forward to try 
and find his regiments.  The same could not be said for Lieutenant Colonel Feland, who 
remained in the Forest of Retz, ostensibly still in communication with 4th Brigade.  
Whether he was actually in communication with the 5th Marines is unclear.53
 After reaching the first objective, what information Harbord received from his 
advancing units became sketchy at best.  He knew the assault went off on time, and that it 
was doing well as shown by the steady stream of prisoners filing to the rear.  Word came 
that the 5th Marines were held up on the division’s left, and Harbord ordered the 4th 
Machine Gun Battalion sent in as reinforcement.54  Around noon, he received orders 
from XX Corps directing him to press the attack.  Sensing a breakthrough, Berdoulet 
instructed all three divisions in the Tenth Army to push forward to a line east of the 
Soissons – Château-Thierry highway, effectively securing the offensive’s ultimate 
objective.  Unfortunately for the men at the front, the officers at Corps Headquarters were 
receiving even less reliable reports than the division commanders, and believed that all 
three divisions were farther east than they actually were.   Nor did they realize that the 
momentum gained in the initial assault was all but spent, but the chance for a 
breakthrough was too appealing and the French meant to press the advantage.55
As though a concession to the confusion on the battlefield, the corps’s orders 
directed each division commander to move his command position “as far forward as 
possible,” and to redistribute the artillery “so as to support their infantry as close as 
possible.”56  Both were good ideas, but the second proved more difficult than the first.  
Without accurate knowledge of the exact location of the front line troops, any artillery 
support would be limited at best.  Combined with the difficulty of movement, the 
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advancing regiments would be lucky to receive any artillery support at all, and most did 
not. 
 With the new goal in hand, Harbord set to writing the orders for the afternoon 
attack.  Because the 5th Marines were scattered across the front, responsibility for the 
attack fell to the 3rd Brigade, with the 5th Marines and 6th Machine Gun Battalion 
providing whatever support they could.  The 6th Marines remained in corps reserve, 
untouchable without the corps commander’s permission, so the 2nd Division would have 
to launch their second attack on 18 July with virtually the same troops they employed that 
morning.57
 Unknown to Harbord at the time, there was a serious discrepancy between his 
orders for the afternoon attack and the actual situation at the front.  While reports 
indicated both Vauxcastille and Vierzy taken that morning, neither was the case.58  A 
small group of determined Germans still occupied a position in Vauxcastille, despite 
being bypassed by elements of the 23rd Infantry.  The Germans would hold out for most 
of the day before eventually surrendering around 6:00 p.m., immobilizing the 23rd 
Infantry’s right flank.59  The situation in Vierzy proved a greater problem.  With all 
objectives thought achieved, the new attack would advance from a line east of Vierzy.  
But reports of the town’s capture were also incorrect.  Evacuated during the initial 
American push, a German staff officer returned to the village at 11:00 a.m. and found it 
unoccupied.  He immediately ordered elements from the German 14th Reserve Division to 
reoccupy the town, and by noon, the Germans had reestablished their position in Vierzy, 
just as Harbord was writing his orders for an attack further to the east.60
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 At this point communication amongst the division and brigade commanders 
turned from confused to almost comical.  Harbord issued his attack orders at 1:30 p.m. 
and sent them to the front.  They never arrived, but the division commander did not wait.  
Having not heard from his brigade commanders for much of the morning, he set out for 
the front to discern for himself what was actually happening.  Approaching Verte Feuille 
Farm, about three quarters of a mile past the jump-off line, Harbord ran into General Ely, 
on his way back from Beaurepaire Farm to deliver a report to Harbord.  As it turned out, 
Ely was the only reliable method of communication in the division.   
At 8:30 a.m., Ely departed his Brigade Headquarters within the Forest of Retz and 
moved up to Chavigny Farm, just west of the jump-off line near the division’s southern 
border.  Arriving at 10:00 a.m., (the two-and-a-half mile trip took an hour-and-a-half) Ely 
established his Brigade Headquarters.  He then departed for Beaurepaire Farm, just under 
two miles away, seeking his regimental commanders.  This time the journey took two-
and-a-half hours, for Ely was forced to abandon his car along the way and travel by foot.  
He finally reached Beaurepaire at 12:30 p.m.  Once there, Ely met with Colonels Upton 
and Malone, receiving his first real intelligence reports of the day.  With this information 
in hand, Ely turned around and headed to the rear at 1:00 p.m., intending to deliver the 
information to Division Headquarters.  It was at this point that Ely met Harbord on the 
road near Verte Feuille.  The division commander listened to Ely’s report, then handed 
him a copy of the attack order, which Ely sent ahead by way of motorcycle and 
horseback.  He left Harbord at Verte Feuille and headed again towards Beaurepaire, 
finally arriving at 4:00 p.m., fifteen minutes behind the orders sent by horse (apparently 
the motorcycle never made it through).  Once there, he found that the regimental 
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commanders had left, and it would be another half-hour before the attack orders could be 
communicated to them.  Each replied that they could not possibly attack before 6:00 p.m., 
while the French tank officer at Beaurepaire informed Ely that it would be 7:00 p.m. 
before his tanks would be ready.  Ely instructed both Upton and Malone to attack with all 
possible speed, and told the tank man to come along as quickly as he could.  Thus, for the 
better part of 18 July, communication amongst the 2nd Division’s senior commanders 
relied on a brigadier general personally moving between the front and the rear.  Though it 
worked, the situation was not exactly the scenario envisioned in the American Infantry 
Drill Regulations.61
The confusion did not end there.  In two messages, one sent at 3:05 p.m. and 
another at 3:50 p.m., Brigadier General Bowley, commanding the 2nd F. A. Brigade, sent 
word to the division commander that he was setting up artillery positions between 
Beaurepaire Farm and Vauxcastille.  Bowley reported ordering the 4th Machine Gun 
Battalion, then held in reserve, to head for Vauxcastille and link up with either the 9th or 
23rd Infantry, whichever was there.  As it turned out the 23rd Infantry was still in 
Vauxcastille, along with several hundred Germans, and the 4th M. G. Battalion joined in 
the attack.  Bowley also reported that Vierzy remained unoccupied by the enemy, and had 
at present a few French colonial troops in the village.  This last statement was completely 
incorrect, but communication was such that no one knew exactly what was going on.62
The only information Harbord knew for sure was that his advancing troops were 
running desperately low of water, rations, and ammunition.  At 1:15 p.m., just before 
Harbord issued his order for a renewed attack, Colonel Upton sent a chilling message 
describing the status of his men. 
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Due to lack of sleep 3 nights, lack of food 2 days, no water 2 days, lack of 
ammunition and worn out condition officers and men, it is necessary that 
the 23rd and 9th Infantry and Marines be relieved tonight and allowed to 
have food, water and rest.  After a magnificent fight all objectives 
attained; officers and men are dead on their feet.  Losses fairly heavy.63
 
Half of the message was correct.  The men were running low on water, food, and 
rest and needed to be relieved.  But, as described above, all of the objectives were not 
met.  However, as in the Bois de Belleau, Harbord chose to focus on the positive and 
issued his attack orders anyway. 
For the second attack, Harbord’s orders stated, “The attack will be made on 
receipt of this order.”64  Given the confused state of the three regiments, no advance 
began before 7:30 p.m.  Leading the 23rd Infantry, Colonel Malone received his orders to 
attack sometime between 4:00 and 5:30 p.m..65  He assembled his three battalions along a 
ravine running west of Vierzy and prepared to move out.  With support from some of the 
remaining French tanks and the regimental machine gun company, the 23rd Infantry 
attacked towards the southeast at 7:30 p.m.  Two battalions bypassed Vierzy to the north 
while one battalion turned south to take the town.  Though it received no artillery 
support, the regiment was able to push forward with the aid of the French tanks, 
eventually halting just over a mile east of Vierzy.66
To the north, Colonel Upton formed up his battalions, along with the 2nd 
Battalion, 5th Marines, and launched his attack by 7:30 p.m.  With all three of his 
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battalion commanders dead, Upton pressed forward to the ravine north of Vierzy.  He, 
too, received no artillery support, and the tanks assigned to his advance were late in 
coming.  When they finally arrived, Upton ordered his men forward, under intense 
machine-gun and artillery fire.  In the attack the II/5 became separated on the extreme 
left, opening up a large gap in the line.  The infantrymen continued to press forward, but 
mounting casualties and the coming of darkness forced the regiment to halt at 9:00 p.m. 
along the heights to the west of Vierzy.  With the help of members of the 2nd Engineers 
and several machine gunners, the 9th Infantry dug in on their extremely precarious 
position.  Both flanks were exposed, and Upton could account for only 310 men between 
all three of his battalions.  The rest were killed, wounded, or missing somewhere to the 
rear.67
 On the division’s southern edge, Major Julius S. Turrill, commanding the 1st 
Battalion, 5th Marines ran into General Ely near Vierzy just after 7:00 p.m.  Having 
attempted to enter Vierzy and been fired upon by the Germans still occupying the town, 
Ely ordered Turrill to rally his men and attack immediately.  The Marines, numbering 
about 150 men, moved around the western edge of the town and attacked the southeastern 
corner.  At the same time, Ely found Major Waddill leading the 1st Battalion, 23rd 
Infantry, and ordered him to attack the town as well.  Both units attacked at relatively the 
same time, the I/5 from the southeast, and the I/23 from the north.  They met in the 
middle and captured all of the exhausted German defenders.68
At Division Headquarters located at Verte Feuille Farm, Harbord waited 
anxiously for any word on the second attack.  The first report came from Colonel Malone 
at 8:25 p.m., who stated: 
 
 342
 
Many machine guns have been captured, number not known.  We must 
have food, water, medical supplies.  Machine Guns, ammunition in large 
quantities sent to us in trucks at once.  Urgent.  Please inform me as to 
whether requests will be complied with.  Also, send tonight picks, shovels 
and axes.  Please inform if troops will be relieved tonight, they are utterly 
exhausted.69
 
Harbord did what he could to send the requested supplies forward, but with roads 
hopelessly congested it would be hours before anything reached its destination.  
Meanwhile Harbord grew increasingly irritated at the lack of information reaching his 
headquarters.   At some point that afternoon or early evening, Harbord unfairly vented 
much of these frustrations upon General Ely, the man doing the most to press the 
advance. 
 
No reports from you today.  As far as you are concerned we are in 
complete darkness as to what has been happening in your front.  Reports 
from other sources indicate that your troops, with the Marines on your left, 
are occupying normal objective just beyond Vierzy.  Is this true?  What is 
the condition of your troops?  Have you lost enough to seriously cripple 
you?  We have instructions from the Corps to pass on to the [Soissons – 
Château-Thierry road] . . . when we have liaison with troops on right and 
left.  Germans are reported in disorder and the division on your right 
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reports as being some distance ahead of you pursuing Germans now.  Is 
the spirit of your men such that you can push on and take that road, either 
by using troops now in your front line or passing some of your rear 
battalions through? . . . What liaison have you with the marines on your 
left and the division on your right?70
 
The message shows just how out of touch Harbord and his staff were on the 
afternoon of 18 July.  At 10:00 p.m. he moved the Division Headquarters up to 
Beaurepaire Farm and began making preparations for an assault the next day.71  He and 
his staff believed the front to be well established east of Vierzy, with the 9th Infantry on 
the left and the 23rd Infantry on the right.  The 5th Marines were distributed somewhere 
between them.  They also believed both flanks to be tied in with the respective French 
divisions.72
In fact, the situation was much more desperate.  The 23rd Infantry did hold a 
position along the southern front, but it was only loosely tied in to the 9th Infantry on its 
left.  What was left of the 9th Infantry held a line a few hundred yards wide, supported by 
what machine gun units it could find.  The 5th Marines was even more scattered than 
Harbord knew.  One group (all battalion cohesion had completely disintegrated) held an 
isolated position along the division’s northern edge just south of Chaundun.  Another was 
roughly a half mile due east, facing north, with both flanks completely exposed.  The rest 
of the 5th Marines were distributed amongst the 3rd Brigade.  Both of the division’s flanks 
were in the air, with the most extreme gap between the two groups of Marines to the 
north.  The 6th Marines were now at Beaurepaire Farm, having moved up that afternoon, 
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and the 2nd Engineers were in the vicinity of Vierzy.  At the center of the confusion, the 
brigade commanders set up their command positions in Vierzy.73
While the 2nd Division’s attack on 18 July had shattered the German lines, it also 
wrought tremendous casualties on the three regiments making the advance.  The 9th 
Infantry had ceased to exist, with less than four hundred men accounted for of the three 
thousand who began the day's assault.  Though not as severe, losses in the 23rd Infantry 
and the 5th Marines were also heavy.  Each lost nearly half their numbers, both officers 
and men, to confusion, straggling, and enemy fire.  But despite these horrific figures, the 
2nd Division made incredible gains on 18 July.  The division advanced an average of four-
and-a-half miles, well beyond that of the French divisions on its flanks or the 1st Division 
to the north, who advanced an average of three miles.  It was an incredible feat, but at the 
cost of three regiments.  However, the 2nd Division still had one regiment in reserve, and 
plans were already in the works for it to take over and continue the attack the next day.74
 
Soissons: The Second Day (19 July) 
 
 To General Berdoulet of the XX French Corps the night of 18-19 July seemed 
alive with prospects for a tremendous breakthrough.  All three divisions in the Tenth 
Army had made spectacular progress, smashing the German lines and approaching the 
operational objective of the Soissons – Château-Thierry highway.  All that was needed, 
Berdoulet thought, was one more great push to cross the road and cut the German supply 
line into the Marne salient, and he ordered his three divisions to resume the attack on 19 
July.  Each would continue to push on until it could establish a position east of the 
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highway.  In his attack orders, Berdoulet called special attention “to the fact that during 
the course of the attack the American infantry, which was brought up to its lines of 
departure under particularly hurried conditions (especially the 2d Div.), displayed 
remarkable endurance and keenness.”75
 Harbord received the orders to attack about midnight on 18-19 July.  He 
immediately began writing his own orders, which he issued at 3:00 a.m.  Harbord called 
upon the only fresh troops in the entire division, the 6th Marines, to constitute the main 
attack force.  Though it was still in corps reserve, he appropriated it for the operation.  He 
did not have permission from the corps commander to do so, but Harbord was never 
called to task for the move.  His attack order specified that the 6th Marines would move 
up that night, pass through the lines held by the 3rd Brigade, and attack at 7:00 a.m.  This 
was a modification of the corps attack orders, which set the attack for 4:00 a.m., but 
Harbord had to make the change to allow his men time to move into position along the 
still congested roads in the combat zone.  The orders indicated the 2nd F.A. Brigade 
would begin a preparation fire at 6:00 a.m., but did not provide for a rolling barrage to 
precede the 6th Marines.  As it turned out, the Marines would attack with almost no 
artillery support whatsoever.76
 The plan for the 6th Marines was in essence a repeat of that issued to the 3rd 
Brigade and the 5th Marines the day before.  They would advance forward in an effort to 
cut the Soissons – Château Thierry highway, but this time one regiment was being called 
upon to do what three had attempted the day before, along a front exactly as wide.  No 
significant artillery support was provided, and the division had only minimal effective 
troops available for reserves.  For the most part, the Marines were on their own. 
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 Further complicating the task was the fact that the element of surprise was 
completely gone.  The assault on 18 July cut through the German 9th Army, but it was 
now reorganizing, moving up fresh troops, and preparing to defend the highway at all 
costs.  On the morning of 19 July, the battered Germans held a line west of the highway 
with elements of at least three divisions.  By the time the 6th Marines attacked, the 
Germans had largely rebuilt their defenses and replenished their numbers.  As a result, 
the attack proved to be one of the rare times in the World War when attacking Americans 
were outnumbered by the German defenders.77
 The commander of the 6th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee, received his 
orders just after 3:00 a.m., and immediately called together his battalion commanders to 
discuss their plan of attack.  At 4th Brigade Headquarters located at Beaurepaire Farm, the 
four men decided that the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (Major Hughes) would take up 
position of the right, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Holcomb) on the 
left, and the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines (Major Sibley) would act as the reserve.78  With 
the order of battle settled, the men departed to begin the long march to the jump-off line 
some three miles away. 
 The three battalions made their way forward as best they could, but the roads 
were still so congested that by 7:00 a.m., the time set for the advance, the two attack 
battalions were only as far as Vierzy.79  Colonel Lee held another conference with his 
battalion commanders just east of Vierzy to go over last minute details.  Finally, around 
8:15 a.m., the advance battalions began the attack, over two hours after the artillery began 
its preparation.  As the 6th Marines crossed the wide open terrain between Vierzy and the 
front lines they fell under withering German machine-gun and artillery fire.  Just as at 
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Belleau Wood, the Marines advanced straight into the torrent.  The few French tanks 
supporting the attack drew additional artillery fire, and were either destroyed or 
abandoned within a few hours.  Even so, Colonel Lee reported “Attack moving nicely” at 
8:45 a.m., and again at 9:50 a.m., with the assurance of “casualties normal.”80
 Soon after crossing the 3rd Brigade’s line, casualties in the 6th Marines became 
anything but normal.  The German fire shredded the American lines advancing in the 
open without any artillery support.  The contact point between the I/6 and II/6 began to 
buckle, and Major Sibley sent in two companies to strengthen it.  Both took heavy 
casualties before reaching the line, but continued the advance once there.  Concerning 
news reached Harbord at 10:30 a.m., when a report from the 2nd Engineers stated that 
“Col. Upton says that Moroccan Division is not connected with his left and that it is in 
the air and is weak.”  At the same time, the message indicated that the 6th Marines were 
in or near Tigny.81   
Again, part of the report was accurate and part was not.  The left was indeed open, 
as it had been since the previous evening, but the Marines were not in Tigny, nor would 
they be.  The Germans held the town in some force, and blocked any advance with 
destructive artillery and machine-gun fire.  Alarmed at reports of a weak left, Harbord 
ordered General Ely to send a battalion from the 23rd Infantry, thought to be in Vierzy, to 
support the left of the attacking line.82  Ely replied an hour later that the entire 23rd 
Infantry was in the line, and therefore could not move to the new position.  He could send 
a battalion from the 5th Marines if Harbord wanted, but by this time the division 
commander had other things on his mind.83
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Despite early reports of everything going well in the 6th Marines, when the 
regiment passed beyond the 3rd Brigade’s lines whatever momentum it had was quickly 
spent.  Colonel Lee sent word to Harbord that, “Reports indicate growing casualties 
amounting heavy say about 30%. . . . 1st Bn. reports no French troops on right and are 
held up 300 yards in front of Tigny.”84  The II/6, supported by elements of the III/6, 
made a valiant push along the left portion of the line, but eventually had to halt just over 
a half-mile past the 3rd Brigade’s lines.  Various companies of the III/6 went into the line 
as needed, and by 11:00 a.m. all units in the 6th Marines were engaged.  Along the 
southern end of the attack line, the I/6 bore down upon Tigny, pushing a small salient in 
the line north of the city, but could not enter.  At 12:15 p.m., Lee sent out orders that if 
Tigny could not be taken, all units were to dig in and hold their present positions.  By 
1:50 p.m., Harbord realized the attack was over and ordered Lee to “dig in and entrench 
your present position and hold it at all costs.  No further advance to be made for the 
present” and extended his congratulations to the 6th Marines for its “gallant conduct in the 
face of severe casualties.”85
Though the timing is unclear, reports indicate that Harbord decided to call for the 
2nd Division’s relief several hours before telling Lee to dig in.  In a long letter to 
Berdoulet, probably sent around noon, Harbord explained the present situation. 
 
The order of the XX Army Corps to the 2d Division to attack at 4 a.m. this 
date was received at 2 a.m.  It was impossible to comply with the order to 
attack at 4 a.m. due to the delay in receiving the order.  With the exception 
of the 6th Marines . . . and the 2d Regiment of Engineers . . . every infantry 
 
 349
unit in the division was exhausted in the fight yesterday.  It was necessary 
therefore to make the attack this morning with one regiment, the 6th 
Marines, supported by a battalion of the engineer regiment, a force 
regarded by me as inadequate to the task, but no other was available. . . . 
The attack has progressed favorably until the line has come to a north and 
south line approximately through TIGNY.  It is held up on the right from 
the direction of PARCY-TIGNY, a place previously reported to us as 
being in French possession.  On the left it is being held up and our left 
flank is threatened, due to the fact that the Moroccan 1st Division has not 
apparently advanced as far as CHARANTIGNY. . . . 
I do not anticipate that my division will not be able to hold what it has 
already gained but I desire to insist most strongly that they should not be 
called upon for further offensive effort.86
 
Thankfully for the men in the 2nd Division, General Mangin, commanding the 
Tenth Army, anticipated Harbord’s request by half a day.  At 5:45 a.m. on 19 July, he 
ordered the 58th French Division to move up from its position in reserve, “with the relief 
of the American 2d Div. in view.”87  Whoever ordered it, the only thing that mattered to 
the men in the 2nd Division was that relief was coming.  That night, the 58th Division 
moved into the lines, and the 2nd Division retired for some much-needed and well-earned 
rest. 
At the end of 19 July, the 2nd Division stood within rifle-shot of the Soissons – 
Château-Thierry highway; close enough for the artillery to begin shelling the German 
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artery.  No other division advanced as far, as fast, or accomplished as much in the two 
days of fighting.  But the gains came at tremendous cost.  The 6th Marines suffered close 
to fifty-percent casualties.  Combined with the losses of the previous day, the entire 2nd 
Division lost over four thousand men.  Most of the men were without food or water for at 
least twenty-four hours, and were utterly exhausted.  Unit cohesion had completely 
disintegrated, and communications were reduced to runners.  Coordination between the 
artillery and infantry disappeared after the initial advance on 18 July, and liaison between 
units was marginal at best.  But even with these problems, the operation was a smashing 
success.88
 Thus ended the 2nd Division’s part in the battle of Soissons.  The 2nd Moroccans 
and the 1st (U.S.) Division continued the drive for two more days, finally taking the 
Soissons – Château-Thierry highway on 21 July and consolidating their position.  Soon 
afterward, the Germans began a general withdrawal from the entire salient.  But even 
though the battle was a victory, opinions varied as to the part played by the 2nd Division.  
After the war, General Robert Bullard, commanding the III Corps, blamed the confusion 
in the 2nd Division and the scattering of its units on its rapid movement to the line and 
inability to conduct necessary reconnaissance.89  Harbord took great offense to the 
criticism, and enlisted General Berdoulet to aid in defending his men.  Berdoulet 
responded with a fine letter declaring: “Your troops at the moment of their retirement 
were absolutely in no greater or lesser disorder than the rest of the troops (French or 
others) which were relieved after a very hard battle."90  As evidenced by the encounter 
between the 5th Marines and the 18th Infantry, both American divisions struggled with 
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unit cohesion, but that does not refute the fact that the 2nd Division indeed became 
scattered on the morning of 18 July.91
Harbord can hardly be blamed for the manner in which his division launched its 
attack on 18 July or the fact that it became strewn across the battlefield.  Considering the 
confusing and haphazard manner in which it was brought into the line it is remarkable 
that the division performed as well as it did.  But Harbord can be faulted for his 
continuing inability to manage operations once combat began.  He stayed too long in the 
rear, trying to orchestrate a battle by telephone when they were working and by runner 
when they were not.  As at Belleau Wood, he also remained too long in the dark as to 
conditions at the front.  That he could write clear and concise orders based upon the 
information he had is evident, but much of that information proved flawed, and it fell to 
his subordinates to make the necessary adjustments, resulting in a breakdown of unit 
coordination, especially between the infantry and the artillery.  Finally, Harbord’s 
unwavering belief in tenets of “open” warfare too often resulted in the infantry advancing 
without sufficient artillery or machine-gun support.  Though the Germans had shown the 
value of tactics based upon infiltration and movement, they required considerable skill in 
the execution, which the Americans did not possess.  Harbord and his French superiors 
called on the 2nd Division to do more than it was reasonable to expect, given the 
division’s limited training and experience.  That it accomplished as much as it did was 
due more to the drive and courage of the individual soldiers than any skill and leadership 
shown by its commanding officer.  Still, as after Belleau Wood, to the victor goes the 
spoils, and Harbord garnered all the personal and professional accolades that fall to a 
successful general after a victorious battle.  He would have to enjoy them quickly, 
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however, for his time in the lines would end before the month was out. 
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CHAPTER XI 
A HANDLE ON LOGISTICS (AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 1918) 
 
 For James Harbord, late July of 1918 was the high point of his career.  Eighteen 
months earlier he was a major of cavalry, detailed to the Army War College to develop 
plans for a future war that no one was sure was coming.  Now he was a major general, 
commanding an entire division in the greatest military conflict of the age.  Adding to the 
moment, Harbord’s command, the American 2nd Division, had performed well in the 
Soissons counteroffensive that, according to George C. Marshall, “swung the tide of 
battle in favor of the Allies.”1  As messages of congratulations came streaming in from 
AEF compatriots and friends back home, Harbord could see everything he had ever 
worked for in the military just over the horizon.  Even General Pershing noted Harbord’s 
growing reputation after the battle, remarking to the division commander, “It appears I 
have to congratulate you every time I see you!”2  With the AEF soon to begin major 
combat operations of its own, the possibility of further advancement seemed likely, 
despite having commanded the division for a week.  What was next?  A corps command?  
A full army?  If the war would only last long enough to provide Harbord the opportunity, 
there was no limit to how high he could rise as long as he kept performing.  But, just as 
everything came within his grasp, events beyond his control conspired to shatter this 
wondrous scenario. 
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Tapped for S.O.S. Command 
  
After a brief respite in the village of Perrefonds, the 2nd Division moved on 23 
July to the vicinity of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, located midway between Paris and Soissons.  
After weeks of marching and battle, the division needed a rest.  Harbord’s own 
headquarters had moved seven times since he took over command, and everyone was 
growing ragged.  The division had lost nearly five thousand men over the past week and 
now found itself a full third below organized strength.3  Harbord hoped to garner some 
time for his men to regain their spirit and prepare for the full Allied offensive anticipated 
for the early fall.  What he did not envision was his own departure from the line, but 
Pershing had plans for his most trusted subordinate. 
Just as Harbord settled into his billet in Nanteuil-le-Haudouin on 26 July, a call 
came from Chaumont requesting Harbord’s immediate presence.  Unclear as to the 
purpose of the summons, Harbord departed at once with his Marine aide, Fielding 
Robinson, on the five-hour motor trip to General Headquarters.  The journey took them 
through Meaux, whose slowly returning commerce presented a starkly different scene 
from the general panic Harbord encountered when the Marine Brigade moved through the 
town nearly two months earlier on its way to block the German drive towards Paris.  
Harbord tried to take it all in as the countryside grew increasingly familiar the closer they 
came to Chaumont.  He pondered the meaning of his trip, finally deciding that the 
commander-in-chief either wanted to discuss the division’s training or simply thought 
Harbord deserved the rest and a chance to visit with old friends.  With these thoughts in 
mind, Harbord fully expected Pershing to have turned in when they arrived just after nine 
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that night.  He was surprised, and not a little troubled, to hear that Pershing was waiting 
for him, despite the late hour.  “I wondered a little if I had guessed right as to why I was 
summoned,” Harbord admitted.  “My conception had not seemed so urgent.”4
True to form, Pershing wasted little time explaining the point of the meeting.  The 
AEF commander, displeased with the Services of Supply (SOS) for some time, wanted 
Harbord to take over command of the AEF’s logistical service as Commanding General, 
Services of Supply (CGSOS).  The news fell on Harbord like a death sentence.  Though a 
great responsibility, command of the SOS meant a departure from the front lines.  Visions 
of a corps command flittered away as Pershing laid out his reasoning for the move.  He 
described a plan in the works in the War Department to reorganize the SOS; taking it out 
from under Pershing’s direct command and placing it under a coordinate authority.  
Aghast, Harbord thought the idea “a perfectly impossible situation from any military 
standpoint except that which might desire the failure of the expedition and incidentally of 
Pershing.”5  He immediately suspected Chief of Staff Peyton C. March as the source for 
the plan, but listened as Pershing filled out the details. 
When he first learned of the plan to take the SOS from under him, Pershing began 
looking for a way to mollify the War Department.  After contemplating the matter for 
several weeks, he decided that there was only one man he could trust to reinvigorate the 
SOS: Harbord.6  His reasons were threefold.  First, Harbord’s experience as chief of staff 
and relations with the staff gave him valuable knowledge of the AEF’s inner workings 
and proved his ability to manage large organizations.  Pershing needed a man who could 
put the SOS in order, and Harbord had shown himself capable of the task.  Second, 
Harbord’s newly won reputation as a field commander would bring a considerable boost 
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to morale in the AEF’s floundering logistical branch.  Mired behind the lines, the soldiers 
in the SOS needed to know their importance.  The assignment of Harbord to command 
the SOS would show how critical Pershing considered the organization.  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, Harbord’s favorable relationship with Secretary of War Baker 
provided a potential supporter for the move should other elements in the War Department 
object.  Put more simply, for Pershing to retain control of his supply system, he needed 
his best, most experienced, and most loyal man to take over command of the rear.   That 
meant Harbord.7
While Harbord blushed upon hearing that Baker had taken a liking to him, it 
could not soften the blow of Pershing’s request.  Like any soldier, Harbord wanted to 
remain on the fighting line; it was what he was trained to do and worked his entire career 
to achieve.  Now, just as he reached the pinnacle, Pershing wanted him to step aside and 
return to the doldrums of an uninspiring command.  It was an unfair request, and 
Pershing knew it.  The commander-in-chief understood that he was asking a great deal of 
his former chief of staff, both professionally and personally.  But the seriousness of the 
situation demanded action, and Pershing needed Harbord to accept.  As the conversation 
meandered through various topics, he resigned himself to his fate.  Though Pershing 
asked for an answer in the morning, Harbord said there was no need.  “I was [Pershing’s] 
man,” he wrote in his diary, “and whatever my personal wishes they would go no farther 
than being willing to do anything he wished me to do in the way he wished it done.”8  
The next morning Harbord again told Pershing that he would go wherever the general 
needed him.  The two men then sat down with Major General James McAndrew, the AEF 
chief of staff, and worked out a plan.  After a brief talk, the three agreed that the change 
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should go into effect immediately and that Harbord and Pershing should meet at Tours 
for an extended tour of the SOS.  When the meeting broke up, Harbord set out to pack up 
his former command headquarters with the enthusiasm of a man going to the gallows.9
He arrived at his little château just after midnight on 28 July with a heavy heart.  
He could hardly contain his pride at the 2nd Division’s accomplishments over his short 
tenure.  Prior to the battle of Soissons, people knew of the Marine Brigade but not the full 
division.  Now, thanks to the events of 18 and 19 July, every American officer in France 
knew of the gallantry displayed by the 2nd Division.  But Harbord could not even oversee 
the distribution of honors won over those two days; relinquishing that duty to his soon to 
be successor, Marine Brigadier General John A. Lejeune.  The next day, Harbord 
attended the divisional luncheon he had set for his brigadiers, colonels and senior staff.  
The idea was to improve communication and camaraderie amongst the division’s senior 
officers, but now it served as a farewell affair.  Though bittersweet, Harbord consoled 
himself with his pride for the division and left with his coterie of personal aides and 
assistants as though in exile, accompanied by the sounds of the 23rd Infantry Band 
playing “The Twenty Third Infantry March.”10
 
 The Goethals Proposal 
 
For Harbord, the worst part of his transfer to the Services of Supply was that it 
came in response to yet another effort by the War Department to meddle in Pershing’s 
affairs.  What Harbord did not know was how the idea came about, nor did he realize the 
level to which it was being discussed in Washington.  The exact origins of what became 
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known as the Goethals Proposal remain a mystery.  The clearest account is that the idea 
came from the combined efforts of President Wilson’s most trusted advisor, Colonel 
Edward M. House, Secretary Baker, and Chief of Staff March to relieve Pershing of a 
portion of his massive responsibilities, allowing the AEF commander to focus most of his 
attention on military operations.11  Colonel House’s plan came out of consultations with 
President Wilson and Sir William Wiseman, a British official in Washington who thought 
the AEF supply system dangerously close to collapse and blamed the situation on 
Pershing’s tendency to take too much responsibility upon himself.  House agreed and 
suggested to Wilson in early June that Assistant Secretary of War Edward Stettinius and 
Vance McCormick, a prominent Democrat and chairman of the War Trade Board, be sent 
to France to relieve Pershing of the burdens of supply and diplomatic concerns.  Wilson 
passed the suggestions along to Secretary Baker, who took the matter up with General 
March.  The two men agreed with the plan in principle, but concluded that Stettinius, 
whose experience in banking did not lend itself well to military affairs, should be 
supplanted with Major General George W. Goethals.  The builder of the Panama Canal, 
Goethals was currently the number two man in the War Department, heading up the 
Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division.  His experience with supply and managing large 
bureaucracies made him imminently qualified to take over the SOS.12
Thinking the plan well in motion, March told Goethals to prepare for a post in the 
AEF, but did not explain the exact nature of the position.13  The move proved premature, 
for Baker did not intend to make the change without consulting Pershing.  Nor would he 
proceed if the AEF commander dissented.14  When March learned of Baker’s hesitations 
he told Goethals to delay his preparations, but did not indicate that the proposal was 
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abandoned.  Perhaps anticipating Pershing’s reply, Goethals confessed to his diary that 
the news “put an end to any thoughts of going over.”15
Pershing was not completely oblivious to the planning taking place in the United 
States.  March had informed him of the Administration’s concerns regarding his 
workload on 5 July, saying that, “It seems inevitable that a subdivision of your work must 
be made in the near future, which will take off your shoulders the burden of personal 
conferences with Prime Ministers and other diplomatic representatives . . . and release 
you to straight military duty, which, of course, is what you were sent there for.”16  
Concerned over the possible challenge to his position in France, Pershing responded by 
assuring March that diplomatic matters were of little burden, and that he did not think the 
situation required sending an official representative.  Little else came of the matter, and 
Pershing continued to oversee diplomatic relations with the Allies.17
As for the idea of freeing the AEF commander of his responsibilities over supply, 
Pershing’s response was less constrained.  In a letter on 6 July, Baker outlined the 
Goethals Proposal, conveying the belief that “The American people think of you as their 
‘fighting General,’ and I want them to have that idea brought home to them.”   The idea 
of having an officer sent to command the SOS without Pershing’s request was bad 
enough, but Baker contemplated Goethals serving “rather in a coordinate than a 
subordinate relationship to you.”18  Pershing was flabbergasted.  The very concept of 
relinquishing control over the AEF’s supply system seemed a violation of the most 
fundamental military principles.  He told March that in reference to military matters in 
France, “There can be no dual command.  It must be centered in one man.”19  Pershing 
considered the idea of stripping him of his logistical base utter lunacy.  Receiving 
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Baker’s letter several days after March’s, Pershing apparently thought the decision 
already made.  At the very least he believed events in Washington were spiraling out of 
his control and he needed to take action.  After meeting with Stettinius, who was already 
in France and could offer a better view of the current state of the War Department, 
Pershing decided he needed to make a change and made the call for Harbord to come to 
Chaumont.  Once his former chief of staff agreed to the move, Pershing reached for his 
cable pad marked “RUSH RUSH RUSH RUSH”20 at the top, and fired off an urgent 
message to Baker.  In it he said, “I very much appreciate your desire to relieve me of 
every burden that might interfere with the direction of military operations.  However 
there appears to be an exaggerated view concerning the personal attention required in 
handling the details of administration of this command.”  He assured the secretary that 
administrative details were not a drain on his time, and that when the AEF began 
conducting independent combat operations the General Staff could handle the added 
pressure on the supply system.21
Not content to let the matter rest with a cable, Pershing composed a long letter to 
Baker the next day outlining his position in greater detail.  He explained that problems in 
the SOS were more the result of a lack of manpower than a poor organizational structure.  
The need to get American troops into the lines to help block the German offensive the 
previous spring caused cutbacks in the shipment of auxiliary personnel, which now 
resulted in the SOS being overworked.  Pershing agreed that the time was at hand to 
address these problems in anticipation of the AEF taking over the heaving lifting in 1919, 
saying, “Our port facilities must be increased, our railroads must be improved, and we 
must have a large increase in cars and locomotives.  These things must come more 
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rapidly from now on.”22  But he did not see how taking the SOS from his control would 
solve the problem. 
In effect, what Pershing wanted was support from home, not interference.  
Considering Baker’s previous hesitancy in hindering his field commander, it was a well-
phrased request.  In regard to the Goethals Proposal, Pershing was more direct in bringing 
up Baker’s stated reluctance to interfere with matters at the front.  “It has always been my 
understanding,” Pershing stated, “that you believed that full power should be given to the 
man on the spot and responsible for results.”  He promised that “our officers and men are 
far and away superior to the tired Europeans,” and pleaded that “our organization here is 
working well.”23  If only the War Department would provide the material and stay out of 
the way, Pershing had every confidence the AEF could achieve victory. 
The general knew his audience well, for Baker accepted the AEF commander’s 
assertion that Harbord would “pull in the team,” so to speak, and agreed to hold off on 
sending Goethals for the time being.24  But for all Pershing’s protestations regarding 
unity of command, the idea of extending War Department control over supplies to France 
was not as far-fetched as he made it seem.  Neither the French nor British commanders in 
chief controlled their supply lines to the French coast.  In the same areas where the SOS 
operated, Pétain had to work in conjunction with the Ministry of War, the Ministry of 
Transportation, and other agencies to supply his armies.  Likewise, Marshal Haig had to 
rely on the War Office to deliver supplies across not only the English Channel, but the 
French countryside as well.25
Additionally, Pershing did not control his entire supply line, as he seemed to 
suggest necessary for any field commander.  He did not oversee supply decisions in the 
 
 367
United States, nor did he dictate shipping across the Atlantic, even with his continual 
insistence upon the Priority Schedule.  The French ports appeared a logical line of 
demarcation between War Department and AEF jurisdiction, but even that did not mean 
the operational commanders controlled their own lines of communication.  As set forth in 
General Orders No. 44, the SOS controlled supplies from the ports to the regulating 
stations.  From there control shifted first to the Coordination section of the AEF General 
Staff (G-4) via the regulating officers, who relied on input from the corps and divisional 
commanders in directing supplies.  The result was a bureaucratic nightmare of competing 
responsibilities and egos; hardly the smoothly running organization Pershing described to 
Baker.  But whether the SOS worked efficiently was beside the point.  It was a part of the 
AEF, which fell under Pershing’s authority, and any abridgment of that authority 
represented a threat to his command.  Instead, Pershing placed the entire matter on 
Harbord, whose unwavering loyalty would keep the final authority over the AEF 
precisely where Pershing wanted it: in his hands. 
 
Touring the Services of Supply 
 
Early on the morning of 29 July, Colonel Johnson Hagood, chief of staff for the 
SOS, received word that his commanding officer, General Francis J. Kernan, had been 
relieved as Commanding General, Services of Supply.  The news left Hagood in shock.  
He had no knowledge of the conflict between Pershing and the War Department over 
control of the SOS and thought Kernan was doing a fine job.  Hagood learned that 
Kernan would head up a special assignment in Switzerland at the War Department’s 
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behest, but received no further information.  With Pershing coming to Tours to oversee 
the transition, and without any explanation for the change, Hagood began preparing for 
the AEF commander’s arrival.26
Both Pershing and Harbord arrived by train that morning, meeting up at SOS 
headquarters.  There Harbord watched as Pershing delivered the bad news to Kernan, 
who “was very loath to surrender his command.”27  Harbord tried to soften the blow, 
expressing great confidence in Kernan’s work, but the departing general believed himself 
unfairly treated and resented losing what he thought would be his last command.28  
Kernan’s removal threatened to diminish the already tenuous morale amongst the officers 
serving in the SOS.  Pershing knew that the SOS was a vital part of the American effort 
in France, but he also saw that “even from the beginning the idea prevailed in the minds 
of its personnel, especially at the ports, that they were not exactly doing the work of 
soldiers.”29  Both he and Harbord tried to bolster morale amongst those officers staying 
on with the SOS, and spoke at length with the men.  Harbord particularly worried about 
Hagood’s reaction to the transition.  He thought Hagood and Kernan had worked well 
together, despite the problems in the SOS, and wanted to emulate that relationship during 
his tenure as CGSOS.  He knew of Hagood’s concerns over fluctuating officer levels 
within the SOS and told the SOS chief of staff of his desire to “get the S.O.S. personnel 
more permanently established and . . . to speed up the work.”30
Pershing also spoke privately with Hagood, understanding that he was invaluable 
to the smooth transition between Kernan and Harbord.  During a long walk that night, 
Pershing described the SOS’s pivotal role within the AEF and promised to give greater 
attention to SOS concerns in the future.  While grateful for the kind words, Hagood told 
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the commander-in-chief that “all that would be fine but that the lack of more substantial 
recognition in the way of promotions and so forth had very seriously handicapped our 
work.”31  Hagood believed Pershing needed to do more to make the SOS a desired career 
path, not simply a way station for men either hoping for something more or trying to 
salvage their careers.  Though Pershing assured him that more promotions were coming, 
SOS officers continued to suffer from a lack of formal recognition for their 
accomplishments.32
The next day, Pershing and Harbord departed for a tour of the principal ports and 
facilities in the SOS, taking a small group of senior SOS officers with them and leaving 
the rest to wonder exactly what was going on.33  The first stop was Bordeaux in 
southwest France.  Organized as Base Section No. 2, it was a massive territory, 
encompassing some fourteen French Federal Departments.  The Bordeaux area contained 
the AEF’s primary forestry and sawmill operations, an artillery training center, remount 
and veterinary facilities, and several hospitals, along with the docks on the Gironde 
River.  Also located near Bordeaux was the enormous classification yard and storage 
facility of St. Sulpice.  Pershing strode purposely around the various facilities, 
performing spot inspections and gaining a general understanding of the current situation.  
Some operations were going well, while others showed definite need for improvement.  
Pershing fretted over the amount of personal luggage arriving from America and asked 
Harbord to look into it.  Construction at St. Sulpice was coming along nicely, but 
Harbord found the situation at Bordeaux far from satisfactory.  He said later, “There 
seemed to be more attention paid to what would now be called ‘public relations’ than to 
hustling freight off the ships and expediting their turn-around.”  Harbord decided that he 
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would need to make a change and asked Pershing to transfer W.D. Conner to command 
the Base Section.  “But he is commanding a brigade in the 32nd Division, fighting in the 
Vesle,” Pershing replied.  Harbord politely reminded the general that he too had only 
recently been commanding a division in the region, to which Pershing gave a faint smile 
and said he would order the transfer.  Conner came and performed admirably, eventually 
succeeding Hagood as SOS chief of staff after the Armistice, and Harbord as CGSOS the 
following May.34
The next few days saw more of the same as Harbord and Pershing made their 
rounds.  Traveling mainly by rail, they attached a flatcar to the end of the train so that 
Pershing could make impromptu speeches at various locales in an effort to improve 
overall morale, and, as Dawes put it, “to inspire the Service of Supply with increased 
enthusiasm and desire to accomplish.”35  Harbord mused that, “[Pershing] had the story 
pretty well learned by the time we finished our tour of the ports.”36  Of course not 
everyone was inspired by the C-in-C’s motivational skills.  Pershing’s idea of a reward 
was a transfer out of the SOS to a combat division.  While perpetuating the image of SOS 
duty as unworthy of a soldier, the idea of trading a safe job on the docks for a spot on the 
front line did not seem like much of a reward to some.  After one such speech to a group 
of African-American stevedores, one of Pershing’s aides asked a corporal for his 
impression.  The man thought long and hard and then, rather hesitantly, said that he was 
“very well satisfied” where he was.37
At every location the group found centers and construction projects of tremendous 
size and complexity.  The reception camp for arriving troops at St. Nazaire could handle 
sixteen thousand men, while the docks at Brest could unload ships as large as the 
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Leviathan, which delivered twelve thousand soldiers per trip when running at full 
capacity.  The storage depot at Montoir covered some two thousand acres, utilizing two 
hundred miles of railroad track, and containing four million square feet of roofed storage 
and another ten million square feet of open storage.  At other stops along the route the 
men observed various construction projects intended to provide the infrastructure 
necessary to support the millions of men expected in 1919.38
By 3 August the group finished visiting the ports and moved into the interior.  The 
first stop was the city of Blois, which served as a depot for unassigned officers arriving 
from the United States.  These men, “commissioned misfits of all types” as Harbord 
called them, existed in a sort of limbo, being close to the war but without any part in it at 
the present.  Blois was also the AEF’s Officer Reclassification Depot, providing a chance 
for officers deemed unsatisfactory at some point, usually in combat, to salvage their 
careers.  Men found wanting under fire could still serve the AEF in the rear, especially in 
the SOS where experienced officers were at a premium.  By December, Harbord would 
achieve almost total control of those officers sent to Blois, redistributing them as he saw 
fit.39  Though Colonel Hagood believed Blois an asset to the AEF, providing a second 
chance to men on the verge of being sent home in disgrace, the center had gained an 
ominous reputation within the AEF’s officer corps.  To be “blooeyed,” as it became 
known, was a mark of shame and more often than not signaled the end to a Regular Army 
career.  As Harbord described it, “For many an American [Blois] was the grave of buried 
ambitions, the temporary home of the hopeless.”40
That afternoon the group proceeded to the massive supply storage depot at 
Gièvres.  Providing supplies to the front, either through the Regulating Station at Is-sur-
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Tille or in direct shipments to divisions, Gièvres was the heart of the SOS’s Intermediate 
Section.  Unlike many of the port facilities, it was operating smoothly, handling an 
average of twenty-three hundred rail cars a day.  In one instance, an order came in to the 
center at 8:15 a.m. calling for exactly 4,596 tons of supplies, comprised of 1,250,000 cans 
of tomatoes, 1,00,000 pounds of sugar, 600,000 cans of corned beef, 750,000 pounds of 
canned hash, and 150,000 pounds of dried beef.  By 6:15 that night, 457 freight cars were 
loaded and on their way to Is-sur-Tille, filling the order to a tee.41
The party made several more stops before returning to Paris on 4 August to 
discuss their impressions of the SOS.  Overall, Pershing was pleased with what he saw, 
with only a few installations needing serious attention.  But the trip showed the AEF 
commander that the SOS had grown far beyond his own comprehension, even with its 
lack of manpower and supplies.  What the SOS needed now, in Pershing’s mind, was 
“coördinating direction, initiative, and driving-force.”42  Confident that Harbord could 
provide these things, Pershing wrote to Baker several days later describing the trip in 
glowing detail.  Despite a previous “lack of push in the S.O.S.,” Pershing told the 
secretary he was confident in Harbord’s abilities, stating that the new CGSOS “has taken 
hold in splendid fashion.”43  It was bit of an exaggeration.  Harbord had only been on the 
job for a week’s time, and spent it with Pershing on their tour.  But Baker was satisfied, 
and decided to drop the Goethals matter entirely.  Colonel House agreed, and the two 
men advised as much to President Wilson, who stated that in the future no decisions 
would be made without Pershing’s consent.  It was a tremendous delegation of authority, 
and exactly what Pershing wanted.44
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Taking Hold of the SOS 
 
 With the full weight of the AEF’s supply system firmly upon his shoulders, 
Harbord moved quickly to secure greater authority for his command.  He convinced 
Pershing to give him control over “all questions of automatic supply” for the AEF.  
Questions of policy, including those involving new types and scales of equipment and 
immediate control over military transportation would still be handled by the General 
Staff, but all other supply matters reverted to Harbord’s command.  To facilitate this, 
Pershing put the supply chiefs directly under Harbord, and allowed the new CGSOS to 
communicate directly with the War Department, freeing him from having to rout requests 
through GHQ.45  Bolstered by his new authority, Harbord set about speeding up his 
command.  He thought the entire SOS functioned adequately enough, and considered its 
organization “in the main efficient.”46  Likewise, the men at the base ports were doing 
their best to move the freight along with all possible haste, but low morale continued to 
plague the services.  Moving freight was hardly satisfactory work for any soldier, no 
matter how important the job.  The men needed routine reminders of their value, and a 
sense of worth in the AEF, which became Harbord’s first goal as CGSOS. 
One area where Harbord believed Kernan added to the poor morale was his 
propensity to spend most of his time behind a desk.  When the former CGSOS did 
venture out on inspection trips he did so in a motor car, limiting his range and the amount 
of time he could spend in the field.47  If Harbord wanted to improve performance in the 
SOS and improve the morale of its personnel, he believed he needed to spend a good deal 
of time away from Tours.  “It is as important that the man who is doing his duty well 
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should be seen and told of it,” Harbord said, “as it is that the less efficient man shall be 
seen and told of his faults.”48  To facilitate this, he ordered a special train from the 
Transportation Department set up to operate as a rolling headquarters.  A remarkable 
piece of equipment, the train allowed Harbord to travel at night, inspect during the day, 
and cover the entire SOS with some frequency.  It provided sleeping quarters for 
Harbord, his personal staff, chauffeurs, orderlies, translators, stenographers, etc., and had 
accommodations for ten or so officers Harbord brought along with him.  These were 
usually SOS section chiefs or other heads of supply departments who could address 
specific issues as they came up.49
Harbord made good use of the train, spending fifty-five of his first one hundred 
nights as CGSOS aboard.  In a typical week, he spent three or four days on inspection 
trips.  To communicate with Tours and Chaumont, the train contained a telephone and 
telegraph system that could be connected along the way.  Harbord provided his own 
headquarters and GHQ AEF with a daily itinerary and worked to keep to it.  When away 
from the train for any period of time, he had an aide remain behind to make daily contact 
with Chaumont and Tours to see if anything required Harbord’s personal attention.  The 
system worked exceptionally well, allowing Harbord to “do a good deal of business right 
on the ground where business needs to be done.”50
When not out on the rails, Harbord spent most of his time at Tours.  He and his 
personal staff (his two aides, Norris Williams and Fielding Robinson, his Marine orderly, 
Lieutenant Moore, his interpreter, Martin Legrasse, and his cook and steward) moved 
into General Kernan’s former residence on the northern heights of the Loire, known as 
Maison Beaulieu.  A few months later he moved farther back from the Loire to a lovely 
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mansion owned by the Princess de Croy.  These splendid residences suited the old 
cavalryman well, and the Croy family provided a vibrant social life for Harbord and his 
staff.51
Another benefit of taking over the SOS was the chance it gave Harbord to work 
closely with the General Purchasing Agent, Charles G. Dawes.  Brought by Pershing 
from civilian life to the AEF to secure supplies in Europe, Dawes was a master 
administrator.  He was also a jovial and gregarious personality, whose inability to grasp 
the concept of military formality provided endless amusement for those around him.  
Pershing worried that Dawes would be deemed an “interloper” or a “climber” by regular 
officers, and reminded Harbord that Dawes was “too valuable a man to allow any staff 
officer to snub him or fail to appreciate the usefulness of his position.”52  Pershing need 
not have worried, at least as far as Harbord was concerned.  The CGSOS found in Dawes 
a kindred spirit, thinking him “a winning personality, very much of a special pleader, and 
master of the art of insidious approach.”53  Dawes returned the sentiment, considering 
Harbord “a dear, faithful, and loyal friend.”54  The two men had made a point to get 
together in Paris as often as possible, usually to attend the theater or some other variant of 
the still vibrant Parisian nightlife, and Harbord now had the chance to partake in this 
distraction on a more regular basis.55
Of course Harbord spent most of his time at the office in Tours, where he 
discovered that Kernan had left him a good and efficient staff.  But it, too, suffered from 
the same low morale and lethargy found throughout the SOS.  Filled with men sent back 
from the front, the SOS operated under the aura of failure, and the men running it seemed 
to suffer from a personal malaise.  A powerful source of this depression was the lack of 
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appreciation shown to those in the SOS.  Harbord took the matter up with Pershing soon 
after taking over, expressing the belief that, “The S.O.S. cannot be considered a kind of 
purgatory in which a man remains in a state of suspense until, by good or bad behavior, 
his final destination is determined.  The S.O.S. must be made worth a soldier’s career.”  
The lift provided by Pershing’s recent speeches would soon wear off if they were not 
followed by more tangible rewards.56
Harbord was even more pointed in assigning blame for some of the hard feelings 
amongst the SOS personnel to GHQ AEF (and to a lesser extent Pershing himself).  “The 
War Department has been liberal in authorizing high grades in the organization for the 
SOS,” he argued, “but no names have been submitted from the AEF to fill them.”  The 
situation was undoubtedly serious for Harbord to side with the War Department against 
the AEF.  He even used the recent controversy of the Goethals Proposal to support his 
growing belief that GHQ was not paying enough attention to the men behind the lines.  
He argued that the War Department’s recent attempts to meddle with the AEF’s supply 
system were “indirectly” responsible for the recent increases in SOS authority, not a 
newfound appreciation for the services by Pershing or GHQ.  Pershing made no direct 
response but did ask that Harbord "consider it an obligation” to come to Chaumont 
whenever circumstances allowed to keep the AEF commander “in touch with the whole 
machinery.”57  While still unquestionably loyal to the AEF commander, Harbord was 
beginning to distance himself from GHQ AEF.  Now responsible for the entire SOS, his 
focus shifted to its needs, and he was slowly realizing that many of the problems 
afflicting the organization were emanating out of Chaumont. 
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With Pershing still leaving the SOS to its own devices, Harbord moved to 
improve relations amongst his senior officers at Tours.  Just as he had intended in the 2nd 
Division, Harbord organized a regular Sunday brunch at his château.  Though not 
embraced by everyone (Hagood thought the affair “too stiff and formal” and balked at 
losing the day) the event showed Harbord’s sincere desire to improve morale within his 
own headquarters.58  As part of his managerial style, he wanted to build up camaraderie 
among his officers, like in any combat unit.  If the men would start thinking of 
themselves as a military unit, then perhaps it would rekindle their drive to perform.  
Harbord then turned his attention to motivating the men in the SOS to pick up the pace 
across the board, utilizing his administrative skills to achieve tangible results.  Unlike 
Pershing, Harbord possessed a good understanding of motivation.  Whereas the AEF 
commander offered a transfer to a combat unit as reward for service, Harbord offered 
extended leaves for units performing exceptionally well.  He had bands play fast-paced 
music to help the workers keep a quick pace, and played upon the men’s homesickness 
by devising a competition between the stevedore companies working at the ports.  Known 
as the “Race to Berlin,” the competition set up a system where each unit was judged 
against its previous accomplishments to see which was making the greatest improvement.  
The winning company would secure a spot on the first transport home after the war 
ended.  Now here was a goal the men could get behind!  Weekly statistics reported in 
Stars and Stripes were posted at each port and flashed on newsreels, keeping everyone 
informed as to which unit was in the lead.  The scheme worked to perfection, as the base 
ports increased the amount of tonnage unloaded by roughly twenty percent between them 
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over the last two months of the war, a good indication of Harbord’s skills as an 
administrator.59
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CHAPTER XII 
GRINDING DOWN (SEPTEMBER - NOVEMBER 1918) 
 
When James Harbord took control of the AEF’s logistical system, the Services of 
Supply, he instilled in it a new sense of purpose and professional vigor long absent from 
the organization.  But for all his energy, drive, and managerial skill, there were simply 
too many critical problems affecting the organization and the American supply system in 
general.  The shipping arrangements made the previous spring to block the German 
offensive now caused a serious shortage of personnel within the SOS.  To make up the 
difference, the War Department needed to abandon the shipment of combat troops to 
Europe in lieu of auxiliary personnel.  But fall 1918 also brought a critical shortage in 
shipping tonnage and transportation materiel in France.  When added to the personnel 
shortages, it meant that there were not enough men in the SOS, nor were there enough 
ships to transport them and the AEF’s increasing materiel demands, and there was not 
enough rolling stock in the SOS to adequately move the men and material once in France.  
All along the supply chain, the pressure of building and maintaining a complex network 
without adequate preparation or time to make sure it functioned efficiently was finally 
causing the entire system to grind down.  The officers in the SOS and the General Staff 
tried to manage the system as best they could, but ended up engaging in a battle over 
authority.  Thankfully, just before the entire system imploded, it was granted a reprieve in 
the form of the Armistice. 
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Personnel 
 
As Harbord worked to improve efficiency within the SOS, he slowly came to realize the 
monumental task before him and the systemic problems gumming up the works in the AEF’s 
logistical system.  Since its inception, the most persistent and serious problem afflicting the SOS 
was a lack of adequate service personnel.  At the very least, Harbord believed that one out of 
every three men in the entire AEF should be assigned to the SOS.  In the summer of 1917, the 
General Staff calculated that an army of 1.3 million required twenty five percent of its numbers 
designated for the line of communications.  Though both were minimum estimates, neither was 
achieved.  By the end of August 1918, Harbord’s first month in command, the AEF numbered 
1,293,000 men, with less than 300,000 of which serving in the SOS, or just under twenty three 
percent.1  As Pershing explained to Baker in July, the source of this shortage was the shipping 
program enacted the previous summer.  When the Germans launched their massive offensive the 
previous spring, Pershing agreed to a modification in the American shipping schedule at 
Abbeville in early May.  The plan called for the United States to ship 250,000 men, composed 
mostly of infantry and machine-gun units, to France over May and June.2  This emphasis forced 
the reduction of SOS troop shipments to 15,000 in May and 25,000 in June (down from 25,000 
and 55,000 respectively).3  These reductions exacerbated an already growing numerical 
deficiency within the SOS. The situation was made worse in late July when Pershing cut 
personnel even further by ordering that all soldiers serving within the SOS who were deemed fit 
for combat duty be transferred to the line.4  Shipments in July and August failed to make up the 
difference, resulting in a serious manpower shortage in the SOS by the first of September, just as 
the AEF was gearing up for its long anticipated independent combat operations. 
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Harbord could see disaster on the horizon if the SOS could not keep up.  To 
achieve the War Department’s goal of eighty divisions in France by June 1919, the SOS 
needed to increase the amount of tonnage unloaded by 150,000 tons each month.  But 
without sizable increases in manpower, there was little chance for the SOS to reach that 
mark.  Frustrated by the situation, Harbord confided to his diary that, “It matters not if 
our people at home build ships and send over men if we here are unable to unload the 
ships, and get the supplies to the front.”5  He began requesting additional troops, but by 1 
October the SOS still found itself short by over 80,000, or nearly twenty-two percent.  
For an army of four million men, the SOS needed to grow by 700,000 in order to account 
for twenty-six percent of the AEF.6
The personnel already assigned to the SOS proved equally problematic.  In 
addition to the challenge of maintaining of morale for men stuck behind the lines when 
they desperately wanted to get into the fight, the SOS struggled with ever-changing 
personnel lists due to GHQ’s inability to establish a “permanent, fixed organization.”7  
Too often GHQ shifted officers and enlisted men in and out of the SOS without 
considering the effects of the changes on SOS efficiency.  The policy resulted in a lack of 
officers with sufficient experience to perform their duties, and a hodge-podge of enlisted 
men performing various tasks regardless of their training.  Harbord observed that 
“Ribbon-counter jumpers are found in stevedore regiments, who never saw a ship before 
the one that brought them over; lawyers appear in engineer units; longshoremen in the 
forestry regiments; railroad men in labor battalions, etc., etc.”8  Many of these men rarely 
lasted long in such assignments, and were routinely transferred to other tasks with equal 
disregard for their talents.  The transitory nature of such employment resulted in a labor 
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force increasingly disconnected to the work before them, with little incentive to 
adequately learn their jobs.  As Hagood told Harbord in August, “Almost every man in 
the S.O.S. considers his status more or less temporary and is in hopes of a change of 
duty."9  No one in the SOS was committed to the organization as a whole, and the entire 
system suffered as a result. 
The situation grew decidedly worse when Pershing finally organized the 
American First Army on 10 August.10  The long anticipated event caused a mixture of 
pride and anxiety for the men in the SOS.  No longer were they building an army, but 
now shifted to the role of supporting one in the field while it conducted combat 
operations.  Within a few weeks, the First Army began the initial American offensive of 
the war, reducing the St. Mihiel salient just west of Verdun.  Though cheered by news of 
American advances at the front, Hagood watched as the recent withdrawal of troops from 
the SOS to support the First Army began to have an effect on efficiency levels.  He took 
it upon himself to draft a foreboding cable for Harbord to send to GHQ outlining the 
present state of the SOS.  It was not a pleasant image.  The cable described serious 
deficiencies in motor transport, railroad transportation, and an overall slowdown of 
construction projects throughout the SOS.  To add insult to injury, just that day the SOS 
was ordered to supply two thousand men to handle ammunition for the First Army.  “The 
SOS must have some immediate relief . . .” the cable read, “It is as much involved in the 
present push as is the First Army, as that army cannot get its food, clothing and 
ammunition unless the SOS continues to function.”11  Several days later George Van 
Horn Moseley, the assistant chief of staff, G-4, promised more troops as soon as they 
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could be made available.  Till then the SOS would have to bear down and make due with 
what they had.12
Without help from GHQ, the SOS was stretched to the limit in terms of its 
capabilities and needed some form of relief, and soon.  After looking into the situation, 
Brigadier General Fox Conner, Pershing’s assistant chief of staff, G-3, agreed that the 
SOS was “reduced to the breaking point on account of demands made on it by the First 
Army.”  He pointed to the fact that in August the SOS unloaded 18,424 tons on average 
every day.  By mid September, that number had fallen to 14,584 tons daily.  To remedy 
the growing crisis, Conner suggested ceasing the shipment of combat divisions in 
December, and instead bringing over auxiliary troops to build up the SOS and other 
support services.  Pershing approved the plan, hoping that it would ease the growing 
panic at Tours.13
It did not.  Whatever promises GHQ made regarding additional troops for the 
SOS, the fact remained that with the First Army launching an offensive in the Meuse-
Argonne on 26 September, the pressure continued to mount on the supply services.  With 
additional rail and motor transportation being reassigned to support the offensive, the 
SOS found itself again asked to do more with less.  Pershing continued to comb through 
the SOS for combat troops, assuring Harbord that it was only done “to meet an urgent 
situation which all must appreciate and which I think you can appreciate.”  The AEF 
commander also denied requests for the transfer of potential combat troops to the supply 
services, acknowledging the serious manpower crisis in the SOS, but insisting that the 
First Army’s “needs of replacements are constant and daily? [sic] increasing and the 
demands for fighting men are of the utmost urgency at this moment . . . as you 
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undoubtedly know.”14  Ever loyal to his commander, Harbord promised that he and his 
organization would do their best to keep up the fight.  He did, however, offer up a 
warning: 
 
If the war ends this Winter no great harm will be done by delays in getting 
men to work.  If it does not, the failure to keep up construction and other 
necessary work in your supply service will in my judgement make failure 
certain for your plans next Spring.  Our only interest is that you know the 
need for men.  We then loyally accept your decision.15
 
Harbord later admitted that if the Armistice had not occurred when it did, “there 
would have had to be a suspension of hostilities and movement until the supply and troop 
program could be brought back into balance.”16
 
A Crisis in Shipping 
 
 Pershing’s practice of stripping the SOS of personnel to support the operations of 
the American First Army at St. Mihiel belies his understanding of the serious problems 
affecting the SOS.  He knew that the SOS needed more men, and he desperately wanted 
to get them, but as AEF commander he was juggling several balls at the same time, and 
had to work to keep everything going lest the entire system come crashing down.  The 
goal for the ultimate size of the AEF that Pershing and the War Department agreed upon 
was eighty divisions by the summer of 1919.17  To accomplish this goal the Americans 
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needed the continued help of the British in supplying tonnage for the shipment of 
personnel.  But in August, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George informed the 
Americans that “we shall not be able to continue our help as far as cargoes of 
merchandise are concerned and that we shall probably have to cut down the tonnage 
assigned for troop transportation.”18  Lloyd George explained that recent losses suffered 
at the hands of the German submarines required the British to reassess their commitment 
to the American shipping program.  Hoping to take advantage of the British shipping 
while they still had it, Pershing cabled the War Department: 
 
 Most urgent that service of supply, auxiliary troops and replacements, 
sailing of which classes has been postponed in the past, should so far as 
possible have absolute priority over divisional troops.  If this is not done 
the inevitable result will be the diversion of combat troops to service of 
supply duty which is undesirable from every point of view.19
 
 Pershing echoed his calls for SOS and auxiliary personnel nine days later, adding 
that, “Until sufficient replacements are available in France to keep our divisions at full 
strength replacements should be [sic] all means sent in preference to new divisions.”20  
Chief of Staff Peyton March replied on 20 August that, “Divisions will be sent only when 
necessary to avoid shipping space going vacant.  It is frequently impossible to secure 
sufficient S.O.S. troops to fill available shipping space. . . . All replacements called for by 
you are being shipped but they are often delayed by quarantine.”21  If March could find 
the men, he would ship them to France, but they were simply not available in the 
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numbers that Pershing wanted.  The War Department could not make up for the 
deficiencies of the past in a month’s time, no matter how urgent the situation. 
 As March and the War Department did their best to find additional personnel for 
the SOS and auxiliary services in the AEF, they faced an even greater problem.  A lack of 
cargo tonnage had hampered the United States since its entry into the war, and the 
problem was only growing worse.  A survey of the situation the previous December 
estimated that an army of 1,000,000 men in June of 1918 would require 1,920,000 gross 
tons for troop transport and 1,589,000 tons for cargo shipping.  Unfortunately, the United 
States had nowhere near these numbers available.  In 1914, 90-percent of American 
foreign trade was carried in foreign-owned bottoms, and the country had not been able to 
make up much of the difference when the combatants withdrew their shipping to cover 
their own war needs.  Though progress had been made in constructing new ships and 
appropriating others, the United States still found itself facing a deficiency of 900,000 
tons of shipping in September and October based upon the requirements of the eighty 
division program.22  For all of Pershing’s urgent cables requesting additional men and 
materiel, and the need to keep to the schedule for having eighty divisions in France by 
June 1919, the War Department could no more pull cargo ships out of a hat than Harbord 
could labor battalions.23
 Considering the seriousness of the situation, Secretary of War Newton Baker 
deemed it necessary to journey to France to see what could be done to remedy the 
shipping deficiencies and make sure the American logistical system continued to 
function.  Baker began contemplating the trip in August after the British indicated that 
they would curtail their tonnage allotments to the United States.  General Tasker Bliss, 
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the American representative on the Supreme War Council, had written the secretary that, 
“If Marshall Foch will state that the 80-division program gives reasonable assurance of a 
final campaign next year I feel sure that the United States can demand and secure 
necessary tonnage. . . . If we cannot do this we must deliberately contemplate a campaign 
of 1920 with its untold losses in life and money most of which will be American.”24  
Baker could see that relations between the Allies were growing increasingly strained.  
“Every shipload of soldiers we land in France,” he wrote to a friend, “increases the 
complications of their supply and, quite confidentially, of harmonious cooperation with 
our allies.”25  Hoping to mend the growing rift between the Allies and the AEF, Baker 
sailed for France at the end of August, arriving in France on 7 September. 
 Baker’s second visit to the Western Front gave proof of the tremendous work 
accomplished by the AEF.  After witnessing the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, Baker 
returned to his tour of the American facilities.  On 19 September, Harbord joined the 
secretary’s party for an inspection of several installations in the SOS.  Though Baker’s 
party was somewhat extensive, Harbord managed to secure an hour with the secretary for 
a private conversation.  During the discussion, in which Baker did most of the talking, the 
secretary explained that he was the source of the Goethals Proposal.  Intended as a 
sincere effort to relieve Pershing from many of his non-essential concerns, the secretary 
admitted that he realized the plan a mistake and promised no more interference with 
Pershing’s command.  The discussion then turned to General March and the relations 
between he and the AEF.  Baker was surprised to learn that many in the AEF were 
distrustful of the chief of staff and believed he was seeking to supplant Pershing as 
commander of the AEF.  Baker assured Harbord that he had no intention of removing 
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Pershing from command, but in the event that the general should be incapacitated or 
killed, his successor would come from the AEF.  “[If March] wished to be in the 
running,” Baker stated, “he would have to give up his position as Chief of Staff and 
return to France and take his chances.”  The talk did much to quell Harbord’s fears, and 
he told Pershing that, “I think relations with the War Department will be greatly bettered 
by [Baker’s] visit here.”26
 What Baker did not tell Harbord was that he had been thinking of who would 
replace General Pershing should he be killed since the previous March.  After asking 
Pershing for suggestions, which the general felt unable to give, the secretary made up a 
list of his own.  It contained only three names: Major General Hunter Liggett, 
commander of the First Army as of October 1918, Major General Charles P. Summerall, 
commander of the 1st Division from July 1918 through October when he rose to 
command the V (U.S.) Corps, and Harbord.  After his second visit to the AEF, Baker 
made his choice.  “It was for Harbord, who as the pioneer Chief of Staff, the fighting 
commander at Belleau Wood, and the reorganizer of the S.O.S., had risen ably to his 
responsibility in each part and had given proof of the poise, initiative, judgement, and 
perspective that fitted him for command of the whole.”27
Baker kept his thoughts to himself on the matter, however, and returned to the 
tour of the SOS.  He was imminently satisfied by what he saw.  Supply and training 
facilities that were only in the planning stages the previous March were now up and 
running, while other construction projects were underway with more in the planning 
stages.  He could plainly see that “Harbord’s energy had given what was once called the 
“Service of the Rear” an esprit de corps of its own, and how,” with the help of his 
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assistants, “he had developed a team-play by every method known to the military and 
civil worlds.”28  Yet everywhere Baker went he heard the common call for more material, 
more troops, more everything.  And the constant cry for help that arose from the men in 
the AEF meant the need for more ships, which Baker hoped he could extract from the 
Allies. 
 This proved every bit as difficult as Baker had anticipated.  In meeting after 
meeting with the Allies, he heard repeatedly that the British could not increase their aid to 
the Americans for fear that it would create a critical shortage in the transport of food 
supplies to the British Isles.  The British agreed to honor their commitment to supply 
200,000 tons for September and October, but would not acquiesce to the secretary’s 
requests for additional ships.  They did, however, leave the matter open to further 
discussion if the United States would disclose all relevant information as to American 
needs and facilities.  President Wilson agreed to the request, and Baker managed to 
persuade the Allies to establish several boards to oversee Inter-Allied supply 
procedures.29  The secretary then wrote to Pershing that, “In effect this amounts to a 
present approval of our program with the reservation that in view of the constantly 
changing situation we are all free to meet any new crisis should it arise.”30
 Hoping to finalize the agreement, Baker went to meet with Allied Commander-in-
Chief Foch several days later.  Buoyed by positive reports from the front and behind the 
German lines, Foch was in a fine mood to receive the American secretary of war.  
Recalling Bliss’s cable about the need for Foch’s support to press for additional tonnage 
from the British, Baker asked the Marshal how many American divisions he believed 
necessary to win the war.   
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“Forty!” Foch replied. 
“I think I must have misunderstood the Marshal,” Baker said to the 
interpreter.  “Will you repeat the question and make sure he understands 
that I am referring to divisions to be in France for use in 1919?” 
When the interpreter repeated the question, Foch replied: “I 
understood the Secretary, and my answer is forty.” 
“But, Marshal, there are nearly that many divisions in France now, and 
General Pershing is urging upon me the necessity for 100 divisions in 
1919.” 
“I win the War with forty,” Foch replied.31
 
Amazed, Baker cabled Wilson that the “Army has renewed the attack and is 
progressing.  Tonnage situation favorably cleared up.”32  Apparently mollified by Foch’s 
pronouncement, Baker returned to the United States several days later.  However, he 
failed to discuss Foch’s assessment of the situation with Pershing and allowed the AEF to 
continue its calls for strict adherence to the 80-division plan.  Even if the secretary had 
said something, it is doubtful that Pershing would have put much faith in Foch’s claims.  
The Allied commander-in-chief could afford to be optimistic; Pershing could not.  If the 
war continued into 1919, it would fall on the AEF to carry the load against the Germans, 
and it was Pershing’s responsibility to make sure that they were ready.  Foch could make 
whatever claims he wanted, but Pershing remained committed to building up the AEF, 
which required additional shipping.  The AEF commander continued to call for increases 
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in the shipping program throughout October, but as the negotiations for an armistice grew 
more serious, the Allies refused to give any further aid to the Americans.33
 
The Transportation Department 
 
While Baker dealt with the shipping situation, Harbord looked to other factors 
contributing to the delays in the SOS.  In addition to the difficulties facing him at the 
docks due to an acute lack of personnel, Harbord found serious problems in transporting 
supplies from the coast to the supply depots and beyond.  Under the organization set by 
General Orders No. 44 the previous March, responsibility over supplies between the ports 
and the regulating stations fell upon the Commanding General, Services of Supply.  But 
Harbord did not control the rail lines.  Instead, administration for the American rail 
system in France fell to the Transportation Department, which operated under a 
convoluted mixture of authority between the CGSOS and G-4 GHQ.34
At the ports, the Transportation Department representative, known as the 
Transport Officer, oversaw the unloading of ships and forwarding of cargoes to their 
destinations.  The Section Base Commander, the official SOS representative, had 
responsibility for the labor and stevedore troops when they were not actually employed in 
unloading ships or loading trains.  Consequently, the men passed between two separate 
commands every day on the journey to and from work.  The base commander paid little 
attention to how well the men worked when not under his purview, and the transport 
officer cared little for what the men did during their off hours.  That the two were 
inextricably linked did not factor into the equation.  On personal observations of this 
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system, both Harbord and Pershing found it flawed.  They believed making the Transport 
Officer part of the Section Commander’s staff a more workable setup, and made the 
change that August.35
This apparently simple solution ran into a larger problem: the quasi-independent 
status of the Transportation Department and its head, Brigadier General William W. 
Atterbury.  Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad before the war, Atterbury joined 
the AEF in September 1917 as Director General of Transportation [DGT] at Pershing’s 
request.  Inspired by the British model, Pershing believed the complex rail system the 
AEF needed required an expert to run it, and Atterbury fit the bill perfectly.  Pershing 
found him “very familiar with the [AEF] situation, and his personality, his force, his 
grasp of the difficulties of the task and his willingness to undertake it appealed to me at 
once.”36  Anxious to do his part, Atterbury approached his new position like any other 
business enterprise, running the AEF rail system like a commercial operation.  But the 
needs of a military rail network were not the same as a civilian one.  Transport schedules 
needed to be malleable to adjust to changing conditions at the front and had to comply 
with the tenets of military procedure.  Atterbury’s position made it difficult for officers in 
the AEF to make changes on the run.  The DGT reported directly to Pershing and could 
not be ordered to change the system by anyone but the AEF commander. 
When Pershing began reorganizing the AEF’s rear in December of 1917, he 
formalized Atterbury’s position as DGT, giving him “charge of the unloading of freight 
and troops from ships at points of debarkation and of the transportation of all troops and 
supplies by rail.”  In addition, Atterbury was responsible for the “construction, 
maintenance and operation of such railroad lines and rolling stock as come within 
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American control.”37  Pershing later put the entire Army Transport Service in Europe 
under the DGT’s control.38  This made the DGT an integral part of the American supply 
chain, but he was not under the authority of the Commanding General, Line of 
Communications.  This system continued until the overall reorganization of the AEF with 
the issuance of General Orders No. 31.  Bending to Atterbury’s critics, the new 
organization brought the Transportation Department into the Service of Utilities under 
the coordinating authority of the CGSOS.39  As described earlier, responsibility for 
unloading freight shifted to the CGSOS in March, but the DGT still oversaw the daily 
operation of the stevedores and other dock-workers.  In July, the Transportation 
Department was finally amalgamated into the SOS on equal standing with the other 
supply services.  But instead of supervising its activities, Kernan established a board to 
settle differences between the SOS and Transportation Department.  Both Kernan and 
Atterbury, acting as “co-equal authorities,” selected their own representatives, while 
GHQ supplied a third member.  Consequently, control over rail transportation remained 
split between competing authorities.40
When Harbord learned of the board soon after taking over the SOS he could 
hardly believe Kernan’s complicity in giving away his own authority.  Harbord did not 
intend to emulate his predecessor’s example, and moved to have the board abolished.  He 
brought Atterbury and his staff in for a series of conferences in an effort to gain their 
support for the change.  This proved a challenge, for the transportation officers believed 
that increased military oversight would impede their work.  Harbord explained that he 
had no desire to interfere with how they did their jobs, much like he did not interfere with 
his staff surgeon’s treatment of patients, but he needed to supervise and coordinate their 
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activities with the rest of his command.  After lengthy discussions, the CGSOS finally 
convinced the railroad men to give his system a try.  As Harbord predicted, it proved 
more efficient in the long run.41
 Conflicting authorities and personnel shortages were not the only problems 
plaguing the Transportation Corps that fall, however.  Nor were they the most troubling.  
Of much greater concern was the lack of adequate rolling stock.  Since the AEF first 
arrived in France it struggled to secure a sufficient number of locomotives and rail cars to 
support the coming divisions.  This was added to the very real difficulties of operating in 
a foreign country with its own rail system that proved very different from the one the 
Americans were used to.42  Delays in developing a shipping program for the American 
buildup in France made it impossible to produce valid estimates regarding equipment 
requirements.  Securing tonnage to transport locomotives and rolling stock proved 
equally difficult, and competition with the War Department added another obstacle for 
the AEF in securing rolling stock.  When Pershing and the War Department settled on a 
rough plan for eighty divisions in Europe by June of 1919, the deputy Director General of 
Transportation for the AEF, William Wilgus, studied the equipment presently available 
and made requests for additional materials to support the anticipated buildup.  He found 
that a force of four and a half million men required 4,000 locomotives and 98,000 cars to 
handle troops movements and supply.  After further analysis, these numbers rose to 5,011 
and 127,033 respectively.43  Charles Dawes did his best to secure equipment in Europe to 
take the pressure off oceanic shipping, borrowing several hundred locomotives from 
Belgium, but the well was quickly running dry.  Any future increases in the AEF’s 
equipment would have to come from the United States.44
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 In the face of frequent requests for additional locomotives and cars, the War 
Department simply could not keep pace with the demand.  By the signing of the 
Armistice, shortages were reaching epidemic levels.  To adequately move and supply an 
army of two and a half million men, the Transportation Corps required 1,833 locomotives 
and 43,919 cars.45  As of 11 November, however, the AEF had in service only 1,329 
locomotives (344 of them from Belgium) and 14,042 cars.  Wilgus explained later that 
“in the closing month of the War, the American Army had at its service in France only 73 
per cent of its locomotive, and 32 per cent of its car, requirements to the then existing 
front.”46
 These numbers paint an alarming picture of the AEF and its problems with rolling 
stock.  The lack of trains meant that troop movement and supply had to rely more heavily 
on motor and animal transport, which also suffered serious shortages.  That the AEF 
managed to keep supplies moving during combat operations at St. Mihiel and the Meuse-
Argonne is a testament to the men serving in it.  Though food supplies and artillery 
ammunition occasionally ran low, the shortages did not have any measurable impact on 
combat operations.  But managerial ability and belt-tightening could not make up for a 
lack of equipment indefinitely.  Cracks were already appearing in the dam during the 
Meuse-Argonne offensive in October.  If the war lasted into 1919 the situation would 
only grow worse, as the arrival of new troops and the evacuation of wounded would put 
additional strains on the already over-taxed transportation system.  Thankfully for those 
involved, the war ended before the entire system collapsed under the pressure, but that 
does not negate the fact that the AEF supply and transport system was fast-approaching a 
breaking point in October of 1918. 
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SOS v. G-4, GHQ 
  
 As the supply system in the AEF began to break down after the formation of the 
American First Army and the launching of combat operations, frustrations began to 
mount in the SOS that eventually led to increased tension with GHQ.  The irritation of 
SOS officers was directed mainly at the use of regulating stations in the AEF’s supply 
system.  Borrowed from the French, the regulating station was a stopping point for all 
supplies heading to the front.  Representing the transition between the Zone of the 
Interior and the Zone of the Advance in the AEF’s logistical framework, it also marked 
the end of Harbord’s direct authority over the SOS.  Once supplies reached the regulating 
station, their management fell under the purview of the Regulating Officer.  A member of 
the Fourth Section, General Staff (G-4), it was his duty to give “all orders for the railway 
movement of troops and supplies within the sector served by his regulating section, and 
to follow the movements through to completion.”47  Requests for troops and supplies 
emanating from the Zone of the Advance (or Zone of the Armies in the French system) 
went to the Regulating Officer, who oversaw their fulfillment.  This included the daily 
automatic supplies for the front line units at the front, and any specific requests that 
emerged as units engaged in combat operations.  To keep pace with the fluid nature of 
life at the front, the Regulating Officer stayed in constant contact with the corps and 
division commanders in his zone and the staff at GHQ.  He also stayed in reasonably 
close contact with the various elements of the SOS, but did not take orders from them.48
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As organizations go, the regulating station worked passably well.  It provided a 
point of contact between the unit commanders and the AEF’s supply network, bringing a 
level of elasticity and mobility to the system.  But for Harbord and the rest of the SOS, 
the regulating stations proved a continual source of irritation.  When he originally signed 
off on the system as AEF chief of staff, Harbord had to think in terms of the AEF as a 
whole, and did not comprehend the particular difficulties General Orders No. 31 and 44 
inflicted on the SOS.  After becoming CGSOS, however, these difficulties became 
perfectly clear.  In Harbord’s view, the regulating stations “broke the line of necessary 
control over rolling stock sent to the Advance Section, S.O.S., jeopardizing our entire 
supply situation in the later months of our fighting at the front.”  It was not the regulating 
stations’ existence that bothered Harbord, but rather the transfer of authority over 
supplies from the SOS to G-4, GHQ.  Thus, six months after overseeing the creation of 
the system, Harbord now found himself in direct opposition to the view of supply held by 
GHQ AEF.49
In regard to control over supply matters in the AEF, Colonel William D. Conner, 
assistant chief of staff, Fourth Section [G-4], General Staff, wrote after the war that “two 
schools of thought” emerged in the AEF concerning supply authority.50  The first of these 
“schools,” herein called the SOS System, represented Harbord and Hagood’s conception 
of supply.  First proposed in the Hagood Board Report the previous March, the plan 
called for the regulating officer at Is-sur-Tille, then the main regulating station in the 
AEF, to be brought under the authority of the CGSOS.  Furthermore, it advised a distinct 
separation between the Service of the Rear [or SOS], and General Headquarters.  Much 
like the current system, the board recommended that all planning and policy-making 
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affecting military strategy and international relations originate with G.H.Q., but in supply 
matters, it stated that “plans and policies affecting procurement, supply, and 
transportation should be initiated in the S.O.R.”51  Essentially, the plan called for 
transferring responsibility for administration and supply (G-1 and G-4) to the SOS at 
Tours while leaving control over intelligence, operations, and training (G-2, G-3, and G-
5) with GHQ at Chaumont.  Though it divided the AEF into two distinct administrative 
organizations, the plan would create a unified supply system in France, controlling troop 
movements and supplies from the ports to the trenches. 
The second school of thought on supply, which Conner called the “Pershing 
system,” was the one actually implemented in the AEF.  As outlined in General Order 
No. 31, the Commanding General, Services of Supplies occupied a position under 
Pershing’s direct authority, as expressed through the chief of staff, AEF.52  While this 
seemingly placed the CGSOS on a par with the five heads of the General Staff sections, 
General Orders No. 44 offered a clarification.  It established that the CGSOS was 
responsible for procurement, care and storage, and distribution of supplies to the storage 
depots, but stated that “the general supervision of all these functions is exercised by the 
General Staff, as a rule through G-4 thereof.”53  Thus, the CGSOS fell under the direct 
supervision of the assistant chief of staff, G-4.  But exactly what that entailed remained 
unclear.  Did it make G-4 ultimately responsible for supply, or did G-4 only oversee 
policy decisions, leaving supply operations to the CGSOS?  This air of ambiguity left 
room for the members of the SOS, especially Johnson Hagood, to balk at G-4’s 
involvement in supply matters as an interruption in SOS authority. 
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Soon after Harbord took over as CGSOS, Hagood seized the opportunity to push 
for the split GHQ he championed six months before.  He called for the establishment of a 
GHQ for operations and training at Chaumont and one at Tours for supply.  Such an 
organization would elevate Harbord, as CGSOS, to a co-equal position with the AEF 
chief of staff.  “The C.-in-C. should look directly to General Harbord in all matters of 
supply,” Hagood wrote, “in the same manner and to the same extent that he looks directly 
to [Chief of Staff] McAndrew in all matters of operations and training.  There should be 
no intermediary between General Harbord and the C.-in-C. any more than there is 
between General McAndrew and the C.-in-C.”54  Though Harbord initially rejected the 
suggestion as not representing Pershing’s wishes, he eventually came to support the idea. 
The difference of opinion came to a head in early October when Hagood received 
an advance copy of a general order under discussion at GHQ.  Known hereafter as 
Moseley’s Order for its author, Brigadier General George Van Horn Moseley, who 
replaced Conner as assistant chief of staff, G-4, the previous summer, the order proposed 
to transfer overall responsibility for supply in the AEF from the CGSOS to G-4, GHQ.55  
With Harbord away touring the SOS, Hagood immediately made copies of the proposed 
general order for distribution amongst the bureau chiefs and prepared two memoranda 
outlining the alternative scheme he had proposed in August.  When Harbord returned 
several days later, he sat in on a conference of the bureau chiefs and the SOS general staff 
as they discussed the situation.  Directed by Hagood, the conferees came down 
unanimously in opposition to Moseley’s Order, and stated a preference for Hagood’s plan 
should a change be deemed necessary.  Their solidarity impressed Harbord, and though 
he did not support Hagood’s plan in its entirety, he believed the idea had merit.56
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After the conference, Harbord composed a long telegram to General McAndrew 
expressing SOS concerns on the subject: 
 
[The proposed order] confuses and divides responsibility; gives authority 
without responsibility in some cases, and holds Staff Departments and the 
S.O.S. generally responsible at the same time it curtails our authority.  It is 
an actual reversal of the Commander-in-Chief’s policy announced in 
August of throwing greater amount of responsibility with commensurate 
authority to Services of Supply.  It reduces S.O.S. to mere unloading and 
forwarding agents from port to regulating stations and lends itself to the 
attempt already made to attach us to the War Department instead of to the 
Commander-in-Chief [a la the Goethals Proposal].  We are a unit in 
believing that the time has come when the activities of G-1 and probably 
G-4 should pass to the Services of Supply.  We are in agreement to an 
alternative proposition which we believe will preserve the control desired 
by General Moseley and at the same time retain to S.O.S. the authority 
which should go with the responsibility for which, not withstanding the 
General Staff control, the Services of Supply must ultimately answer at the 
bar of public opinion in the Army.57
 
As he awaited a response from GHQ, Harbord forwarded Pershing a rumor that 
the Goethals Proposal was not yet dead.  He described a supposed conversation between 
Chief of Staff March and General Goethals in which March stated, “By God, I have not 
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given up.  I will put it over yet.”58  Whether intended to reinvigorate Pershing’s distrust 
of the chief of staff, or to hasten a decision on the proposed general order is unclear.  
Whatever the motive, no response was forthcoming, and Harbord decided to make his 
objections to Moseley’s Order directly to the commander-in-chief.  With Hagood in tow, 
the CGSOS made his way to Ligny on 28 October, which was serving as Pershing’s 
advance command center during the Meuse-Argonne offensive.  Finding the AEF 
commander absent, Harbord held a conference with McAndrew, Moseley, Fox Conner, 
and Brigadier General LeRoy Eltinge, the deputy chief of staff, AEF.  During the 
meeting, Harbord and Hagood vigorously argued their position against chopping off the 
SOS at the regulating stations, but could not convince their GHQ counterparts.  Hagood 
believed the officers had already made up their minds, and blamed Moseley in particular 
for swaying their judgement.  Sensing that he was fighting a losing battle, Harbord agreed 
to the order generally, “but a considerable amount of revision would be necessary.”59
Believing the matter tabled for the present, Harbord was shocked two days later 
when he heard that a decision had already been reached.  The source of this information 
was a letter from Moseley to Charles Dawes, stating that he had “just finished reading 
proof on our new order.”60  Considerably agitated, Harbord cabled McAndrew to express 
his displeasure.  If the report turned out to be correct, Harbord maintained it was not only 
a discourtesy, “but a very grave defect in our organization” when “a distant staff officer” 
could draw up an order completely changing the CGSOS’s command without any 
notification.61  McAndrew passed the telegram along to a stunned Moseley, who 
immediately sent a reply telegram to Harbord confessing the error in choosing the word 
“proof” instead of “revision” in his letter to Dawes.  The matter was still under review, 
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Moseley explained, and no decision would be made without sufficient consultation with 
the SOS.  “I would much rather lose my position here that your friendship,” Moseley told 
Harbord, and he regretted that the misunderstanding “should have plunged me into 
difficulties with you.”62  In this instance Harbord’s reputation and position amongst the 
AEF hierarchy worked in the SOS’s favor.  Had it been anyone else, it is doubtful that 
Moseley would have been as concerned about ruffled feathers, but he respected Harbord 
and did not want to offend Pershing’s former chief of staff.  Apparently mollified, 
Harbord wrote to Moseley that, “There is no-one in the A.E.F. for whose ability and 
squareness [sic] I have a higher respect than yours.”  However, Harbord still had serious 
concerns regarding the proposed order, and expressed his desire that the officers at GHQ 
hold off on deliberations until Hagood and Colonel Henry C. Smither, the head of G-4, 
SOS, could make it to Chaumont.  He also admitted that the constant reminders from 
GHQ that General Staff control needed to be maintained made him a little tired.  “It 
always implies that there is no General Staff except that at G.H.Q.,” Harbord explained, 
“while I know that I have here a General Staff as sincerely devoted to the General Staff 
idea; as patriotic and high-minded; and in the case of some of its members, as able as any 
of the men who wear the same insignia on their collar at G.H.Q.”63
Hoping to finally settle the dispute between SOS and GHQ, Harbord sent Hagood 
to Chaumont on 3 November to work with Moseley on revising the proposed general 
order.  What resulted clearly represented Hagood’s organization model.  The new draft 
created two Chiefs of Staff, one for operations and one for supply along the lines of the 
organization originally suggested in the Hagood Board Report.64  Hopeful that he could 
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gain approval for the revision, Hagood returned to Tours and composed an extensive 
attack against the original proposal, which he sent to Pershing.65
The same day, however, LeRoy Eltinge told Pershing that, “I don’t think that 
there is any chance of General Harbord and General Moseley coming to an absolute 
agreement. – In my opinion, the system now in operation is working reasonably well. . . . 
Considering all the circumstances, I believed it would be better to file the papers and take 
no action for the present.”66  Moseley echoed Eltinge’s sentiments.  He was tired of 
having to “waste time to consider attacks from the rear,” and believed they should seek to 
improve efficiency in the SOS through other means.  When Pershing finally reappeared at 
GHQ and asked what all the fuss was about, Moseley simply advised that they shelve the 
order.  Consumed with the armistice negotiations, Pershing was more than happy to put 
an end to the infighting between Tours and Chaumont.  He agreed to abandon the order 
and returned to planning for the end of the war, which came on 11 November when the 
Armistice ended the fighting.67   
Although the dispute over Moseley’s Order ended as much to do about nothing, it 
shows the level of confusion and frustration over supply that gripped the AEF in the final 
months of the war.  Eighteen months after arriving in Europe, the Americans were still 
trying to get their supply system worked out.  Even with an effective administrator like 
Harbord in command of the SOS, the organization could not overcome serious 
deficiencies in personnel and material.  Add to this the confusion surrounding conflicting 
authority between the CGSOS and G-4, GHQ, and the system lurked ever closer to 
collapse in the fall of 1918.  That the collapse was ultimately prevented by the Armistice 
should not overshadow the seriousness of the situation afflicting the AEF.  Had the war 
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continued into 1919, it is doubtful that the AEF could have continued combat operations 
on the Western Front.  In all probability, Pershing would have had to halt his armies and 
hold the line until his supply service could catch up, costing an unknown number of 
American lives in the meantime.  As it was, Pershing, Harbord, and the rest of the AEF 
could bask in their accomplishments while relegating the problems to the judgment of 
history.
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CHAPTER XIII 
EPILOGUE / CONCLUSION 
 
After the Armistice 
 
 The Armistice of 11 November 1918 ended the fighting in the First World War, 
but for the AEF Services of Supply, the conclusion of combat operations brought with it a 
new challenge: reversing the American mechanisms of supply and transport to return the 
American Expeditionary Forces to the United States.  The turnaround would not be 
immediate, however, as General John J. Pershing deemed it necessary to keep a sizable 
portion of the AEF in Europe in case peace negotiations collapsed and the fighting began 
anew.  He called for a slow reduction, leaving thirty American divisions in France until 1 
February 1919, after which they would start returning to the United States in stages.1  
The SOS had to revise its supply requirements so that it could continue to support the 
American soldiers in Europe before they could return home, while at the same time 
eliminating excess materiel and settling up matters with its numerous construction 
projects and supply facilities.  It was a difficult undertaking, as the Allies were no longer 
willing to contribute aid to the Americans, but instead looked to attend to their own 
affairs and begin rebuilding their countries after long years of war and sacrifice.  But 
even still, a sense of relief and exuberance filtered through the former Allies.2
 For Commanding General, Services of Supply James G. Harbord, demobilizing 
the AEF was simply another part of his wartime service, and he approached it with the 
same drive that he had shown over the past eighteen months.  But while his daily 
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concerns centered on reversing the supply system, his thoughts started to shift to more 
intangible aspects of the postwar period.  Although he had become increasingly irritated 
at GHQ’s attitudes towards the SOS during the final months of the war, Harbord began 
returning to his old role as Pershing’s principal advisor and supporter.  In this regard, 
Harbord took it upon himself to make the AEF commander aware of potential threats 
emanating from the United States.  He understood that peace brought with it an increase 
in political maneuvering amongst the participants, and he wanted to make sure that 
Pershing sufficiently protected himself against attack.  Throughout March and April, 
Harbord warned Pershing of individuals and factions within the War Department who 
were actively working to tarnish the general’s reputation.3  Harbord feared the emergence 
of a movement both at home and in Europe to lay upon Pershing all of the blame for the 
difficulties the AEF experienced during the last months of the war, with the ultimate goal 
being Pershing’s removal from command.  Harbord even went so far as to compose a 
type of “enemies list” from which attacks were likely to come.  It included, but was not 
limited to, politicians, the War Department, the Administration, the bureau chiefs, and the 
Allies.  Harbord pointed out that in all previous wars there had been a “scapegoat” made 
of someone in the military organization as being responsible for all of the failures 
incurred during the war, and he did not want Pershing to fall into such a scenario.4
 In addition to advising Pershing on how to approach the demobilization period, 
Harbord worked to support the general on his own.  When Secretary of War Newton 
Baker came to France in the spring of 1919, Harbord met with him and discussed 
Pershing’s future.  The secretary was worried about bad feelings developing between the 
members of the AEF and the rest of the Army, and hoped to prevent such a division.  
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Pershing’s treatment upon his return to the United States would impact many in the AEF, 
and Baker confessed that he did not know what to do with the AEF commander once the 
AEF returned home.  At this point Harbord suggested that the only logical position for 
him was Chief of Staff of the Army.  Baker agreed to the logic, but could not decide what 
to do with the current chief of staff, General Peyton C. March.  Harbord advised that 
March be made commander of the new army of occupation on the Rhine, an idea which 
Baker admitted had merit and agree to consider.  The two men then parted with Harbord 
feeling reassured as to the secretary’s continued support for Pershing and the AEF.5
 Of course, as Harbord dealt with rumors, machinations and positioning for the 
postwar era, the soldiers continued to return home.  By the end of May, over 1,250,000 
men had departed Europe for the United States, leaving the AEF with only five divisions 
committed to occupation duty.  With the duties of the SOS winding down, Pershing 
finally found the opportunity to bring Harbord back to Chaumont, again as AEF Chief of 
Staff.6  With most of the AEF’s soldiers already gone, Harbord and Pershing mainly 
concerned themselves with ceremonial duties and recreation.  Horseback riding, tennis 
and the like were the primary orders of the day as Chaumont was slowly drained of its 
personnel.  The greatest thrill for Harbord came in late June when he accompanied 
Pershing to Paris to witness the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.  The occasion also 
gave Harbord the chance to meet President Wilson, the only time he did so.  The 
president thanked Harbord for his service and mentioned a plan to send him to Armenia 
as the head of an American mission.  The idea did not sound very appealing to the AEF 
chief of staff, but he did not have time to dwell on it as events in Paris occupied most of 
his time.  On 14 July, Bastille Day, he joined Pershing in the Grand Parade for the Allied 
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Victory down the Champs Elysee.  Riding behind the AEF commander, Harbord took it 
all in with a sense of awe and wonder.  “It was a sight never to be forgotten,” he later 
wrote, “and in that historic setting never to be seen again.”7
 The days of revelry finally came to an end in August when Harbord received 
word that he would, in fact, head up the American mission to Armenia.  More than a little 
annoyed at the assignment, Harbord busied himself selecting a staff.  He chose his old 
friend, Brigadier General Frank R. McCoy, as his chief of staff, and brought along 
Brigadier General George Van Horn Moseley to round out the GHQ AEF 
representatives.8  The duty came as a great disappointment to Harbord, for it prevented 
his returning to the United States with Pershing in early September.  Before they parted, 
Pershing wrote a short but heartfelt letter of farewell to Harbord, saying: 
 
Now that the time of your departure has arrived we are to separate 
officially, though only temporarily I hope, I can not let go without saying 
to you how much I appreciate your patriotism, your personal loyalty, and, 
above all, the highly efficient manner in which every duty has been 
performed by you.  While of course this is a matter of record, I feel that I 
can not omit to say it to you in this way. 
Personally it is difficult for me to say what fills my heart.  Our 
relations in the great accomplishments of the American Expeditionary 
Forces, in which you have been my chief supporter, will always remain in 
my memory as one of the most precious souvenirs of my work at the head 
of the A.E.F. 
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I thank you again and again with all the feeling that I possess and 
wish you, as you already know, all the success in the world that I am sure 
is to be yours in the future.  I only hope that we may be thrown in together 
again for as many years as possible in whatever work our government may 
see fit to assign us.9
 
 With that the two men parted, ending an incredibly effective partnership that 
lasted more than two years.  It would be another two years before they would be brought 
together again officially.  In the meantime, Harbord served as head of the Mission to 
Armenia, and then as commander of the skeletonized 2nd Division at Fort Travis, Texas.10  
Pershing spent the years fighting over the postwar structure of the Army and biding his 
time while Baker decided what to do with him.  The general would have to wait until the 
next administration to become chief of staff, for Baker refused to push General March out 
of the War Department.  Finally, in 1921, Pershing was appointed Army chief of staff by 
the new secretary of war, John W. Weeks.11  One of Pershing’s first orders of business 
was to recall Harbord from Texas to serve as deputy chief of staff, reuniting the two men 
with the task of directing the War Department. 
 Although Pershing had long desired the position of Army chief of staff, once he 
attained it he spent little time attending to his duties.  One reason for this was the fact that 
after the excitement of commanding the American Expeditionary Forces, life behind a 
desk had little appeal for Pershing.  A second, and more compelling explanation for his 
distaste for Washington, was that the General Staff and War Department that he and 
Harbord took over was very different than the one that General March had created during 
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the war.  During the military emergency, March had finally broken the will of the bureau 
chiefs and firmly established the General Staff as the operating head of the U.S. Army.  
In the years since, however, Congress returned to its prewar distrust of the General Staff 
and, with the support of the revitalized bureau chiefs, stripped the General Staff of much 
of its power.  When Pershing took over in 1921, he found that the General Staff no longer 
controlled the daily administration of the army, but was reduced to a planning 
organization.  Hoping to make the best of the situation, Pershing tapped Harbord to head 
up a board to conduct a thorough evaluation and reorganization of the General Staff, 
which he did with a vengeance.  As though seeking to wipe away General March’s 
imprint on the War Department, the Harbord Board scrapped March’s wartime 
organization and replaced it with one based upon the G system utilized by the AEF 
General Staff.  The new system consisted of four branches (G-1: Personnel; G-2: 
Intelligence; G-3: Operations and Training; G-4: Supply) and a War Plans Division.  As 
another swipe at March, the board established that in the next war, the chief of staff 
would take the field as the military commander, and the deputy chief of staff would 
remain behind to run the War Department as a subordinate to the field commander.  The 
system remained in place until General George C. Marshall reorganized the War 
Department as chief of staff at the beginning of the Second World War.12
 With the reorganization of the General Staff completed, Harbord began to tire of 
life in Washington.  Though he was presumed to be the likely choice to succeed Pershing 
as Army chief of staff when the general retired, Harbord was weary of battling with a 
Congress that was growing increasingly hostile to the military with each passing year.  
As fate would have it, a new opportunity presented itself in the private sector in 1922.  
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Owen D. Young, chairman of the board of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 
contacted Harbord to say that the company was looking for a new President and was 
interested in him for the position.  After considering the offer, Harbord initially rejected 
it, saying: 
 
A man’s duty is not done until it is all done, and the difficulties 
that now confront the Army; the hostility of the appropriating authority; 
the consequent worry and uneasiness that beset our whole personnel, seen 
to call for me to stand by even at this sacrifice.  I have the confidence of 
the service I am sure, and to set the example of quitting in the face of 
adverse conditions where I feel that I can be a steadying influence, even at 
such pecuniary advantage to myself, is something I cannot bring myself to 
do.13
 
 Despite these strong words, the lure of a new challenge, a relief from the 
headaches of Congressional politics, and the promise of a considerably larger salary 
continued to nag at Harbord for the next few months.  He also learned that, due to the 
reinstatement of the regulations preventing an officer from serving with the General Staff 
for more than four consecutive years, he was not eligible to succeed Pershing should the 
general decide to retire.  Though Secretary Weeks hoped to have the law repealed, 
Harbord finally decided that he had had enough with Washington and accepted Young’s 
offer in October.  He officially retired from the U.S. Army, his home and career for 
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thirty-three years, on 29 December 1922.  Three days later, he became president of 
RCA.14
 For the Radio Corporation of America, Harbord’s acceptance of the presidency 
was a godsend.  During the search to fill the position, Young made up a list of all the 
qualities he wanted in the next president.  It read as follows: 
 
 1st.  He should be well known both nationally and internationally 
and he should have made a place for himself as would enable him to speak 
with authority either to foreign Governments or to our own Government. 
 2nd.  He should not be previously identified with politics because 
that would mean party alignment and partisan reaction. 
 3rd.  He should not have been identified with Wall Street and the 
money interests because it is important that the American people should 
accept the Radio Corporation as an organization for service to American 
interests both at home an abroad rather than as an organization primarily 
to make profit for Wall Street interests. 
 4th.  He should have had administrative experience and if possible 
business experience. 
 5th.  He should be well known in Washington and in position to 
appear before Committees of Congress and before the Departments and 
have his statements of facts accepted without question.  It is particularly 
important in this connection that no one should be able to question his 
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Americanism such as they have done in several instances in the case of 
our international bankers. 
 6th.  He should be a man of public position whom to attack would 
be bad politics rather than good politics.15
 
 Harbord fit all of these requirements perfectly.  His impeccable reputation as an 
army officer and his war record gave him the credentials to address any audience from a 
position of prestige.  Over the next twenty-four years, he aided RCA General Manager 
David Sarnoff in establishing the company as one of the giants in the American 
communications industry.  In 1930, Harbord succeeded Young as chairman of the board, 
where he remained until his retirement in 1947. 
 During his postwar career, Harbord enjoyed a quieter life, but one filled with its 
own rewards.  He traveled the country making speeches on the war and the future of 
radio.  He also took up writing, publishing his wartime letters to his wife, Emma, in 1925 
under the title, Leaves From a War Diary.  He delivered lectures at the Army War 
College, and worked to expand RCA’s operations into South America.  In the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, he became involved the Republican Party, serving as the chairman of the 
Metropolitan Republican Campaign Fund Committee in 1929 and president of the 
National Republican Club in 1931.  He and Emma also bought a house in Rye, New 
York, on the outskirts of New York City, in 1929 where they lived the rest of their 
lives.16  Personally, Harbord made the most of his latter years, traveling the country and 
abroad with Emma whenever possible, and keeping up his wartime friendships, 
particularly with Charles Dawes.  The two men engaged in a running correspondence, 
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often writing to each other monthly, between the end of the war and Harbord’s death in 
1947. 
 Harbord’s last great battle came in the 1930s when he rose to General Pershing’s 
defense in a scuffle between the former AEF commander and his old nemesis, Peyton 
March.  The conflict dealt with each man’s memoirs of his service in the war.  Pershing’s 
text, My Experiences in the World War, published in 1931, was a dry defense of the AEF 
and an indictment of the War Department.  Though it did not attack March directly, it did 
level considerable criticism at his organization and its supposed lack of support of the 
AEF.  March responded a year later with, The Nation at War, in which he minced no 
words and attacked Pershing directly.  Harbord wanted to respond with a book of his 
own, but was talked out of it by Newton Baker.  Hoping to quell the dispute before it got 
too much out of hand, Baker suggested that Harbord write on his own experiences in the 
war, and cover the entire history of the AEF.  Harbord agreed, and eventually published 
The American Army in France 1917-1919 in 1936.  Though not a direct refutation of 
General March’s book, it still contained numerous barbs directed at the former chief of 
staff.  Though the adage states that “time heals all wounds,” such was not the case 
between March, Pershing and Harbord, as the men continued to despise one another for 
the remainder of their lives.17
 A year after publishing his book, Harbord’s life took a tragic turn as his wife, 
Emma, died after a long bout with pneumonia.  Harbord did the best that he could to 
carry on, eventually marrying again at the end of 1938.  With his new wife, Anne Lee 
Brown, daughter of famed Civil War general Fitzhugh Lee, Harbord kept to his quiet life 
in Rye.  In 1942, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired list in 
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recognition of his wartime service.  He continued as chairman of the Radio Corporation 
until poor health forced his retirement in 1947.  On the morning of 20 August, that same 
year, Harbord finally passed away at the age of 81.  He and Emma were buried in 
Arlington Cemetery, in the section reserved for America’s senior military officers.18
 
The Military Manager 
 
 When the United States entered the World War in April of 1917, it did so with an 
army wholly unsuited to the task of waging war on the scale and level of complexity 
demonstrated by the armies fighting on the Western Front.  The U.S. Army, miniscule by 
European standards of the day, had neither the manpower, organizational structure, nor 
planning policies to effectively contribute to the war without a long process of 
mobilization and reorganization.  Operating on a steep learning curve, the War 
Department and the American Expeditionary Forces had to develop the organization and 
infrastructure to build, train, transport, supply, and operate a massive army the likes of 
which had not been seen since the American Civil War.  That they had to do this in 
conjunction with Allies and in opposition to an enemy already operating at a significantly 
higher level of combat effectiveness and administrative proficiency only added to the 
challenge.  The saving grace for the U.S. Army was a small coterie of well-trained, 
highly skilled officers who, though lacking in combat experience, possessed a degree of 
professionalism and administrative experience that prepared them for the task ahead. 
 This group of officers represented a new entity in the American military.  Just as 
the industrial revolution caused the development of a new managerial class in American 
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business, so to did industrialization necessitate a managerial revolution in the American 
army.19  Built around the educational system created by the Root Reforms, most notably 
the Staff College at Leavenworth, and the administrative experiences in the occupation of 
Cuba and the Philippines, the American officer corps had developed new skills to meet 
the challenges of administering an increasingly complex modern military organization.20  
One such example of this new breed of officer was Major General James G. Harbord.  
His experiences during the war, and his ability to meet the challenges of administering 
and coordinating a massive military organization thousands of miles from the United 
States, are indicative of the managerial skills needed by officers in a modern army. 
 Harbord’s greatest contribution to the AEF during the war came in his first stint as 
chief of staff between May 1917 and May 1918.  While General John J. Pershing 
established early on the type of officers he wanted at AEF General Headquarters (young, 
physically fit, efficient, and full of personal drive), it was Harbord who molded the early 
General Staff into a workable organization.  He assumed the role of Pershing’s general 
manager, acting as liaison between the AEF commander and the General Staff, and 
utilized his administrative skills, as well as his ability to build a professional camaraderie 
amongst the senior officers, to create an effective staff system at GHQ AEF.  Whereas 
Pershing commanded with a martinet’s demand for efficiency, Harbord inspired those 
around him on a personal and professional level.  He encouraged the members of the 
AEF General Staff to think creatively and to try various organizational models to find the 
best possible solution to the numerous problems facing them.  When it became obvious at 
the beginning of 1918 that the staff system was not working, he helped conduct a 
complete reorganization, culminating in the issuance of General Orders No. 31 and No. 
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44.  But this was only a part of Harbord’s importance as AEF chief of staff.  As 
Pershing’s primary subordinate, Harbord acted as a buffer between the AEF commander 
and the myriad details under his command.  Harbord directed staff operations, 
coordinated the activities of the branches of the General Staff, and kept all but the most 
important matters off of Pershing’s desk, allowing the general to focus his attention on 
building up the AEF and coordinating its activities with the Allies.21
Pershing also utilized Harbord as his principle advisor, bouncing ideas off the 
chief of staff to gain perspective as to their feasibility, and encouraged Harbord to do the 
same with the officers in the AEF General Staff.  When Harbord finally left GHQ AEF 
for a field command, his replacement, Major General James A. McAndrew, altered the 
dynamic of the General Staff.  Less of a driver than Harbord, McAndrew managed by 
committee, delegating authority to the heads of the General Staff’s branches (the G’s).  
The system worked, but it lost much of the unifying coherence that came with Harbord’s 
managerial style.  Without Harbord, a small group of officers coalesced around Pershing 
to form a type of advisory committee.  Known as the “GHQ Clique,” this group 
formulated policies in the AEF for everything from training schedules to transportation 
networks.  That such a group could exist reflected McAndrew’s penchant for delegating 
authority, and showed Harbord’s ability to develop a highly competent staff that knew its 
duties and could handle tremendous amounts of responsibility and authority in his 
absence.  Harbord was the glue that held the early staff together, and when he left the 
bonds he had helped to form remained. 
 And yet Harbord’s importance to the American effort in France in the World War 
goes beyond his time at GHQ.  The breadth of his duties in the AEF covered the three 
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principal aspects of military operations: administration, operations, and logistics.  Though 
he spent most of his time directing the General Staff, Harbord’s tenure in the line and as 
the commander of the AEF’s logistical system, the Services of Supply, is no less 
important to a study of the American Expeditionary Forces.  In the second of these areas, 
combat operations, Harbord’s experiences illustrate the difficulties associated with 
implementing Pershing’s goal of “open” warfare.  As seen in his command of the 4th 
“Marine” Brigade at Belleau Wood and the 2nd Division at Soissons, Harbord struggled to 
grasp the changes that a modern, industrialized war required of military tactics.  A fervent 
disciple of Pershing’s conception of “open” warfare, Harbord did not display sufficient 
appreciation for the need for effective battlefield communication either between 
advancing infantry units, or between the infantry and the artillery.  Like Pershing, 
Harbord also failed to appreciate the level of firepower needed to carry off a successful 
operation without incurring significant casualties.  Thinking that the rifle and bayonet 
would continue to dominate the battle line, Harbord sent men forward without sufficient 
support from either the artillery or the infantry’s machine-gun battalions.  In this manner, 
Harbord allowed his distaste for the defensive tactics utilized by the Allies to blind him to 
the lethality of fire that these weapons could bring to the battlefield, with the result being 
a large number of American soldiers advancing into a maelstrom without the necessary 
support.  That many of these men died unnecessarily as a result can be traced directly to 
Pershing’s poor tactical emphasis.22
 Although Harbord proved himself a rather ineffective combat commander, this 
fact should not negatively color an assessment of his performance as an officer in the 
war.  Harbord’s main contribution to the American war effort came not in the field, but in 
 
 427
the management of the AEF’s administrative and logistical systems.  His taking over 
command of the latter, the SOS, came in direct response to a movement in the Wilson 
Administration and the War Department to separate the AEF’s logistical service from 
Pershing’s direct control and establish it as a coordinate command.  Seeking to block the 
move, Pershing called upon Harbord, his most trusted and effective subordinate, to take 
the reigns of the SOS.  Harbord did just that in August 1918, assuming the position of 
Commanding General, Services of Supply, which he held until the following May.  Given 
the task of instilling the same drive and efficiency into the logistical services that he 
brought to the AEF General Staff, Harbord performed well.  He worked to create a 
renewed sense of pride within the organization, one that reflected the valuable place the 
SOS occupied in the makeup of the AEF.  He increased the authority of the CGSOS over 
AEF supply and worked to improve efficiency in the SOS’s numerous facilities.  That the 
SOS was approaching a total collapse at the time of the Armistice was not the result of 
any failing on Harbord’s part, but rather indicative of the systemic problems afflicting 
American supply during the entire war.  The Americans never had enough tonnage, 
personnel, or resources to handle the ever-increasing load of maintaining a force the size 
of the AEF.  That the SOS performed as well as it did, especially after the Americans 
began conducting independent combat operations in the fall of 1918, is a testament to 
Harbord’s managerial ability. 
 At the most basic levels, the United States was unprepared for war in the spring of 
1917.  Years of neglect and lack of viable threats to national security had resulted in the 
U.S. Army being rendered a functionally weak institution in comparison to its European 
counterparts.  The reality of the American army entering the World War meant that it had 
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to make up for decades of inattention as rapidly as possible.  The level of unpreparedness 
caused the Allied powers to push for the amalgamation of American manpower into their 
respective forces, which brought another challenge to Pershing and the American 
leadership.  Whether amalgamation could have ended the war sooner is debatable, but the 
issue obscures the fact that the dearth of available tonnage, the lack of ready manpower 
reserves, and the small number of trained officers in the U.S. Army meant that it would 
take a considerable amount of time for the United States to contribute to the war in a 
meaningful way.  Many of the problems and frustrations that plagued the AEF grew out 
of the fact that it simply did not have the time to do everything it needed to do in an 
efficient manner.  That the Americans raised, transported, and marginally trained an army 
of two million men to France in eighteen months time was a remarkable achievement, 
and the AEF should be judged for that rather than what it failed to accomplish on the 
battlefield. 
 As for James Harbord and the officer corps he represented?  The experience of the 
First World War shows that war is no longer simply about a contest of arms, but rather is 
a highly technical endeavor that requires officers and soldiers with abilities ranging far 
beyond marksmanship and close order drill.  Along with men such as John J. Pershing, 
Johnson Hagood, James McAndrew, W.D. Conner, Dennis Nolan, and George Van Horn 
Moseley, Harbord proved that the United States possessed men capable of leading a 
modern military force.  Though limited in number, these men evidenced the fact that the 
U.S. Army was producing officers on par with the best in the world.  They were the 
forerunners, and mentors, of Dwight D. Eisenhower, George C. Marshall Jr., Douglas 
MacArthur, and George S. Patton, all titans of the Second World War.  The officers of 
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the First World War set the tone for American soldiers in the twentieth century, and their 
experiences showed that in the industrial age, warfare had grown so complex that it 
required a group of officers with the managerial ability to administrate a large, highly 
bureaucratic military force.  This was as true in the fields of France in 1918 as it is in the 
deserts of Iraq today, and James Harbord was one of the first and best examples of this 
new breed of officer. 
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